

Education Cluster Capacity Mapping: Global Study

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List of Acronyms

CAP	Consolidated Appeals Process
CCF	Christian Children's Fund
CERF	Central Emergency Response Fund
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
DRR	Disaster risk reduction
ECD	Early Childhood Development
ECHO	European Community's Humanitarian Aid Office
ECU	Education Cluster Unit
ECWG	Education Cluster Working Group
HR	Human Resource
GOAL	Global Oversight and Liaison (Task Team)
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
INEE	Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
IRC	International Rescue Committee
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OCHA	UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs
PALS	Planning Accountability and Learning System
PoLR	Provider of Last Resort
SOP	Standard Operating Procedures
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
WFP	World Food Programme

Executive Summary

Introduction

The primary objective of this report is to identify the capacities and capacity gaps in Education Cluster agencies at the global level. The focus is on the surge capacity² required to assist governments and education authorities to provide education during the first three months of a response. Analysis covers three domains: the global operating environment, organisational capacity, and human resource capacity. Finance, and quality and accountability are relevant to all three and are therefore covered in separate sections.

The report evidences many positive and increasingly dynamic developments in education in emergencies. Chief among these is the growing recognition by a range of stakeholders of the importance of education in humanitarian response, as articulated through the formation of the global Education Cluster itself. The report identifies an important base of existing capacity and expertise across the agencies interviewed for the study, and these capacities are described throughout the report as well as in the Annexes.

Notwithstanding, major capacity constraints with regard to meeting the Cluster's commitments to timeliness, predictability and accountability are identified. Due to various methodological constraints it has not been possible to quantify these gaps. Many of the constraints are associated with Cluster-wide challenges, and the report has relevance beyond Education Cluster stakeholders.

Overview

Perhaps the most important issue to emerge from the study is that the continued funding gap for education in emergencies combined with the lack of a shared understanding of the common elements of an education in emergencies response, especially at country level,³ as well as low overall staff capacity, means it is difficult to define what kind of capacity is required. This is reinforced by three factors: that most agencies involved in Education Clusters are focused on primary education provision; that there is often insufficient coordination and programme planning across all phases of an education response; and that country-level Education Clusters have tended to focus on short-term results and have not sufficiently analysed their capacity needs. The result is that it has been difficult to vision what the sector wants to look like in, say, 10 years time. Yet an important lesson from the Health Cluster is the need to define this kind of vision early on, in order to identify explicitly what kind of capacities are required.

While the majority of agencies involved in the study believe that global surge capacity mechanisms need to be strengthened, findings from the research indicate that national capacities need equal if not more attention: humanitarian reform implies moving beyond individual agency mandates to having a greater sectoral focus, with an emphasis on strengthening capacities at country level. Moreover, developing Cluster capacity cannot just be about individual agencies bringing their own capacities to scale, as limited resources will impinge on this. Focus must be on leverage between stakeholders, including with national governments. Many of the organisations involved in this study are aware of these issues and are beginning, for example, to regionalise elements of their surge capacity as well as work more together in an effort to optimise the impact of their resources. Surge capacity can only ever be a 'palliative solution' (EC, 2004), and strengthening national capacity should be the priority. Capacity that is developed, whether internationally, regionally, and / or nationally, must be defined by what is required at country level.

Critical Gaps

The report identifies a number of critical gaps across the different domains studied. For example, at the global level the necessary strategic vision to develop the Education Cluster (and other clusters) demands not only a better understanding of the capacity required, but also greater understanding of the change processes needed to respond to the Cluster approach and humanitarian reform

² Surge capacity is: [Th]e ability of an organisation to rapidly and effectively increase [the sum of] its available resources in a specific geographic location, in order to meet increased demand to stabilise or alleviate suffering in any given population (Houghton, 2007).

³ This is despite the excellent contribution of the Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies' Minimum Standards.

more broadly. This includes awareness of essential new kinds of capacity, such as a whole new level of personnel skilled in partnership working, as well as new forms of partnership and coordination. Corporate leadership will be critical in bringing about political and organisational consensus for these change processes. In addition, there are still considerable challenges with regard to mainstreaming the resources required to sustain Education Clusters. Greater efforts also need to be focused on inter-operability between clusters and with cross-cutting themes, as well as on developing cluster/sector-wide learning strategies.

At the organisational level, the study found that capacity is often not matched to mandate, especially in preparedness and recovery programming. Preparedness planning in particular is not sufficiently mainstreamed. Having a clear organisational vision and mission can help agencies clarify levels of ambition and scale in these areas. Programmatically, there are gaps in secondary, tertiary and home-based provision, as well as lack of joint assessments and cross-phase planning. This means that Education Clusters will need to assess how they go about addressing the educational needs of children from 0-18 years, given their predominant primary education focus. Cross-cutting issues such as disability programming, environmental impact, and Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) have limited coverage. In relation to gender mainstreaming and gender equality programming, while most agencies have developed policies in this regard it would seem, for the most part, that implementation of these policies is relatively weak.

A major constraint for the global Education Cluster remains the low number of specialised staff globally, as well as the low number of trained Education Cluster coordinators. This is often reinforced by constraints associated with releasing staff, as well as the overall lack of well-resourced, talented and business-responsive HR professionals who can support education in emergencies programming. A critical related issue pertains to continuity planning, and much better inter- and intra-agency linkages are needed between humanitarian, programme and HR departments to ensure the long-term sustainability of programmes. The report also identifies the lack of logistics officers worldwide as a critical gap for education in emergencies. Another point is that unless logistics support is requested and budgeted by education programmes from the beginning, these programmes take serious risks with quality and sustainability. Both of these issues have implications for the kind of staff capacity that organisations seek to build. Two other significant challenges concern the necessity to define common competencies for education in emergencies specialists, as well as the need for a step-change in approaches moving from a focus on one-off training to on-going staff support and learning methodologies.

Developing surge capacity and strengthening national capacity is a costly business and will also involve a step-change in investment at numerous levels. Unrestricted funding best enables agencies to respond most quickly. Rarely is money earmarked for preparedness activities. At country level, greater leverage can be gained through the comparative advantage of cluster collaboration to access pooled funding mechanisms. This might also help those agencies that have less money available for start-up operations. Greater use of pooled funding would also help agencies address issues of programmatic fragmentation.

Finally, in terms of quality and accountability, this study found that quality is considered a more serious issue than accountability despite the lack of any formalized internal or external accountability mechanisms at both the global Education Cluster level as well as at country level. This has impacted cluster coordinators in particular. The report notes that the resources required to implement the different quality and accountability policies and standards are only partially adequate, and that there are particular challenges in terms of accountability to claim-holders. With regard to quality, the biggest problem relates to the fact that members of Education Clusters at country level often do not know what constitutes a quality education in emergencies intervention. This is compounded by the continuing focus on outputs rather than outcomes.

The INEE Minimum Standards are of course the primary tool to support both quality and accountability in education in emergencies interventions. Despite this critical resource, the report identifies a number of key challenges with the Minimum Standards. These include the need for more operational guidance on how to contextualise them, as well as gaps in standards related to preparedness and recovery programming. Many of these challenges will be addressed in the revision of the INEE Minimum Standards during 2009.

Going Forward: Key Recommendations

The report ends with a series of recommendations. These span the different domains, and attempt to build a picture of the way forward at both cluster and individual agency level. For the purposes of this Executive Summary they can be encapsulated as follows:

- In terms of capacity development, the most important first step will be to clearly define a series of different baselines prior to convening a series of scenario planning workshops at global and regional level as the basis for determining quantifiable targets that can be turned into a concrete capacity development plan for the global Education Cluster.⁴ In addition, over the medium term the Cluster will need to assess what national resources are estimated to exist, and therefore what the priority gaps for action should be at national level. More broadly:
- There is an urgent need develop a joint, Cluster-wide advocacy strategy and undertake more strategic advocacy to ensure sufficient recognition and resource allocations for education in donor humanitarian funding. It will also be important to ensure sufficient funds are available to address the gaps identified among the cluster leads and participating agencies. Lead agencies will need to develop funding strategies to ensure that Cluster costs are mainstreamed.
- It will be critical to continue to strengthen partnerships within the Cluster, especially as they relate to coherent co-leadership functions, complementarity of different activities with the INEE and other agencies and networks, and enhancing inter-Cluster relations / mutual support. A related point is the need to ensure that the organisations participating in the global Cluster cover the breadth of the mandate of the Education Cluster.
- The global Cluster will need to develop a Knowledge Management (KM) Strategy which links to cluster-wide KM initiatives and which seeks, among other things, to support the more effective operation of country-level clusters. This will also be facilitated by the development of cluster-branded, standardised and quality materials, along with standard lists and budget templates for the material resources required to support an Education Cluster in an emergency.
- In terms of human resources, work underway by the co-lead agencies to develop a common education in emergencies training package will need to be founded on a commonly defined set of competencies. Once these competencies have been defined, all cluster members should undertake a staff capacity audit. In attempts to increase the overall pool of education in emergency specialists, emphasis should be on building regional and country-level capacity and include staff development strategies other than training. The same is true for increasing the number of Education Cluster Coordinators. Estimated needs are for 30 trained international Cluster Coordinators to respond to large-scale sudden emergencies, plus a minimum of 60 trained national Cluster Coordinators to lead clusters in current Education Cluster countries as well as be ready to lead in protracted crisis contexts.
- It will be important to develop an integrated monitoring and evaluation strategy for the Education Cluster at all levels. This could include defining a common set of quality indicators.

In summary, effecting the kind of change envisioned by humanitarian reform and the cluster approach will be about changing agency philosophy and culture. This will need to be underscored by a fundamental shift in attitudes toward partnership, assisted, as noted above, through the definition – and monitoring – particularly of attitudinal competencies for all staff involved in cluster operations. The necessary strategic vision to drive the Education Cluster forward will demand a better understanding of the capacity required and the value-added in-country of the cluster approach. It will require creative thinking about how to raise education's profile in the increasing number of pooled funding mechanisms at country level; and it will demand much greater understanding of the benefits of partnership and collaboration as a multiplier. There may well come a time when collaboration will need to be mandated in order to sufficiently fund reform processes, including the cluster approach itself.

⁴ Some of the information in this report will be relevant (eg, Annex 7); additional work will be required in other areas, such as competencies.

Education Cluster Capacity Mapping: Global Study

Introduction

The main purpose of the Cluster approach is to improve the predictability, timeliness, effectiveness and accountability of humanitarian preparedness and response.⁵ Global Clusters support country-level clusters through training and systems development, and establishing and maintaining surge capacity, standby rosters, and material stockpiles (IASC, 2006). The aim of the global Education Cluster is to:

Strengthen system-wide preparedness and technical capacity to respond to humanitarian emergencies, including the early recovery phase, and ensure greater predictability and more effective inter-agency responses in education in the main areas of standards and policy setting, building response capacity, and operational support.

The global Education Cluster's Workplan for 2007/08 identified a series of key and interrelated gaps in the education in emergencies sector, at global and country level, related to human and financial resources, technical capacity, and equity of provision.⁶ To address these gaps more systematically a detailed capacity mapping study was commissioned. This report sets out the overall results of that study, with a focus on capacity implications for agencies at the global level.

The Education Cluster

The cluster approach is one element of the Humanitarian Reform Agenda emerging from the 2005 Humanitarian Response Review.⁷ Clusters operate at global and country levels and the approach aims to strengthen humanitarian response capacity by addressing gaps and building partnerships. It is about making the international humanitarian community more structured, accountable and professional so that it can be a better partner for host governments, local authorities and local civil society.⁸ In addition, the responsibility to act as 'provider of last resort' (PoLR) is part of a broad set of responsibilities set out for lead agencies.⁹

While not initially a global Cluster, Education Clusters spontaneously formed in many of the cluster roll-out countries. Recognising the importance of early initiatives in support of education in emergencies, the Inter-agency Standing Committee (IASC) Principals meeting on 12 December 2006 endorsed the recommendation from the IASC Working Group's meeting on 15-17 November 2006 for the cluster approach to be applied to the education sector.

The global Education Cluster is co-led by UNICEF and the International Save the Children Alliance (hereafter referred to as Save the Children). Initially the lead agencies were supported by an inter-agency Advisory Group (January 2007 – April 2008).¹⁰ Following completion of the co-leadership arrangement, a global Education Cluster Unit (ECU) was established in May 2008, while the global Education Cluster – represented by the Education Cluster Working Group (ECWG) – was formally inaugurated in September 2008. The ECWG includes the participation of UNICEF, Save the Children, Care, CCF, CRS, the INEE Secretariat, the IRC, Relief International, UNHCR, UNESCO, UNRWA, WFP, and World Vision, along with a number of individuals. The work of the global Education Cluster is taken forward by the ECU as well as through four ECWG task-teams.

⁵ For more information on the Cluster approach see <http://www.humanitarianreform.org/humanitarianreform>

⁶ Equity of provision along sex, age and diversity lines, where diversity is understood to be any characteristic of a population or individual that increases their vulnerability or exclusion from access and opportunity (eg, ethnicity; race; political affiliation; disability; caste etc).

⁷ This emerged from the 2005 Humanitarian Response Review, which was set up to assess the humanitarian response capacities of the UN, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement and other key humanitarian actors in order to identify critical gap areas and make recommendations to address them. See, eg, <<http://ocha.unog.ch/humanitarianreform/>> and <http://www.icva.ch/doc00001571.html?_page_state=ba:0:ab>

⁸ See the Humanitarian Reform in Action website: <http://ocha.unog.ch/humanitarianreform/>

⁹ See, for example, Guidance note on using the cluster approach to strengthen humanitarian response: <http://www.humanitarianreform.org/humanitarianreform/Portals/1/cluster%20approach%20page/Introduction/IASCGUIDANCENOTECLUSTERAPPROACH.pdf>

¹⁰ The inter-agency Advisory Group was made up of UNESCO, UNHCR, WFP, IRC, CCF, and the INEE Secretariat.

Out of 36 countries officially implementing the cluster approach (as per records of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), January 2009), 28 have formally implemented an Education Cluster.¹¹ In terms of the international community, UNICEF is formally the Education Cluster lead or co-lead in all countries, Save the Children serves as co-lead in 15 clusters, while in a small number of cases other international agencies lead. Increasingly, however, Ministries of Education are taking overall leadership supported by the international community. Ad hoc co-leadership arrangements in many countries have not yet been formally acknowledged or officially recognised at global level.

Study Objectives and Methodology

The aim of the global Education Cluster's overall capacity mapping study is to inform plans to strengthen the preparedness and response capacities of organisations involved in education in emergencies world-wide. This is a long-term endeavour, and this study and its various outputs provide a foundation for this work. The objectives of the capacity mapping have been to:

1. Map the capacities, and identify the capacity gaps, in emergency education preparedness and response at global level
2. Develop a set of mapping tools for ongoing use at both global and country levels to enable education cluster stakeholders to monitor their capacity over time
3. Document lessons learned and good practice
4. Recommend strategies to address identified capacity gaps

The agencies interviewed for this report were drawn from the global Education Cluster's former Advisory Group (UNESCO, UNHCR, WFP, the IRC, CCF, and the Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE) Secretariat). Research for this report also incorporated other stakeholders in order to develop a more comprehensive sense of global emergency education capacity. The agencies that responded and are referred to in this report are CARE, Catholic Relief Services (CRS), the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) and Plan International.¹² ActionAid also contributed information on its preparedness and disaster risk reduction (DRR) work in relation to education.¹³ This takes the total number of agencies to 12 (11 implementing agencies, and the INEE Secretariat). While organisations that comprise the 'evidence base' for this report by no means represent all those with education in emergencies capacity at international level, they do make up the majority. However, in order to have a better picture of 'global' capacity, all members of the ECWG should now complete a 'capacity audit' to provide a more complete picture of capacity in the global Education Cluster.

The research approach was primarily qualitative, though some quantitative information has been gathered and there has been some quantitative analysis of qualitative data. The process began with a desk review of capacity mapping tools to assess their relevance for the study; key 'think pieces' on education in emergencies; and literature related to capacity development. This informed subsequent work to define 'capacity' and to develop a series of semi-structured questionnaires. Save the Children and the NRC piloted the questionnaires (February and March 2008) prior to their circulation to all participating agencies (end March / early April 2008). Completion of the surveys involved a series of telephone or face-to-face interviews, most of which took place between April and May 2008. Some data collection took place after May 2008 for reasons that have been documented elsewhere (e.g., Update to the Education Cluster Advisory Group, June 2008).

Those interviewed were staff in agencies' emergencies and education and / or programme departments, as well as some Human Resource (HR) professionals. There are a higher number of respondents from the agencies the consultant visited, in particular Save the Children UK (where the consultant was based) and UNICEF, where the consultant spent over a week in April 2008. See [Annex 1](#) for a list of all those interviewed.

¹¹ These are: Afghanistan; Burundi; Central African Republic; Chad; Colombia; Côte d'Ivoire; Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC); Ethiopia; Guinea; Haiti; Indonesia; Iraq; Kenya; Lebanon; Madagascar; Mozambique; Myanmar; Nepal; the OPT; Pakistan; the Philippines; Somalia; South Africa; Sri Lanka; Sudan; Tajikistan; Timor Leste; and Uganda.

¹² CARE and CRS are members of the global Education Cluster. The NRC and Plan International have not formally joined.

¹³ ActionAid is not a formal member of the global Education Cluster, either.

In order to mitigate 'old data', key information was verified with participating agencies prior to completion of this report (August and September 2008).¹⁴ The report actually benefits from its place in the overall sequence of activities, as information gathered during the Lessons Learned Review as well as the country visits has implications for global capacity.¹⁵

Finally, the overall study has benefitted from the expert advice of a panel of three peer reviewers.¹⁶

Definitions

For the purpose of this study, education for children in emergencies is defined as 'education that protects the well-being, fosters learning opportunities, and nurtures the overall development (social, emotional, cognitive, physical) of children affected by conflicts and disasters'. (SC Alliance, 2001). The educational needs of children are prioritised as per international instruments (ages 0-18).

The IASC does not explicitly define what it means by 'capacity', so this study had to look elsewhere for a definition. Many definitions share common components, neatly summed up by Danida (2007) as 'the ability of individuals, institutions and societies to perform functions, solve problems, and set and achieve objectives in a sustainable manner. Capacity development refers to the process through which the abilities to do so are obtained, strengthened and maintained over time'.¹⁷ Based on the literature review, this study recognises that capacity sits across a number of different domains (see, for example, UNDP, 1998) – or spheres of activity – and should be defined by what is required at a practical level to improve education in emergencies preparedness and response. Accordingly, the study's conceptual framework was developed to guide assessment of the following domains:

Domain 1: The global operating environment

Domain 2: The organisational level

Domain 3: Human resource capacity

The primary focus of the global capacity assessment has been on surge capacity for education in emergencies, as specified in the methodology. This refers to the capacity that exists internationally (and regionally and nationally) to assist governments and other education authorities to provide education during the first three months of any humanitarian emergency (the 'acute' phase), as well as the groundwork required for supporting communities to a 'care and maintenance' phase. As continuity planning is recognised by many agencies as integral to humanitarian response, the study also addresses issues related to early recovery.

Study Constraints

Capacity for What?

This report has been faced with the question: capacity for what? Lack of virtually any baselines – for example, common minimum components of an education in emergencies programme¹⁸ or universally agreed and applied competencies for education in emergencies personnel¹⁹ – has made it difficult to quantify capacity and attendant gaps. On a related point, lack of joint preparedness and contingency planning at global level has made it difficult to project required capacity. While the study set out with the intention of trying to define some baselines against which to map capacities, this proved unfeasible for many of the reasons highlighted in the Lessons Learned Review (see Section 6.7 in that report on Quality and Accountability).

¹⁴ Agencies were asked to update their 'Agency CV'; updated CVs were received from the majority of agencies.

¹⁵ All outputs from the overall capacity mapping / gap analysis study can be found on:

<http://ocha.unog.ch/humanitarianreform/Default.aspx?tabid=699>

¹⁶ These were Lola Gostelow and John Telford, independent humanitarian consultants, and Margaret Sinclair, independent education in emergencies specialist.

¹⁷ Danida Website

<http://www.search.um.dk/search.aspx?pkid=9450346&aid=356062&pt=6018936&sw=capacity%20development&wtid=9390512>

¹⁸ Despite the role of the INEE Minimum Standards in addressing this 'gap', they are not yet sufficiently mainstreamed. Moreover, because education in emergencies has only recently been formally incorporated into humanitarian response, and due to the huge variation in country contexts, and lack of evaluations of education in emergencies responses, there is still no commonly understood or applied programme for EiE.

¹⁹ This work has now been taken up by one of the new global Education Cluster's Task Teams.

The approach has therefore tended toward an asset-based capacity mapping exercise which has sought to locate current resources as well as generic resource gaps. However, establishing what emergency education capacity is does *not* establish where the priorities for action on capacity should be, as gaps are a product of pressures placed on that capacity in different emergency contexts. The Cluster will need to develop a picture of national capacities over time in order to define any capacity development strategy it develops.

This points to another constraint: the absence of analysis of government resources. Over the medium term the Cluster will need to assess what national resources are estimated to exist, and therefore what the priority gaps for action should be. This is addressed by one of the companion outputs of the overall capacity mapping study, which entails a set of Tools and Workshop Guidelines to guide country-level Education Clusters through a capacity assessment exercise.

The Research Process

The research process encountered two main constraints. First, in terms of information collection, efforts were made to design survey questionnaires that could be used across different stakeholder groups. Partly due to this, and partly due to the burden of information collection requirements, survey responses differed considerably in terms of the questions answered and the amount of information provided. As a result, parts of this report are based on quite limited responses. This led to further difficulties in attempting to quantify capacity gaps.

Second, the difficulty of conducting the study against the backdrop of a rapidly developing global Education Cluster has meant that the focus of the study has necessarily been at the institutional rather than inter-agency or cluster level. The global Cluster was not formally established until after the main information collection period and the majority of agencies felt it was too early to answer questions on 'the Cluster' as opposed to individual agency capacity. The report attempts to mitigate this by referencing more recent developments at the global Cluster level.

National Capacities and Lessons Learned

While it is accepted that global capacities need to be strengthened, national capacities need equal if not more attention. Given the changing, and increasing, nature of humanitarian need, combined with the overall low and disproportionate levels of international funding, strengthening capacities at regional and country level is imperative. This is born out by the Lessons Learned Review. It is critical as the most appropriate and sustainable responses occur when led by local and national capacities (see, eg, Telford et al, 2006; OSE, 2006). While it is beyond the scope of this report to provide an analysis of the challenges associated with strengthening country-level capacity, readers are reminded that country-level capacity strengthening will be the most important component of future emergency response. As noted above, capacity will need to be assessed at this level in order to develop a realistic capacity development strategy for the Education Cluster.

Structure and Contents

This report takes the conceptual framework of the different capacity domains as its primary organising principle. As financial capacity and quality and accountability are relevant to more than one domain, they are covered in separate sections. The structure of the report is as follows:

Domain 1: The Global Operating Environment

Domain 2: The Organisational Level

- Agency mandates
- Programme capacity
- Material capacity

Domain 3: Human Resource Capacity

- Staff capacity
- Staff development
- Mobilisation policies and procedures

Financial Capacity

Quality and Accountability

Each section is broken down into four main sections: (1) a brief introduction to each section that explains the focus; (2) a factual description of existing capacities as identified by survey responses; (3) information about explicitly and implicitly identified capacity gaps; and (4) a box summarising capacity and capacity gaps.

The report ends by drawing together a series of recommendations with regard to how global Education Cluster agencies might address the identified capacity gaps. Many of the recommendations are broad as they address different agencies with different mandates and structures, as well as at different stages in the development of preparedness and response capacity.

Domain 1: The Global Operating Environment

This section considers the relative strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and constraints of the global operating environment for education in emergencies. Included here is information on recent developments in education in emergencies, the cluster approach and humanitarian reform more broadly. Issues concerning partnership are particularly highlighted.

Existing Capacities

Survey respondents highlighted a number of positive developments that the global Education Cluster can build on. Chief among these is the recognition that education is increasingly seen as a critical component of humanitarian response due to growing awareness of the value of education as a source of protection in emergencies, as well as key to rebuilding livelihoods. The growing provision of education in emergencies and the fact that Education Clusters formed spontaneously in many cluster roll-out countries prior to the formal implementation of the Education Cluster at global level provides evidence of this. In a context of increasing, and increasingly complex, emergencies, including many chronic crises, the provision of education in emergencies is a human right and is decisive to countries' longer term development, including attainment of their Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

As the scale and complexity of emergencies grows the organisations mandated to respond, including national governments, will need to invest more in their humanitarian preparedness and response capacities, as well as develop shared capacities between them (see, for example, Telford *et al*, 2006). The cluster approach is considered an important mechanism for developing such capacities – including the social capital²⁰ brought about by increased partnership, critical to sustainable response.

Another opportunity presented by country-level clusters is the growing trend toward preparedness. Interviews suggest that the preparedness activities now associated with many clusters take their stakeholders beyond previous coordination models. The growing emphasis on preparedness is linked to recent shifts in the international humanitarian system and has been spurred by collaborative structures and policies such as the Hyogo Framework for Action, a global framework for disaster risk reduction (DRR).²¹ Significantly, preparedness and DRR more actively support, and work alongside, national government capacity. Moreover, DRR and education in emergencies are uniquely suited: many country-level Education Clusters have already been promoting DRR through the curriculum. Members of the global Education Cluster, most notably Plan International and ActionAid, are leaders in the field of DRR. Notwithstanding, most participants to this study still identified DRR as one of the main programme gaps for Education Cluster agencies overall (see Section 3, Part 4).

²⁰ Social capital refers to the trust and reciprocity brought about by the collective value of networks.

²¹ <http://www.unisdr.org/eng/hfa/hfa.htm> The Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) is a global blueprint for disaster risk reduction efforts during the next decade. Its goal is to substantially reduce disaster losses by 2015 – in lives, and in the social, economic, and environmental assets of communities and countries. The Framework offers guiding principles, priorities for action and practical means for achieving disaster resilience for vulnerable communities.

The Co-leadership Arrangement

One of the main findings of the *Cluster Approach Evaluation* (OCHA, 2007) is that the cluster mechanism has helped to foster much stronger and more predictable leadership. This point finds articulation in the MoU between UNICEF and Save the Children. In addition, humanitarian response is ever more dependent on partnership – a reality recognised by the Partnership Principles that originated from the Global Humanitarian Platform (GHP), a forum intended to help agencies realise more effective partnership.²² These Principles could be a useful tool for the Education Cluster going forward, particularly as the Education Cluster is the only cluster to be formally co-led at the global level by an INGO. This represents a particular opportunity – and also responsibility – for UNICEF and Save the Children with regard to how such an arrangement can work.

In general, cluster members felt it was too soon to comment definitively on the co-leadership arrangement at global level. The Lessons Learned Review (Houghton, 2008:9), however, highlights a number of issues concerning the arrangement that the global Education Cluster might consider. Significantly, it found that although the global co-leadership arrangement does not assume country-level co-leadership, this is generally how it has been interpreted. In the main it is viewed positively and is predicated on (i) effective preparedness, including good institutional relationships; and (ii) making the best use of agencies' comparative advantages.

The Education Cluster at Global Level

The global Education Cluster is comprised of the ECWG assisted by the ECU. The work of the global Education Cluster is primarily led by four inter-agency task-teams made up of various members of the ECWG. These task-teams, established at the inaugural meeting of the Education Cluster in London in September 2008, are progressing programmes of work covering Field Operations, Capacity Building, Knowledge Management, and Global Oversight, Advocacy and Liaison (GOAL).²³ The ECU supports the work of cluster task teams (particularly capacity mapping and information assessment) and country-level Education Clusters, and represents the Education Cluster at Geneva-based and other international meetings and missions.

Within the financial constraints of the education sector, leverage will need to become a key strategy for Education Cluster agencies, and these task-teams represent an important capacity in this regard. Developing cluster capacity cannot just be about individual agencies bringing their own capacities to scale, as limited resources will impinge on this. Focus must be on leverage between organisations.

The Education Cluster and the INEE

The INEE provides a unique context and capacity for the global Education Cluster. This is primarily due to the social capital already built by cluster members through their participation in the INEE, which has helped to sustain global collaboration in education in emergencies. The usefulness of the INEE Minimum Standards and other educational resources available through the network was also recognised. The INEE Minimum Standards in particular mean that the global Education Cluster does not need to define a new set of technical standards, as many of the other clusters have had to do. The ECU works closely with the INEE Secretariat and members of the Secretariat are active in the Education Cluster Task-teams.

Inter-cluster Cooperation and Cross-cutting Themes

Inter-cluster collaboration is seen as critical to the effectiveness of education in emergencies, as this helps to define cross-cutting issues and needs. For example, the ECU participates on an ad hoc basis in meetings of the Protection Cluster and the Early Recovery Cluster. At the country level, inter-cluster forums are increasingly being established, e.g., the Cluster Leads Forum in Pakistan and the inter-cluster working group organised by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in the Philippines. In addition, within UNICEF, as lead of four clusters, information is exchanged through an inter-divisional Task Force on emergency/cluster issues.

²² See, for example, <http://www.humanitarianreform.org/humanitarianreform/Default.aspx?tabid=219> and <http://www.icva.ch/ghp.html>

²³ Details of the work of these task-teams can be found at: <http://www.humanitarianreform.org/humanitarianreform/Default.aspx?tabid=115>

The ECU is also intending to focus more effort at the level of cross-cutting themes. At the global level the ECU is active in all meetings of the IASC Task Team meetings. For example, it is working closely with the IASC sub-working group on gender. In addition, it is working with INEE Task Team conveners to ensure that the INEE's technical groups are able to contribute to the activities of the ECWG. These areas include gender, HIV/AIDS, early childhood care and development, adolescents and youth, and inclusion and disability.

Capacity Gaps

Despite these considerable capacities and the opportunities they provide, interviewees noted a number of significant challenges and capacity gaps. Not least is the fact that many stakeholders still categorise education as a development activity rather than as a process that should not be interrupted, even in a disaster.²⁴ This is born out by levels of funding for education in emergencies. There is an ongoing need to advocate for education in emergencies – in inter-agency forums, to donors, and even within many of the agencies involved in the global Education Cluster itself.

Many interviewees felt that, so far, efforts to mainstream the cluster approach have been inadequate. The co-lead agencies were particularly candid in this regard. To some extent this is due to a lack of understanding about the change processes required to respond to the cluster approach and humanitarian reform more broadly, and the kinds of new capacities this will entail. The need for leadership on coordination and new forms of partnership was noted, and one such new capacity is seen a whole new level of personnel who are skilled in partnership working.

Given that the development of global capacity should be informed by country-level demand, there is a need for more understanding of the cluster approach and humanitarian reform at country level. Country-level clusters feel they have received insufficient guidance from headquarters on operationalising the cluster, particularly with regard to the co-lead arrangement.

The issue of inter-operability between all clusters, not only the Education Cluster, was also an area identified as neglected at both global and country level.²⁵ Despite the forums that exist to facilitate inter-cluster work, there is still a perceived gap with regard to how to operationalise implementation more broadly – for example, how the Logistics Cluster might better support education staff at country level. And with regard to cross-cutting themes, greater integration is warranted across all clusters. In terms of education clusters, country-level experience shows that most clusters are only at the beginning of collecting and analysing sex- and age-disaggregated data on enrolment, completions and early school leavers.

The concept of equality in partnership is central to the operation of any Education Cluster mechanism.²⁶ UNICEF has recognised this in the document 'Enhancing the Dialogue between UNICEF and Non-governmental Organisations in Humanitarian Action' (2007). This report urges the agency to institutionalise more comprehensively its own ability to work effectively in partnership with non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). Some respondents, including from the co-lead agencies, noted specific issues related to partnership working, particularly between UNICEF and Save the Children. For example, some respondents noted UNICEF's tendency to initiate cluster-level activities without the kind of consultation that might be expected in a partnership. On the other hand Save the Children was seen as not always having the capacity to take on co-leadership at country level (though in many instances has greater field-level operational capacity). And at the global level, Save the Children's commitment to the arrangement has not been clarified beyond the initial two years. A necessary first step is to pursue partnership based on honesty, transparency and mutual respect for inherent differences, including in capacities.

²⁴ For example, UNHCR deals with education response through non-expert community services officers rather than education specialists. This is partly because the emergency section is perceived not to see education as a core component of humanitarian response.

²⁵ This might also have been the case more so prior to the establishment of the ECU in Geneva, which is now more actively involved in inter-cluster and other inter-agency forums at global level.

²⁶ The IASC *Interim Self-assessment of the Cluster Approach in Somalia* (2006a) makes the recommendation that, "The balance of power with a cluster (UN versus INGOs and national NGOs) must be recognised and steps taken within the cluster to address equity" should the need arise.

Another gap concerns evidence of insufficient investment in programme monitoring, evaluation and learning. This impedes iterative improvements in cluster operations at country level, and also impacts on the quality of advocacy that the global cluster is able to undertake. This is linked to the lack of an overall knowledge management strategy for the cluster 'system' as a whole.

Summary of Capacity and Capacity Gaps in the Global Operating Environment	
Capacity	Capacity Gaps
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increasing incorporation of education into humanitarian response. Increasing number of international policy instruments that prioritise education in emergencies. The cluster approach as an effective mechanism to build capacity. Growing trend toward preparedness and the global Education Cluster's Capacity Assessment and Preparedness tools and workshop guidelines. The co-leadership arrangement. An active Education Cluster Unit (ECU) and four task-teams. The INEE as a facilitator of collaboration in education in emergencies as well as the INEE Minimum Standards and resource website. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ongoing need to advocate for education in emergencies given continuing view that education in emergencies is not an essential component of humanitarian response. Inadequate mainstreaming of the cluster approach by donors and lead agencies alike. New tier of staff capacity skilled in partnership and collaboration required. Need for more understanding of the cluster approach at both global and country level. Lack of guidelines on how to operationalise the co-leadership arrangement at country level. Ongoing challenges with regard to inter-operability between clusters and with cross-cutting themes. Ongoing problems related to partnership and the definition and agreement of required capacity in each agency. Insufficient investment in monitoring and evaluation (M&E) and learning. The need to mandate collaboration.

DOMAIN 2: Organisational Capacity

This section identifies a variety of organisational capacities that will be required for the global Education Cluster to fulfil its commitments to support country-level clusters. The section covers agency mandates, programming capacity and material capacity.

Part 1: Agency Mandates

Agency mandates and their associated objectives shape the type of response capacity that agencies build, as well as where they focus this response capacity.²⁷ Evidently, agency size also determines the type and scale of capacity that can be built. This is relevant given the requirement that global cluster members develop appropriate capacity to support country-level clusters.

Existing Capacity

Many of the agencies involved in this study have a mandate for both humanitarian and development work, with 10 out of the 11 operational agencies having a mandate for emergency response. This indicates that global Education Cluster members are at least oriented toward building the kind of surge capacity required for supporting country-level clusters. The challenge is to determine the relative strengths of each agency in terms of which is best suited to develop and/or manage particular capacities, and to identify niche capacities in more specialist agencies

²⁷ Of course agency size, as well as whether or not agencies are horizontally or vertically integrated, also determines the type and scale of capacity that can be built.

that can be used for the cluster as a whole. [Annex 2](#) provides an overview of agency mandates and strategic objectives.

Ten out of the 11 implementing agencies, including the lead agencies, also have a mandate and/or strategic objectives for preparedness. This is critical, as preparedness as much as emergency response relies on robust internal systems with the tools and systems to support preparedness work.

Agencies structured and/or mandated to support regional and country-level capacity development may be better placed to ensure sustainability over the longer term, not least because country 'leadership' of a response contributes to a smoother transition from relief to recovery.²⁸ Thus another critical capacity concerns agency structure and the location of capacity. For example, UNICEF's decentralised structure has facilitated the creation of regional human resource capacity in support of emergency education and the agency's cluster responsibilities. Regional rosters, such as Save the Children US' REDI teams have moved capacity closer to the point of deployment. Many cluster agencies, including the IRC, CARE and CCF, focus on building national capacity so that, over the longer term, they can rely less on international surge capacity. Arguably the best way forward following this capacity mapping and the development of the country-level capacity assessment tools would be for the Education Cluster members to map existing capacity, geographically, and then transpose gaps on top of this in relation to likely needs.

Corporate leadership is essential to steer change processes within organisations, and the cluster approach has been shown to necessitate changed levels of investment and ways of working. Agencies were therefore asked about their capacity – in the form of staff resources and funding – to contribute to the global Education Cluster, on the basis that the vision of humanitarian reform needs to be fulfilled across all organisations beyond the global co-lead agencies. All former Advisory Group agencies see their participation in the global Education Cluster as a priority, although only the two co-lead agencies have invested in additional capacity to support their involvement in the global Education Cluster.²⁹ [Annex 3](#) shows staffing and funding commitments to the global Education Cluster.

Capacity Gaps

In terms of gaps in mandates, only two of the 11 agencies have specific mandates for education in emergencies (UNICEF and the IRC), though all bar UNESCO have strategic objectives that address this.³⁰ In addition, while most responding agencies address recovery explicitly it is notable that Save the Children does not have an explicit mandate or objective for transition/recovery programming. According to one senior staff member, this was perceived to result in misunderstandings about optimal levels of ambition and scale.

Another gap relates to preparedness. Most agencies, including those with preparedness mandates and corresponding guidelines, feel that capacity is not matched to mandate in this area – particularly with regard to systems to ensure preparedness planning is an integral part of annual agency planning. This is significant given that country-level clusters are increasingly being established as preparedness mechanisms. In this regard clusters need to keep in mind the role of national governments in preparedness efforts. Efforts must address national institutional needs and not just agencies' own needs.

In addition, although global Cluster members prioritise their involvement in the global Education Cluster, responses were unanimous that the resources and associated staff capacity required to make the work of the global Education Cluster truly transformative are 'huge and as yet unsecured'. This relates to the fact that both donors and implementing agencies have not yet sufficiently mainstreamed cluster costs. This links to the issue of accountability, which is relevant in-as-much that collaborative ways of working as envisaged by humanitarian reform require some

²⁸ See for example, Scheper et al, 2006; Christopolos, 2005

²⁹ Agencies not actively involved in the global Cluster at that time had not assigned staff to cluster work and are not represented in Annex 4.

³⁰ This is not UNESCO's mandate anyway, and the agency brings different and complementary strengths to the global Education Cluster.

kind of incentive mechanism/s in each cluster member agency (beyond financial resources and if collaboration is not mandated).

Capacity and Gaps in Agency Mandates	
Existing capacity	Capacity gaps
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Cluster members appropriately mandated for building surge capacity for education in emergencies. Some comprehensive preparedness guidelines in some cluster members. Regional and national focus as a strategy for building capacity in some agencies. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Greater strategic focus – in the form of mandates/objectives – for education in emergencies. Most cluster members have primary education mandates, which affects their ability to address the educational needs of children from 0-18 yrs. Capacity not matched to mandate particularly in preparedness and recovery / transition programming.

Part 2: Programming Capacity

Programming capacity in this context refers to two things: to the actual levels of education response provided by agencies (e.g. primary education); and to agencies' capacity for cross-phase planning and implementation.

Existing Capacity

Survey responses showed the following expertise across study agencies:

Table 1: Agency Expertise in Education in Emergencies					
Agency	ECD / Pre-school	Primary	Secondary	Tertiary / post-secondary	Home-based
CARE	✓	✓	x	x	x
CCF	✓	x	x	x	x
CRS	x	✓	x	x	x
IRC	x	✓	✓	✓	✓
Plan International	✓	✓	✓	x	x
Save the Children	✓	✓	x	x	x
UNESCO	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
UNHCR**	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
UNICEF	✓	✓	✓	x	x
(WFP; school feeding only)	(✓)	(✓)	(✓)	x	x

* The IRC has some capacity in ECD, but it is not a specific focus of the agency.

** It is notable that elsewhere in the surveys UNHCR mentions its overall lack of expertise with regard to education in emergencies.

Agencies also noted their particular areas of expertise within these levels. In addition, a number of agencies said that they target special groups through project planning and in accordance with local contexts, while others noted their expertise with particular vulnerable groups (also [Annex 4](#)). In terms of cross-cutting issues, and in relation to gender mainstreaming and gender equality programming, while most agencies have developed policies in this regard it would seem that, for the most part, these policies have not translated into action-plans. Accordingly, implementation of the policies appears to be relatively weak. The situation is not dissimilar with human rights.

While programme approaches were not discussed in depth, study participants underscored the importance of integrated programming or 'cross-phase planning'. This has also been recognised as important for building surge capacity as it enables agencies to plan better for, for example, succession of surge capacity staff. This is underscored by the Lessons Learned Review which highlights that country-level Education Clusters are more effective in the initial stages of an

emergency if they have been established beforehand. Moreover, integrating planning for both DRR and recovery of education systems early on means that education in emergencies can be used as a window of opportunity for longer term planning and contribute more appropriately to longer term development.

Education Cluster members are advised to pool their resources and build on each other's strengths and experiences when it comes to developing cluster-level resources. The UN agencies in particular are strong on preparedness – though operational implementation still varies considerably. CRS focuses on community-based disaster preparedness with an emphasis on community as 'first responder'; Plan International, UNESCO, CRS, and ActionAid appear strongest on DRR, with UNESCO having experience at every stakeholder level. The IRC has developed an innovative approach to programming which allows it to respond to both immediate and ongoing conflict and post-conflict challenges. This is now its principal programming instrument.

Key lessons are: the need to plan for each phase of response; to define different skill sets required in different programme phases; and to undertake preparedness at all levels: starting at the family level, moving to the school level, to provincial, state and national education authorities. In addition, it is not enough to concentrate on the provision of materials in the emergency response phase; 'softer' issues like curricula and teacher training, which are critical for quality education in the longer term, need to be paid due attention in preparedness so that emergency programmes can link better with development work. Issues like equality of opportunity and equality of access are also critical 'softer' issues. This is supported by the Lessons Learned Review. Agencies with regional emergency advisors are particularly well-placed, as are those with regional education in emergencies officers. UNICEF plans to employ regional cluster advisors.

Capacity Gaps

While there is apparent programming capacity among current Cluster members to provide ECD and primary education, responses indicate a lack of capacity to deliver secondary, tertiary and home-based education. This is important, as agencies are used to working from their mandates rather than on the basis of what is required. Moreover, it presents a challenge to all clusters if the educational needs of children are to be prioritised as per international instruments (0-18). In addition, a more holistic vision of education in emergencies would include better integration of, for example, protection, health education and school feeding.

Agencies themselves drew attention to gaps in programme capacity more broadly. Some of these are specific to agencies missing expertise in a particular area, while others are shared gaps. The shared gaps include:

- preparedness programming;
- transition / early programming (particularly around shelter issues), and harmonisation with longer term development education
- working on a cross-border basis, and the problems of accreditation associated with this (the IRC, UNESCO and UNHCR have most to share in this area);
- capacity for re-integration into education systems;
- lack of joint assessments and planning;
- lack of integration of different educational components, e.g., child / girl friendly schools and community-based schools;
- monitoring, evaluation and learning; insufficient focus on outcomes.

In terms of cross-cutting issues, there are big gaps with regard to disability programming, programmes which consider environmental impact, and DRR. A number of agencies also mentioned gaps with regard to peace education. And, as noted earlier, gender and human rights programming continue to pose critical challenges.

One of the most important lessons concerning preparedness and contingency planning is that individual agency plans must relate to overall cluster plans. Levels of involvement in preparedness and DRR often depend on agency mandate – for example, CCF, primarily a development organisation, only gets involved in preparedness if one of its programme countries is considered at risk, while the IRC's focus from emergency to transition through to post-conflict has, until recently,

meant that the organisation has not focused on DRR. This implicitly suggests the need for country clusters to plan their responses based on comparative advantage. All agencies share the challenge that fragmented donor policies and lack of defined skills make recovery programming problematic. Another key challenge is ensuring much greater inter-departmental integration at the global level, given the requirement for integrated programming. (Problems here might be as much about having lack of a commonly defined and understood purpose and even language with which to talk about, and implement, greater integration.) All of the agencies in the study admitted to struggling with this.

An important point highlighted in the Lessons Learned Review is that members of Education Clusters at country level do not always know what constitutes a quality education in emergencies intervention, and therefore what 'success' looks like. This is due to a number of factors, including: the relatively recent (formal) incorporation of education into humanitarian response; the lack of system-wide evaluations of education in emergencies programmes; the lack of sufficient numbers of appropriately skilled personnel; the INEE Minimum Standards not being widely used or understood; the huge variation in country contexts; and the fact that 'education in emergencies' is *interpreted* differently in different settings. In response to this challenge a number of clusters have begun to develop their own set of indicators for education in emergencies interventions (eg, in Somalia and the DRC). Others noted the need for such work, while yet others noted the need for these indicators to go beyond 'service delivery' and address the issue of quality of education in emergencies work. Factoring in feedback from children and parents should be a component of success determination. It is suggested that Education Clusters would do well to pool their shared resources (eg, UNICEF's CCCs; indicators identified in Save the Children's Emergency Education SOPs; the INEE Minimum Standards) to define the core components of education in emergencies interventions; indicators which could be adapted to each country context.

Capacity and Gaps in Programme Capacity	
Capacity	Capacity Gaps
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Good capacity for ECD and primary provision • Specialist capacity in individual Cluster members • Expertise in working with particular vulnerable groups 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gaps in secondary, tertiary and home-based provision • Preparedness programming, as well as transition/early recovery (particularly shelter) • Cross-border response and re-integration • Lack of joint assessments and planning • Lack of integration of different educational components, e.g., child / girl friendly schools and community-based schools • Limited experience with the cross-cutting issues of disabilities; environmental impact; DRR

Part 3: Material Capacity

Material capacity constitutes a number of different components: levels and quality of stockpiles, and the human resource capacity to manage these stockpiles, procure other materials, and provide technical support to manage equipment (mostly related to construction and DRR). Not all agencies involved in the study answered this section. This was either because they do not maintain stockpiles, focusing rather on local procurement, or because the stockpiles they do have are managed at country level and the information was too difficult to compile globally.

Existing Capacity

Only UNICEF and Save the Children have global stocks of education materials (see [Annex 5](#)). The NRC has some materials stockpiled at global level, but these were not specified and are not in any significant quantity. UNESCO keeps some textbooks for its East African programmes in Nairobi.

UNICEF has the greatest material capacity, both in terms of types and amounts of stockpiles, as well as warehousing and procurement capacity. In addition, the agency completes an annual market survey to approve worldwide suppliers so that country offices can order directly. This is something that could be used by Education Clusters. UNICEF is working toward greater

decentralisation of supplies, though still needs to identify appropriate locations. It would like to focus on creating inter-agency hubs as part of its cluster work. Funding will be required to make this a reality. A number of member agencies, and some UNICEF staff, believe that if there are to be cluster-wide resources these should be cluster-branded and not agency-specific branded.

A number of agencies support UNICEF's call for greater coherence in this area (which would be aided by de-branding) both at the inter- and intra-cluster level. For example, UNHCR indicated that it would like to reactivate an MOU with UNICEF that includes emergency materials, and have joint contingency planning based around this. Another critical capacity involves good inter-departmental relationships between programmes and logistics. In recent years UNICEF's programme supply division has worked more closely with logistics during assessment to see what is needed and to identify the required budget. This has helped to overcome the too-common problem with education programmes not understanding how to budget for material / logistics support.

In addition to capacity represented by UNICEF, Save the Children has recently developed an Emergency Kits Catalogue which outlines the standard programme and non-food relief item kits which the emergency section recommends for use in emergency response and preparedness planning. These kits can be drawn upon in an emergency by Country Programmes. The intention of this catalogue is to provide a set of standard kit lists, including for education in emergencies, based on previous responses with relevant technical input, to assist emergency teams to plan, budget and deliver their first phase response.

Human resource capacity in the form of logisticians is another critical capacity. This is covered in more detail in Human Resources. However, some of the difficulties experienced in the area of logistics support is referenced below. Work in the area of stockpiles and supplies falls under the jurisdiction of the ECWG's Teak Team on Field Operations.

Capacity Gaps

For those agencies that did respond to this section (8 out of 11) answers highlighted a number of gaps. For example, with regard to material supplies, agencies identified temporary shelter and lack of gender-sensitive kits as posing particular challenges. Some agencies noted particular difficulties in transporting tents for education programmes and safe play areas; pre-positioning tents would go some way to solving this. As pre-positioning is funding dependent (agencies commented on the difficulty of convincing donors of the need to fund pre-positioned stock), agencies could benefit from investing time in increasing pre-existing and/or building new partnerships with a view to sharing resources, as well as lists of suppliers. Leveraging relationships in this way would lead to economies of scale.

With regard to logistics support, there is a clear need for guidance from logistics specialists on the kinds of logistics capacity required for education in emergencies. This is because there is a tendency for programme staff to only consider material need: logistics is about more than stockpiles, and budgets need to include technical, management and delivery costs. UNICEF notes that if there isn't a good logistics plan in place from the start, implementation is unlikely to succeed. In general, unless logistics support is requested and budgeted for by education programmes, education in emergencies interventions take serious risks with quality and sustainability.

The lack of logistics officers worldwide has implications for the kind of staff capacity that agencies seek to build. In particular, lack of logistics staff at country level to carry out assessments (including engineers and architects) leaves education officers with little experience to assess structural needs. It can lead to slower programme start-up as well as poor supply chain planning and management of incoming supplies. Subsequent delays of deliveries can result in higher transport and procurement costs for poor quality or inappropriate materials. UNICEF has used surge capacity when it has had insufficient logistics officers on the ground. However, the agency notes that reliance on stand-by agreements can delay response. In addition, one of the senior logisticians in UNICEF noted that it is 'still a fight to get coordination' between logistics and programmes, and the agency believes it needs to focus most capacity strengthening at country level. This will mean skilling-up programme officers to understand logistics better, and integrating supply chain officers into programmes. However, logistics officers also need to understand educational needs better.

Summary of Capacity and Capacity Gaps in Material Capacity	
Capacity	Capacity Gaps
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> UNICEF has significant capacity in terms of types and amounts of stockpiled resources. The agency also has significant regional warehousing capacity, and is looking to extend to further country locations. UNICEF's increasing experience in terms of integrating better its programmes and logistics departments. Save the Children's education in emergencies 'kit lists', with advice on how education programmes should plan, budget and deliver materials and logistics-sensitive emergency education programmes. Significant appetite to create much greater inter-agency coherence in this area. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Limited funding for preparedness makes it difficult to pre-position sufficient supplies. The need for greater coordination between logistics and programmes departments (in this instance, education) and personnel. Lack of logistics officers worldwide; not enough supply chain officers integrated into programmes. Insufficient numbers of logistics officers trained in education, and education specialists trained in logistics. Problems in particular with temporary shelter and gender-sensitive kits.

Domain 3: Human Resource Capacity

Human resource capacity is split into three sections: the first on staff capacity; the second on methods to develop that capacity; the third on human resource policies and procedures associated with recruitment and deployment.

Part 1: Staff Capacity

Existing Capacity

Staff capacity entails two things: the number of skilled staff, and the quality of that staff. There are generally three tiers of staff capacity in Education Cluster terms:

1. Technical/operational staff capacity (i.e., education in emergency programme staff)
2. Cluster Coordinators
3. Support co-ordination functions (e.g., information managers and administrators)

Education in emergencies surge capacity is met internally or externally through a variety of mechanisms. Agency preference is for internal deployment due to staff familiarity with agency policy and practice. [Annex 6](#) shows current levels of staff capacity with regard to 1 and 2 above.

Technical/Operational Staff Capacity

At an internal level, emergency departments typically enable agencies to support humanitarian response. The INGOs in this study tend toward reliance on their Emergency Departments for first phase response. The UN agencies involved typically rely on programme-to-programme redeployment for first phase response, whilst also making use of rosters, such as the NRC's.³¹

A core element of internal surge capacity is standing capacity. These staff are permanently employed to be available for deployment. A small number of agencies worldwide utilise 'on call' lists, with a number of named personnel ready for immediate deployment at any time. Of the agencies included in this study, only Save the Children UK and the IRC operate this system. Standing teams have been shown to improve considerably the speed and quality of emergency response though need to employ in sufficient numbers (Willits & Darcy, 2005). It is common for staff on standing teams to contribute significantly to preparedness activities when they are not deployed to an emergency, as reported by both the IRC and Save the Children.

³¹ A couple of the UN agencies noted that it's important not to be over-reliant on one provider, which is the tendency with the NRC.

Currently the IRC employs one standing team member who covers the two sectors of education and protection, while Save the Children (UK) has four standing team members. Save the Children's standing team represents the largest education in emergencies standing capacity in the sector. Conversely, UNICEF's approximately 370 education officers distributed across 126 countries worldwide are the largest cadre of education officers that exist and give the agency leverage. UNICEF is currently undertaking a staff audit to determine how many have skills in emergency preparedness and response.

Many agencies do not have access to the levels of unrestricted funding to employ standing teams. Their chosen route for increasing staff capacity is through the development of rosters. These are either 'internal rosters' – or, in the case of UNICEF and WFP, staff lists of personnel currently employed by each organisation and/or, external staff – or 'external rosters'. The development of rosters can also be used to help address staff shortages in particular areas. For example, Save the Children, in its role as co-lead of the global Education Cluster, has initiated the development of an Emergency Education Roster; the NRC is also in the process of developing an 'E-Team' of 12 emergency education specialists internal to the agency. Other agencies are seeking to address shortages of skilled emergency managers through the development of specialised rosters (e.g., UNDP and World Vision). It has been suggested that sectoral excellence requires a minimum of four specialists on staff, amounting to an annual investment of around \$250,000 (Willits-King & Darcy, 2005; figures from exchange rates in 2005). Responsibilities as co-lead of a cluster suggest investment is required beyond this, however.

UNICEF aims to maintain surge capacity in each programme division, including education. However, a number of interviewees in UNICEF believe the agency needs to increase the size of its Emergency Response Team (ERT) from six to around 15-20 people, and include education in emergency specialists in this team (at the moment it covers only support functions, such as coordination and logistics).

Strengthening capacity at regional and country level – both in terms of education in emergencies advisors as well as regional emergency and/or preparedness advisors – can be an important component of surge capacity. Regional focal points can facilitate surge capacity mobilisation. Currently, UNICEF is structured to put education in emergencies advisors at regional level, and Save the Children has emergency and preparedness advisors at this level. In comparison, Save the Children is focused on building its education in emergencies capacity at country level. Notwithstanding, constraints have resulted from this approach and Save the Children staff involved in the Lessons Learned Review commented about lack of agency capacity at both regional and country level with regard to the agency's co-lead position, and also in terms of its intention to be the leading INGO for education in emergencies. The IRC has just begun a partnership with the University of Nairobi's Faculty of Education to build the capacity of approximately five faculty members to function as education in emergencies specialists and develop a course that comprise a year's worth of material on education in emergencies. This will help to increase considerably the number of people in East Africa with education in emergencies knowledge and training.

Agencies with a mandate for both humanitarian and development work such as CARE, Save the Children and UNICEF need an additional programme of work to train their staff, including country directors, in emergency response, including in education in emergencies.

Implementing a comprehensive education response in an emergency invariably consists of more than an education in emergencies specialist. Save the Children, for example, prefers to deploy a logistician, a Child Protection adviser and a security expert. For UNICEF, the 'dream team' constitutes a logistician, learning support, a training expert, communications specialists and administrators, and an inter-agency coordinator. Other agencies did not answer this question, though all noted that who else is deployed depends on available funding. The Lessons Learned Review confirms much of the above by highlighting:

- The importance of having an education in emergencies specialist from the beginning of a response.

- That lead agencies require a *minimum* of one person with education in emergencies experience in-country.

Defining and using core competencies is a vital part of achieving quality (see for example People in Aid³²). While most of the responding agencies do define core competencies, these are not standardised and only a handful use a standard hiring format based on core competencies.

As noted above, there are three categories of cluster capacity in staff terms. Each of these requires different, although sometimes overlapping, profiles, competencies, and training. UNICEF, in conjunction with other Cluster members, has attempted to define a set of core competencies for education in emergencies personnel. It is using this as the basis of its staff audit. In addition, Save the Children is currently undertaking a review of its entire competencies framework for all emergency personnel, including education staff. This mechanism will enable the development and accreditation of education in emergencies specific competencies and could be utilised more widely by the Education Cluster once it is complete. The ECWG's Task Team on Field Operations is managing work to develop Cluster-wide staff surge capacity mechanisms.

Cluster Coordinators

At the time of conducting the research there were seven trained Education Cluster Coordinators worldwide (see [Annex 6](#)), though in reality many more are fulfilling this position. Of these seven, Save the Children's Cluster Coordinators are most mobile: the OCHA-trained UN Cluster Coordinators are unlikely to be re-deployed from their current positions. That said, the Lessons Learned Review highlights the benefits of using existing country staff as cluster coordinators as it does the importance of having:

- At least one person in the cluster coordination team with Cluster Coordination training.
- Good succession planning: cluster coordinators need to stay for three months with at least a week's handover.

Save the Children has developed a generic terms of reference for Cluster Coordinators which goes some way to defining their required skills and qualities. The WASH Cluster has recently published a manual to guide its coordinators at country-level, and the Education Cluster Capacity Building Task Team will be developing an Education Cluster-specific training for cluster coordinators (see section below on Staff Development).

Cluster Support Functions

Country-level clusters need additional support functions. Recent cluster responses have involved the deployment of the following capacity during the acute phase of the response:

- Myanmar: three full-time staff (two cluster coordinators; one information manager); support also at sub-national level.³³
- Mozambique: 3½ full time staff (two cluster coordinators; information management; reporting).
- Kenya: three full-time staff (two cluster coordinators; 1 information manager).

This study was unable to distinguish where existing support capacity sits within agencies.

Capacity Gaps

Low numbers of specialist staff capacity is one of the major constraints to education in emergencies. In addition, and as noted earlier, there is a technical capacity gap with regard to logistics support to education in emergencies programme staff. As only half the responding agencies provided information on the number of logistics officers they have, this information is not included here. However, it will be critical for the Education Cluster to have a comprehensive picture of this going forward.

³² People in Aid various publications: <http://www.peopleinaid.org/resources/publications.aspx>

³³ In terms of numbers required, it is interesting to note that SC-UK employed 60 surge capacity at any one time in Myanmar. It was felt that an additional two advisors with emergency experience would ideally have been available in order to coach national staff in emergency response.

With regard to cluster coordinators, many of those currently in position have pre-existing portfolios that hamper their ability to focus exclusively on cluster work. The same is true across many of the other clusters, including nutrition. While less important in non-emergency times, this does decrease the effectiveness of the emergency response and can also weaken existing programmes during response periods. If cluster coordinators are not dedicated staff, surge capacity should be brought in to relieve them of much of their other duties. Again, this has implications for the kind of staff capacity that cluster members build. The WASH Cluster has identified the need to have 70 trained cluster coordinators.

The rule of thumb is the identification of five potential staff in order to locate and deploy one person. The IASC baseline is that clusters are ready to respond to 2 x 500,000 affected population simultaneously, plus 1 other 500,000 affected, and on an annual basis. Furthermore, in large emergencies experience has shown that there is generally more than one Cluster 'hub' (e.g., in the Jogjakarta response there were eight 'hubs'). The IASC also stipulates the development of sufficient capacity to respond to 26 ongoing protracted crises.

Table 2: Projected Potential Need for Trained Cluster Coordinators

- Education Cluster currently in 28 countries: min 1 trained cluster coordinator (28)
- Capacity for 2 x 500,000: generally 2 cluster coordinators (one from each lead agency) + at least 2 others for local 'hubs' (6 in total)
- Another large emergency on the tail of the these (consider issues related to continuity): as above (4)
- Readiness to respond to 26 ongoing protracted crises: min 1 trained cluster coordinator (26)

Considerations:

- On first glance this would imply the need to have 64 trained cluster coordinators. HOWEVER:
- For internationals (ie, from agency HQs) mobility and release agreements will be defining issues, which reinforces the need to focus capacity development at national level.
- If international staff are generally deployed to the large-scale crises (as is generally currently the case), the rule of thumb is success in 1 in 5 requests. 3 x 500,000 with two lead agency cluster coordinators each = $6 \times 5 = 30$. Plus average of 2 hubs in each country staffed by trained nationals: **6**
- Current Education Clusters + ongoing protracted crises: **54** (minimum; need to factor in staff turnover)

NB: This kind of projection will also need to be done for information managers, education in emergencies staff in general, as well as, for example, logisticians.

Annex 6 provides the global Education Cluster with an idea of current capacity for Cluster Coordinators. The 'Agency CVs' developed to identify staff (and other) capacity across Cluster members will need to be updated by member agencies on an annual basis in order to inform ongoing capacity assessment and planning. Numbers of HQ surge capacity required will depend on identified national capacity, and the picture of this capacity will need to be built over time.

This capacity will also need to be built on the basis of core competencies identified for education in emergencies staff. These have not yet been formally developed. In the articulation of these competencies, particular attention will need to be paid to the definition of attitudinal competencies: if agencies don't address the issue of attitudes they will be unable to influence behaviour. This is critical to the partnership working envisaged by the cluster approach.

Attempts were made throughout this study to assess different skills required in different emergency contexts, as well as across the phases of an emergency. Most agencies were unable to answer these questions. It is clear that learning needs to be captured from diverse operational experience and guidance subsequently produced for specific emergencies and for phases of emergency response. The NRC appears to be the only agency in the study set to have developed a clear picture of how skills differ across response phases – though the IRC has done this implicitly through

its Programme Framework. In addition, there is still a reported sector-wide lack of understanding of coordination as a skill set, with the focus on coordination as an activity.

Different agencies identified different technical skills gaps. Conversely both UNESCO and UNICEF noted that they have yet to define and map the skills of their current education staff, and as such were unable to highlight gaps in technical skills.

Several agencies remarked that their education advisors are not as culturally or linguistically diverse as necessary. Advisors from UN agencies tend to have UN languages, but for INGOs there is a shortage of Spanish, Portuguese, French and Arabic speaking staff. CARE, the IRC and CCF reported that they are trying to rectify this by encouraging in-country applications and the development and promotion of national staff. This should be the overall approach of cluster members, and another reason why national capacity needs to be better configured into cluster mechanisms in general.

Capacity and Gaps in Staff Capacity	
Existing capacity	Capacity gaps
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Standing team capacity of Save the Children in the form of 5 Emergency Response Personnel • Specialist education rosters/teams in Save the Children and the NRC • UNICEF's world-wide cadre of over 370 education staff, and the agency's current audit of these staff to assess which have emergency education competencies • The IRC's world-wide cadre of staff given the humanitarian mandate of the agency • Developing regional capacity for education in emergencies (UNICEF and Plan International), Regional emergency / preparedness advisors in CRS; Save the Children; UNICEF; Plan International; and WFP • UNICEF's definition of education in emergencies competencies; Save the Children's review of all emergency competencies. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Overall, too few education in emergencies staff. Including, for example, few education in emergencies advisors in agency's emergencies departments • Too few trained cluster co-ordinators (need minimum of 30 trained and deployable international staff, and 60 trained country level staff; see table on projected potential needs for cluster coordinators) • Under-resourced rosters (except for the NRC) • Insufficient logistics staff; lack of clarity about where this capacity sits • Use of in-country cluster co-ordinators impedes ongoing programme work as well as the quality of the emergency response • No agreed education in emergencies competencies; attitudinal competencies for co-ordination and partnership need particular attention • Language gaps in INGOs; specific skills gaps identified in specific agencies

Part 2: Staff Development

There is a common misconception that capacity development of staff is solved by the provision of training. However, training is only one component of capacity development and on its own cannot build capacity. Tufts University, a major provider of emergency nutrition training, has concluded that training is not necessarily the best use of resources unless part of a much wider institutional change project that might include, for example, mentoring, on-going staff development support, country-to-country exchanges, etc.

Human capacity constitutes the combination of knowledge, skills and attitudinal behaviour. According to Gostelow (2007) all three are required to enhance the capacity of individuals and groups to respond to emergencies. While knowledge and skills can be learned, including through training, attitudinal behaviour is not necessarily something that is learned but refers to a person's predisposition to use his or her knowledge and skills for a particular purpose. This requires organisational and institutional support and systems, as well as personal drivers, such as the humanitarian imperative. Accordingly, UNICEF has developed a 'Learning Strategy' while the IRC has a 'Capacity Building Strategy'. The NRC is also developing a more comprehensive learning

approach, and Save the Children utilises learning and development plans for its staff. Training is but one component in each of these strategies.

Notwithstanding, the Education Cluster requested that this study map education in emergencies training packages. There are four agencies with discrete education in emergencies training packages: the IRC; Save the Children; UNESCO; and UNICEF (see [Annex 7](#)). All of these build on the INEE Minimum Standards and associated training materials, which themselves constitute a key training resource for the sector. The most important point to note is the ongoing development of collaborative training materials by UNICEF and Save the Children through the work of the ECWG Capacity Development Task Team,³⁴ as well as the IRC's new partnership with the University of Nairobi's Faculty of Education, as described earlier. [Annex 8](#) shows other training capacity in the global Cluster (where the information has been provided). The INEE currently acts as an informal repository for many of the emergency education training resources, but as yet there is no formal or centralised mechanism for collecting and sharing training materials. Neither is there a centralised quality control mechanism.

OCHA's generic cluster sector lead training is now being incorporated into a broader Humanitarian Action Training Package for 2009. This will target cluster coordinators, programme officers dealing with resource mobilisation, and information officers. Both UNICEF and Save the Children felt that the previous OCHA training paid insufficient attention to strategic coordination skills; neither was there sufficient introduction to some of the standardised tools useful to clusters at country-level, and gender was not explicitly addressed. In addition, new responsibilities and accountabilities are crystallising – including how lead agencies can best support their Cluster Coordinators. Other key issues concern what it means to be coordinated, as well as the implications in practice of 'equal partnership', and how to work best at the inter-cluster level. UNICEF has also identified the need for a one-day training on humanitarian reform for country directors, who currently find that their lack of knowledge in this area can be a impediment. It is recommended that new OCHA training should also incorporate a component on competency assessment.

Additionally, the ECWG's Capacity Development Task Team will be developing an Education Cluster Training for cluster coordinators. This will be based on existing education in emergencies and generic training materials. The person with responsibility for developing this training will also oversee the training of a roster of cluster coordinators selected by the Global Education Cluster, in order to increase their capacity to effectively manage the education responses to humanitarian crises in countries where they may be deployed. It is intended to complete the design of this training and to roll it out by mid-2009.

Capacity Gaps

Agencies identified a number of gaps in capacity development in the sector as a whole. Chief among these is the failure to roll-out comprehensive capacity building at national level. This is partly why CCF is focusing its staff development work at country level. Moreover, several agencies feel that relationships with national staff, local NGOs and ministries need greater attention if these strategies are to be effective and sustainable.

The capacity to deliver education in emergencies training and provide follow-up is presently weak, due to both human resource and financial constraints, although the extent to which this is the case varies across agencies.

UNICEF regional offices have the responsibility for carrying out their emergency education trainings, but as the agency's toolkit has not been signed off only two regions have undertaken this training. For Save the Children, additional staff capacity is required to plan workshops and conduct trainings. This has meant de-prioritising the training roll-out while the education advisor responsible

³⁴ Save the Children and UNICEF colleagues developed a training of trainers package in February and March 2009. Two regional ToT workshops are scheduled to be held in Nairobi in April and May 2009 for teams of UNICEF, SC and MOE officers from up to 20 countries in the region. Country teams will then be supported to conduct national-level training in their countries of origin and in many cases training will be conducted at provincial and district levels for local stakeholders to increase the knowledge and capacity of education cluster members on EIE. The training incorporates a dedicated session on gender, and gender is embedded throughout the training, eg, in sessions on safe spaces, emergency supplies, and staffing issues.

supports emergencies in the field. The agency projects that it will need at least two people globally to roll out this training, with support from regions and countries. To date the agency has created a new role of Capacity Building Manager has recently been recruited (February 2009). The NRC, by contrast, uses members of its E-Team roster when there has been a need for extra capacity. The NRC is one of a number of agencies that inserts education in emergencies -specific training modules into its general induction training – though also uses these to specifically target education advisors.

Cluster leads are also expected to develop sector-specific training for their coordinators. While the global Education Cluster benefits from the INEE Minimum Standards as well as the four education in emergencies packages described above, there is as yet no training for Education Cluster Coordinators aside from the generic OCHA Cluster Coordinator training. UNICEF has been involved in developing a tri-partite training across the WASH, Health and Nutrition clusters, and work is underway to assess whether education could be included in this training and/or whether it could be used as a basis to develop an education-specific training. Prior to this, however, it will be important to identify training needs based on identified competencies for Education Cluster Coordinators. Moreover, there will be a need for UNICEF and Save the Children, as co-leads at the global level, to harmonise their policies and procedures with regard to augmenting numbers of Education Cluster Coordinators.

There were mixed views on the possibility of the cluster developing and delivering collaborative education in emergencies training, though the ECWG Task-team on Capacity Development is now pursuing this. Those agencies that did endorse the idea of coordinated training for the cluster believe that more materials will be required for this, as well as sufficient time given for materials development. Moreover, the new training should incorporate work from other agencies' education in emergencies packages. In particular, agencies called for additional materials available in different languages; compiled standards and curricula; practical guidance on anticipated situations for the field; guidance on humanitarian reform and the cluster approach; and more funding for distance learning programmes and 'soft learning' approaches like mentoring, coaching and shadowing. They also noted the need for better support to real-time learning events such as real-time evaluations and after action reviews.

There are plenty of inter-agency training collaborations which could be used as examples of collaborative training, including the Emergency Capacity Building Project of which a number of agencies involved in this study are a part. Prior to the completion of any new training materials, the NRC suggested agreement on the knowledge and skill set that education staff should have. This will need to be addressed by the ongoing work on competencies.

Although agencies provide inductions for all staff, the opportunities for ongoing learning and development are more limited. Even if agencies have policies and resources to systematise practices such as mentoring, in no instance are these well-structured; neither do there appear to be clear guidelines. It seems all agencies struggle with both the time and resources required to support learning in a more structured and holistic way; there is also very little monitoring in this area. Yet supporting learning is one of the 10 'key enablers' in the development of a comprehensive surge capacity mechanism (Houghton, 2007). Ensuring that learning is part of people's job descriptions is essential and progress will be limited until this is done.

Capacity and Gaps in Staff Development	
Existing capacity	Capacity gaps
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Work to develop an education in emergencies training package for the Education Cluster as a whole • Some agencies with experience of integrating training into wider capacity development and learning strategies, particularly at global level • The INEE website as a resource for education in emergencies training materials 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Overall lack of focus on capacity development at country level, and lack of strategies to address this • Weak capacity to deliver education in emergencies training and provide follow-up • The need for the new training to address more than is currently included in both UNICEF's and Save the Children's Education in emergencies training, and also to build on training provided by the IRC and UNESCO

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Limited opportunities for ongoing learning and staff development • Lack of an Education Cluster specific cluster coordination training
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Part 3: Mobilisation Policies and Procedures

The second tier of emergency response is the well-rehearsed movement of people (and money and stock). Houghton (2007) identifies 10 'enablers' for surge capacity. Two of them are relevant here:

1. Investment in HR as a strategic function and not just an administrative one. This is necessary not only at HQ but also at regional and/or country level.
2. The development of standard operating procedures governing all aspects of an immediate response. This is important as being able to rapidly deploy will inevitably compromise ordinary agency policies and procedures.

In terms of 1) above, this section considers the role of HR, recruitment, and deployment.

Existing Capacity

The priority afforded to, and the location of, an agency's HR capacity, as well as the development of policies to facilitate rapid deployment, define an agency's ability to respond. Experience has shown that the existence or deployment of HR specialists in the first phase of an emergency response, including for education in emergencies, is critical. UNICEF has an HR Emergency Focal Point in two regions, which anecdotally has improved rapid response. In addition, UNICEF is the only agency in the study set to employ an HR advisor specifically for education in emergencies.

HR specialists are vital bridges between the HR function and emergency units. In some instances, emergency departments have created their own HR positions – for example, in Save the Children UK and the IRC. If emergency HR sits separately, then regular and transparent communication between HR and the emergency unit / programme division is essential. UNICEF has recently taken steps to address this 'departmental divide' by connecting one of its education in emergencies advisors with the person responsible for education in emergencies recruitment in the HR department.

With regard to emergency recruitment, agencies have different levels of staff capacity. [Annex 9](#) outlines this in addition to agency approaches to HR. In terms of staff deployment, it is worth noting that only the IRC and the NRC have an explicit *and operational* HR policy that guides the operation and management of their rosters.

Capacity Gaps

Respondents to this study noted considerable constraints with their HR capacity, particularly for managing rosters and emergency recruitment at regional level. Moreover, when responsibility for emergency recruitment lies at the global level, this can lead to confusion with regard to what extent country offices take on cluster surge capacity responsibilities.

What seems to be lacking in all agencies surveyed for this study are policies and procedures to (a) identify and train education in emergencies 'talent', and (b) strategies to retain this talent. Some respondents remarked they felt this is partly because HR teams are insufficiently 'business responsive' and do not employ creative strategies to identify new talent – critical if the available pool of personnel is to widen. The Cluster's November 2007 surge capacity meeting suggested examining possible linkages with UNICEF's New and Emergency Talent Initiative.

One solution might be to strengthen links with universities in the global south to take advantage of the potential of emerging young professionals.³⁵ Another solution could involve targeted training.

³⁵ Examples to draw from are numerous and include a higher education–NGO project recently initiated at Save the Children UK called 'Enhancing Learning and Research for Humanitarian Assistance' being funded by the UK higher education funding councils; a consortium of African universities called PHREEWAY which is focused on collaboration between southern higher education institutions

Save the Children's Child Protection Scheme may provide a potential model. The agency is also in the process of developing an Emergency Education Roster, but this roster currently lacks sufficient resources to maintain it.

Agencies reported that their capacity to deploy education in emergencies advisors in the initial phase of an emergency response is limited, mostly due to constraints with releasing staff as well as lack of overall education in emergencies staff capacity. This emphasises the need to build in-country staff capacity – backed up by the fact that several agencies commented that their ability to carry out education programming depends on having advisors already in-country. The Lessons Learned Review identifies that internal policies and procedures to facilitate staff mobilisation at country level need to be reviewed. Having someone on the ground immediately to coordinate, conduct assessments and lobby donors for quick and early funding is critical.

Deployment from all rosters, except for those operated by the NRC, seems difficult, with deployment from standing teams found to work better. Moreover, there are still insufficient numbers of education in emergencies staff on agency rosters and agencies also struggle with how to incentivise people to stay on rosters. Two other issues that need attention are backfilling strategies and 'second wave' or continuity planning. One of the more important lessons concerning continuity is to develop staffing plans for an ongoing response from the beginning, once the initial assessment has been undertaken. This means having HR people in the field from the outset.

If agencies operate rosters without sufficient investment in roster management, including in quality assurance systems, they are bound to fail – as reportedly found in recent times by WFP and UNICEF. Unfortunately, employees in both agencies feel that their new staff redeployment mechanisms still lack the required management and financial support. WFP has tried to address this by instituting an activation protocol for 'corporate emergencies' as a way of getting accountability into the system. UNESCO relies on ad hoc arrangements, finding that because these are small scale and based on personal, informal networks they tend to work well. Other rosters with education in emergencies personnel include: Canadem (an NGO supported by CIDA) and Swiss Cooperation. It would be useful if the Education Cluster looked to create formal links with these other rosters in order to boost the number of potentially available personnel.

Another major issue with regards to deployment concerns the terms and conditions that agencies offer to their staff. While those agencies that answered this question listed various services they provide, many report that they still 'don't do enough'. Neither do they track how their 'R & R' policies impact on retention, or monitor adherence to these policies. While UNICEF, with DfID funding, has launched a series of peer support volunteer networks, there are no resources to track and monitor these staff.

Capacity and gaps in Mobilisation Policies and Procedures	
Existing capacity	Capacity gaps
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UNICEF's HR capacity at regional level; the agency's employment of an HR advisor specifically for Education in emergencies • Some specific emergency recruitment capacity in all agencies • The IRC and NRC policies on the operation and management of their rosters 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Little high-level support and resources for rosters • Too few policies and procedures to identify and train Education in emergencies talent, and to retain this talent • Difficulty deploying Education in emergencies advisors to the first phase of every response (due to overall limited numbers) • Greater attention required to back-filling strategies and continuity planning • Lack of comprehensive care packages to support surge capacity staff in general, and little monitoring of these policies

and NGOs in the areas of humanitarian assistance and risk reduction; and a more recent initiative between the IRC and the University of Nairobi that seeks to build the capacity of the university's education faculty to train masters students in emergency education.

Financial Capacity

The global Education Cluster is seen to provide both an opportunity and an imperative to advocate for increased resources for education in emergencies preparedness, response and recovery programming. Nearly all of the agencies underlined the critical need to engage better with donors, with a particular focus on advocating for the inclusion of education as part of humanitarian policy and response.

Existing Capacity

Over the past three years there has been a consistent increase in total humanitarian aid to education, as well as an increasing proportion of humanitarian aid to education (Table 2). Moreover, since 2006 education has been included in the CERF guidelines which has resulted in an increasing amount of education funding through the CERF (Table 3). The source for this data is the OCHA FTS, and was accessed in September 2008.

Year	Total Humanitarian (US\$ millions)	Funding for Education (US\$ millions)	Education Funding as % of Total Funding
2005	13,152	216	1.6
2006	7,495	112	1.5
2007	7,713	147	1.9
2008	8,645	213	2.5

Year	Education (US\$ millions)	Education as % of total	No. of countries to receive funding
2006	1.0	0.40%	2
2007	4.4	1.26%	11
2008	7.0	1.78%	15

Some of these opportunities have been opened up by changes in donor policy. These include:

- The European Commission's Humanitarian Aid Office's (ECHO) recently launched working document on children in humanitarian crises which has a particular focus on education in emergencies. ECHO has also made a commitment to develop more operational recommendations for its humanitarian interventions in education.
- An increasing variety of pooled funding mechanisms at country level, some of which directly benefit education clusters (e.g. OCHA's Humanitarian Response Fund in Somalia).
- An unprecedented \$200m commitment to UNICEF by the Netherlands government. This is intended to allow UNICEF and key partners to improve their staff capacity, operational strategies and intervention mechanisms to strengthen education in emergencies, post-crisis transitions and fragile states.

Having appropriate funding mechanisms at an agency level is critical in a situation of limited resources. Moreover, agencies require flexible and effective financial management systems if they are to scale up rapidly. This is linked to how an agency prioritises its spending based on its mandate. Leverage as a result of collaboration is also critical in a context of limited funding – whether internally between departments or externally between different cluster members. It is notable that during the course of this study, CCF changed its strategic objectives to include emergency response to better enable it to access available institutional resources.

An agency's vision for education surge capacity needs to be developed as part of a managed programme of investment and growth – a point backed up by a number of respondents who

suggest that being able to demonstrate long-term strategies and intentions to donors is vital. [Annex 10](#) and [Annex 11](#) delineate agencies' capacity – and the challenges they face – with regard to their funding mechanisms. While none of the agencies earmark money for preparedness, including for education in emergencies, it is worth noting other significant capacity in this area. For example, UNICEF has significant funding for capacity development (from the Netherlands) as well as some regional capacity for preparedness. In addition, agencies that do not have to reclaim 100% of their deployment costs (e.g., Save the Children UK and the IRC) are able to assign their surge capacity staff to work on preparedness activities when not deployed to an emergency.

Capacity Gaps

Despite increasing global dialogue and commitments since 2005, evidence from data still shows that funding still does not meet requirements: in the 2008 Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) to date (September 2008) education was 4.7% of the requirements but only received 3.0% of the funding. While all sectors are under-funded, education receives one of lowest proportions of funding:

Year	Total humanitarian % coverage	Education % coverage
2005	67	66
2006	66	26
2007	72	40
2008	57	37

Moreover, according to Save the Children's *Last in Line, Last in School* report (2008):

- Only five donors have clear policies on education in emergencies (Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Japan, Canada).
- Funding by individual donors is low: only Denmark and Australia allocated over 4.2% of their humanitarian aid to education (and only 7 other donors over 2%).

The endemic problems with funding education in emergencies are well-documented in the *Last in Line, Last in School* reports and elsewhere. It is therefore no surprise that survey responses highlighted the difficulties in the current global funding environment, with both education response and preparedness being found to be inadequately supported. This is reflected by the 27 per cent funding of the global Education Cluster in its first year, and only through four donors: Denmark, Ireland, Norway and Sweden. It is compounded by the lack of proportionality and political partialities in humanitarian funding. Furthermore, what little donor funding there is for education in emergencies is frequently short term, and there is a tendency for donors to pledge more than they disburse and/or for commitments to be disbursed too slowly (surveys and *ibid*). In addition, interviewees indicated that they feel international funding instruments still favour UN agencies over INGOs. This has sometimes been seen to militate against partnership at country level.

On the sustainability of education in emergencies programmes, nearly all of the participating agencies made the point that there are major gaps in funding transition and recovery programming, while responses to chronic crises are particularly difficult to maintain. These factors combine to threaten the predictability, timeliness, effectiveness and accountability of education in emergencies responses. They also have implications for the achievement of countries' MDGs.

Of the seven agencies to respond to whether their agency funding mechanisms for surge capacity are fit for purpose, four responded 'partially adequate' while three responded 'inadequate'. Reasons for perceived gaps include:

- dependence on institutional donors for sustainability;

- the need to be more strategic in the funding of capacity development, including better investment in HR systems;
- the obligations for agencies entailed by humanitarian reform;
- a lack of funding for short-notice deployments; and
- the need to pay money back soon after deployment but before being able to secure further funding.

Agencies that don't have significant funding available for start-up operations report constraints (see, for example, Willitts-King & Darcy, 2005). Those agencies that do have funding for start-up operations have correspondingly grown in size and quality (ibid). The importance of own emergency funds in the decision to launch a response and to support the first week in particular is also reported in a survey of WASH cluster members (Cosgrave, 2008). This implies the need for agencies to establish their own emergency funds if they are to respond effectively in the initial phase of an emergency.

In addition, few agencies earmark money for gender responsive programming. NRC's GEN-CAP roster and UNHCR's VAR projects are examples of such programmes. UNICEF commented that, while money is set aside, integration remains weak during emergencies. Save the Children pushes gender-responsive programming through its standard operating procedures (SOPs) rather than through funding.

In terms of fulfilling cluster commitments, all of the eight agencies to answer this question feel that they need additional resources – including UNICEF, which has set aside 2m USD for global level cluster activities in 2008. This is reflective of the widely held view that insufficient money has been made available to properly fund the institutional change required by humanitarian reform. The partnership model demanded by the cluster approach involves transaction costs not previously present – including to train a cadre of cluster coordinators – in addition to simply more money for good quality staff capacity.

An important message is that surge and other mechanisms can only ever be a 'palliative solution' (EC, 2004). Building greater national capacity and scaling up country programmes should be the priority and is a costly process.

Capacity and gaps in Financial Capacity	
Existing capacity	Capacity gaps
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increasing humanitarian aid for education in emergencies. • Education now included in Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) guidelines. • Positive developments in other donor policy instruments, at both global and country level. • Some global Education Cluster agencies have emergency response funds which enable them to mount rapid response. • UNICEF has significant funding for capacity development in education in emergencies. • UNICEF has targeted funds to develop regional staff capacity in particular. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lack of overall funding for education in emergencies. • Funding for education in emergencies is often short-term and not focused on outcomes and longer term goals • Few donors have clear policies on education in emergencies, and there's very little education funded through humanitarian departments. • Continued emphasis on funding to UN bodies which can make partnership difficult. • Emphasis on revolving funds mean money needs to be returned to emergency funding mechanisms. • No agencies earmark funding for preparedness, though a number support specific capacity development / preparedness staff positions. • Little gender responsive earmarking.

Quality and Accountability

Quality and accountability are important aspects of capacity, yet all too often over-looked. An additional issue to consider in the cluster context is that collaborative ways of working as envisaged by humanitarian reform will require clearly defined accountabilities at multiple levels throughout the cluster 'system'. The IASC is currently looking to define and formalise different country and global level accountabilities, and the Education Cluster will follow this broader initiative.


Existing Capacity

Only seven agencies responded fully to the Accountability Survey (CCF; the IRC; the NRC; SC-UK; UNESCO; UNICEF; WFP) in part due to the burden of information collection associated with this study. It is also thought to reflect the challenges agencies faced with regard to accountability in general. All of the agencies to respond, except for CCF, have statements specifying how they seek to ensure accountability to their different stakeholders. Education and accountability standards and frameworks actively used are shown in Chart 2.


The provision of accountability training to education in emergencies staff in the agencies surveyed is mixed. Only the IRC and the NRC have mandatory trainings in this area, with IRC staff all trained in using SPHERE and the INEE Minimum Standards and NRC staff undergoing training in their accountability obligations at an annual global education workshop. Save the Children and UNICEF offer similar trainings, but not systematically and they are not mandatory. CCF and UNESCO currently do not provide training in this area.

UNESCO and WFP are the only agencies to require all staff to demonstrate competencies in programme design, management, needs assessment and monitoring and evaluation; WFP have a beneficiary contact monitoring methodology, which all staff must be able to use. Other agencies require staff to demonstrate these competencies, but not for every post. UNICEF noted that much of its monitoring and evaluation capacity is decentralised and that most of its country offices have a specialised monitoring and evaluation unit. CCF noted that it is rolling out a new Planning, Accountability and Learning System (PALS) which will include more training on M&E.

Chart 2: Education and Accountability Standards and Frameworks Used



In terms of technical standards, all the agencies to contribute to the study utilise the INEE Minimum Standards. The following chart shows how the INEE Minimum Standards are used:



In addition, all of the participating agencies have policies to institutionalise the INEE Minimum Standards – apart from UNESCO, which is soon to enact them as part of its overall education in post-conflict and post-disaster situations policy, and Plan International, which lacks the dedicated human resource capacity to do so. Different agencies have institutionalised the INEE Minimum Standards in different ways. For example: the INEE Minimum Standards are integrated into the Save the Children education in emergencies toolkit and capacity building training; UNICEF has been involved in training workshops jointly with the INEE Coordinator for Minimum Standards; and, WFP includes them in its draft school feeding policy.

Despite challenges, it was noted that the cluster approach is improving the accountability of emergency responses in education due to the simple fact of getting agencies around the table at the global level, to discuss education in a specifically emergency context.

Capacity Gaps

With regard to quality, one issue is that members of Education Clusters at country level do not always know what constitutes a quality education in emergencies intervention. This is due to a number of factors, including: the relatively recent formal incorporation of education into humanitarian response; the lack of system-wide evaluations of education in emergencies programmes; the lack of sufficient numbers of appropriately skilled personnel; the INEE Minimum Standards (including its provisions on gender equality) not being widely used or understood, in addition to other relevant guidelines such as the s (2006) gender handbook for humanitarian action; the huge variation in country contexts; and the fact that 'education in emergencies' is interpreted differently in different settings. In response to this challenge a number of clusters have begun to develop their own set of indicators for education in emergencies interventions (e.g., in Somalia and the Democratic Republic of Congo). Others noted the need for such work, while yet others noted the need for these indicators to go beyond 'service delivery' and address the issue of quality of education in emergencies work. A major part of the problem seems to be that many Education Clusters don't have clear work-plans with attendant aims, objectives and indicators; also that there is a continuing focus on outputs rather than outcomes.

These are issues that global Education Cluster members can help their country-level counterparts address – not least by defining how accountabilities and relationships work at the global level and by continuing to work on clarifying indicators and competencies for education in emergencies. It is suggested that Education Clusters would do well to pool their shared resources (eg, UNICEF's Core Commitments for Children; indicators identified in Save the Children's Emergency Education SOPs;

the INEE Minimum Standards) to define the core components of education in emergencies interventions; indicators which could be adapted to each country context.

In the main, quality was considered to be a more serious issue than accountability, with many agencies noting some very positive improvements with accountability in terms of improved coordination and coverage, as well as increased response times. However, in no instance has any Education Cluster formalised any internal or external institutional accountability mechanisms – considered a huge gap by many of those interviewed. Education cluster coordinators have been particularly unclear about their accountabilities. In addition, the IASC Guidance (2007) does not require cluster members to be held accountable to cluster leads – globally or nationally – and does not require accountability of non-UN actors to UN agencies, except in instances where they have made specific commitments.

On the whole, cluster members are hugely appreciative of the INEE Minimum Standards. However, several challenges were noted. The most commonly identified challenge was in terms of contextualising and making the standards specific both to different emergency contexts, including natural disasters, and to agencies' own contexts. In particular, there is a need for more operational guidance on their application. This might be mitigated by the recent 'companionship agreement' between the INEE and the Sphere Project which will help ensure that linkages are made between the INEE Minimum Standards and the Sphere Handbook in terms of advocacy, promotion and communications as well as training. Gaps in preparedness and recovery programming were also noted, as was the emphasis on qualitative versus quantitative indicators. Linked to this, a number of agencies noted the need for a thorough review of INEE Minimum Standards Handbook and one agency felt that protection issues could be more explicitly integrated. The INEE Secretariat and Working Group on Minimum Standards has been collecting feedback on the INEE Minimum Standards Handbook since their launch in 2004 and will be coordinating an update of the standards in 2009 to address and incorporate these inputs.

Beyond barriers to using standards, agencies noted that accountability is not included in the job descriptions of their education in emergencies staff. While the IRC do not include accountability directly in job descriptions, it is written into performance evaluations. Save the Children UK is still developing an overall framework for this. CCF emergency staff do not currently have this in their job descriptions.

In addition, the resources to implement the different policies are only partially adequate. This includes challenges with monitoring their implementation and being able to follow up evaluations closely. The contexts in which each of the standard frameworks are applicable was also questioned. The IRC felt that there is a challenge 'across the board' in making individuals responsible for how their work affects people, and that the notion of accountability should go beyond fulfilling terms of reference. The NRC noted that, in particular, accountability to child and youth beneficiaries in education programmes needs to be improved.

Many of the challenges in this area could be addressed by conducting a joint evaluation or series of after action reviews of education in emergencies across cluster members. The issue of quality would need to be given equal status in such an evaluation, as well as the way in which agencies are mainstreaming cluster activities, as this will need to be the model in the longer term. Some interviewees suggested employing monitoring and evaluation personnel at regional/country level to address quality and accountability issues more thoroughly.

Capacity and Gaps in Standards and Accountability Mechanisms	
Existing capacity	Capacity gaps
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In general, high-level support for quality and accountability standards in agencies. • Good incorporation of the INEE Minimum Standards into different agency trainings • IRC and NRC mandatory training in standards; UNICEF and Save the Children also have specific training materials. • WFP and UNESCO's competency 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Too few resources to implement the different quality and accountability policies. • No formal cluster accountability mechanism or delineation of different accountabilities and how they work • Lack of understanding about what is a 'quality' education in emergencies intervention. Limited focus on quality during

<p>frameworks for assessing skills in monitoring and evaluation and learning</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UNICEF's decentralised monitoring and evaluation capacity so that every country office has a specialist • CCF's new Planning, Accountability and Learning System 	<p>emergency response</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Quality and accountabilities issues not generally included in job descriptions • Need to contextualise the INEE Minimum Standards and make standards specific to different emergency context • Little coverage of preparedness and recovery programming in the INEE Minimum Standards.
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Recommendations

GLOBAL LEVEL

- 1.1 The ECU and members of the Education Cluster to clearly define a series of different baselines prior to convening a scenario planning exercise as the basis for determining quantifiable targets that can be turned into a concrete capacity development plan. Some of the information in this report will be relevant (eg, [Annex 6](#)); additional work will be required in other areas, such as competencies.
- 1.2 The ECU and co-lead agency HQs to develop a joint advocacy strategy and together undertake more strategic advocacy to ensure sufficient recognition and resource allocations for education in donor humanitarian funding. Additionally, seek to hold governments and donors accountable to global and national commitments to education in emergencies, including: incorporating education in humanitarian first response; mobilising resources for second phase response; attaining education-related Millennium Development Goals and Education for All.
- 1.3 All members of the ECWG to continue to build / strengthen partnerships within the Cluster, especially as they relate to coherent co-leadership functions, complementarity of different activities with the INEE and other agencies and networks, and enhancing inter-Cluster relations / mutual support.
- 1.4 The ECU, based on the work of relevant Task Teams and in consultation with relevant technical specialists, including in country-level clusters, to develop / operationalise a clear and simple toolkit for country level implementation that includes:
 - Guidance on when and how to initiate / formalise a cluster and establish harmonious co-leadership (over and above the generic guidance provided by the IASC).
 - A set of operations management tools – including minimum terms of reference for Cluster Coordinators; common assessment tools, and generic education-focused MoUs to promote government/agency partner relations.
 - Clarification of the role, responsibilities and accountabilities of the Education Cluster within the Humanitarian Country Team and the UN Country Team (the ECU to concurrently advocate with the IASC to promote more generic orientation in this regard).
- 1.5 The ECU and Knowledge Management Task Team to develop a comprehensive Knowledge Management (KM) Strategy for the Education Cluster which links to cluster-wide KM initiatives. This strategy should integrate the various related advocacy and communications activities required and listed in these recommendations. It should also address ways to improve information management and needs assessments.
- 1.6 The ECWG to ensure that organisations participating in the global Cluster cover the breadth of the mandate of the Education Cluster, from preparedness / contingency planning, to DRR, emergency response, and early / development, at all levels of education.

2. ORGANISATIONAL LEVEL

- 2.1 Cluster members to re-assess their mandates and strategic objectives in order to: (1) ascertain whether their current capacity is matched to their mandates, including their new cluster commitments; (2) where relevant, re-adjust their strategic objectives in order to clarify any confusion about levels of ambition and scale; and (3) ensure that there is optimal programme integration.
- 2.2 Programming: Based on the experience and on different programme and other strengths of cluster members, the ECWG to address identify current gaps or insufficiencies in programming, for example in the areas of DRR; ECD; quality secondary and vocational skills training; disabilities; the environment; early recovery / development; and other cross-cutting issues. This can be achieved through:
- (a) targeted outreach to, and alliances with, agencies that specialise in areas not well-covered in the current ECWG membership;
 - (b) development of capacity of current members by incorporating identified gaps into appropriate training opportunities;
 - (c) incorporating these areas into existing education in emergencies training and linking with other Clusters' training plans, including IASC training.
- 2.3 Supplies (material capacity, mainly within UNICEF):
- (a) Enhance and systematic local (including sub-national) stockpiling for use as a cluster resource; consider de-branding these stockpiles, as they should be for use of all cluster members.
 - (b) Progressively develop cluster-branded, standardised and quality materials: eg, for emergency child-friendly school tents and kit lists adapted for differing schools, teachers and pupils. Also develop a standard list and budget template for such material resources required to support an Education cluster in an emergency.
 - (c) Promote discussions about the global Education Cluster's mandate in light of the programme gaps identified as a result of this study. Consider whether membership should involve a greater and stated commitment to collaboration and partnership.

3. HUMAN RESOURCE CAPACITY

- 3.1 Education Cluster Coordinators
- (a) Develop education cluster coordinator training in line with commonly defined set of competencies. This needs to focus more on coordination than specific technical areas.
 - (b) Review current staff capacity on the basis of agreed competencies in all member agencies, then analyse this capacity and expenditure to extrapolate desired staff capacity levels and associated costs. Estimated need for 30 trained international Cluster Coordinators and a minimum of 60 trained national coordinators.
 - (c) Based on the above, increase the number of potential education cluster coordinators spread between international, regional and national staff.
 - (d) Develop surge capacity and system(s) both within agencies and cross agencies (including rosters and stand-by agreements) to enable rapid deployment of cluster coordinators, education in emergency specialists and support functions (particularly in relation to knowledge management) where needed. This should link to continuity / succession planning. (At the international level, it is recommended that surge capacity systems are modeled on standing capacity as the most effective means of rapid deployment; otherwise regional / country-level mechanisms should be prioritised.)

3.2 Education in Emergency Staff

- (a) Develop cluster-wide education in emergencies training (including preparedness / contingency planning, DRR, and early recovery / development) within an agreed, well-defined set of competencies.
- (b) Increase the overall pool of education in emergency specialists through building regional and country-level capacity, including alternative staff development strategies other than training.
- (c) Pay due attention to attitudinal competencies, and link the competencies to a national vocational accreditation system in order to properly support staff development.
- (d) Ensure competencies are reflected in education in emergencies and Cluster Coordination training. Agree generic terms of reference for Cluster Coordinators based on the competencies taking into account different skill sets required for different types or phases of an emergency).

3.3 Provide clarity to all country-level clusters by defining the different levels of staff capacity and corresponding costs required to manage and lead cluster partnerships in different context. See Table on Projected Potential Needs for Trained Cluster Coordinators as an example of how to calculate this.

3.4 Support roll out of the Capacity Assessment and Preparedness tools and workshop developed as part of this study, in order to assist in estimating HR (and other) capacity needs at country level.

4. FINANCE

4.1 Linked to the joint advocacy strategy, develop a comprehensive fundraising strategy focused on needs at country level, which should include accepting more education projects / activities in donor humanitarian appeals and funding, as well as strategies mobilising resources for second phase response toward early recovery / development.

4.2 Ensure adequate financial tracking and quality reporting of all funding for education in emergencies.

4.3 Develop guidance tools for country-level clusters to prepare funding requests and access funding for country-level needs / plans.

4.4 Ensure sufficient funds are available to address the gaps identified among cluster leads and participating agencies. Lead agencies to develop funding strategies to ensure that these costs are mainstreamed in the longer-term.

5. QUALITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY

5.1 Develop an integrated monitoring and evaluation strategy for the Education Cluster including:

- (a) Identifying a set of country-level cluster indicators (building on those developed in the Lessons Learned Report);
- (b) country-focused evaluations: real time learning and after action reviews;
- (c) regional support for M & E and learning for country-level education clusters.

5.2 Continue to support the work of and collaborate closely with INEE on the revision of the Minimum Standards:

- a) Feed into the process of updating the INEE Minimum Standards Handbook
- b) Develop guidance on the application of the INEE Minimum Standards by education clusters

- c) Link with the work of the INEE Task Teams on cross-cutting issues
 - d) Feed into the process of developing inter-agency Guidance Notes on Safer School Construction (*this will begin to address the gap on DRR*)
 - e) Develop guidance on the application of INEE Guidance Notes on Safer School Construction and on Teacher Compensation
- 5.3 Clarify both individual accountabilities and lines of accountability across the education cluster and humanitarian architecture, including:
- (a) Feeding into and implementing IASC guidance that is currently under development (as well as any future IASC guidance documents); and
 - (b) Clarifying / formalizing relationship between country-level clusters and the ECU.
- 5.4 Continue to prioritise partnership effectiveness across the co-lead agencies, for example:
- (a) Defining appropriate measures of success at a global and country levels);
 - (b) evaluating the co-lead relationship as a possible model for other clusters.

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