

**Conflict Sensitivity and Peacebuilding in UNICEF**  
**Technical Note**  
June 2012

**SUMMARY**

This Technical Note responds to the growing recognition<sup>1</sup> that: (i) countries affected by conflict and high levels of violence are a priority for UNICEF; (ii) UNICEF plays a vital role in peacebuilding; and (iii) UNICEF needs a more systematic approach to ensure all its programmes are conflict sensitive and to design explicit peacebuilding interventions in order to improve the quality of its programmes and achieve better and more sustainable results for children in these contexts.

Over 1 billion children under the age of 18 live in areas affected by conflict and high levels of violence. The risk of conflict relapse remains high. Smaller-scale, low-intensity intra-state conflicts and multiple forms of violence pose a new category of threats for children. In countries affected by violence and conflict, UNICEF programmes can either passively reinforce or actively address violence and conflict factors.<sup>2</sup> UNICEF therefore must ensure all programmes avoid exacerbating conflict and violence factors (conflict sensitivity) and, where appropriate, better address the causes of conflict and violence (peacebuilding).

The note aims to support a more systematic approach in UNICEF to conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding. While conflict sensitivity applies to all programmes, including humanitarian, peacebuilding applies only UNICEF's development programmes. The note explains key concepts, offers tools and approaches, identifies entry points in UNICEF strategies, frameworks and programmes, and provides examples of UNICEF programmatic contributions in this area. The note recommends three principal directions for UNICEF:

- all UNICEF strategies and programmes in these countries should be informed by a robust conflict analysis;
- all UNICEF strategies and programmes in these countries should be conflict sensitive; and
- UNICEF should take a more explicit and systematic approach to peacebuilding, where appropriate.

These directions involve actions in a number of key areas, including: making peacebuilding for children a national and global priority, including influencing country-specific plans, as well as UN and inter-agency strategies, policies and frameworks; identifying conflict and violence factors affecting children; and integrating conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding into UNICEF strategies, systems, and programmes to reduce risks to children.

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<sup>1</sup> Including calls from Member States (e.g. UK, Denmark, Netherlands) and assessments (e.g. Conflict Sensitivity Assessment in DRC, Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment in Madagascar) and requests for a more strategic approach from field leadership in violence- and conflict-affected countries through a sustained global dialogue in 2009-2010.

<sup>2</sup> This is major lesson from the Do No Harm project: no intervention is neutral. See Six Lessons from the Do No Harm Project, CDA Collaborative Learning Projects, [http://www.cdainc.com/cdawww/pdf/manual/dnh\\_the\\_six\\_lessons\\_from\\_the\\_do\\_no\\_harm\\_project\\_Pdf.pdf](http://www.cdainc.com/cdawww/pdf/manual/dnh_the_six_lessons_from_the_do_no_harm_project_Pdf.pdf).

## **INTRODUCTION**

### **Conflict, Violence and Children**

Over 1 billion children under the age of 18 now live in areas affected by conflict and high levels of violence—almost one-sixth of the world population. No conflict-affected country has achieved a single Millennium Development Goal (MDG).<sup>3</sup> Children in conflict-affected states are more than three times as likely to be unable to go to school, children are twice as likely to die before age five,<sup>4</sup> and more than twice as likely to lack clean water.<sup>5</sup> Eight of the 10 countries with the highest under-five mortality are conflict-affected and/or fragile.<sup>6</sup> The most vulnerable during times of conflict, children are not merely bystanders, but targets and, increasingly, instruments. The direct consequences of conflict can include child recruitment and use, gender-based violence, killing and maiming, separation from families, trafficking and illegal detention, and long-term negative impacts on the mental health and well-being of children.

Armed conflict has changed dramatically in recent decades. Civil wars recur at an alarming rate—nearly 60 percent of all countries that suffered one civil war experience conflict again. Recurring civil wars have become the dominant form of conflict in the world, and primarily in sub-Saharan Africa.<sup>7</sup> But while civil wars and deaths from civil wars are declining in number overall,<sup>8</sup> a rising concern is how armed conflict has become more fluid, diversified and has descended into a “fragmentation of violence.”<sup>9</sup> The recent World Bank *World Development Report: Conflict, Security and Development* highlights this pattern.<sup>10</sup>

Long lasting, smaller-scale, low-intensity intra-state wars and multiple forms of violence pose a new category of threats with particular impact on children. For instance, they involve ill-trained combatants, armed with readily available small arms,<sup>11</sup> and are increasingly characterized by the use of rape and sexual violation of children and women. There is also an increasingly complex intersection of conflict and disaster risk. Thus, traditional understandings of conflict and peace are insufficient to uphold children’s rights in this new landscape of multiplying risks.

Under the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), children’s rights are not subject to derogation, and they apply both in peacetime and in conflict, when children are at their most vulnerable. Armed conflict affects all aspects of child development—physical, mental and emotional. Affirming the protection of children in situations of armed conflict as a fundamental

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<sup>3</sup> *World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security and Development*, World Bank, 2011, p.2. In fact, the Report claims that violence is the main constraint to countries meeting the MDGs (p.62). The International Dialogue process, joining fragile states (G7+), OECD donors and UN partners has identified key peacebuilding and statebuilding interim objectives in order to meet the MDGs. These objectives form part of the “New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States”, endorsed by the International Dialogue at the November 2011 Busan High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness. See [http://www.oecd.org/document/22/0,3746,en\\_21571361\\_43407692\\_49151766\\_1\\_1\\_1\\_1,00.html](http://www.oecd.org/document/22/0,3746,en_21571361_43407692_49151766_1_1_1_1,00.html).

<sup>4</sup> Almost 70 percent of the countries with the highest child mortality burden have experienced armed conflict over the past 20 years only. *A fair chance at life: why equity matters for child mortality*, International Save the Children Alliance, 2010, London: Save the Children.

<sup>5</sup> *World Development Report 2011*, p.5.

<sup>6</sup> UN Inter-Agency Group for Child Mortality Estimation, 2011.

<sup>7</sup> *Conflict Relapse and the Sustainability of Post-Conflict Peace*, Barbara F. Walter, September 2010, Background Paper for the World Bank *World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security and Development*.

<sup>8</sup> *World Development Report 2011*, p.2-3.

<sup>9</sup> SIPRI Yearbook 2008: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008).

<sup>10</sup> *World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security and Development*, World Bank, p.4-5.

<sup>11</sup> Machel Study 10-Year Strategic Review: Children and Conflict in a Changing World, UNICEF (2009), p.4-5.

peace and security concern, The Security Council has adopted eight resolutions on children and armed conflict since 1999. Six grave violations against children are monitored in 15 conflict affected countries by a Task Force on monitoring and reporting (MRM) co-chaired by the UNICEF Country Representative.<sup>12</sup> UNICEF plays a lead role in this mechanism, in the field and at HQ, and especially in engaging with parties to the conflict to develop means to stop, prevent and respond to grave violations against children.

Children and adolescents make unique contributions to peacebuilding. It is their right under the CRC to participate in decisions that affect them, which applies in violence- and conflict-affected contexts. Moreover, the role of children and adolescents in peacebuilding can make peacebuilding efforts more effective and sustainable. Their roles can range from creating a culture of peace, supporting reconciliation and the rebuilding of social relationships to searching for protection and rights. Ignoring the varied capacities of children and adolescents undermines the capacity of a community and society as a whole to address conflict factors and cope with consequences.

## **Conflict Sensitivity and Peacebuilding: Background**

### **Definitions**

Conflict sensitivity is the capacity of an organisation to understand its operating context, understand the interaction between its interventions and the context, and act upon this understanding to avoid negative impacts (“do no harm”) and maximise positive impacts on conflict factors.<sup>13</sup>

Peacebuilding involves a multidimensional range of measures to reduce the risk of a lapse or relapse into conflict by addressing both the causes and consequences of conflict, and strengthen national capacities at all levels for conflict management in order to lay foundations for sustainable peace and development.<sup>14</sup> Peacebuilding is multidimensional (including political, security, social and economic dimensions), occurs at all levels in a society (national to community levels), and includes governments, civil society, the UN system, as well as an array of international and national partners.

Another important term related to peacebuilding, is peace dividend. Peace dividends are visible, tangible results of peace, delivered ideally by the state, but also by international partners, and also accessible beyond the political elite to communities throughout the state and in an equitable manner.<sup>15</sup> Peace dividends may not necessarily address the underlying causes of conflict, but are nonetheless vital actions that address the consequences of conflict. They help create incentives for

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<sup>12</sup> The Resolutions are: 1261 (1999), 1314 (2000), 1379 (2001), 1460 (2002), 1539 (2004), 1612 (2005), 1882 (2009), and 1998 (2011). The six grave violations are: killing or maiming of children; recruitment or use of children as soldiers; attacks against schools or hospitals; denial of humanitarian access for children; abduction of children; rape and other grave sexual abuse of children. For information, see: <http://www.un.org/children/conflict/english/index.html>.

<sup>13</sup> *Conflict-sensitive approaches to development, humanitarian assistance and peace building: tools for peace and conflict impact assessment*, Conflict Sensitivity Consortium ([www.ConflictSensitivity.org](http://www.ConflictSensitivity.org)).

<sup>14</sup> Adapted from the Secretary General’s Policy Committee Decision, May 2007. See also Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Development Assistance Committee *The DAC Guidelines: Helping Prevent Violent Conflict*, Paris, OECD-DAC, 2001, p. 23. For the purposes of this note, conflict prevention, comprising short-term measures to prevent an imminent escalation of a potential conflict and longer-term measures to address underlying causes of a potential conflict, shall be subsumed under peacebuilding. It is important to note, however, that conflict prevention is considered a distinct domain by certain UN actors, such as the Department for Political Affairs (DPA). DPA, for instance, maintains specialized mechanisms, such as mediation teams, which are considered uniquely preventive in nature.

<sup>15</sup> Adapted from *Report of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict* (2009), A/63/881–S/2009/304.

non-violent behaviour, reduce fear and begin instilling confidence in affected populations in their communities and in the legitimacy of their institutions.

## Origins

The realization that development and humanitarian interventions could have negative impacts on affected populations emerged in the 1990s. Evidence pointed to how infusing resources in environments characterized by scarcity, inequalities, competition and inter-group tensions could in fact ‘do harm’ by exacerbating tensions and conflict dynamics.<sup>16</sup> Concern arose over how dominant development strategies (such as structural adjustment) were having negative effects on the stability of recipient countries,<sup>17</sup> how development actors poorly understood local realities and implemented programmes assuming an artificially depoliticized context, and even how humanitarian aid deliveries sometimes precipitated raiding and the diversion of food and other supplies to combatants.<sup>18</sup>

This concern led to the “do no harm” principle and the concept of conflict sensitivity.<sup>19</sup> Conflict sensitivity considers the potential impact of development or humanitarian interventions on their environment and, particularly, prevailing conflict dynamics and supports organizations to conduct their activities in the least harmful way. For instance, health or education projects can avoid legitimizing or supporting systems and structures that promote violence and conflict, or creating tensions between groups over access to services. Conflict sensitivity has an important role in supporting humanitarian principles and ensuring that humanitarian assistance fulfils its humanitarian objectives.

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<sup>16</sup> See: *Conflict, Peace, and Development Cooperation at the Threshold of the 21st Century*, OECD DAC Policy Statement, 1997, [http://gwweb.jica.go.jp/km/FSubject0501.nsf/95129be37202c5aa49256b92001e3263/971d2b5234e67b2549256e01001c15bc/\\$FILE/CONFLI~1.PDF](http://gwweb.jica.go.jp/km/FSubject0501.nsf/95129be37202c5aa49256b92001e3263/971d2b5234e67b2549256e01001c15bc/$FILE/CONFLI~1.PDF); Anderson, Mary, *Do No Harm: How Aid can Support Peace—or War*, (Lynne Rienner, 1999); Andersen, R, *How Multilateral Development Assistance Triggered the Conflict in Rwanda*, *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 21, no. 3, 2000.

<sup>17</sup> For instance, aid privileged social groups at the expenses of others, reducing access to social services and exacerbating distributional conflicts. See Woodward, Susan, *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War* (Brookings Institution Press 1995). See also: Collier, P, *Africa: Geography and Growth*, Oxford University Centre for the Study of African Economies, Oxford, 2006; Keen, D., *Liberalization and Conflict*, *International Political Science Review*, vol. 26, no. 1 (2005), pp. 73-89.

<sup>18</sup> Ferguson, J, *The Anti-Politics Machine: ‘Development’, Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, MN, 1994.

<sup>19</sup> For more information, see: the Do No Harm Project website at <http://www.donoharm.info/content/welcome/welcome.php>; CDA/Collaborative Learning Project’s *Do No Harm Workbook* at [http://www.cdawww.com/cdawww/pdf/manual/dnh\\_workbook\\_Pdf.pdf](http://www.cdawww.com/cdawww/pdf/manual/dnh_workbook_Pdf.pdf); and Zicherman et al, *Applying conflict sensitivity in emergency response*, Humanitarian Policy Group Network Paper No. 70 (October 2011), <http://www.odihpn.org/hpn-resources/hpn-network-papers/applying-conflict-sensitivity-emergency-response-current-practice-ways-forward>.

### Six Lessons from the Do No Harm Project<sup>20</sup>

**Whenever an intervention of any sort enters a context it becomes part of the context.**

- No intervention is seen as neutral by people in the context.

**All contexts are characterized by “dividers” and “connectors”.**

- We can analyze a context in terms of dividers and connectors.
- This analysis is done better by teams.
- This analysis needs to be iterative, being done on a regular schedule.

**All interventions interact with both, either making them worse or making them better.**

**Actions and behaviors have consequences (ABC).**

- All interventions consists of both actions and behaviors
- Actions reflect effects of resources being brought by an organization into a context.
- Behavior reflects the conduct of the people bringing the resources.

**The details of interventions matter.**

- The details are where the impacts come from, not the whole.
- By analyzing the details of an intervention, we can determine how actions and behaviors are having an impact on the context.

**There are always options.**

- Options grow out of understanding our actions and behaviors.
- Generating options is done better by teams.

Whereas conflict sensitivity can be viewed as the “minimum standard” for development and humanitarian interventions in all conflict-affected contexts, peacebuilding represents a more explicit effort to address the root causes of conflict and violence. The concept of peacebuilding originated in the field of peace studies more than 30 years ago,<sup>21</sup> as an endeavour to create sustainable peace by addressing the root causes of conflict and supporting local capacities for peaceful management and resolution of conflict through both structural and relational means.<sup>22</sup> In this respect, peacebuilding represents an intervention into conflict dynamics. Therefore, it is not neutral or impartial as with humanitarian principles, and involves a much greater degree of social transformation. Up until the 1990s civil society organizations and NGOs were active in pursuing peacebuilding approaches, but these efforts were largely in parallel to the UN and diplomatic communities.

## Peacebuilding in the UN

Despite the UN’s long-standing role of promoting peace and the prevention of conflicts, the UN struggled to define peacebuilding. Peacebuilding did not enter official UN parlance until the 1990s. Then Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's *An Agenda for Peace* in 1992 used the term "post-conflict peacebuilding" as "an action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict." The 2000 *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations* (known as the *Brahimi Report*) refined the definition of peacebuilding and stated that peacebuilding is “a hybrid of political and development activities targeted at the

<sup>20</sup> CDA Collaborative Learning Projects, February 2011. [http://www.cdainc.com/cdawww/publication\\_recent.php#manual953](http://www.cdainc.com/cdawww/publication_recent.php#manual953).

<sup>21</sup> The term was coined by Johan Galtung in his *Three Approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, and Peacebuilding*, in *Peace, War and Defense: Essays in Peace Research, Vol. II*, ed. Johan Galtung (Copenhagen: Christian Ejlertsen, 1976), 297-298.

<sup>22</sup> John Paul Lederach uses the concept of conflict transformation, a holistic and multi-faceted approach to managing violent conflict in all its phases, an ongoing process of change from negative to positive relations, behaviour, attitudes and structures. See *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1997), 20.

sources of conflict".<sup>23</sup> In 2005 in order to strengthen system-wide support to country-specific peacebuilding strategies, a Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) and Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) were established by the Security Council and General Assembly.<sup>24</sup>

In 2009 the Secretary-General issued his *Report on Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict*, representing the latest watershed in the UN's peacebuilding efforts. It offered renewed focus and direction for the UN system to respond better to the challenges of conflict-affected contexts. The report expressed peacebuilding as a multidimensional range of interventions that aim to solidify peace and prevent the lapse or relapse of conflict. In this way, no one actor is responsible for peacebuilding—it is a system-wide undertaking. Peacebuilding processes and interventions can take place prior to the outbreak of violence or conflict, during conflict, or long after hostilities have ended.

The Secretary-General's *Report on Peacebuilding* provided a new framework to guide the UN's engagement in peacebuilding. The report validates the contributions made by operational agencies, funds and programmes in the area of social services and peace dividends. The report also lays out five recurring peacebuilding priority areas, and states that through early peace dividends, political process confidence-building, and early development of core national capacity, the risk of relapse into conflict can be reduced and the chances for sustainable peace substantially increased.<sup>25</sup>

<b>Peacebuilding Priority Areas (Secretary-General's Report on Peacebuilding, 2009)</b>
<u>Basic safety and security</u> , including mine action, protection of civilians, disarmament/demobilization/reintegration (DDR), rule of law, and security sector reform
<u>Political processes</u> , including electoral processes, promoting inclusive dialogue and reconciliation, and developing conflict-management capacity at national and subnational levels
<u>Basic services</u> , such as water and sanitation, health and primary education, and support to the safe and sustainable return and reintegration of internally displaced persons and refugees
<u>Core government functions</u> , in particular basic public administration and public finance, at the national and subnational levels
<u>Economic revitalization</u> , including employment generation and livelihoods (in agriculture and public works) particularly for youth and demobilized former combatants

The role of women in peacebuilding has also risen atop the global agenda. The role of women in peacebuilding is crucial, yet women remain significantly underrepresented in peacebuilding processes, including in UN peace operations, in peace negotiations, in national governance and in economic recovery. Key Security Council Resolutions 1325 (2000) and 1889 (2009) explicitly linked women to the peace and security agenda and recognized women's contribution to conflict

<sup>23</sup> The Brahimi Report defined peacebuilding as "activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations something that is more than just the absence of war." See *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, A/55/305 - S/2000/809, August 2000, p.44.

<sup>24</sup> The peacebuilding institutions were originally recommended in the Secretary-General's High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change: A More Secure World in 2004, refined in the Secretary-General's report *In Larger Freedom* in May 2005, and was endorsed by heads of state at the World Summit in September 2005. For more information in the peacebuilding architecture, see [http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pbso/pdf/pbso\\_architecture\\_flyer.pdf](http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pbso/pdf/pbso_architecture_flyer.pdf).

<sup>25</sup> *Report of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict*, Para. 3, (A/63/881 - S/2009/304).

resolution and sustainable peace. In 2010 the Secretary-General also issued his Report on Women's Participation in Peacebuilding.<sup>26</sup> The report established a seven point action plan, including a requirement for the UN system to allocate 15 percent of UN-managed funds in support of peacebuilding to projects that address women's needs, advance gender equality and/or empower women as their principal objective (consistent with organizational mandates).

## **Peacebuilding and Fragility**

Global attention to finding new ways of addressing the challenges of fragile situations<sup>27</sup> has gained prominence, particularly over the past two years. Fragility has multiple underlying causes, both chronic and acute, and these can include very low state capacity (including service delivery), poor governance, corruption, low state legitimacy, insecurity and often conflict, porous borders and organized crime. It is important to note that not all fragile situations are conflict-affected. However, where fragile situations do involve conflict and high levels of violence, peacebuilding plays a critical role in supporting resilience and a transition out of fragility.

Peacebuilding goals now underpin a new approach for working in fragile states, agreed between the UN, OECD members and fragile states themselves. The International Dialogue, joining OECD members, the UN, and the recently formed G7+ group of fragile states (17 Member States) endorsed a New Deal<sup>28</sup> for Engagement in Fragile States at the Busan High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (November 2011). The New Deal was premised on the notion that MDGs in these countries cannot be achieved without making progress in peacebuilding and statebuilding. Therefore, the New Deal upholds five Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (legitimate politics, security, justice, economic foundations, revenues and services) to guide country-level engagement in all fragile and conflict-affected states and offer a foundation for improved progress towards the MDGs. The goals will help monitor the implementation of national vision, plan and a country-level "compact" to implement the vision and plan.<sup>29</sup>

## **Partners**

The landscape of partners and partnerships in conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding is manifold. Governments, civil society, and international co-operating partners are increasingly developing conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding policies, frameworks, tools, capacities, rosters and networks. In addition to the recently created UN peacebuilding institutions, important actors in many conflict-affected countries are Security-Council mandated peacekeeping and special political missions (including integrated peacebuilding offices).

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<sup>26</sup> *Report of the Secretary-General on Women's Participation in Peacebuilding*, September 2010 (A/65/354-S/2010/466).

<sup>27</sup> While there is no internationally-agreed definition of the term 'fragile states', or 'fragility', most development agencies define it as a failure of the state to perform functions necessary to meet the basic needs of citizens, ranging from basic security, rule of law and justice, basic services and economic opportunities. The OECD characterised fragile states as: 'unable to meet [their] population's expectations or manage changes in expectations and capacity through the political process' (See Concepts and Dilemmas in State Building in Fragile Situations: From Fragility to Resilience, OECD, 2008 at <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/59/51/41100930.pdf>. DFID similarly defines fragile states as: 'those where the government cannot or will not deliver core functions to the majority of its people, including the poor' (See DFID, 2005).

<sup>28</sup> *A New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States*, International Dialogue, 2010.

[http://www.oecd.org/document/22/0,3746,en\\_21571361\\_43407692\\_49151766\\_1\\_1\\_1\\_1,00.html](http://www.oecd.org/document/22/0,3746,en_21571361_43407692_49151766_1_1_1_1,00.html)

<sup>29</sup> For more information on compacts, see: *Research Note on Transition Compacts*, International Peace Institute, 2010; *Supporting Coherent and Sustainable Transition from Conflict to Peace*, Draft Guidance, OECD, November 2010 ([http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DCD/DAC\(2011\)41&docLanguage=En](http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DCD/DAC(2011)41&docLanguage=En)).

Governments and UN organizations carry out assessments to determine the degree to which their assistance in a country is conflict sensitive. Some donors have established their own conflict analysis and conflict assessment frameworks.<sup>30</sup> The table below overviews a methodology increasingly used by development partners to assess how their support and interventions interact with the conflict dynamics in a given situation or country. (See Annex 3 and 4 for more detail on key partners and relevant frameworks.)

**Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA)**

The PCIA is a tool to help donors, the UN and non-UN partners understand the conflict sensitivity of their interventions. The PCIA evaluates (*ex post*) and/or anticipates (*ex ante*, if possible) the impacts of proposed or completed programme on conflict dynamics in a given context, specifically, whether it has or will enhance conflict dividers, or strengthen conflict connectors. A PCIA can be conducted at any stage of programme planning and implementation. PCIA's are increasingly used by bilateral donors, such as Switzerland (Angola) and Canada (Nepal), UK (Sri Lanka). UNICEF commissioned a PCIA in Madagascar on behalf of the UN system and international partners.<sup>31</sup>

### Conflict Sensitivity and Peacebuilding in UNICEF

Conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding are not new to UNICEF. Helping children live in peace has been at the core of UNICEF's work since its founding.<sup>32</sup> UNICEF has remained committed to protecting the rights of children in situations affected by conflict and violence. UNICEF's current investment in these countries is considerable,<sup>33</sup> and UNICEF's work on peacebuilding has become widespread.<sup>34</sup>

However, UNICEF must make improvements in important areas. External reviews and UNICEF's field leadership in conflict-affected countries point out that UNICEF's approach to conflict sensitivity and, in particular, peacebuilding remains too *ad hoc* and inconsistent, and lacks a systematic approach.<sup>35</sup> Many programmes termed "peacebuilding" are in fact labeled as such retrospectively, rather than explicitly planned as such from the beginning. UNICEF staff can often assume that simply implementing a programme in a conflict-affected context means that programme is peacebuilding—when it this is not necessarily the case. As will be shown later, a peacebuilding programme must start with a conflict analysis as part of the SITAN, and the results framework must reflect the conflict analysis and a peacebuilding theory of change.

UNICEF's understanding of peacebuilding and its contributions to peacebuilding varies across its sectors. The complex nature of violent and conflict-affected situations, including the multiplicity of actors and processes, also requires UNICEF staff to develop capacities beyond their immediate technical or sectoral skill sets.

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<sup>30</sup> For instance, assessments have been carried out by DFID (Nepal, Sri Lanka), Switzerland (Angola), Canada (Nepal).

<sup>31</sup> UNICEF commissioned a Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment of the entire development community (Madagascar) and a Conflict Sensitivity Assessment of its programme in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The PCIA for Madagascar can be found at: [http://graduateinstitute.ch/webdav/site/ccdp/shared/6305/PCIA\\_Mada\\_eng\\_WEB\\_4nov2010.pdf](http://graduateinstitute.ch/webdav/site/ccdp/shared/6305/PCIA_Mada_eng_WEB_4nov2010.pdf). Further resources can be found at: [http://www.berghof-handbook.net/documents/publications/hoffman\\_handbook.pdf](http://www.berghof-handbook.net/documents/publications/hoffman_handbook.pdf) and <http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/8D6B8844543EE82F8525711F00607481-PCIA%20Handbook.pdf>.

<sup>32</sup> UNICEF was awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace in 1965 for "promoting brotherhood among nations".

<sup>33</sup> UNICEF spent nearly 65 percent of all 2010 country programme resources in fragile and conflict-affected countries, using the harmonized World Bank and OECD list of 47 fragile and conflict-affected states.

<sup>34</sup> An internal UNICEF mapping exercise in 2007 identified nearly 350 peacebuilding activities and projects implemented globally by 120 UNICEF Country Offices.

<sup>35</sup> See: DFID Multilateral Aid Review (2010); Education and Peacebuilding



While UNICEF programmes should be sensitive to existing conflict dynamics, UNICEF is also well positioned to strengthen its unique contributions to peacebuilding. UNICEF’s dual humanitarian and development mandate, its operational presence before, during and after conflict, as well as its national and subnational programmes centered on social services that reach the community level deliver tangible peace dividends in the lives of people and address conflict factors that put children at risk. By advocating on behalf of the most vulnerable, UNICEF works to ensure that the various forms of inequality and vulnerability that sustain fragility and fuel conflicts are addressed.

Conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding are already included to a limited degree in UNICEF’s strategic frameworks. They are incorporated in the Mid-Term Strategic Plan (MTSP) under Focus Areas 2: Basic Education and Gender Equality (Key Result Area or KRA 3 and 4), Focus Area 4: Child Protection from Violence, Exploitation and Abuse (KRAs 2 and 3), and Focus Area 5: Policy Advocacy and Partnerships for Children’s Rights (KRA 3). However, conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding should be integrated to a greater extent across all Focus Areas, and strengthened in Focus Areas that have a more limited focus. Conflict sensitivity, through the “do no harm” principle, is integrated under all humanitarian KRAs and explicitly informs humanitarian action under the revised Core Commitments for Children in Humanitarian Action (CCCs).

Conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding are related to capacity development, which is a key strategy of UNICEF’s approach to both development and humanitarian action.<sup>36</sup> Delivering social services through humanitarian action, which also can serve as peace dividends, links peacebuilding to UNICEF’s CCCs, and particularly the early recovery approach.<sup>37</sup> Particularly in contexts prone to both disasters and conflict, delivering humanitarian assistance will require extra sensitivity and care to avoid harm and further restrictions on affected populations. In some situations, response has created opportunities to begin peacebuilding dialogue processes.<sup>38</sup>

Peacebuilding offers essential contributions to community resilience.<sup>39</sup> Community resilience is underpinned by the community’s ability to understand and manage multiple risks and uncertainty. Peacebuilding can help communities understand conflict and violence risks, and manage them. For instance, interventions supporting capacities for dialogue, reconciliation, and inter-group collaboration support a community’s social cohesion and collective action—key dimensions of resilience.<sup>40</sup>

An understanding of peacebuilding underpins UNICEF’s effective engagement with UN integrated presences, including integrated planning.<sup>41</sup> For instance, UNICEF participates in joint conflict

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<sup>36</sup> See UNICEF Technical Note on Capacity Development for the CCCs (2011) at <http://intranet.unicef.org/emops/EMOPSSite.nsf/root/Page0501>.

<sup>37</sup> Early recovery is an approach applies development principles of sustainability and local ownership in humanitarian action. For more information, see UNICEF’s Technical Note on Early Recovery at <http://www.intranet.unicef.org/Emops/EMOPSSite.nsf/root/Page0104>.

<sup>38</sup> Examples include: Indonesia and Aceh after the Tsunami in 2004, Turkey and Greece after the earthquake in 1999.

<sup>39</sup> Community resilience is the capacity of a community to anticipate, absorb or withstand, and recover from shocks and stresses. Key dimension of community resilience is social cohesion, social capital and collective action, all of which rely upon peaceful, constructive relations among the community and the capacity to manage disagreement and conflict. See UNICEF *Humanitarian Action Report 2011: Building Resilience* at [http://www.unicef.org/hac2011/hac\\_lead.html](http://www.unicef.org/hac2011/hac_lead.html).

<sup>40</sup> For reading on the relationship between peacebuilding and resilience dimensions such as social cohesion, see Nat Colleta and Michelle Cullen, *The Nexus Between Violent Conflict, Social Capital and Social Cohesion*, World Bank Social Capital Initiative Working Paper No. 23 (2000) at <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTSOCIALCAPITAL/Resources/Social-Capital-Initiative-Working-Paper-Series/SCI-WPS-23.pdf>.

<sup>41</sup> See UNICEF *Technical Note on Engaging Effectively with UN Integrated Presences* (2010) at <http://intranet.unicef.org/pd/pdc.nsf/e59d3405e8ee2cb9852567460068fae4/891bbd5334da51598525771b0053b8ee?OpenDocument>.

analysis exercises, and articulates how its programmes contribute (or do not) to national peace consolidation priorities. Peacebuilding and conflict sensitivity are integrated into the new Emergency Risk Informed Programme process, which lays out steps in the programme cycle to help ensure that UNICEF regular programmes better address priority emergency risks—in this case conflict causes and factors—threatening the rights of children. UNICEF’s work on communication for development and social norms can also assist peacebuilding efforts.

There is an important relationship between UNICEF’s Monitoring of Results for Equity Systems (MoRES) and conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding. Horizontal inequalities have been shown to contribute to conflict risk and the intensity of conflict.<sup>42</sup> Similarly, conflict and violence factors are drivers of barriers to service delivery, blockages to access, and are tied to social norms and beliefs. UNICEF must understand these factors when looking at the factors behind child deprivations, avoid exacerbating them, and as appropriate find ways reduce them in order to remove bottlenecks and barriers. In this way, the ability of UNICEF to deliver on its equity strategy relies upon improved conflict analysis, as well as improved conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding strategies.

Lastly, UNICEF staff should clearly understand the relationship between humanitarian action, conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding. Humanitarian assistance is planned and implemented according to humanitarian principles—among them to address the *consequences* of violence and conflict by saving lives. Conflict sensitivity supports humanitarian objectives by helping humanitarian assistance avoid exacerbating conflict dynamics among affected populations. Peacebuilding, however, is distinct from humanitarian action in that its objective is to address the *causes* of conflict and violence. Humanitarian action, including the early recovery approach, can provide *indirect* contributions to peacebuilding through the provision of services that serve as peace dividends. Ideally, these services should be delivered by national authorities to also increase state capacity, legitimacy, and improve the citizen-state compact. Lastly, UNICEF must make sure that when it decides to pursue peacebuilding interventions, they will not put at risk ongoing humanitarian programmes. Here, a risk management approach is particularly useful.

## **STRENGTHENING UNICEF’S APPROACH**

### **UNICEF’s Concept of Peacebuilding**

For UNICEF peacebuilding represents a concrete way to improve the quality and impact of its programmes. Therefore, peacebuilding does not signify a new political identity or new programme priorities. At its essence, peacebuilding helps UNICEF to better understand and design programmes that more effectively reduce the risks of conflict and violence that affect children and their communities. As will be illustrated, UNICEF’s peacebuilding programming can take many forms—from collaborative community management of service delivery to national education curriculum reform, and from explicit peacebuilding initiatives to peace dividends. UNICEF’s engagement of peacebuilding targets all levels of society.

Lastly, UNICEF can apply peacebuilding to a wide range of contexts. This includes those affected by high levels of violence, situations featuring latent or open conflict dynamics, as well as pre- or

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<sup>42</sup> Frances Stewart, *Horizontal Inequalities as a Cause of Conflict: A Review of CRISE Findings*, Background Paper for the World Bank World Development Report 2011.

post-conflict contexts. The conflict analysis methodology and theories of change explained below can be adapted to suit each Country Office’s particular needs.

### **Differentiating Conflict Sensitivity and Peacebuilding**

In order for UNICEF to integrate conflict sensitivity into its programmes and support peacebuilding in a more strategic and effective way, understanding the relationship between conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding is essential. They are closely related, and both begin with conflict analysis and a robust understanding of conflict causes and dynamics. Yet they are also quite distinct in concept and practice in important ways. Experience shows that conflating the concepts or treating them as entirely distinct and unrelated, results in poorly conceived programming and reduces effectiveness.<sup>43</sup>

The following table summarizes the distinct characteristics and purposes of conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding.

<b>Comparison: Conflict Sensitivity and Peacebuilding<sup>44</sup></b>	
<b>Conflict Sensitivity</b>	<b>Peacebuilding</b>
<p><b>Definition:</b> The ability of to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Understand the context in which it is operating, particularly intergroup relations;</li> <li>- Understand the interactions between its interventions and the context/group relations; and</li> <li>- Act upon the understanding of these interactions, in order to avoid negative impacts and maximize positive impacts.</li> </ul>	<p><b>Definition:</b> Peacebuilding involves a multi-dimensional range of measures to reduce the risk of a lapse or relapse into conflict by addressing both the causes and consequences of conflict, and strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management in order to lay foundations for sustainable peace and development.</p>
<p><b>Aim:</b> Work IN the context of conflict to prevent negative and, if possible, maximize positive impacts of programme on conflict and violence factors</p>	<p><b>Aim:</b> Work ON conflict to explicitly reduce conflict causes and factors to contribute to the foundations for sustainable peace</p>
<p><b>Application to Programmes:</b> All programmes of all types (humanitarian or development) in all sectors, at all stages of violence and conflict (early/latent factors, open conflict, post-conflict) must be conflict sensitive</p>	<p><b>Application to Programmes:</b> Integrated into development programmes in all sectors, at all stages of violence and conflict. Can serve as an explicit overall goal or objective for a programme, depending on context and the results framework. (Peace dividends can be an indirect result from humanitarian action [early recovery approach]).</p>
<p><b>Programme Example:</b> A WASH programme builds a borehole in an area shared by two competing tribes who often resort to conflict over resources. The borehole is located in the most mutually acceptable location so that it does not exacerbate tensions.</p>	<p><b>Programme Example:</b> A WASH programme builds a borehole in an area shared by two competing tribes who often resort to violence over resources. UNICEF staff facilitate discussions between the two tribes on a mutually agreeable location of the borehole, but also on collaborative arrangements to jointly manage use of the borehole by both tribes to address underlying factors and prevent conflict, as well as to open broader areas of collaboration and dialogue (e.g. shared garden, small market, etc.)</p>

It is recommended that all UNICEF programmes in violence- and conflict-affected countries should at minimum be conflict sensitive. The decision to pursue a more explicit peacebuilding approach in the UNICEF Country Programme will depend on country context and national planning priorities.<sup>45</sup>

<sup>43</sup> *A distinction with a Difference: Conflict Sensitivity and Peacebuilding*, CDA Collaborative Learning Projects, 2009.

<sup>44</sup> Adapted from *A distinction with a Difference: Conflict Sensitivity and Peacebuilding*, CDA Collaborative Learning Projects, 2009.

<sup>45</sup> UNICEF’s DRC Country Office commissioned an external conflict sensitivity assessment of the Programme of Expanded Assistance to Refugees (PEAR Plus) in 2009 in order to take steps to improve the programmes conflict sensitivity and, subsequently, integrate elements of peacebuilding. See *Conflict Sensitivity Assessment of the PEAR Plus Programme*, Search for Common Ground, 2009, [http://www.sfcg.org/programmes/drcongo/pdf/English\\_SummaryCover\\_Final.pdf](http://www.sfcg.org/programmes/drcongo/pdf/English_SummaryCover_Final.pdf).

## **Conflict Analysis**

### **Purpose of Conflict Analysis**

Conflict analysis is the crucial starting point for conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding—and for ensuring that UNICEF robustly understands the contexts in which it works. Conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding rely upon an understanding of the consequences of conflict, but especially the causes of conflict and violence, which can be complex. There is ample literature debating the causes of conflict, whether longer-term and structural, or more proximate factors and triggers. A challenge in explaining the causes is that attention tends to focus on what is the most important cause, when the crucial issue can be how the different causes interact.<sup>46</sup>

The causes of conflict and violence are increasingly understood.<sup>47</sup> While each context differs, some general theories have been elaborated. They can include: macroeconomic shocks (including price shocks), rising levels of income inequality and poverty, the expansion of unemployed or unengaged youth, unequal and limited access to education, limited livelihoods, horizontal inequalities—including social inequalities—among groups, unequal access to natural resource wealth, persistent political and socioeconomic grievances (associated with land distribution, human rights abuses, lack of access to political or economic opportunities, corruption, and ethnic or religious discrimination and/or competition), and weak institutions that are unable to manage conflict.<sup>48</sup> A well-done conflict analysis will also identify the types of change needed in a given conflict-affected context, as well. (For more information on theories of conflict, see Annex 1.)

### **Definition of Conflict Analysis**

Conflict analysis is the systematic study of the profile, causes, actors and dynamics of conflict. Conflict analysis should capture the multidimensionality (political, social, economic, security, etc.) of a conflict, and can be tailored to any geographic area or programmatic level. The essence of a conflict analysis therefore provides:

- a better understanding of the causes (proximate, intermediate and root), dynamics and forces promoting either violent conflict and/or peace; and
- an opportunity to identify and prioritize key underlying causes (e.g. root causes) of conflicts as the basis to inform programming (development, humanitarian, peacebuilding and at all levels—project, programme, and sectoral).

Depending on context and stakeholders, a conflict analysis may also serve as a platform for:

- different stakeholders at different levels to participate and develop a shared understanding of peacebuilding priorities and interests; and
- reviewing and improving UNICEF interventions.

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<sup>46</sup> Dan Smith, *Trends and Causes of Armed Conflict*, Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, 2004, p7.

<sup>47</sup> For a summary of the theories of the causes of conflict, see Annex 1.

<sup>48</sup> *Armed Violence Prevention and Reduction: A Challenge for Achieving the Millennium Development Goals*, Geneva Declaration, June 2008, 11; *World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security and Development*, World Bank, p74. For a detailed survey of literature on political and economic causes of conflict, see page 75.

### Key Elements to Conflict Analysis

Profile/Situation Analysis: “Photograph” of a given national or regional context, including political, economic and socio-cultural factors

Causal Analysis: Identifies and classifies existing and potential causes of tension or conflict and their linkage. This includes structural/root causes, proximate causes and conflict triggers. The ‘Problem Tree’ can be used for this exercise

Stakeholder Analysis: Identifies critical local, national, regional and international actors that influence or are influenced by the conflict, analyses their perspectives (i.e. interests, needs, positions, resources) and their relationships (with one another, and with other entities), determines how to engage with such stakeholders and identify possible opportunities to act. A stakeholder ‘mapping’ and matrix is useful for this exercise

Analysis of Conflict Dynamics: Analyzes the interaction between of different causes with multiple stakeholders, identifies ‘dividers’ and ‘connectors’ and helps identify windows of opportunity for appropriate programmatic response

Prioritization: A prioritization process is conducted in the context of multi-stakeholder, strategic planning processes. This uses criteria derived from conflict analysis findings. Importantly, this process promotes consensus-building and multi-stakeholder buy-in.

## Conducting a Conflict Analysis

Conflict analysis frameworks and methodologies have proliferated. Many agencies, governments, and NGOs have developed their own frameworks for conflict analysis and assessment—from UNDP to the World Bank to bilateral donors, such as USAID, DFID, the Swedish International Development Co-operation Agency (Sida), German Society for International Co-operation (GIZ), as well as large NGOs. The UN System Staff College (UNSSC), together with UN Development Operations Co-ordination Office (UNDOCO), initially developed a Conflict Analysis for Prioritization Tool to support the multilateral Post-Conflict Needs Assessment (PCNA) methodology. The value of the tool comes from its substantive analysis and prioritization as well as multi-stakeholder assessment process, which can help to build consensus and to build ownership of priorities. The tool is adaptable to diverse planning scenarios where different national and international stakeholders are involved.

Conflict analysis currently forms part of important country-level, inter-agency planning frameworks. These include the Common Country Analysis (CCA)/UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP), PCNA, Peacebuilding Priority Plan (PPP), Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF) and Strategic Assessments and Technical Assessments under the Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP). (See Annex 4 for descriptions of these processes and links to relevant guidance).

For countries where there is a UN Country Team (UNCT), but no peacekeeping or special political mission, the CCA component of the UNDAF preparation offers a timely opportunity to conduct a conflict analysis. For those countries where there is a UNCT and a peacekeeping or special political mission, existing UN guidelines on integrated presences require that a conflict analysis be jointly conducted by the UNCT and the mission as part of IMPP. Conflict analysis also informs the ISF, which is a strategic planning exercise for an integrated peace consolidation plan. The CAP also provides an opportunity for a joint conflict analysis of a country or situation affected by humanitarian crisis.

A conflict analysis will cover all the main dimensions of conflict. This can include, for example: security, (from a state, community and individual perspective); political and governance (at all levels); economic issues; and social domain. The analysis will focus on state and formal institutions, as well as civil society. A conflict analysis can be adapted to address multiple levels of society (national, regional, local levels), as well as a distinct geographic area. Conflict and violence represent a wide diversity of situations and patterns, and each conflict analysis must be attuned to each situation.

A component of conflict analysis that bears important implications for UNICEF is the identification of conflict triggers (or proximate causes) and, in particular, root causes. Triggers or proximate causes can be single key acts, a series of events, or their anticipation that can set off or escalate violent conflict, such as a *coup d'état*, riots, etc. Root causes are underlying, structural factors, often which pervade policies, and which can create pre-conditions for conflict. These can include a lack of or discriminatory access to social services, discriminatory or exclusionary policies, horizontal inequalities among groups and regions, inter-group competition, lack of rule of law, massive youth unemployment, etc.

Identifying and addressing proximate and root causes of conflict often reflects organizational mandates. The dual development-humanitarian mandate of UNICEF, and other agencies, funds and programmes, can often be oriented to root causes. On the other hand, UN actors with political- or security-oriented mandates can often focus on the more proximate causes. UNICEF's participation in conflict analysis is, therefore, crucial to ensure root causes receive appropriate attention. The lack of focus on root causes is often cited as a key factor in the international community's inability to support a sustainable peace. As UNICEF alone will not be able to sufficiently support national authorities to address root causes, UNICEF should advocate for full UNCT, Mission (where relevant), and broader partner engagement to jointly address root causes. UNICEF's role in targeting root causes can be key in this regard.

Process can matter greatly for a quality conflict analysis product. It is preferable that conflict analysis be conducted by a broad set of UN entities and, depending on the broader planning process, non-UN stakeholders such as government, civil society and specific interest groups. This aids consensus and ownership of peacebuilding priorities, and facilitates an inclusive and participatory approach to programme design. However, in many contexts, inclusivity is challenging, particularly with non-UN actors. For instance, the participation of a government in a conflict situation, if a party to the conflict, can affect the objectivity and thoroughness of the analysis of conflict.

A quality conflict analysis also requires appropriate investment. Ideally the exercise should be sufficiently resourced with appropriate staff, and, preferably, the exercise should be carried out by UNICEF Country Office staff (external consultants can provide support). Staff must be given adequate time for data collection and participatory analysis, and that it addresses children's rights and UNICEF sectors in order to inform prioritization for programming. Often, agencies will not make this important link with programmes, and the goal of improving programme conflict sensitivity or peacebuilding impact is not achieved. A conflict analysis is only useful if it is rigorous and its findings are translated into the programming cycle—design, implementation and monitoring (and any revision), and evaluation to understand impact and any unintended consequences for conflict dynamics.

Finally, a conflict analysis methodology can be adapted to context. This includes the various phases of conflict or cycles of violence. Therefore, there are opportunities for UNICEF to utilize either a full conflict analysis or an adapted conflict analysis even in situations where precursors to conflict may be present. This can greatly aid the identification of emerging conflict risks and support a more risk reduction approach in programmes.

## **UNICEF and Conflict Analysis**

UNICEF should actively advocate for and participate in inter-agency conflict analysis exercises. However, UNICEF may also conduct its own conflict analysis to have a supplemental and focused assessment of the situation of children and within a specific sector. Such an exercise should also have a subnational scope. UNICEF should always ensure that its own conflict analysis exercise is informed by a broader, inter-agency conflict analysis if available. In pursuing its own conflict analysis exercise, UNICEF should use the UN inter-agency conflict analysis tool developed by the UN System Staff College (UNSSC) and UNDOCO as much as possible.<sup>49</sup> UNICEF can adapt this tool to focus on a specific sector or sub-sector, or geographic area.<sup>50</sup>

As mentioned, children's rights and issues are essential to a conflict analysis. Social sectors under UNICEF's mandate, as well as child protection, are highly important for the analysis of root causes, and also need to feature appropriately in the development of strategies and priorities. There are particular areas where UNICEF can engage in a deeper analysis within the broader framework of an inter-agency conflict analysis. These can include:

- *Social dimensions of conflict:* A conflict analysis must sufficiently capture the multidimensionality of the conflict drivers and dynamics. The social dimensions of root causes are central in this regard. Often, conflict analysis can focus preponderantly on political and security aspects—leading to an overall ineffective and unsustainable system response. For example, education rarely figures in conflict analyses, but as a socially transformative institution in a country, it may play a role not only in fuelling conflict, but in preventing, alleviating, and recovering from conflict.<sup>51</sup>
- *Children's rights:* Children are among the most affected by conflict, and are too often victims of grave rights violations. An analysis must take the impact of conflict on children into account and consider the unique role that children can contribute to peacebuilding efforts. This can include learning non-violence and even basic conflict resolution approaches in schools, communities and families.
- *Gender:* UNICEF should ensure analysis has a strong gender perspective, including the impact of conflict and violence on women and girls and their specific rights and needs, as well as their authentic participation in peacebuilding processes. For instance, heightened levels of gender-based violence are seen both as a sign of a breakdown of social controls, and are also recognized as one of the legacies of violent conflict.<sup>52</sup>

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<sup>49</sup> This tool was initially created to support the multilateral PCNA methodology, but is now adopted for wider use.

<sup>50</sup> The new global Peacebuilding and Education Programme has planned an education sector-specific conflict analysis to be developed.

<sup>51</sup> See MNR study; UNICEF Research Study on Education and Peacebuilding, 2011

<sup>52</sup> See *Gender and Conflict Analysis*, UNIFEM Policy Briefing Paper, 2006.

- *Equitable access to services:* Inequalities in access to services contributes to the risk of conflict. Understanding the extent to which children’s access to services is affected and why is vital, as inequity of access to services can be a contributing factor to conflict and instability. Access issues also need to be considered by age group, socio-economic group, ethnicity, gender, which supports an analysis of bottlenecks and barriers in UNICEF’s equity process.
- *Protection and security:* UNICEF can address the participation of children in the conflict and children associated with armed groups, as well as the impact of violence and insecurity on children. This includes attention to duty-bearers, including justice mechanisms, at different levels.
- *Adolescents and Youth:* Adolescents and youth typically represent a major demographic group in violence- and conflict-affected contexts, and both pose unique conflict risks and peacebuilding capacities. Often, analysis focuses on young male unemployment as a conflict risk factor, but broader consideration of their unique needs and capacities for community involvement is a requirement to understand fully the situation of adolescent girls and boys, young men and women. Moreover, greater analysis of gender dynamics that may have shifted as a result of the conflict is required.<sup>53</sup>
- *Restoring the citizen-state social compact:* In post-conflict societies where the state was or is still an important actor in the conflict, trust between the state and citizens typically can be low. Restoring state legitimacy and authority should not only focus on restoring state capacity, but also on restoring trust between the state and citizens—the social compact.<sup>54</sup>

The principal entry point for linking conflict analysis to the UNICEF country programme is the Situation Analysis (SitAn). In line with the Emergency Risk Informed Programming process, UNICEF can incorporate the results of an inter-agency conflict analysis or conduct its own conflict analysis as needed. However, a conflict analysis can also be conducted to support the Country Programme at interim points in the programme cycle, such as mid-term reviews, strategic moments of reflection, and moments of increased access to populations. Inter-agency conflict analysis exercises may also fall in the middle of UNICEF country programme cycle, such as may be the case with Integrated Mission Planning Process or PCNA exercises. The findings of these conflict analysis exercises can be important to adjust UNICEF programmes where possible.

Despite its name, conflict analysis can also be a valuable tool when adapted for analysing contexts suffering from high levels of violence. High levels of violence can occur before outbreaks of conflict, as well as long after. What is important for UNICEF to recognize is that the drivers of violence are precursors to armed conflict. In this way, both “early prevention” or latent conflict, as well as later post-conflict contexts offer important opportunities for UNICEF to inform Country Programmes to more effectively address the causes and drivers of violence and conflict.

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<sup>53</sup> For example, the Maoist army included female commanders who felt highly disempowered when they returned to their communities following an official discharge process and were expected to resume traditional roles for women. Special attention had to be paid to ensure sufficiently attractive opportunities for young women.

<sup>54</sup> For instance, in South Kivu, Eastern DRC, where the PEAR+ project was implemented, only 2% of the surveyed beneficiary population saw the State as responsible for the development of the community, compared to 47% who assigned responsibility to international NGOs.




## Peacebuilding Theories of Change

Just as in any other programme planning exercise, accurate and explicit theories of change are critical to effective peacebuilding programming. A theory of change is simply an explanation of how and why a set of activities will bring about the changes the peacebuilding programme seeks to achieve.<sup>55</sup> A theory of change describes the links between inputs, the implementation strategy and the intended outputs and outcomes. It describes the assumed or hoped causal relationship between an intervention and its (intended) peacebuilding result or impact.<sup>56</sup> Such theories can take the simple “if-then” format: “If we do X (action), then Y will result (peacebuilding impact).” Or the theory may be more complex, seeking to explain broader strategies to achieve peace (see Annex 1 for more information). Theories of change add value because they:

- improve the effectiveness of peacebuilding interventions;
- add rigour and transparency;
- clarify the programme logic;
- highlight assumptions that need to be tested;
- help identify appropriate participants and partners.

Once the conflict analysis and prioritization are completed, peacebuilding theories of change are developed to inform programme planning. A theory of change links the conflict analysis to programme planning by making assumptions explicit to systematically integrate peacebuilding logic into the programme results framework. There is therefore a strong relationship between the peacebuilding theory of change and monitoring and evaluation. The following box offers a basic example of the logical steps of a theory of change. This “line” of actions can be expanded to reveal all assumptions underlying steps, as well.

### Theory of Change Example



Unstated theories of change can lead to ineffective programmes. Using explicit theories of change helps prevent subconscious and unstated assumptions. It also pre-emptively personal programme preferences which can overrule a more rigorous assessment of what approaches would, in fact, be most effective.

Unique approaches and strategies that support countries and communities affected by conflict and high levels of violence. Conflict can suffuse all aspects of a society. Therefore a key theme in

<sup>55</sup> Lederach, J.P. et al., *Reflective Peacebuilding: A Planning, Monitoring and Learning Toolkit*, Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame (2007), p. 25.

<sup>56</sup> Weiss, Carol, *Nothing as practical as good theory: Exploring theory-based evaluation for comprehensive community initiatives for children and families*, in J. P. Connell, A. C. Kubisch, L. B. Schorr, & C. H. Weiss (Eds.), *New Approaches to Community Initiatives: Concepts, Methods, and Contexts* (Vol. 1), pp. 65-92. Washington, DC: Aspen Institute.

peacebuilding theories of change is social transformation—in simple terms, positive and sustainable change in human values, relationships, institutions, norms<sup>57</sup> and systems.

There is a range of key considerations that can help design better programmes that more effectively address the conflict risks and factors identified in the analysis. The following table offers considerations that can help UNICEF integrate a more effective approach to peacebuilding in programmes.

<b>Considerations for Supporting Theories of Change in UNICEF Programmes</b>
<p><b>Begin with conflict analysis</b> – Conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding begin with conflict analysis to inform broader situation analyses and guide programme prioritization and design. Use or update existing analysis if available. Advocate for collective agreement.</p>
<p><b>Focus on causes</b> – Peacebuilding programmes must be explicitly designed to address causes of conflict and violence, and this must inform related results frameworks</p>
<p><b>Act quickly, integrate, and commit long term</b> – Conflict- and violence-affected situations present urgent needs, but sustainable peace and reconciliation can take at 15 years or more. Pursue peace dividends, avoid short-term, “one-off” projects, programme for long-term social transformation. Effective peacebuilding also requires integrated, cross sectoral approaches for holistic impact.</p>
<p><b>Process especially matters</b> – “What” needs to be done is only as important as “how” it is done. Supporting reconciliation and cohesion in a divided society is not business as usual. Mistrust and fear are deeply engrained. How an intervention is planned, managed, and the degree to which and how all parties are involved can determine success or failure.</p>
<p><b>Pursue locally owned solutions (and do no harm)</b> – Local ownership begins by ensuring that peacebuilding priorities, needs, as well as approaches are determined locally. If local people and groups are included in defining the problem, they can be engaged to also take ownership of the solutions. Grasping local culture is essential; applying external templates is discouraged.</p>
<p><b>Foster relationships and trust</b> – Conflict is a constant, inseparable part of human interaction, down to the individual level. Ensuring programmes create mechanisms to bring local actors together for sustained dialogue and co-operation helps build trust and social cohesion—limiting dividers and maximizing connectors, which are key to resilience.</p>
<p><b>Develop local capacity for managing conflict and resilience</b> – Empowering and strengthening the capacities of individuals, communities, and institutions to manage ever-present conflict and violence factors is essential to peacebuilding. Attention should be paid not only to national level institutions, but also to the community level for sources of resilience in local institutions and civil society.</p>
<p><b>Ensure inclusive participation at all stages</b> – Community (including children and youth) and other stakeholders should actively participate in the design, management, monitoring and evaluation of peacebuilding interventions. This can strengthen the accountability of institutions to its citizens. This helps local partners find compromises, and develop constructive relationships.</p>
<p><b>Leverage equity to build peace</b> – Redressing inequalities, discriminatory policies and practice, and increasing equitable access to services support social justice, builds social cohesion at the community, enhances the citizen-state compact at subnational and national levels, and can redress the horizontal inequalities that can fuel conflict.</p>
<p><b>Create innovative partnerships</b> – The scale and multidimensionality of peacebuilding demands collective engagement. This points to fundamentals (ensuring a holistic approach by marrying national policy with grass roots work), creativity (using technology and local customs for new approaches), and new synergies (partnerships with community development organizations, South-South partners, and the private sector). Peacebuilding requires unique approaches, and many new partners can bring value to UNICEF’s programmes.</p>
<p><b>Advance women and girls</b> – Integrate a gender perspective in all peacebuilding interventions, including tailored attention to specific gender disparities and gender-related violence and violations, and maximize the peacebuilding capacities and roles of women and girls.</p>
<p><b>Address mental health and well-being</b> – The importance of prioritising mental health and psychosocial interventions in post-conflict situations is often overlooked. Overcoming traumatic stresses by supporting children and adolescents to rebuild their resilience is a <i>sine qua non</i> to reconciliation, promoting non-violence, and stopping cycles of violence.</p>
<p><b>Equip young people with constructive purpose</b> – Young people not only need jobs. They need a sense of dignity, respect, civic purpose,</p>

<sup>57</sup> For more on social norms change, see the UNICEF intranet at [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ecological\\_systems\\_theory](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ecological_systems_theory).

while keeping positive relationships with older generations. Recognizing this is key to identify new programme opportunities.

**Find creative ways to communicate for peacebuilding**– Information about successful peacebuilding initiatives should be shared as widely as possible. Access to fair and transparent information is key to diffuse rumours and mistrust that fuel conflicted societies. C4D principles and strategies can also contribute to conflict sensitive activities and messages for dialogue and empowerment.

**Support social norms change** – Social norms underpin intolerant, prejudicial, discriminatory and violent behavior throughout a society, and they are also the basis for important social change and transformation.

## **Strengthening Conflict Sensitivity and Peacebuilding in UNICEF**


Pursuing a more strategic approach to conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding in UNICEF requires a number of actions to be taken at the global and field level. The following table provides an overall outline of recommended strategies for UNICEF.

Key Areas	Recommended Strategies
<p><b>1. Make conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding for children a national and global priority</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Continue evidence-based advocacy on the impact of conflict and violence on children and young people, as well as their rights to and capacities for participation.</li> <li>▪ Promote the importance of social services and child- and adolescent-focused peacebuilding in peace agreements, national plans (Poverty Reduction Strategies, national recovery plans, peacebuilding priority plans, national development plans), and related policy and budget instruments</li> <li>▪ Promote inclusion of conflict analysis, attention to social services and child focused peacebuilding in the Common Country Assessment, UNDAF, Integrated Strategic Frameworks</li> <li>▪ Ensure UNICEF Country Programmes are conflict sensitive and integrate peacebuilding approaches</li> <li>▪ Collaborate with governments, UN, NGO and other partners to advance peacebuilding and peacebuilding partnerships</li> <li>▪ Promote the voice and participation of girls, boys, adolescents/young people and women in peacebuilding</li> <li>▪ Promote social services, protection, youth/adolescents and children’s issues in global and national peacebuilding funding mechanisms, frameworks and plans.</li> </ul>
<p><b>2. Identify conflict and violence factors affecting children</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Participate in all inter-agency conflict analysis, ensuring attention to children, adolescents, and social services</li> <li>▪ Include conflict analysis in UNICEF-supported Situation Analysis, data collection and monitoring, and other child-focused research, and humanitarian planning, as possible.</li> <li>▪ Include monitoring of conflict and violence factors, and peacebuilding in UNICEF’s programme management, review and evaluation cycle</li> <li>▪ Promote and strengthen local, people-centred early warning systems</li> <li>▪ Identify conflict and disaster interface factors to inform disaster risk reduction (DRR), response and recovery strategies and programmes.</li> <li>▪ Collaborate with UN, NGO, academia and other partners to establish an evidence and research base on children, adolescents and conflict and violence, and successful peacebuilding approaches</li> </ul>
<p><b>3. Integrate peacebuilding and conflict sensitivity into programmes to reduce risks to children</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Integrate conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding into inter-agency and UNICEF Country Programmes (CPD, CPAP, CPMP, workplans), and consider peacebuilding as a Programme Component Result (PCR) or as specific Intermediate Result(s) (IR) for violence- and conflict-affected countries.</li> <li>▪ Promote knowledge and awareness of child-focused peacebuilding and conflict sensitive approaches at national, community and household levels</li> <li>▪ Ensure peacebuilding approaches prioritize capacity development of national and sub-national partners</li> <li>▪ Maximize participatory approaches in all phases of programmes to optimize sensitivity</li> <li>▪ Explore integrated programming approaches, also with partners, to support community resilience, linking national development and policy processes to community frameworks</li> <li>▪ Identify in UNICEF sectors not only specific activities but also implementation methodologies that particularly impact positively conflict factors</li> </ul>
<p><b>4. Integrate into UNICEF systems and strategies</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Strengthen UNICEF internal capacities in conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding</li> <li>▪ Integrate conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding into strategic frameworks (eg MTSP), and performance management systems and processes</li> </ul>

Key Areas	Recommended Strategies
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Integrate conflict and peacebuilding strategies into the equity tracker process (specifically bottlenecks and barriers driven by conflict dynamics)</li> <li>▪ Explicitly include conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding into monitoring and evaluation frameworks</li> <li>▪ Ensure knowledge management and lessons learned systems address conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding</li> </ul>

In line with the emergency risk informed programme process, the following diagram lays out entry points in the Country Programme planning for strengthening conflict sensitivity of the Country Programme, and, as appropriate, integrating peacebuilding into the Country Programme. The decision to pursue an explicit peacebuilding orientation in the Country Programme depends on each country and Country Office situation. For instance, in some countries, an explicit Programme Component Result on peacebuilding may be appropriate. In other contexts, explicitly crafting Intermediate Results as peacebuilding results may be sufficient. In all contexts featuring violence or conflict factors, the SitAn should be informed by a robust conflict analysis to make the most informed programme decisions.

**Country Programme Planning Cycle**



Resources exist for UNICEF staff to improve their familiarity and understanding of peacebuilding approaches. A peacebuilding and conflict prevention community of practice is maintained by UNDP. The community consists of a wide range of peacebuilding practitioners, and is very active in sharing information, practice, lessons and ideas (see Annex 3 for more information).

Conflict- and violence-affected contexts are typically very political environments presenting various opportunities and constraints to the articulation of the Country Programme. In some contexts, retaining explicit references in the conflict analysis or using the term “peacebuilding” in Country Programme documents or strategies can be deemed sensitive. The priority is that the essence of the processes and approaches underpinning peacebuilding, as outlined in the above table, inform the UNICEF Country Programme and are reflected in results frameworks (see Annex 6 for more information). There are also terms related to peacebuilding that can be used in place of

“peacebuilding”, including “social cohesion”, “community dialogue”, “community management”, “confidence building”.

### **Examples of Peacebuilding in UNICEF**

UNICEF’s engagement in peacebuilding has been wide and varied. However, UNICEF’s comparative advantage in supporting peacebuilding is through social services and protection, although UNICEF also has important contributions to make in other programme areas, such as youth and adolescents. Social services are increasingly recognized as making vital contributions to peacebuilding, and constitute Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goal 5 under the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States.<sup>58</sup> The contributions of social services, in particular, to peacebuilding can be broken down into three main dimensions:<sup>59</sup>

- *Social service delivery as peace dividends:* In an early post-conflict setting or even in a later post-conflict context, if the state is not providing tangible “deliverables” or is providing them in an inequitable or discriminatory manner, a fragile peace could unravel. This dimension can include reducing social tensions through provision of tangible services by the state at the subnational level, incentivizing non-violent behaviour, supporting social cohesion and the citizen-state relationship, and assisting statebuilding at a critical juncture in the peace consolidation process. The delivery of services in rural areas has been cited as a preferable “outcome” level peacebuilding result, as opposed to “output” level results, such as laws and plans in the confined space of the national capital.<sup>60</sup>
- *Social service sector governance through policy advocacy and capacity development:* Poor governance in any sector can create conditions for conflict, particularly if it is discriminatory and causes horizontal inequalities among groups. UNICEF can support national institutions (such as in planning, legislation, policy development and reform, budgeting and financing) to develop capacities for inclusivity, transparency, effectiveness and management of competing interests. National institutions must be both responsive (with effective delivery) and inclusive (in form and function) to be legitimate. This supports the citizen-state compact and state legitimacy—both crucial to peacebuilding.
- *Social service delivery as explicit peacebuilding initiatives:* This dimension refers to programmes that support social service delivery, and the social service delivery itself, that are designed to address conflict factors. Social services in all sectors of concern to UNICEF can be a platform for dialogue, co-operation, reconciliation, social transformation and social cohesion at the national, subnational and community levels.

Often, in order to ensure conflict sensitivity, and for peacebuilding interventions to be effective, integrated, cross-sectoral programming is often required.

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<sup>58</sup> *A New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States*,

[http://www.oecd.org/document/22/0,3746,en\\_21571361\\_43407692\\_49151766\\_1\\_1\\_1\\_1,00.html](http://www.oecd.org/document/22/0,3746,en_21571361_43407692_49151766_1_1_1_1,00.html). The recent World Bank *World Development Report* stresses prioritizing investments in citizen justice, security and jobs, implicitly arguing support to social services should come later. See *World Development Report*, p. 17. UNESCO’s Global Monitoring Report (2011) upheld the importance of education to peacebuilding in all phases of conflict. See *Education For All Global Monitoring Report 2011: The hidden crisis: Armed conflict and education*, UNSECO, 2011, p.222-3

<sup>59</sup> See Erin McCandless, *Peace Dividends and Beyond: Contributions of Administrative and Social Services to Peacebuilding*, Peacebuilding Support Office, 2011.

<sup>60</sup> See *World Development Report*, p. 145.

The following section provides an overview of peacebuilding and peace dividends in UNICEF work in the areas of social services, protection, and adolescents/youth. The references to countries where these programmes or projects took place are not intended to be complete, but only indicative.

## Early Childhood Development

In order to most effectively impact and encourage communities to foster and maintain peace, education must begin in early childhood,<sup>61</sup> which is the period when the brain architecture is developing most rapidly. It is a critical time of life when habits are formed, differences are recognized and emotional ties are built through social relationships and day-to-day interactions in homes and neighborhoods. Young children who grow up in unstable environments, exposed to abuse, neglect, and other stress, are less likely to build trusting relationships which can often lead to low self-esteem and long-term psycho-social and behavioral problems. A key lesson from peacebuilding and conflict management, particularly at the community level, is that emotions and emotional “intelligence” can play a key role in violence and conflict.<sup>62</sup> ECD programmes can contribute, in the long-term, to peaceful societal interactions as it teaches young children critical emotional skills that will impact on their future behavior and foster more peaceful communities.

### Early Childhood Development: Peacebuilding Examples

Type of programme	Description	Country
<b>Home-family based programmes</b>	Development of social-emotional skills such as cooperation, empathy, the capacity to understand other perspectives, and the ability to relate to others in a peaceful manner starts very early and starts at home. Hence, ECD interventions first target parents focusing on improving interaction between parent/care giver and the young child at home. Parenting programmes, for example, aim at improving basic child development knowledge and skills of the parents and caregivers, enabling them to provide quality care for their children to survive and develop their full potential. Parenting programmes can also provide great entry points for conveying appropriate values and values and skills for future active democratic citizenship and pro-social behavior, including healing of atrocities and conflict and of their social and emotional and attitudinal impact on young children.	Sri Lanka, Kirgizstan, Nepal, DRC
<b>Supporting National Policies</b>	In post-conflict contexts, UNICEF supported ECD interventions focus on inclusion and empowerment of parents living in most remote and marginalized areas on their children’s early education and wellbeing. Inequity violates children’s rights and contributes to the conditions conducive to violence and conflict. Support for children and their families during the early childhood years can provide important dividends for peace building. ECD programmes reduce economic inequalities by promoting holistic development for all children - especially those from disadvantaged backgrounds. For children growing up in poverty, quality early education improves school readiness and chances for school success, financial independence, and social stability. ECD can mitigate the factors that trigger armed conflicts or widespread violence. National policies, laws and legislation concerning the welfare, care and education of the young child should also be in line with international agreements.	Nepal, Kenya
<b>Community Based ECD Centers for group learning and development</b>	Community-based ECD programs have significant potential to promote peace and strengthen intra and inter community relations. ECD programs can reach across communal divides and encourage communities in conflict to develop alternative visions of the future based around the needs of children. Safe spaces should be provided for young (and older) children to play, to provide parents with critical information and support to improve child care practices, to provide integrated services, and to encourage positive and supportive parent/child, parent/parent, child/child interactions. If they are functioning during conflict and transition, child-care centres, kindergartens, and nursery schools can	DRC Best example is from Northern Ireland – Early Years Programme (already shared the references)

<sup>61</sup> Declaration of the World Conference on Peace Education in Early Childhood, 24 April, 2007, Albacete, Spain.

<sup>62</sup> See Suzanne Retzinger and Thomas Scheff, "Emotion, Alienation, and Narratives: Resolving Intractable Conflict." *Mediation Quarterly* 18(12)(2000-2001), <http://www.soc.ucsb.edu/faculty/scheff/16.html>.

	provide safe spaces and excellent premise for children to play and learn together overcoming differences that cause conflict. Many early childhood curricula that emphasize social and emotional learning, conflict resolution, and citizenship skills, are widely and regularly used. ECD programmes where parents actively participate in the management of ECD centers, where parents are involved in daily activities and/or with a strong parent education component, can have a particularly powerful impact by bringing together parents in ways that build trust across divided groups. By reaching the most disadvantaged and marginalized groups, they can also help reduce actual and perceived inequities and (potential) sources of conflict.	
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## Education

Education may serve both as a driver of conflict and as a platform for peacebuilding. Education is often complicit in creating the conditions for armed conflict through, for example, inequitable provision, biased curriculum or teaching methods that reinforce existing exclusion and stereotypes. On the other hand, education's contributions to social cohesion and managing conflict are many, and it can provide major peace dividends.

As children grow older, schools provide the means to learn how to think critically, resolve conflict non-violently, and offer a venue where students can develop positive relationships across conflict divides. Schools have the power to shape the attitudes and skills of young people toward peaceful relations. Through teaching young children values of respect, tolerance, and empathy, and by equipping them with the necessary skills to resolve even daily conflict among peers in a non-violent manner, they are provided with the tools they need, now and in the future, to foster peaceful relations at home, at school and in their communities and beyond. Schools are also unique community hubs for multi-sectoral programming reaching into communities.

Education's potential in peacebuilding is realized best when it forms part of wider social, economic and political efforts in peacebuilding. Without these linkages and sustained and strategic investments, education's role in peacebuilding can be marginalized and short-term. Education efforts will otherwise fail to deliver on the often unrealistic expectations placed on it in relation to reconstruction, recovery and peacebuilding in conflict-affected contexts.

### Education: Peacebuilding Examples

Type of programme	Description	Country
<b>Schools as zones of peace (SZOP)</b>	SZOP is one approach UNICEF and partners are using to protect the right of children to access school in conflict- and crisis-affected areas and to ensure education is not hampered by violence. It parallels the education sector's broader work to support efforts to better predict, prevent and prepare for crises. The aim is to improve the quality of the education response in emergencies and transitions and to use the education system to foster a culture of peace and human rights. Schools are a key entry point for peace advocacy, and also utilize development of "codes of conduct" to prevent impediments to child access to school. In addition to advocacy, SZOP incorporates diverse programming at the school, village and district levels. SZOP programming builds on UNICEF's ongoing efforts to develop holistic schools, in particular through the Child-Friendly Schools Initiative and the roll-out of the Quality Education Resource Package. <sup>63</sup>	Nepal
<b>Peace and Conflict Resolution Education</b>	Peace education is "the process of promoting the knowledge, skills, attitudes and values needed to bring about behaviour change that will enable children, youth and adults to prevent conflict and violence, both overt and structural; to resolve conflict peacefully; and to create the conditions conducive to peace, whether at an interpersonal, intergroup, national or international level". This approach is in line with the Education for All (EFA)	Bosnia and Herzegovina, Nepal, Guinea-Bissau, DRC, Kenya, Liberia

<sup>63</sup> For more information about SZOP see *Education in Conflict and Transition Contexts: Case Studies from the Democratic Republic of Congo, Nepal and Southern Sudan*, UNICEF, 2010. Available at [http://www.educationandtransition.org/wp-content/uploads/2007/04/EiE\\_Field\\_Note\\_FINAL\\_9Aug2010.pdf](http://www.educationandtransition.org/wp-content/uploads/2007/04/EiE_Field_Note_FINAL_9Aug2010.pdf)

	Dakar Framework of Action which calls for the promotion of an education that helps children and young people to acquire skills such as the prevention and peaceful resolution of conflict as well as social and ethical values. (See also Peace and Education)	
<b>Curriculum Reform</b>	Apart from teaching of subjects related to peace and conflict resolution, the revision of school texts on religion, language and history can also contribute to the building of social cohesion, national identity and citizenry. New curricular frameworks should integrate and emphasize the fundamental principles of human rights, social justice, social cohesion and inclusiveness.	Kosovo, Nepal
<b>Accelerated Learning Programmes (ALPs)</b>	ALPs offer children and adolescents who have missed periods of their education a second chance to complete primary school, mostly by compressing the curriculum. While challenges persist in the implementation of these programmes – including lack of qualified teachers, limited capacity of national educational institutions to provide supervision, poor monitoring and evaluation – they help protect and realize the right to education for hundreds of thousands of over-aged students. When informed by conflict analysis and peacebuilding approaches, these programmes can offer a valuable platform to address violence and conflict risk, and enhance capacity for peacebuilding and conflict resolution, particularly for children and adolescents who have lost educational opportunities due to conflict.	Angola DRC Angola, Liberia, Nepal, Sierra Leone
<b>Non-Formal, Complementary and Alternative Education</b>	These programmes promote access to primary and vocational education and, less frequently, secondary education for disadvantaged groups, including internally displaced young people, ex-child soldiers, ex-combatants, girls and older out-of-school youths, particularly those in post-conflict situations. In these contexts, there may not be sufficient capacity or political will to meet the needs of children whose education has been disrupted by a conflict. Non-formal “Education for Peace” programmes straddle both the conflict and immediate post-conflict phases. Bringing together different segments of the community, they provide a space for reconciliation and a vision for an alternative future. In Lebanon, it has been widely cited as a successful programme, giving root to multiple other programs and efforts that have been modeled on it, developing a generation of peace education activists that would later become leaders of NGOs and institutions.	Kenya, Tanzania, Lebanon
<b>Life Skills</b>	Life Skills-Based Education (LSBE) is being adopted as a means to empower young people in conflict situations. It refers to an interactive process of teaching and learning which enables learners to acquire knowledge and to develop attitudes and skills which support the adoption of healthy behaviours. It is also a critical element in UNICEF's definition of quality education. Life Skills can have components of problem solving, negotiation, working in groups, and conflict resolution – depending on context.	Croatia, Tajikistan, Sudan, Macedonia, oPt
<b>Psychosocial Training (Teachers)</b>	Teacher training modules that equip teachers with key psychosocial skills to manage trauma and equip children with skills themselves, including: Identifying roles and self-potential, the aspects, stages and influencing factors of/on children's development, the impact of conflict on children, managing feelings and emotions, teachers' role in helping children's development, developing resilience, psychosocial support overview and principals and work ethics, building self-esteem, creativity and decision making, communicating with children and active listening, handling children in the classroom, building cooperation with parents and society members, safe and comfortable learning atmosphere and designing a psychosocial programme	Indonesia (Aceh), Iraq

### Education: Peace Dividend Examples

Type of programme	Description	Country
<b>Back To school campaigns, Go To School campaigns</b>	“Back to school” campaigns can offer massive peace dividends. Through ‘back to school’ campaigns UNICEF encourages community-level engagement, distributes essential school materials and provides temporary learning spaces when necessary to keep children in school during and after conflict (and other crises). It also strengthens the capacity of Ministry of Education through technical assistance with policy, guidelines and system development and programme planning. These campaigns employ intense advocacy, communication and social mobilization efforts. They are informed by the principle of risk reduction, use the Child- Friendly School model, underpinned by a human rights-based approach for local ownership, and serve as platforms for communal dialogue and social cohesion.	Southern Sudan, Somalia, Gaza, Cote d’Ivoire, Afghanistan



## WASH

Competing demands for access to scarce water resources, combined with poor management of water supply, can create or exacerbate conflict. Regions within countries vulnerable to water stress are particularly ripe for conflict, and in turn, the communities with the least access to clean water are the most vulnerable to conflict-induced disease, malnutrition, and displacement.<sup>64</sup> Conflict issues arising from water service and sanitation provision can include: disputes over land for water facility installation; competition between communities over water resources; disagreements over water use for human needs vis-à-vis animals or crops; poor maintenance of water facilities; and the unhygienic disposal of drainage and garbage causing problems for other water users. Water service provision thus needs to be conflict sensitive to manage its impact on conflict factors.

While WASH interventions have the potential to contribute to peacebuilding, there is a substantial need for research in this area, especially for sanitation and hygiene.<sup>65</sup> Water can serve as a starting point for dialogue, and joint community water management mechanisms can facilitate co-operation and reduce tensions within and between communities. Community-Led Total Sanitation (CLTS) is demonstrating results in conflict-affected settings through its participatory approach.<sup>66</sup> WASH social mobilization days—such as global hand-washing days—offer unique vehicles for peace messaging through a community.

UNICEF’s ability to integrate peacebuilding approaches in its WASH programmes can determine whether water becomes a unifying force, rather than divisive force in communities affected by conflict.

### WASH: Peacebuilding Examples

Type of programme	Description	Country
<b>Joint Water Management</b>	Joint local water management board, involving various representatives from communities over the shared objective of water provision and access. This can be a valuable platform for peacebuilding when mechanisms for dialogue and resource-sharing, as well as conflict resolution, are built into the management systems.	Somalia
<b>Community-Led Total Sanitation (CLTS)</b>	CLTS focuses on community-level behaviour change and participation rather than merely supplies delivery. It enables populations to develop their own choices about key priorities in water and sanitation, and builds ownership of the subsequent resources (bore holes, gender-sensitive latrine construction and location, hand washing stations, or the circulation of community WASH advocates). The community participation approach offers important opportunities and entry points for peacebuilding approaches—cooperation and collaboration over shared needs and interests, dialogue, etc.—when carried out in conflict-affected contexts.	Afghanistan, Pakistan, Sierra-Leone, South Sudan, DRC
<b>Community Dialogue over Boreholes</b>	UNICEF supported a water project to meet the needs of the 20,000 residents of Galinsor and nomadic populations from the neighbouring district of Hiran and from Ethiopia. Access to water and land grazing rights in drought-affected Galinsor have been the source of conflict between three sub-clans there, and tensions delayed the start of drilling the borehole. UNICEF organized meetings with elders from the three communities and local authorities to resolve conflict, discuss and work out differences. UNICEF and community elders later began discussions on a new water committee to manage the new resource and pursued collaboration between local authorities and businesses – a public-private partnership - to ensure sustainability.	Somalia
<b>WASH Community</b>	UNICEF developed The Community Action Plan (CAP) as a planning mechanism for	Sudan

<sup>64</sup> Gleick, P.H. et al., *The World’s Water 2008-2009: The Biennial Report on Freshwater Resources* (Island Press, Washington, D.C), 2008.

<sup>65</sup> Humanitarian Policy Group, *Improving the Provision of Basic Services for the Poor in Fragile Environments: Water Supply, Sanitation, and Hygiene International Literature Review* (2008), p.20.

<sup>66</sup> UNIFEM; Joshi, Anuradha, *Concept Note: Women at the Frontline of Service Delivery* (June 2010), pp. 4-5.

<b>Action Plan</b>	WASH programming in Northern Sudan in 2008, with the objective to involve the community in each step of the decision-making process and ensuring that that each household has equal access to resources. This is illustrated in the “Triple Methodology” of CAP, which includes assessment, analysis (with community identifying priorities) and action (implementation and education). The process facilitated community participation and addressed inequalities and disparities of access to water supplies within communities, which has in the past led to violence and insecurity.	
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## Child Protection

Protection and security issues for children in situations affected by high levels of violence and/or conflict are paramount. UNICEF’s release and reintegration programming for children associated with armed forces or armed groups, in particular, involves conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding strategies in line with the Paris Principles and Guidelines. Reintegration programmes should be sustainable and inclusive of other vulnerable children in the same conflict affected communities to promote peacebuilding and reduce conflict factors. Such work must address the underlying causes of child recruitment as well.

UNICEF’ leadership on monitoring and reporting on grave violations against children (Security Council Resolutions 1612, 1882, and 1998) and on Conflict-Related Sexual Violence (Security Council Resolutions 1888 and 1960), while not explicitly peacebuilding, is crucial to improve protection programming, end impunity and advocate against violence that impedes sustainable peace and reconciliation. The development of action plans with parties to the conflict to agree on commitments to end, prevent, and respond to grave violations is in itself a factor of increased stability, especially with systematic inclusion of community mobilization and sensitization on children’s rights.

During and after conflicts, small arms and light weapons devastate the lives of children and often women, and sustain a culture of violence. The vast majority of casualties are directly attributable to these firearms. In addition to being victims, some children have been taught to handle weapons, which are lethal and easy to use. Addressing the high prevalence of small arms in these contexts, and the culture of violence they perpetuate, can offer important contributions to reducing violence and conflict factors.

UNICEF’s work on transitional justice and child-related issues also contributes to peacebuilding. Truth commissions in Guatemala, Peru, Sierra Leone, South Africa and Timor Leste, as well as mixed tribunals such as the Special Court for Sierra Leone, have dealt with crimes against children and involved children as victims and witnesses. In addition, traditional justice mechanisms have involved children for purposes of accountability and reconciliation.

UNICEF Child Protection programmes also address the psycho-social support needs of children and adolescents, particularly in child friendly spaces.

### Child Protection: Peacebuilding Examples

Type of programme	Description	Country
<b>Community-Based Child Protection Networks</b>	Peacebuilding activities often form part of child protection and reintegration programmes at the community level with the support of local child protection networks with activities that include awareness-raising about the negative impact of conflict, such as the recruitment and use of children..and that promote reconciliation, community caring, awareness and coping mechanisms that protect children.	Sudan, Somalia
<b>Rehabilitation and Reintegration of</b>	UNICEF adopts a holistic approach to providing support to boys and girls who have been released from or left armed forces or groups as well as their families and communities in	Nepal, Chad, Cote d’Ivoire, DRC, Sri

<b>Children Associated with Armed Forces or Armed Groups</b>	order to facilitate the reintegration process and to reduce the risk of violence and conflict. This support includes ensuring access to appropriate health services, psychosocial support, life skills training, recreational activities, catch-up classes, information about reintegration support packages, family tracing, mediation, and transitory care if required. Girls may have special needs, particularly if they have been sexually violated, are pregnant or have young children. Reintegration packages support children to return to school (formal or informal), vocational training and income generating activities and include other vulnerable children from the same community.	Lanka, CAR	Chad,
<b>Child Protection Training to Peacekeepers, Military and Police</b>	UNICEF has also been active in developing and delivering child protection training for peacekeepers and national militaries, in collaboration with DPKO and Save the Children.	CAR	
<b>Mine Risk Education</b>	Support to youth NGOs working in mine education development, integrated programme of local NGO capacity development, inter-ethnic reconciliation, community development, non-formal education. Mine risk education is critical also to livelihoods.	Bosnia and Herzegovina	
<b>Child Friendly Spaces</b>	Child Friendly Spaces (CFSs) are widely used in emergencies as a first response to children's needs and an entry point for working with affected communities. CFSs can be established quickly and respond to children's rights to protection, psychosocial well-being, and non-formal education. CFSs are typically used as temporary supports that contribute to the care and protection of children in emergencies. The specific objectives are to: (1) mobilize communities around the protection and wellbeing of all children, including highly vulnerable children; (2) provide opportunities for children to play, acquire contextually relevant skills, and receive social support; and (3) offer inter-sectoral support, including psychosocial and peacebuilding education, for all children in the realization of their rights.	Various	
<b>School-based Protection &amp; Youth Advocacy</b>	"Return to Happiness" is a methodology to support the psychosocial recovery of children and adolescents living in areas affected by armed conflict. It also is used as a tool for preventing the recruitment and use of children by illegal armed groups. Return to happiness is part of UNICEF's recruitment prevention projects in violence affected areas. Results show greater social cohesion, community resilience, and prevention of tensions.	Colombia	
<b>Small Arms and Intolerance Survey</b>	A survey identified and analysed the link between an increase in the use of small weapons and increased violence and intolerance among ethnic groups. Findings were used to develop a communication strategy for young people and children, promoting safer and more tolerant behaviour.	Kosovo	
<b>Youth Development and Gun Culture</b>	UNICEF uses a holistic approach to youth development in its efforts to eradicate gun culture. Youth groups are set up to provide a space for boys and girls to cope with the violent disturbances of their lives. The groups provide recreational, sports and cultural activities, including traditional music, dance, drama and debate. They also organize and implement community development, peace promotion and disarmament.	Somalia	

#### **Child Protection: Peace Dividend Examples**

<b>GBV Prevention and Response</b>	UNICEF's approach to addressing GBV acknowledges that combating GBV requires a comprehensive strategy that prioritizes access to services while also fostering a protective environment through coordination of GBV prevention and response efforts amongst all humanitarian actors. UNICEF and its partners support policy reforms and the implementation of mechanisms to foster a protective environment for women, girls, men and boys. UNICEF provides safe spaces for women and girls including ensuring their access to information, learning opportunities, violence prevention, socioeconomic recovery and livelihood opportunities, and safe access to cooking fuel and food security. UNICEF supports care for GBV survivors including access to age-appropriate health and psychosocial support services including support for reintegration, and in some situations legal support.	Somalia, South Sudan, DRC
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## **Health and Nutrition**

### Health

The contributions of the health sector to helping address the causes of war have been explored in earnest since the 1980s. In 1985 the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) developed the

concept of Health as a Bridge for Peace,<sup>67</sup> and in 1997 the World Health Organisation (WHO) developed guidelines, including on supporting dialogue between warring parties. More recently, as in other sectors, attention is being given towards the ways to improve the delivery of health in fragile states.<sup>68</sup> Some recommendations pertinent to peacebuilding and conflict sensitivity include<sup>69</sup>:

- When service delivery is accessible, non-discriminatory, standardized, and government owned, it can support the citizen-state compact and enhance state legitimacy;
- If health service delivery equalizes access and addresses horizontal inequalities, it can reduce conflict risk;
- Integrate implementing partners, who are often the most exposed and affected by the conflict. They play a key role on the front-lines of service delivery to affected populations and in the reconstruction of the health systems and the social fabric;
- Health programmes can play a role in unifying various groups, including former parties to the conflict, around a common goal;
- Health service delivery can be a useful entry point into political processes as it can address causes of instability and is a precondition for further work on economic recovery;
- Providing psycho-social support to victims can contribute to human recovery and reconciliation;
- Social health insurance systems, forming part of a broader social protection framework, can help reduce vulnerabilities, inequities and conflict factors, while contributing to strengthening community resilience and the social compact.

As much as the physical health of children is at risk during war, so too is their mental health. Many children lose family members and have even witnessed their killings. In the case of child soldiers, they have killed and have even been forced to kill one or more of their family members as an initiation rite and to lower the chance of defection. Mental health and psychosocial programmes provide valuable support to peacebuilding, through their attention to overcoming trauma, assisting human recovery and reconciliation, and developing local capacity for managing violence and conflict.<sup>70</sup> UNICEF work in this area with partners has highlighted the importance of integrating psychosocial approaches into peacebuilding strategies, including supporting a return to livelihoods.<sup>71</sup>

Because of the association between conflict, violence and adolescent mental health problems, peacebuilding initiatives should incorporate adolescent mental health programmes. The incidence of mental health problems peaks during the second decade of life. It is estimated that one in every five adolescents experiences a mental health and/or behavioural problem each year. A systematic review

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<sup>67</sup> Described as "the shared concerns around fundamental health issues can provide an entry point in the process of negotiation because health issues transcend political, economic, social, and ethnic divisions among peoples and provide a nexus for dialogue at multiple levels. CERTI, *How can Health Serve as a Bridge for Peace?* (2001), p. 1.

<sup>68</sup> See Humanitarian Policy Group, *Improving the Provision of Basic Services for the Poor in Fragile Environments: Health Sector International Literature Review*, (2008).

<sup>69</sup> USIP conference, *USIP, Health in Post Conflict and Fragile States: Challenges for the Next Decade*, June 9-10, 2011. See also: Newbrander, William, "Rebuilding Health Systems and Providing Health Services in Fragile States", *Management Sciences for Health*, No. 7 (2007), p. 6.

<sup>70</sup> The contributions of UNICEF's psychosocial programmes to peacebuilding were recognized in an evaluation of UNICEF's psychosocial programmes over 10 years ago. The evaluation recommended the integration of peacebuilding into UNICEF's psychosocial programmes in conflict-affected contexts. *Psychosocial Interventions: Evaluation of UNICEF-Supported Projects (1999-2001)*, Amanda Melville, 2003, p.42, 46.

<sup>71</sup> *Handbook on Psychosocial Assessment of Children and Communities in Emergencies*, Regional Emergency Psychosocial Support Network and UNICEF EAPRO, 2005.

of the literature about the nature, prevalence and determinants of non-psychotic mental health problems in adolescents aged 10-19 years in low resource settings demonstrated that adolescent mental health risks are increased by poverty, the fragmentation of traditional family and community structures, higher levels of environmental stress, and growing aspirations coupled with limited employment opportunities.<sup>72</sup>

### Nutrition

Nutrition interventions can provide a valuable avenue for conflict transformation and peacebuilding. Contexts of chronic or acute household food insecurity, which can easily lead to high or increased levels of acute malnutrition, often fuel conflicts among affected populations. Promoting food security and nutrition can help lower tensions, enhance community resilience, and reduce factors that can incite violence and conflict.<sup>73</sup> Supporting access to nutritious food and nutrition services to women and children are contributing factors to peace. For instance women have cited access to nutrition for children as a stabilizing factor in conflict-affected environments.<sup>74</sup>

However, nutrition interventions in conflict-affected contexts can fuel conflict dynamics if implemented in non-sensitive ways. For instance, implementation of targeted nutrition services (e.g for children and women with acute malnutrition only) can be sensitive and perceive as discriminative in depleted communities. Communication and consultations with the community authorities become critical to ensure that the implementation of such programs does not generate conflicts.

#### **Health and Nutrition: Peace Dividend Examples**

Type of programme	Description	Country
Peace Day, "Day of Tranquility", Vaccination Drives	Vaccination drives and immunization days offer massive peace dividends. The cause of nationwide health for children can serve as a rationale for negotiating ceasefires or truces focusing on children's health. Can mobilize millions of people peacefully, offer high-impact peace dividends, and offer moments for peace messaging. In Afghanistan, in 2007, 2008 and 2009, peace days for national vaccinations were held. For instance, these days can involve more than 10,000 vaccinators across the country, and organized by UNICEF, the World Health Organization (WHO) and Ministry of Public Health (MoPH).	Afghanistan, El Salvador, Sudan, Cote d'Ivoire, Philippines
Youth-Friendly Health Center	Rebuilding and supporting youth friendly health centers in a neutral locations, while including programmes that bring youth from different groups together to discuss sexual and reproductive health issues together, and to offer psychosocial care.	Mozambique
Baby Friendly Spaces	In Haiti, one of the key nutrition interventions UNICEF and partners put in place was the support and promotion to exclusive and continued breastfeeding through the establishment of baby-friendly spaces. These spaces were created as a safe and peaceful environment where mothers could not only receive support and advice for their young children but also engage with other mothers through dialogue which would in turn contribute to reduced tension in the community.	Haiti

### **Adolescents and Youth**


UNICEF has a comparative advantage in supporting adolescents and youth in peacebuilding. Children and young people typically represent the majority of the population in conflict-affected countries. Some 73 percent of Afghanistan's population is under age 30 while a mere 4.4 percent

<sup>72</sup> UNICEF, WHO, and GWU, Round Table on Adolescent Mental Health: Bridging the Mental Health Gap and Reaching the World's Adolescents, Center for Global Health, April 2011.

<sup>73</sup> Florence Egal, *Nutrition in Conflict Situations*, *British Journal of Nutrition* (2006), 96, Suppl. 1, S17-S19.

<sup>74</sup> Porter, Elisabeth J., *Peacebuilding: Women in International Perspective*, Routledge (2007), p.36.

are age 60 or older.<sup>75</sup> The needs and aspirations of these youth-dominated constituencies are regularly overlooked. UNICEF takes a holistic and human rights-based approach to development of adolescents that prepares them for a successful transition to young adulthood and increased responsibilities. Greater attention to adolescents and youth is imperative as conflict-affected countries have never before had populations so young.



The international community initially recognized the importance of young people in conflict-affected contexts as a group deserving specific programming attention based on the assumption that they pose a specific conflict risk. International attention tends to focus on older youth, particularly males, and how they can represent a conflict risk due to unemployment and idleness. Increasingly, adolescents and youth are being recognized as a national resource for conflict management and peacebuilding, but their role in peacebuilding needs greater exploration and understanding—and remains under-utilized.

Adolescents and youth today are the most politically conscious ever. UNICEF and partners must move away from traditional thinking, and understand and accompany youth where they are. Some critical shortcomings in programme and policy responses include: treating young people as a homogenous group and not appreciating different developmental stages and experiences of this wide age group; not addressing more robustly discriminatory practices and inequalities that adolescents and youth experience, especially adolescent girls and excluded young people; a lack of understanding of the intergenerational-mistrust exacerbated by conflicts that prevents adolescents and young people from participating in the rebuilding of their communities and countries .

Responding to these challenges requires careful reassessment of traditional views and approaches. Current recommendations usually involve livelihoods or employment. However, this is only part of the solution, as adolescents and youth strive for purpose, dignity, and a constructive role in society, which can be supported by programmes on citizenship, leadership, volunteerism, youth centers, and other interventions.<sup>76</sup>

**Youth and Adolescents: Peacebuilding Examples**

Type of programme	Description	Country
<b>Youth Peacebuilding and Leadership Programme</b>	UNICEF's Peacebuilding and Leadership skills training reach youth across multiple communities and have been shown to contribute to reconciliation and reduction of mob violence and violence against women, and to an increased awareness of civic rights and responsibilities. In Liberia, a leadership and peacebuilding skills development programme used interactive and participatory techniques to address self-awareness, trust building, cooperation, information seeking, managing emotions, leadership, and discussing concepts of human rights, causes of conflicts, nationalism and patriotism.	Guinea, Liberia
<b>Youth Centers</b>	UNICEF is increasingly active in establishing youth centres to provide a safe, neutral	Liberia, Kyrgyzstan

<sup>75</sup> The proportions for Timor-Leste, the occupied Palestinian territories and Sudan are similar: 70 percent, 72 percent and 67 percent, respectively.

<sup>76</sup> The World Development Report revealed that dignity and status can be more important than pecuniary motives as a driver of violence or as factors for joining armed groups. See *World Development Report*, pgs. 6, 79.

	location for informational and educational resources, including training on peacebuilding, leadership skills, volunteerism, and sexual reproductive health services. Youth centers offer a unique, multisectoral programming platform to give young people a sense of constructive civic purpose, and learn skills for livelihoods. What is crucial to remember is that an effective youth center must go beyond a safe, space, and involve sustained programmes that make interventions into the lives of youth.	
<b>Integration of Education and Participation</b>	The programme has integrated the two focus areas, FA2 and FA5. One focus on reaching a large cohort of out-of-school adolescents and youth through literacy and life-skills classes. This is accompanied by the focus on advocacy and community mobilization in support of the participation of young people. In a country where many youth have grown through conflict, the prioritisation and support by the government on the participation rights of young people is enhancing the franchising and inclusion of young people in governance helping in assuring young people that their thoughts and actions are key in sustaining the peace that exists.	Timor Leste

### Youth and Adolescents: Peace Dividend Examples

<b>Youth Entrepreneur Programme</b>	The programme offers basic literacy and number skills, as well as health, peace education, human rights, culture and a component of practical skills training to illiterate youth.	Guinea, Sierra Burundi	Angola, Leone,
<b>Youth Innovations Lab</b>	UNICEF Innovations Lab in Pristina/Prishtina cultivates innovations for the benefit of Kosovo's youth. It has three elements. By Youth for Youth projects are a change for Kosovo youth to impact their own lives, and those of their peers. The Design Centre directly designs and implements technological innovations for Kosovo institutions that work on behalf of youth and children. The Youth Advocacy Platform seeks to build the capacity to Kosovo's youth to assume constructive roles in their communities, enhance their livelihood opportunities, directly address key social issues within their communities, with the goal of establishing a sustainable network of youth-led advocacy, civic engagement and policy influence.	Kosovo	

### Social Protection

Social protection policies and programmes can play a key role in promoting peacebuilding outcomes. Increasingly recognised as an inherent redistributive and equity-enhancing strategy, social protection supports social cohesion and community resilience, creates opportunities to strengthen the citizen-state compact, and can address some of the underling drivers of conflict. By reaching out to the most economically and socially disadvantaged, social protection compliments UNICEF sector interventions to increase equitable access to services. This is an important peace dividend, but also helps address horizontal inequalities that can fuel violence and conflict.

### Social Protection: Peace Dividend Examples

Type of Programme	Description	Country
Cash Transfer (Pilot)	UNICEF supported a pilot cash transfer program launched in Bomi County in early 2010. The Pilot Scheme was created to respond to the plight of ultra-poor and labor-constrained Liberians. In particular, the pilot aims to protect poor and vulnerable children and their families from the worst impacts of food insecurity and the general deprivation caused by extreme poverty, which in a post-conflict setting and fragility threatened peace. Although an external evaluation of the Programme is under development, mid-term assessments and interviews to beneficiaries have shown the value of transfers for participating households, including use for investments in home improvements, bolster food consumption, investments in income generating opportunities, as well as cover education costs for their children. This programme's implementation includes a strong community involvement to reduce exclusion errors in targeting, as well as to minimize conflict in the community. <sup>77</sup>	Liberia
Child Benefit Cash Transfer	The Social and Human Development Pillar in the draft South Sudan Development Plan (SSDP), proposes introducing a Child Benefit Cash Transfer for families with children under six between 2011-2013. UNICEF, UNDP and partners are currently working with the newly created government collation to design the most effective intervention, including a potential linkage with birth registration. Although still under development, the cash	South Sudan

<sup>77</sup> UNICEF (2011) "Transformative Transfers: Evidence from the Social Cash Transfer Pilot in Bomi County, Liberia". UNICEF

	transfer would have the potential to serve as a peace dividend, resulting in key social and economic impacts for the most vulnerable, as well as help the government to increase its presence in the poorest sectors.	
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**Children and Peace Agreements**

UNICEF has a vital role to play in advocating for the explicit inclusion of children and adolescents as a priority in peace agreements. Since the end of the Cold War, peace agreements have frequently included references to the needs of children and adolescents. Several agreements recognize the general impact of war on children and adolescents and include for measures to ensure their protection, education, care, welfare, health, and security. They also call for the commitment of all parties to uphold the CRC.<sup>78</sup> Priorities for inclusion in peace agreements include the release of children detained by fighting groups, governmental obligations for supporting the reunification of these children with their families, and the creation of commissions to locate children disappeared during an armed conflict.

**Resource Mobilization**

Funding for peacebuilding and conflict sensitive programmes and activities is increasing. Such funding is largely drawn from bilateral and multilateral development and peacebuilding-related budgets and funds. (Humanitarian action, which can offer peace dividends, is funded through humanitarian funding mechanisms, such as an appeal process.) Funding for peacebuilding efforts carried out by peacekeeping or special political missions comes from their assessed contributions.<sup>79</sup> Funding amounts for immediate post-conflict peacebuilding can be significant, and typically exceed that of early prevention and peacebuilding implemented in later post-conflict contexts. Examples of key bilateral donors that have specific peacebuilding and stabilization funding mechanisms include the UK, Switzerland, Denmark, Norway, Belgium, Sweden, and the Netherlands.

Within the UN, the PBF is a global, system-wide multi-donor trust fund. The PBF’s purpose is to: support interventions of direct relevance to early peacebuilding processes and address critical gaps where no other funding is available; and support countries at a later stage of their peacebuilding processes where no multi-donor trust fund has been established and/or where critical peacebuilding interventions remain underfunded. The PBF has a quick disbursement window and a longer-term window. Countries on the Peacebuilding Commission agenda receive more than 60 percent of PBF resources since 2007. Countries not on the Peacebuilding Commission agenda can also receive Funds if they demonstrate a commitment to address peacebuilding issues. In recent years, UNICEF has been the third largest recipient of PBF funding.<sup>80</sup>

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<sup>78</sup> For instance, some agreements mention the need for the resumption of access to education, while others call for the reform of the education sector (Philippines in 1996; Guatemala in 1996; Macedonia in 2001). Other agreements have explicit provisions on children in armed conflict (Sierra Leone in 1999) and child protection systems, such as tracing and reunification (Sudan 2005). Peace agreements in Guatemala (1996) and Burundi (2000) have articles on assistance to young returnees. See Dupuy, Kendra and Krijn Peters, *War and Children: A Reference Handbook* (ABC-CLIO, 2010), p.108-12.

<sup>79</sup> The UN is financed by two types of funding sources: voluntary and assessed (mandatory) contributions from Member States. Assessed contributions largely apply to the regular budget and peacekeeping operations. Each Member State’s capacity to pay is the basic principle for assessed contributions. Voluntary contributions apply to the different UN agencies, funds and programs. UN specialized agencies have a mixed funding of assessed and voluntary contributions.

<sup>80</sup> In 2011, UNICEF received over USD\$5 million from the PBF. UNICEF received USD\$10 million in 2010, and USD\$4 million in 2009.



The World Bank's State- and Peacebuilding Fund (SPF) was established in 2008 to address the needs of state and local governance and peace-building in fragile and conflict affected situations. The SPF is the World Bank's premier global multi-donor trust fund to support projects that contribute to prevention and recovery from conflict and fragility, operating at the intersection of development, conflict prevention, post-conflict reconstruction, and peacebuilding.

The European Commission's Instrument for Stability (IfS) funds conflict prevention, crisis management and peacebuilding. Activities can be supported in situations of crisis or emerging crisis, when timely financial help cannot be provided from other EU sources. A Peace-building Partnership is an innovative part of the IfS and is established to strengthen civilian expertise for peace-building activities. It is created to deepen the dialogue between civil society and the EU institutions. (For more information on partners and funding, see Annex 3.)

### **Monitoring and Evaluation**

UNICEF should integrate conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding into monitoring and evaluation frameworks used for violence- and conflict-affected contexts. This plays a critical role in helping ensure more conflict sensitive and, where applicable, effective peacebuilding programmes. With an increasing share of donor resources being allocated to peacebuilding, there is a growing interest among the donor community to understand whether their contributions are leading to positive long-term social transformation. However, as with any other area it is important that UNICEF views monitoring and evaluation more than merely a donor-driven accountability requirement. Ideally, in violence- and conflict-affected contexts as elsewhere monitoring and evaluation should be a vital management tool to help learn what is working and what is not so that it can refine and retool its approaches as necessary.

Nowhere is this need more acute than in violence- and conflict-affected contexts. There, the focus on conflict sensitivity requires UNICEF to be especially vigilant that its actions are not inadvertently fuelling violence and conflict. In these settings, therefore, it is not only sufficient to ask what is working and what is not and why. It is also important to ask what may be doing harm rather than helping, so that it can be discontinued or adjusted. In monitoring and evaluation terminology this is referred to as the question of unintended negative consequences. UNICEF should be asking it both to ensure programme integrity and to reduce the reputational risk associated with harmful action.

Just as conflict analysis is vital for developing quality programming in violence and conflict affected contexts, a results framework must reflect a theory of change that is founded upon conflict analysis. This is crucial to assess the relevance and effectiveness of UNICEF efforts at addressing the root causes of conflict. Conflict analysis also provides important baseline data in a cost-effective way. Baseline-setting is vitally important for monitoring and evaluation of peacebuilding interventions, which, by definition, take a long-term view ranging from peace dividends to social transformation. In monitoring and evaluation terms, this means impact. This underscores the necessity of articulating right from the outset precisely the long-term results UNICEF and its partners aim to achieve, through which programmatic interventions, and how they are going to demonstrate and measure results achieved over time.

Various organizations and networks have developed guidance on monitoring and evaluating peacebuilding.<sup>81</sup> The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development's Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC) has adapted its criteria for evaluating development assistance to conflict-affected contexts in order to provide greater clarity on main concepts in this field and key questions to consider in the evaluation process. The following are indicative overarching questions that organizations might ask in evaluating their peacebuilding efforts:

- *Relevance*: Does the intervention relate in a meaningful way to current, key driving factors of the (potential) conflict? Are outputs consistent with the objectives of reducing or preventing conflict? An updated conflict analysis is a prerequisite to evaluating a project's relevance
- *Efficiency*: Is this the most efficient way to contribute to peace? Are/were activities well targeted and cost efficient?
- *Impact*: What happened as a result of the conflict prevention and peacebuilding activity? Why? What were the positive and negative changes produced, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended? In this field, the focus may be on impacts on the conflict: how did the intervention impact key conflict actors or affect on-going conflict-creating or peace-promoting factors?
- *Effectiveness*: To what extent were objectives and *outcomes* achieved? What factors contributed to achievements?
- *Sustainability*: Will benefits be maintained after donor support has ended? Has the intervention addressed the role of "spoilers" (those who benefit from on-going conflict) or attempted to engage the "hard-to-reach" (combatants, extremists, men, etc.)? Is there local ownership of the activity or programme, where possible? Have durable, long-term processes, structures and institutions for peacebuilding been created?
- *Coherence*: Are there links and connections to the larger environment? How does the programme or activity integrate with and complement other programmes, initiatives, policy instruments? Are different efforts undermining each other?

Monitoring and evaluating conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding necessitates well-defined qualitative and quantitative indicators. This confronts several challenges. Peacebuilding is often centred on achieving less tangible outcomes, such as social transformation, social cohesion, reconciliation, and changes in relationships and attitudes. These do not always lend themselves readily to quantification. Therefore, it can be difficult to get an objective sense of whether results have been achieved, and the tools to systematically measure such changes over time can be costly. In addition, peacebuilding is by definition a long-term enterprise, which often makes short-term monitoring and evaluation data on some indicators less than revealing, and any longer-term monitoring and evaluation effort required potentially resource-intensive. Finally, given the complex political, economic and social context of violence- and conflict-affected contexts, it can be exceedingly difficult to isolate the impact of a specific programme or peacebuilding intervention on the situation. (For more information, see Annex 6 on Peacebuilding in Results Frameworks.)

Given the complexity and high cost of well-designed monitoring and evaluation frameworks, steps should be undertaken to adequate resources are allocated from the start to baseline-setting and longer-term monitoring and evaluation efforts. Moreover, every effort should be made to undertake

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<sup>81</sup> OECD/DAC Factsheet – Evaluating conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities, a Monitoring and Evaluation Framework for Peacebuilding, Pricewaterhouse Cooper LLP commissioned by EU Peace and Reconciliation Programme, 2007

monitoring and evaluation in these settings jointly at the inter-agency level. In addition to addressing these methodological challenges, joint monitoring and evaluation efforts can reduce duplication and lower the transaction costs borne by individual agencies. As noted earlier, planning and programming informed by sound conflict analysis with solid results frameworks can help further address some of the aforementioned challenges, and learning can be captured and results measured/assessed by using intermediate and proxy indicators. Baseline studies, conflict analysis, and alternative information sources can be used to ensure access to information and primary stakeholders. There are resources to support UNICEF's development of results frameworks as well as monitoring and evaluation frameworks (see Annexes 1, 4 and 6 for further information).

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## **ANNEXES**

1. Overview: Theories of Conflict and Theories of Change in Peacebuilding
2. Conflict Analysis Methodology
3. Key Partners in Peacebuilding
4. Post-Conflict Planning Frameworks
5. Peacebuilding Reference Materials
6. Peacebuilding in Results Frameworks
7. Conflict Sensitivity Considerations

## ANNEX 1

### **Overview: Theories of Conflict and Peacebuilding**

The following overview is an extract from the World Bank's 2011 *World Development Report: Conflict, Security and Development* (page 75-76, Box 2.1) presenting the political and economic theories of violent conflict. The overview reflects broad and long-standing literature in many academic disciplines.

#### **Political and Economic Theories of Conflict (2011 World Development Report)**

##### **Rapid change and rising expectations**

One common perspective has been the importance of drivers such as rapid economic and social change. Drawing on research by psychologists and sociologists, Gurr argued that social and political conflict arises when groups experience feelings of "relative deprivation" and the frustration of expectations for deserved or anticipated economic or social status. Huntington agreed that economic modernization raises expectations and mobilizes members of traditional societies toward national politics, contending that conflict occurs when political institutions lack the capacity to accommodate and manage rapidly rising demands.

##### **Failing to credibly agree to abstain from violence**

Many economists and political scientists see violence as originating from "commitment problems"—situations where organized groups have opposing interests but cannot credibly agree to abstain from violence for a variety of reasons. The focus in these theories is on the difficulty of groups or individuals in some settings to commit themselves to not using force when it would be advantageous to do so. This thinking can be traced back as far as Hobbes, who contended that violent civil conflict is a consequence of low state capacity to deter challengers and manage conflict among groups in society. Recent theories on opportunistic arming and consequent violence can be found in Hirshleifer, Skaperdas, Grossman, and Fearon. Becker developed a rational actor model of crime. Thinking on the "security dilemma"—that arming for defense can also be used to attack, leading to violence—can be traced to Schelling, Posen, Snyder and Jervis, and de Figueiredo and Weingast.

##### **Greed or grievance**

These contending theories have led to debates over the relative importance of normative and economic motives for violence, which has recently led to debates on whether economic incentives or broader social and political motives drive societies to violence. This question was formulated as "Greed and Grievance" by Collier and Hoeffler, who suggested that primary commodities, diasporas, low earnings, human capital, and dispersed populations were positively correlated to the outbreak of civil conflict, suggesting support for the "greed" hypothesis. Further exploration, review and critique of these issues can be found in Nathan and Sambanis, as well as Satyanath, Miguel, and Sergenti and Blattman and Miguel.

##### **Horizontal inequality and identity**

Significant contributions to this debate include recent theories of polarization and horizontal inequality and analysis of violence based solely on identity, such as nationalism and ethnicity. Theories of horizontal inequality as developed by Stewart, and polarization proposed by Esteban and Ray argue that inequality alone does not predict civil war—violence may be driven by relationships between inequality and identity that contribute to the onset of civil violence. In addition, national or ethnic identity may lead to a violent response to oppression or marginalization and need not include any equity concerns, but may be motivated instead by a disposition for self-government.

##### **Ethnic divides and commitment problems**

Bridging the arguments on grievance and rational choice motives for conflict, Fearon contends that ethnic polarization is most likely to precipitate conflict when ethnic groups cannot make credible commitments to abstain from violence. This is consistent with the philosophy in this Report: both political and economic dynamics are often at play, and neither greed nor grievance alone is sufficient to explain the incidence of violence.

##### **Avenues for peaceful contests**

The question remains: why do some societies avoid violence when others do not? The hypotheses put forward by North, Wallis, and Weingast focus on impersonal institutions with open access to political and economic opportunities, creating avenues for peaceful and credible contestation. Besley and Persson contend that investments in legal systems and state capacity can reduce the incidence of violence. Keefer argues that violence occurs when societies cannot collectively punish leaders who engage in predatory behavior or collectively build a capable counterinsurgency force, suggesting that institutionalized political parties serve as a bulwark against conflict by resolving these problems of collective action and credibility. Recent empirical quantitative evidence supports these hypotheses—Goldstone and others find that the quality of political institutions is an order of magnitude more important than other factors in determining risks of political crises and civil wars, while Brückner and Ciccone suggest that institutions are necessary to accommodate shocks in prices to avoid violence. More work is needed to confirm these findings thus to better understand the channels through which institutions contribute to resilience to violence.

##### **Institutions matter in preventing violence**

There are empirical findings that support arguments by theorists (such as North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009) that institutions matter for violence prevention. For instance, the failure to develop legitimate, capable, and accountable institutions can cause repeated cycles of violence. Building on the work by Collier, Fearon, Goldstone, North, Wallis, and Weingast, and others, Fearon finds that countries with above average governance indicators for their income level have a significantly lower risk of the outbreak of civil conflict within the next 5 to 10 years—between 30 to 45 percent lower—and that the relationship also holds true for countries with high homicides. This work confirms earlier directions in the policy community, such as the International Network for Conflict and Fragility’s emphasis on the links between peacebuilding and state-building. Measures of accountability are as important as measures of capacity in this calculation. Fearon finds that high levels of political terror in past periods increase the chances of current conflict. Walter finds that significant reductions in the number of political prisoners and extrajudicial killings make the renewal of civil war between two and three times less likely than in countries with higher levels of human rights abuses. Other measures of accountability also matter: measures of rule of law and corruption are as or more important than measures of bureaucratic quality.

Sources: Gurr 1970; Hobbes 1651; Hirshleifer 1995; Skaperdas 1996; Grossman 1991; Fearon 1995, 2004, 2010; Schelling 1960; Posen 1993; Snyder and Jervis 1999; de Figueiredo and Weingast 1999; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Nathan 2005; Sambanis 2004; Satyanath, Miguel, and Sergenti 2004; Blattman and Miguel 2010; Esteban and Ray 2008; Stewart 2001, 2010; Keefer 2008, forthcoming; North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009; Besley and Persson 2009, 2010; Huntington 1968; Goldstone and others 2010; Becker 1968; Brückner and Ciccone 2010; Walter (2010); Johnston (2010).

(Full citations available under Annex 5: Reference Materials)

While our knowledge has grown about the causes of conflict, our ability to understand how to address those causes is still developing. This is largely due to the fact that the field of peacebuilding is relatively new. Therefore, peacebuilding programming is often built on numerous assumptions or “theories of change” about how we can address the causes of conflict. A better understanding of the theories of change that underpin peacebuilding interventions is essential to planning, monitoring and evaluating peacebuilding interventions. The following table offers an overview of some common theories of change in peacebuilding.

### Theories of Change: Peacebuilding<sup>82</sup>

#### The Individual Change Theory

Peace comes through transformative change of a critical mass of individuals, their consciousness, attitudes, behavior, and skills. [Methods: investment in individual change through training, personal transformation/consciousness-raising processes; dialogue and encounter groups; leadership training and development; coaching; psychosocial and/or trauma healing.]

#### The Relationships and Connections Theory

Peace emerges out of a process of breaking down isolation, polarization, division, prejudice and stereotypes between/among groups. Strong relationships are a central ingredient for peacebuilding and community resilience. [Methods: processes of inter-group dialogue; networking; relationship-building processes; collaborative, joint management over any shared resource or concrete initiative.]

#### The Withdrawal of War Resources Theory

Wars require vast amounts of materiel (weapons, supplies, transport, etc.) and human capital. Interrupting this supply to the war-making system will lead to its collapse, or limit it for an alternative national dialogue, and peace can prevail. [Methods: anti-war campaigns to cut off funds/national budgets; advocacy about war’s impact; advocacy and programmes to stop illegal recruitment (such as children); back to school campaigns and campaigns to enrol adolescents and youth in school or other constructive civic role; social policy and social budgeting advocacy and support; international arms control; arms (and other) embargoes and boycotts.]

#### The Reduction of Violence Theory

Peace will be maintained as the levels of violence or armed conflict perpetrated by combatants is reduced. [Methods: cease-fires, creation of zones of peace, withdrawal/retreat from direct engagement, introduction of peacekeeping forces, observation missions, accompaniment efforts, promotion of nonviolent methods for achieving political/social/economic ends.]

<sup>82</sup> Adapted from Peter Woodrow, *Strategic Analysis for Peace-Building Programmes*, cited by Church, C and Rogers, M. *Designing for Results: Integrated Monitoring and Evaluation in Conflict Transformation Programmes*, Search for Common Ground, Washington (2006). Note that Communication for Development, Child Protection and other programme sectors in UNICEF have routinely used various theories of change over the years. Currently, a socio-ecological model is often being used, which describes the multiple layers of intersecting influences in a child’s life. This theory combines many of the elements of Woodrow’s analysis and different theories presented in this box.

**The Root Cause and Justice Theory**

Peace can be achieved and sustained by addressing the underlying causes (injustice, oppression/exploitation, threats to identity and security, inequalities, grievances, etc.) [Methods: long-term programmes for social transformation and structural change, truth and reconciliation; governance reform—institutions, laws, regulations, and economic systems; development of local human capacity for conflict management; etc.]

**The Institutional Development Theory**

Peace is secured by establishing stable/reliable social institutions that guarantee democracy, equity, services, justice, and fair allocation of resources. [Methods: new constitutional and governance arrangements/entities; institutional capacity development; development of human rights, rule of law, anti-corruption; establishment of democratic/equitable economic structures; economic development; democratization.]

**The Political Elites Theory**

Conflict risk is reduced and peace can be secured when it is in the interest of political (and other) leaders to take the necessary steps. Peacebuilding efforts must change the political calculus of key leaders and groups. [Methods: raise the costs and reduce the benefits for political elites of continuing war while increasing the incentives for peace; engage active and influential constituencies in favor of peace; advocacy; mediation; withdrawal of international support/funding for warring parties.]

**The Grassroots Mobilization Theory**

If there is sufficient social mobilization in opposition to war, political leaders will pay attention. [Methods: mobilize grassroots groups to either oppose war or to advocate for positive action; nonviolent direct action campaigns; advocacy campaigns; use of the media; education/mobilization efforts; organize advocacy groups.]

**The Economics Theory**

People make personal decisions and decision makers make policy decisions based on a system of rewards/incentives and punishments/sanctions that are essentially economic in nature. If we can change the economies associated with war making, we can bring peace. [Methods: use of government or financial institutions to change supply and demand dynamics; control incentive and reward systems; boycotts.]

**The Public Attitudes Theory**

War and violence are partly motivated by prejudice, misperceptions, and intolerance of difference. Positive social relations and non-violence can be promoted by using the media (television and radio), community development, social mobilization to change public attitudes and build greater tolerance in communities and society. [Methods: TV and radio programs that promote tolerance; modeling tolerant behavior; peace education and conflict management in educational systems; curriculum development; advocacy campaigns; community development programmes involving different groups; symbolic acts of solidarity/unity; dialogue among groups in conflict—with subsequent publicity.]

## ANNEX 2

### Conflict Analysis: Example Methodology

#### **Conflict profile/Situation analysis**

The conflict profile is a snapshot or photograph clearly describing the current situation in a given country or region.

- What is the political, economic, and socio-cultural context?
- What are emergent political, economic, ecological and social issues?
- What specific conflict prone/affected areas can be situated within the context?
- Is there a history of conflict?

#### **Causal analysis of conflicts**

The causal analysis aims at identifying key sources of tensions or conflicts that could lead to instability in the society.

- What are the key sources of tension and the underlying structural causes (e.g. economic inequality, limited access to land and resources, poor governance, human rights violations)?
  - What are the main root (structural) causes of the conflict? – pervasive factors that have become built into the policies, structures and fabric of society
  - What issues can be considered as proximate causes of conflict? – factors contributing to a climate conducive to violent conflict or its further escalation, sometimes symptomatic of a deeper problem
- What triggers can contribute to the outbreak/further escalation of conflict? – simple key acts, events, or their anticipation that will set off or escalate violent conflicts
- What new factors contribute to prolonging conflict dynamics?
- What factors can contribute to promoting peace?

#### **Stakeholder analysis**

The stakeholder analysis aims at identifying critical local, national, regional and international actors that influence or are influenced by the conflict.

- Who are the main actors?
- What are their main interests, goals, positions?
- What are their capacities and resources?
- What are the relationships between all actors, and how are they connected?
- What are conflicts of interest?
- What institutional capacities for peace can be identified?
- What actors can be identified as spoilers? Why?

#### **Analysis of conflict dynamics**

The analysis of conflict dynamics helps identify conflict drivers and windows of opportunity by looking at how causes and actors impact each other.

- What consequences might the conflict triggers have on the causes and key stakeholders of the conflict?
- What are the main mechanisms driving the conflict?
- What are conflict trends?
- What are potential entry points for interventions?
- What scenarios can be developed from the analysis of the conflict profile, causes and actors?

## ANNEX 3

### Key Peacebuilding Partners

#### **The Peacebuilding Commission (PBC)**

The PBC is an intergovernmental subsidiary organ of the General Assembly and the Security Council. The core pillars of its mandate are focused on: (1) bringing together all of the relevant actors, including international donors, the international financial institutions, national governments, troop contributing countries; (2) marshalling resources and (3) advising on and proposing integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery and where appropriate, highlighting any gaps that threaten to undermine peace. There are currently five countries on the Commission's agenda – Burundi, the Central African Republic, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and Sierra Leone.

#### **Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO)**

The PBSO works to sustain peace in conflict-affected countries by garnering international support for nationally owned and led peacebuilding efforts. Its primary mandated tasks are to support the PBC, administer the PBF, and to serve the Secretary-General in coordinating the UN in its peacebuilding efforts – catalyzing the UN System and partnering with external actors to develop peacebuilding strategies and marshalling resources. This support is based on PBSO's function as a knowledge centre for lessons learned and good practices on peacebuilding. The PBSO is headed by an Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support, and comprises a PBC Support Section, a Policy Planning Section, and a Financing for Peacebuilding Section.

#### **Peacebuilding Fund (PBF)**

The PBF was launched in October 2006, following General Assembly and Security Council resolutions A/60/984 and S/2005/1645 (2005). The PBF relies upon voluntary contributions from Member States, organizations and individuals. It is managed by the PBSO and administered by the UNDP Multi-Donor Trust Fund Office (MDTF Office).

The PBF aims to provide rapid and catalytic resources that are of direct relevance to advancing peace processes and catalysing peacebuilding in post-conflict settings. The PBF can establish a crucial bridge between conflict and recovery at a time when other funding mechanisms may not yet be available. With mechanisms for rapid reaction, it addresses countries' immediate needs and critical gaps as they emerge from conflicts and thus focuses on providing support during the very early stages of a peacebuilding process. The PBF is guided by the following principles: transparency, flexibility, operational speed, accountability, catalytic effect, effectiveness, needs-based allocations and national ownership. PBF proposals are co-ordinated through the SRSG (where applicable) and/or Resident Co-ordinator's Office in-country. The PBF allocates funding through two facilities:

- Immediate Response Facility (IRF): Project-based funding to jumpstart peace initiatives that can be scaled-up into longer-term programmes. IFR supports: (a) a portfolio of projects, not more than 12 months in duration, drawn from a strategic framework that explicitly addresses peacebuilding needs, typically in the immediate aftermath of conflict (funding limited to a maximum of \$10 million or 10% of the total funding requested in the planning framework); and (b) stand-alone projects responding to a critical and immediate peacebuilding need or opportunity (funding limited to a maximum of \$3 million).



- **Peacebuilding and Recovery Facility (PRF):** A country programme driven by national stakeholders. Upon receipt of a Priority Plan identifying key peacebuilding needs, the PBSO will review and establish a country allocation and delegate project approval authority to a Joint Steering Committee (JSC) to oversee the longer term programme.

PBF guidelines can be found at <http://www.unpbf.org/index.shtml>. (These may undergo a revision towards the end of 2011 and early 2012.)

### **UN Development Programme (UNDP)**

UNDP's work in peacebuilding focuses principally on governance, public administration reform, electoral assistance, DDR and rule of law. UNDP also has supported youth programmes, including national youth policy development and advocacy. UNDP has maintains a conflict prevention team at HQ, and has developed frameworks for conflict analysis. UNDP also hosts the informal UN Inter-Agency Framework Team for Preventive Action (Framework Team), which emphasizes inter-agency early prevention through UNCTs. (UNICEF currently chairs the Framework Team's Expert Reference Group.) Under the joint auspices of UNDP, DPA and the Framework Team, Peace and Development Advisors (PDAs), which are conflict prevention and peacebuilding specialists, are placed either in select Resident Co-ordinator Offices or within a UNDP Country Office. PDAs manage discrete UNDP/DPA-funded prevention initiatives and also offer limited support to the prevention capacity of the UN Country Team. Currently, there are approximately 35 Peace and Development Advisors globally.<sup>83</sup>

UNDP also manages the Conflict Prevention Community of Practice, which can be a valuable resource for interested UNICEF staff. To request access and membership, contact Alex Shoebridge at [alex.shoebridge@undp.org](mailto:alex.shoebridge@undp.org) or the UNICEF Peacebuilding and Recovery Section in EMOPS NYHQ.

### **Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO)**

Important actors in many conflict-affected countries are Security-Council mandated peacekeeping missions.<sup>84</sup> Multidimensional peacekeeping missions are often mandated to play a role in a range of "early" peacebuilding activities. These include: DDR, mine action; SSR and other rule of law-related activities, protection (notably including child protection, in conjunction with UNICEF) and promotion of human rights; electoral assistance; support to the restoration and extension of state authority. These missions also lead Integrated Strategic Frameworks, UN joint strategic plans for peace consolidation.

### **Department of Political Affairs (DPA)**

DPA manages Special Political Missions, including integrated Peacebuilding Offices, the majority of which are Security Council-mandated, and which lead joint peacebuilding strategies. These missions include countries currently on the PBC's agenda – Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS), the

<sup>83</sup> UNICEF has contributed funding to the Framework Team and to PDAs in the past, and currently chairs the Framework Team's Expert Reference Group.

<sup>84</sup> The Department for Peacekeeping Operations' (DPKO) recent Capstone Doctrine and "early peacebuilding" non-paper articulate how multi-dimensional UN peacekeeping operations generally lack the programme funding and technical expertise required to implement peacebuilding programmes. See United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines, DPKO/DFS, 2008, at [http://www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org/pbps/library/capstone\\_doctrine\\_eng.pdf](http://www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org/pbps/library/capstone_doctrine_eng.pdf). For the early peacebuilding non-paper, see <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/PKO%20Peacebuilding%20Peacekeeping%20Nexus.pdf>.

Central African Republic (BINUCA), Burundi (BINUB) and Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL). At the global level, DPA leads the UN system on conflict prevention, and houses a Mediation Support Unit, which supports peace processes, as well as the Electoral Assistance Division, which is the UN focal point for the provision of technical assistance to countries on electoral processes. DPA maintains a global Joint Programme on Conflict Prevention with UNDP.

### **Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)/International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF)**

Founded in 2009, INCAF is a subsidiary body of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) and works in close partnership with the UN, NATO, the World Bank and other bilateral and multilateral organisations dealing with conflict and fragility. The network's four workstreams include:

- Improving donor engagement in fragile states through the Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations
- Peacebuilding, statebuilding and security;
- Financing and aid architecture;
- International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding

UNICEF participates in INCAF at the global level through UNDP as UNDG Chair, and the UNDG-ECHA Working Group on Transition.

### **World Bank**

The Bank's mandate is non-political and therefore the Bank does not formally engage in peacebuilding activities. However, its broader mandate of poverty reduction and economic development through national institutions can encompass peacebuilding-related areas such as governance and institutional development, public administration reform, financial management reform, employment, private sector development, and it has partnered with the UN on components of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. The Bank is also strengthening its approach to justice reform. The Bank's Fragile and Conflict-Affected Countries Group, through the 2011 *World Development Report on Conflict, Security and Development*, is leading a new agenda for strengthening the Bank's engagement in fragile and conflict-affected states, including institutional reforms, rapid response policy and procedures, and changes to organizational and human resource systems.

### **European Commission (EC)**

The EC's Instrument for Stability is a funding facility that aims principally to assist in the recovery process during and after a crisis situation or an emerging crisis. The fund has a short-term facility and long-term facility. The short-term facility aims to avoid conflict, support post-conflict political stabilization and to ensure early recovery after a natural disaster. The long term facility aims to fight against the increase of weapons of mass destruction, strengthen response capacities and enhance pre- and post-crisis preparedness capacity. The majority of the funds granted so far have been disbursed against the long term facility. For more information: [http://eeas.europa.eu/ifs/index\\_en.htm](http://eeas.europa.eu/ifs/index_en.htm).

### **UN-World Bank-EC Partnership Framework for Crisis and Post-Crisis Situations**

A tripartite Partnership Framework Agreement (PFA) for Crisis and Post-Crisis Situations was signed by the UN, World Bank, and the EC in 2008. The PFA reflects the renewed effort to engage

sooner and more systematically after crises, and includes a Fiduciary Principles Accord to streamline financial collaboration, and an Operational Annex that identifies the Post-Conflict Needs Assessment (PCNA) and Post-Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) as the agreed, multilateral recovery assessment and planning tool. The documents can be found at: <http://www.intranet.unicef.org/PFO/PFOInfoV3.nsf/Site%20Pages/Page0304>. (See Annex 4 for more information on the PCNA.) UNICEF has PCNA expertise in EMOPS, and specifically the Peacebuilding and Recovery Section, which participates in PCNA exercises and serves on the global PCNA Advisory Group.

### **World Food Programme (WFP)**

WFP is active in identifying and articulating the links between food insecurity and conflict. WFP's principal contribution to peacebuilding is through support to food security via the delivery of humanitarian assistance (and the early recovery approach). WFP also makes contributions to DDR processes, employment generation schemes, and infrastructural improvements.

### **UN Women**

UN Women is a key actor in promoting the role of women in peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding, and advocates for the active participation of women at all levels of decision-making. This work builds largely on the resolutions of the UN Security Council on women, peace and security and the Secretary-General's 7-Point Action Plan on Gender-Responsive Peacebuilding. Some examples of UN Women's contributions include:

- supporting women's involvement in peace negotiations, such as recently in mediation efforts to end conflicts in Somalia, Uganda, Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC);
- supporting women's involvement and gender expertise in international engagement conferences, such as Afghanistan and South Sudan;
- supporting initiatives aimed at strengthening the presence and capacity of female officers in peace operations, such as Afghanistan;
- strengthening the development of gender-sensitive early warning strategies to prevent the outbreak of conflict in Colombia and the Solomon Islands;
- advocating for women's inclusion in the design, implementation and conduct of post-conflict elections in Burundi;
- providing gender expertise in a variety of peace operations in, for example, Libya.

### **NGOs**

There is an array of international NGOs that are very active in peacebuilding and conflict sensitivity. Finding the appropriate partner to implement UNICEF programmes will be an essential factor in ensuring quality approaches and achieving results. Several NGOs are included below as examples:

- Save the Children ([www.savethechildren.org](http://www.savethechildren.org))
- International Alert ([www.international-alert.org](http://www.international-alert.org))
- Search for Common Ground ([www.sfcg.org](http://www.sfcg.org))
- World Vision ([www.worldvision.org](http://www.worldvision.org))
- PACT ([www.pactworld.org](http://www.pactworld.org))
- Catholic Relief Services ([www.crs.org](http://www.crs.org))
- CARE ([www.care.org](http://www.care.org))
- International Rescue Committee ([www.rescue.org](http://www.rescue.org))

- Counterpart International ([www.counterpart.org](http://www.counterpart.org))

The US Institute of Peace offers a list of NGOs specializing in the conflict resolution field, which can be found at <http://www.usip.org/node/5657>.

## ANNEX 4

### Post-Conflict Planning Frameworks

#### **Post-Conflict Needs Assessment/Transitional Results Matrix (PCNA)**

The PCNA is the agreed inter-agency tool for post-conflict assessment and planning under the World Bank-UN-European Commission Partnership Framework for Crisis and Post-Crisis Situations (2008). PCNAs are government-led, multilateral exercises undertaken in partnership with the United Nations Development Group (UNDG), the World Bank, and the European Commission (EC), and with the cooperation of donor countries. Assessments based on the PCNA methodology are increasingly used as entry points for conceptualizing, negotiating and financing a common shared strategy for recovery and development in fragile or post-conflict settings. The PCNA process includes both the assessment of needs and the national prioritization and costing of needs in an accompanying transitional results matrix.

Consideration of a PCNA is initiated when a national government sends a request to UN, World Bank or EC representatives. Though in principle a PCNA is to be triggered by the signing of a peace agreement or other indication that a conflict has subsided, because of the political nature of the PCNA, they increasingly are requested and conducted prior to the cessation of hostilities and in the midst of a humanitarian response. In these cases, the PCNA draws heavily from existing needs assessments conducted in the humanitarian phase, thus underscoring the importance of mainstreaming early recovery approaches not only into early programmatic responses, but within rapid needs assessments as well.

#### **Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF)**

The Secretary-General's 2008 Decision on Integration requires UN presences operating in conflict and post-conflict situations where there is a peacekeeping operation or political mission/office and a UN Country Team (UNCT) to have (1) "a shared vision of the UN's strategic objectives" and, (2) "a set of agreed results, timelines, and responsibilities for the delivery of tasks critical to consolidating peace".

The Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF) is a new tool designed to fulfil these two requirements. The ISF fills an important gap among other strategic planning tools as: (1) an integrated peace consolidation plan that presents a joint mission/UNCT strategic vision and related priorities, (2) a shared accountability framework that documents these joint priorities, and (3) a living management and operations tool to facilitate regular stocktaking and prioritization of key initiatives. Detailed guidance on ISFs can be found in the [IMPP Guidelines: Role of the Field](#).

The ISF can also play a useful role as a post-conflict recovery framework for the UN system, and accordingly, the ISF should take account of relevant early recovery, peacebuilding and recovery programming that is planned or ongoing. ISFs should take into consideration existing planning instruments such as the PRSP, UNDAF, PCNA/PDNA, Peacebuilding Priority Plan, and Common Humanitarian Action Plan (as appropriate) and, in turn, that the ISF feeds into subsequent revisions of those plans. The ISF should also clearly delineate roles and responsibilities among actors.

#### **Peacebuilding Priority Plan**

The Priority Plan is the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) funding instrument for the Peacebuilding and Recovery Facility (the longer term PBF window). The Priority Plan lays out the results framework for the country level programme drawing from existing national plans. When there is an existing

national strategy with peacebuilding objectives the development of the Priority Plan should be a quick and light process leading to a brief document to:

- Record the consensus of the immediate priorities for peacebuilding arising out of a joint analysis by the Government and the UN;
- Facilitate the determination of the country allocation (funding envelope) from the PBF (based on an indicative financial allocation among broad priority areas and outcomes); and
- Serve as the strategic framework for PBF intervention against which the review and approval of projects is delegated to the country level, and progress and impact are measured and monitored by a Joint Steering Committee.

The Priority Plan summarizes the underlying plan and the consultative process through which priorities for PBF funding were determined by the Government and the UN. These priorities are elaborated within the PBF Results Framework, together with a brief outline of the types of interventions foreseen and the indicators that will be used to measure impact (monitoring and evaluation framework). The Priority Plan explicitly identifies the ‘gap’ targeted by PBF support and the foreseen catalytic impact of PBF resources.

For countries on the agenda of the Peacebuilding Commission agenda, the Priority Plan will be informed by the priority-setting exercise and/or the integrated peacebuilding strategy agreed between the Commission and the national authorities of the country concerned. A select number of indicative project ideas should be outlined and submitted with the Priority Plan to indicate how the plan will be operationalized at the country level.

### **Strategic Assessment**

A Strategic Assessment is part of the Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP) and is designed to provide recommendations to the Secretary-General for how the UN system could formulate or reformulate its response in a crisis or post-crisis country. It is a joint assessment that cuts across all aspects of the UN’s work. It aims to identify the drivers of conflict and analyze the UN’s comparative advantage in addressing these root causes. It typically occurs at the outset of the planning process for a new mission, but can also be applied to situations where the existing UN architecture may need to be adapted in response to changed circumstances. It is important to note that a Strategic Assessment need not always lead to the establishment of an integrated presence.

A Strategic Assessment is managed through the country-specific Integrated Task Force/Integrated Mission Task Force (ITF/IMTF), which is responsible for writing the terms of reference, fielding the team, and managing the follow-up. The UNCT, as members of the ITF/IMTF, should be heavily involved throughout the process. For a full description of the Strategic Assessment process, please see [Guidelines for UN Strategic Assessments](#).

### **Technical Assessment**

Alternatively, the ITF/IMTF may field a Technical Assessment Mission (TAM). A TAM is also part of IMPP and similar to a Strategic Assessment, but often oriented to a more operational level. Multiple TAMs are typically fielded throughout the lifecycle of an integrated presence, particularly at strategically important stages of the mission cycle such as mandate review, restructuring or exit. As with the Strategic Assessment, the ITF/IMTF develops the ToRs and staffs the TAM, and the outputs of the mission are revised/endorsed by the ITF/IMTF membership. Some TAMs may focus

on detailed aspects of the mission that are essentially ‘mission internal’. In general, the UNCT, as members of the ITF/IMTF, should be heavily involved throughout the process.

## ANNEX 5

### Reference Materials

#### Key Reference Materials

##### UN

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##### Conflict Analysis

The UN System Staff College (UNSSC) has an on-line portal, including the conflict analysis and prioritization tool (<http://www.unssc.org/home/themes/peace-and-security/e-learning-0>) and an on-line semi-tutored course on conflict analysis for prevention and peacebuilding (<http://www.unssc.org/home/activities/conflict-analysis-prevention-and-peacebuilding-online-course>).

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**ANNEX 6**  
**Peacebuilding in Results Frameworks**

The following are short examples of how peacebuilding can be integrated into key planning and results frameworks, using example formulations, including in the UNDAF, UNICEF Country Programme.

**UNDAF**

**UNDAF Outcome Area**

“National and local authorities increasingly have the capacity to provide security, manage conflict and prevent violence, respecting human rights throughout”

“A national infrastructure for peace (at local, regional and national levels) involving government, civil society, communities and individuals reduces the risk of violent conflict and supports peacebuilding”

**UNDAF Country Programme Outcome**

“Reintegration policies and programmes implemented in a conflict-sensitive manner, respecting human rights with special attention to women and youth, and including social dialogue”

**UNICEF Country Programme**

<b>Programme Component Result (PCR)</b>	<b>Key Progress Indicator</b>	<b>Intermediate Result (IR)</b>	<b>Intermediate Result Indicator</b>
By 2016, increased capacities at the national and subnational levels to support peacebuilding and more peaceful conditions for children	Strengthened policies and practice in education that support peacebuilding	Increased institutional capacities to supply conflict sensitive and peace education	# of duty-bearers with skills in delivery of conflict sensitive education at community, district and national levels  # of teachers with skills in managing conflict and teaching conflict management
		Increased capacity of children, parents, teachers and community members to prevent, reduce and cope with conflict and promote peace.	% change in perceptions among representative samples of children and adult community members of their own ability to prevent, reduce and cope with conflict and promote peace  % change in a perceptions among representative samples of teachers and adult community members of their own ability to prevent, reduce and cope with conflict and promote peace  # of teachers trained on themes of conflict resolution, tolerance and social cohesion.

			<p>% reduction of violent incidents in schools</p> <p>% increase in violent incidents in schools mediated effectively by teachers</p> <p>% change in perceptions by students in reduction of violence in schools</p>
	Enhanced role of youth in peacebuilding at national and local levels	National voluntary youth service, including peacebuilding component, established	<p>National youth policy developed through inclusive national consultation</p> <p>Youth centers standards approved</p> <p>Non-formal education curriculum established including components on peacebuilding, conflict resolution, group work, etc.</p> <p>% of youth with positive perception of wellbeing (including safety), tolerance, peace and co-existence and participation in social and political life</p>
		Youth equipped to play a more active role in peacebuilding, particularly at community level	<p># of non-formal trainers/educators and social workers trained on working with high risk school aged youth</p> <p># youth with skills in conflict management and resolution, group work, volunteerism, community development and project management.</p> <p># youth with improved perceptions about conflict and violence in communities, and about own future.</p> <p># youth centers open and active in conflict-affected areas, including managing peacebuilding capacity development programmes</p> <p>% of youth regularly participating in youth center programmes (gender/ethnic disaggregated)</p> <p>Acceptance of youth (disaggregated by sex) as legitimate actors in conflict prevention and resolution; perception of youth as capable mediators, negotiators, advisors</p>

## ANNEX 7

### Conflict Sensitivity

<b>Considerations for Strengthening Conflict Sensitivity in UNICEF Programmes<sup>85</sup></b>	
<b>Organization and staff</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Take measures to continually understand the public's perceptions of UNICEF, asss/vet partners for their own conflict sensitivity</li> <li>▪ Provide strong induction packages for all new staff, particularly international, on contextual, political and cultural understanding, humanitarian principles, codes of conduct and conflict sensitivity.</li> <li>▪ Hold regular and open, all-staff meetings to foster relationships between staff, new and existing, international and national, and from different locations</li> <li>▪ Ensure that awareness of national staff identity issues informs staffing decisions, and identify possible measures to mitigate tensions</li> <li>▪ Factor staff identity into field mission, programme management decisions.</li> </ul>
<b>Understanding context</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Ensure the CO has staff with skills in conflict sensitivity integrated across sectors, or located in one function, supporting all sectors.</li> <li>▪ Ensure CO has skills in conflict analysis, and build capacity across sectors for conflict sensitivity and conflict analysis where needed.</li> <li>▪ Always participate in, and advocate for, inter-agency conflict analysis exercises (CCA/UNDAF, ISF, peacebuilding plans, etc.) and factor into own situation analysis. Conduct own conflict analysis to enhance the inter-agency analysis, where necessary.</li> <li>▪ Conduct minimum conflict analysis as part of humanitarian response planning.</li> </ul>
<b>Programme planning, monitoring, evaluation</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Plan the programme according to the conflict analysis (including conflict analysis as part of preparedness planning, or a "good enough" conflict analysis to inform emergency response).</li> <li>▪ Consider carefully timing programme milestones, particularly start-up, with conflict dynamics.</li> <li>▪ Select beneficiaries in relation to needs assessment and the conflict analysis</li> <li>▪ Create feedback, complaints mechanisms, and clear, transparent communication with affected communities</li> <li>▪ Develop a partnership strategy which takes into account identity and spread of local partners, including as part of emergency preparedness plans.</li> <li>▪ Meaningfully involve local partners in all phases of the programme; in emergency response, involvement should occur especially in the first phase and during assessment</li> <li>▪ Use participatory techniques to facilitate community input in determining targeting criteria, ensure continual information-sharing with beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries on targeting, selection criteria</li> <li>▪ Adapt any programme strategies or approaches taken from other countries/contexts.</li> <li>▪ Avoid supplanting local capacity and plan for sustainability—including humanitarian response</li> <li>▪ Map existing social divisions against the proposed targeting criteria, and map key local power relations and actors and use this knowledge to identify possible risks of, and measures to prevent, manipulation</li> <li>▪ Foster links between host/beneficiary communities wherever possible</li> <li>▪ Involve the community in the management of service delivery and distributions, including through community management bodies that are inclusive and representative of all segments of the population</li> <li>▪ Balance the power of community bodies with robust complaints mechanisms</li> <li>▪ Build capacity in community bodies for leadership, management and conflict resolution</li> </ul>
<b>Gender</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Develop an understanding of gender among programme staff beyond women's participation</li> <li>▪ Monitor levels of violence against women within the household</li> <li>▪ Listen and respond to the concerns of men as well as women</li> </ul>
<b>Evaluation/Assessment</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Conduct a conflict sensitivity assessment (such as a PCIA) during or after the programme, and adjust programme accordingly.</li> <li>▪ Integrate conflict analysis, and conflict sensitivity in programme results frameworks and evaluations.</li> </ul>

<sup>85</sup> Adapted from Zicherman, Nona et al, *Applying conflict sensitivity in emergency response*, Humanitarian Practice Network Paper No. 70, October 2011, p. 15.