

Rapid Education Risk Analysis in the Gao Region

Report



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The Gao team – Tassaght NGO



The Bourem team – SEAD NGO



The Menaka team – GARI NGO



The Ansongo team – CRADE NGO

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Acronyms

AE	Regional Education Office (Académie d'Enseignement)
ALP	Accelerated Learning Program
CAP	District Level Education Office (Centre d'Animation Pédagogique)
CPS	Department of Planning and Statistics (Cellule de Planification et de Statistiques)
CRADE	Cabinet de Recherche Action pour le Développement Endogène
DNEF	Direction Nationale de l'Enseignement Fondamental
DNP	Direction Nationale de la Pédagogie
ECCN	Education in Crisis and Conflict Network
EDC	Education Development Center
EMMP	Environmental Mitigation and Monitoring Plan
ERSA	Education Recovery Support Activity
FY	Fiscal Year
GARI	Groupe des Artisans Ruraux d'Intadéné
GREFFA	Groupe de Recherche, d'Étude, de Formation Femme Action
INSO	<i>International NGO Safety Organization</i>
INSTAT	Institut National de la Statistique
IRB	Institutional Review Board
JENA	Joint Education Need Assessment
MOJWA	<i>Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa</i>
MOU	Memorandum of understanding
OCHA	<i>Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</i>
PACEN	Programme d'Appui à la Consolidation de l'Éducation au Nord
PARIS	<i>Programme Adapté pour la Résilience et l'Insertion Scolaire</i>
PMP	Performance Monitoring Plan
RERA	Rapid Evaluation of Risk in Education
SEAD	Sahel Etudes Actions pour le Développement
SSA-P	<i>La Stratégie de Scolarisation Accélérée/Passerelle</i>
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

INTRODUCTION

The Education Recovery Support Act ("ERSA", or its French acronym "PACEN" - "Programme d'Appui à la Consolidation de l'Education au Nord"), financed by the United States Agency for International Development ("USAID") is implemented by the Education Development Center (EDC) and its partners: the Women Action Group for Research, Study and Education ("GREFFA", "Groupe de Recherche, d'Étude, de Formation Femme Action"), Sahel Action Studies for Development ("SEAD", "Sahel Etudes Actions pour le Développement") the Grouping of Rural Artisans of Intadéné ("GARI", "Groupement des Artisans Ruraux d'Intadéné", Tassaght and the Action Research Office for Endogenous Development ("CRADE", "Cabinet de Recherche Action pour le Développement Endogène"). The program started in July 2015 for a period of five years, under the supervision of the Ministry of Education.

ERSA aims to provide education and training opportunities for children and young people in the Gao Region. A total of 7,450 children aged 9 to 14, who had previously dropped out or who had never attended school, will enter or re-enter formal schooling as a result of a 1 to 2-year program adapted for resilience and school integration, as well as 1,160 who will join a livelihoods preparation program. A total of 2,100 young people, aged 15 to 24, will complete a basic education program focused on work readiness that will help them to obtain employment. To achieve this objective, the program will build 150 classrooms and will rehabilitate 15 functional literacy centers.

Children aged 9 to 14 are joining a program adapted for resilience and school integration, provided by a facilitator from the community, who is trained and supported by the program. After one year in the program, children can join the school in 4th grade, or continue for another year in the program, either to enter school in 6th grade or to enter job preparation program. Young people aged 15 to 24 join a basic education program focused on employment preparation that is taught by young volunteers living in the community. These volunteers also support young people in their job search and training, or in the creation of their own employment. All materials, support and pedagogical techniques are developed by the program team, as are the implementation strategies which must be adapted to the context of conflict.

The rapid education risk analysis (RERA) in the Gao Region was conducted during the last quarter of 2015, by the Education Recovery Support Act (ERSA). Its purpose is to analyze the effects of the crisis on the lives of the populations, the school system and on the security situation, in order to design inputs and define the project's implementation strategies for the region. More specifically, this analysis aims to:

- Identify potential communities where the project will intervene, based on the needs, the number of potential beneficiaries and the security realities,
- Understand the causes of the conflict as well as the populations' perceptions of the conflict,
- Understand the consequences of the conflict on education, educational needs and the expectations of the populations,
- Know the risks faced by the populations and by the vulnerable populations (risks and risk perceptions),
- Identify training and employment opportunities for young people, and
- Identify the factors, stakeholders and local mechanisms of division, of cohesion and resilience.

It is based on the analysis of secondary data, particularly of the Education Cluster, and primary data collected by the agents of the NGOs partnering with ERSA: GREFFA, CRADE, GARI, Tassaght and SEAD.

These agents have collected data under very difficult security conditions and have assumed a very significant workload. All communes in the region, with the exception of Alata, were surveyed and in each commune, its capital and another locality were visited.

In total, 459 young people, half of them women, were interviewed individually; discussions were held with 46 leaders of community groups, 46 groups of women, and 93 groups of young people (half of which were young women). In all, 68 teachers from 37 schools and 36 communities were surveyed¹. Also, 19 district education officers were surveyed.

The assessment allowed for the analysis of perceptions of the communities as to the sources, factors and those responsible for the crisis, and to highlight the influence of ethnicity and gender on these perceptions. Insecurity and the lack of employment opportunities are the most important issues for all communities, as much as food insecurity. Ethnic tensions are very present and resentment due to injustice between the north and south of Mali is very strong. While insecurity comes mainly from armed groups, local elected officials and traditional leaders, as well as NGOs, are singled out as sources of division at the local level.

The analysis of the primary and secondary data (mainly data from the CPS of 2010-2011) highlighted a very unequal education system, between the region's cercles and between the communities within the cercles, in terms of access to school (distance and socio-economic barriers), infrastructure, and teacher training, etc. The populations no longer have confidence in school and they criticize the programs, the methods, and education in the national language.

The conflict has had a very strong impact on the education system since schools have closed, and teachers and students have fled. Infrastructures, equipment and materials have been damaged or looted. A quarter of the schools are still closed today and those schools that have reopened suffer acute needs. The reopening of schools varies depending on the cercles, from 66% in Menaka to 85% in Bourem at the time of the last start of the school year, and varies within the cercles themselves, replicating the same inequalities that existed before the crisis. Thus, in the Talataye commune, no school has since reopened. Insecurity and deterioration of infrastructure, as well as lack of personnel, hinder the reopening of schools. At that start of the last school year in October, the Gao Region alone was lacking 500 teachers. This deficit is greater in the same disadvantaged areas, including the Menaka Cercle and the nomadic communes. The return to pre-crisis education levels, in terms of the number of children in school, let alone exceeding the previous level, is difficult, and once again, is more difficult in the Menaka Cercle.

Insecurity is the populations' main concern. The sense of security varies considerably from one cercle to another as well as by gender. Half of the young people interviewed have changed their habits because of security risks, with women more so than men to do so. More than tricks to mitigate risks, these changes mean a limitation to their personal mobility, the reduction or even the discontinuation of economic activities, the wearing of the hijab or even the interruption of recreational activities. For their part, communities say they adapt by implementing patrols, as well as young people's self-defense groups, which are sometimes armed.

Depending on the community, students are more vulnerable to insecurity on their way to school and in school itself. The main risks on the way to school are traffic accidents, land mines and other

¹ In the 10 other localities, schools were not operational and the teachers were absent.

explosive objects, followed by forced recruitment and the raping of girls. The presence of a fence is, for the community, one of the key elements of safety at school.

The economic situation - already precarious before the crisis - has worsened. Food insecurity, poverty and unemployment are, according to the populations, the main causes and major consequences of the conflict. Opportunities for employment and vocational training are almost nonexistent, except for NGOs and a few vocational training centers in the city of Gao.

The conflict has also had a great economic impact, since half of the young people who had an economic activity before the conflict, have lost it because of the conflict. Women's jobs were hit hardest. A third of young people interviewed have left their villages because of the conflict, to Bamako, the Mopti Region and abroad. The comings and goings of young people and their families are linked mainly to the security situation and to job opportunities. At the end of this 2015, the number of refugees in Niger and Burkina Faso experienced a new increase, particularly due to fighting between the Idourfane and Menaka tribes in Menaka and Ansongo.

Employment is the main concern of young people and the rest of the community. They also want to learn how to read, write, count, as well as subjects such as management and accounting, and they prefer to learn French. Young people need training as well as financial and material support to start their economic activities. Youth support programs are rare. Young people have a role to play within the community, in the education of the youngest, as well as in the health and the protection of the population.

Current education projects in the Gao Region mainly include training for the psycho-social care of students, return-to-school projects, the construction and rehabilitation of schools, and the distribution of school kits. While Mali and its partners have made the return of children to school in the Gao Region a clear priority, the synergy between the different initiatives is insufficient, both in the selection of sites as well as in the pedagogical approaches. Furthermore, with the return-to-school programs facing the same constraints as formal education, especially security constraints and the difficulty of reaching people in areas with low population density (efficiency), inequalities persist.

The different results of the analysis helped provide ERSA with a series of recommendations. These recommendations concern the process of social negotiations, the principles and criteria for selecting the intervention communities, strategies for the retention of beneficiaries, youth vocational training strategies, curricula content and languages in which education is to be carried out, resilience activities and the promoting of peace, sustainability of achievements, the indirect impact on the formal education sector, risk awareness and mitigation, constructions and rehabilitations or even monitoring-evaluation. These recommendations are detailed in section XII of this report.

SECTION I. CONTEXT AND JUSTIFICATION

The launch of ERSA comes after almost 4 years of violence in the Gao Region. In 2012, the entire Gao Region was attacked and brought under control by the Tuareg separatist movements and jihadist movements within a few months. After nearly three months of heavy fighting, from the taking of the town of Menaka on January 17, 2012 to the taking of the city of Gao on March 31, 2012, the entire region was controlled by armed groups, especially by the MUJWA ("Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa", by its French acronym). The occupation, which resulted in much violence against the populations, ended in January 2013, when French air strikes allowed loyal elements of the Malian army to enter Gao. The strikes continued to allow the liberation of the majority of the localities in the region. Some communities remained bastions or fallback areas for armed groups that up to the present day continue their attacks and abuse on the populations as well as the Malian and international armed forces.

It is in this context of post-conflict and great insecurity that ERSA begins its activities. These activities must therefore take into account the impacts of events on populations, on the school system and on the security situation, in order to design inputs and define appropriate implementation strategies. In order to achieve this, the team developed a rapid education risk analysis (RERA), whose fieldwork took place in October 2015.

SECTION II. METHODOLOGY

II.1 Objectives of the RERA

The objectives of this rapid education risk analysis are:

- To inform the ERSA team for the design of inputs and the definition of implementation strategies that are appropriate to the context of the conflict,
- To identify potential communities where interventions are to be made, as needed, as well as personnel of potential beneficiaries and security realities,
- To understand the causes of the conflict and their perceptions by the populations as well as the consequences of the conflict on education and the safety of populations, and
- To identify the principal training and employment opportunities for young people.

This analysis will provide the team and its partners a deep understanding of:

- the causes of the conflict and how they are perceived by the populations,
- the demographics of the region (community mapping, target population, migration, etc.),
- the risks faced by vulnerable communities and populations (risks and risk perceptions),
- the impact of the conflict on the education system (schools and functionality of the school administration, out-of-school children, teacher attendance, etc.),
- the educational needs and expectations of the population, and
- the stakeholders and potential mechanisms of resilience and peace.

II.2 Topics and Research Questions

The team was based on the guide for rapid education risk analysis developed by the USAID Education and Conflict Network (ECCN USAID), consisting of USAID teams as well as teams from partner institutions, including the Education Development Center. The Joint Education Needs Assessment Toolkit developed by the Global Cluster for Education was also used. These guides provided the methodological framework for the exercise and helped define the themes and research questions, as well as the adoption of a working approach. The following table shows the identified subjects and research questions. They also contain, in addition to the elements from the toolkits mentioned, specific elements in the implementation of the project such as telephone network coverage, existence of other accelerated schooling initiatives, competencies of the different stakeholders involved in the accelerated schooling initiatives.

Table 1. Topics and Research Questions of the RERA

Topics	Questions
A. Causes of the conflict	A1. What are the causes of the conflict?
	A2. What are the causes of the conflict according to the different communities?
	A3. What are the factors of division and cohesion? Of resilience?
	A4. What is the impact of education on the conflict?
	A5. How will the situation evolve in the medium term?
B. The demographics of the region: communities and migrations	B1. What is the current population?
	B2. What are its ethnic and religious characteristics?
	B3. How will this population evolve in the months and years to come?
	C1. Which populations are most affected by the conflict?

Topics	Questions
C. The risks faced by the populations	C2. What are the risks faced by the populations?
	C3. How do the populations perceive these risks?
	C4. How do the populations face these risks?
	C5. How will these risks evolve in the medium term?
D. The impact of the conflict on the education system	D1. What was the situation of education before the conflict and now?
	D2. What is the state of the schools in the Gao Region? (infrastructure, personnel, CGS...)
	D3. What are the needs of the education system?
	D4. What are the current accelerated learning initiatives? What are the strengths and weaknesses of their implementation?
	D5. Who are the different local stakeholders? Among them, who are the potential sources of resilience for education?
E. The needs and expectations of the population	E1. Where are, and who are the out-of-school children?
	E.2. What are the expectations of the children, the young people and of their community?

II.3 Analysis of Secondary Data

A database was established, based mainly on reports by the Education Cluster, OCHA, UNICEF, the Ministry of Education, the World Bank, INSO alerts, INSTAT and the Food Security Plans. The team also created a database of schools in the region by crossing data from the Cluster and data from the 2010-2011 CPS and OCHA's database of settlement areas. The main sources of secondary information were:

- The Education Cluster, led by Save the Children and UNICEF, for their databases and evaluation reports on educational needs in the northern regions,
- INSO for statistics on security,
- INSTAT for demographic statistics,
- MEN (CPS, AE and CAP) for statistics on schools and the impact of the conflict on education,
- OCHA for maps and population data, and
- The Report on the Impact of Crises on the Malian Education System, commissioned by USAID/Mali, prepared by Magali Chelapi-den Hamer, for all of its topics.

The list of secondary data can be found in the bibliography in Annex 1.

II.4 Update of Secondary Data on Schools of the Region

This update, conducted by the personnel of the 5 CAPs of the Gao Academy allowed the merging of multiple sources of information, including the database of the 2010-2011 CPS, the Education Cluster database and the lists of schools participating in the return-to-school programs. All cases of duplicates, omissions or errors, in the allocation of a school within a commune, were also corrected. The language spoken by the majority of students in the school (from the CPS database) has been completed or corrected as needed. This work also aimed to locate the totality of schools in the Gao Region, that is to say, to identify, for each school, the village or settlement area to which it is associated or geographically close. This data reconciliation will allow for the cross-analysis of demographic and migration data with the school data. The schools were located using OCHA's georeferenced database of settlements and data from the 2009 RGPH. However, these geographic data are imperfect. Indeed, 18% of schools in the Gao Region are located in villages that do not exist in the RGPH and which are not close to an indexed town; and 23% of schools in Gao are located in villages that do not exist in OCHA's settlement areas and which are not close to an indexed village. In certain cases, the villages

where the schools are located are important villages, as in the case of Indelimane (Talataye commune, Ansongo Cercle), for example. The communes whose villages are the less well indexed are:

- In the Ansongo Cercle: Talataye, Tessit and Tin Hama,
- In the Bourem Cercle: Tarkint and Bourem,
- In the Gao Cercle: Anwhawadi, N'Tillit and Tilemsi, and
- In the Menaka Cercle: Tidermene.

II.5 Primary Data Collection

The identification of the subjects and research questions, the reading of the evaluation reports of educational needs produced by other education stakeholders in Mali, as well as the previously mentioned methodological guides have allowed the team to develop a set of data collection tools and a protocol for their administration.

Data collection in the communities took place from October 19 to 30, 2015, and was conducted by agents of NGOs partnering with ERSA. These agents were prepared by a team of trainers, led by the project's regional coordinator, Youssouf Maiga, two agents of the Gao CAP (Mahamane Abathina and Oha Ag Ayad), and supported by a GREFFA training agent in charge of leading a session on the issue of gender and its inclusion in the collection of data. The collection teams were made up of interviewers from the communities visited, grouped according to their language skills (Tamasheq and Songhai-speaking agents in all teams, Arabic-speaking agents in the Bourem Cercle). Each team contained at least one woman (see list of interviewers in Annex 2).

5.1. Tools and Targets

Table 2. Targets and tools for primary data collection

Target	Tools
Young People	
Young People	Individual questionnaire
	Focus group (M/W separately)
Community	
Community leaders (village chief and his advisors, Imam, dignitary)	Focus group (M)
Women	Focus group (W)
Education stakeholders	
Teachers of the basic primary cycle	Interview
Academic advisors (AA)	Interview (with 3 AAs)
Town hall education officers	Questionnaire

In addition to these tools, the survey teams fill out a village fact sheet before leaving the village, which summarizes the different ethnic groups and their cohabitation, the accessibility of the village (physical and communication), and the number potential beneficiaries.

5.2. The Sample

A sample of 46 villages and communities was chosen. **In each and all of the** communes of the Gao Region, two communities/villages were surveyed: the commune capital, and another village within the commune, which was chosen randomly. This sampling ensures us of a collection of information from all population groups, including the most potentially vulnerable populations (e.g. remote areas,

nomadic environments, potentially crowded urban centers, etc.) and those potentially marginalized. In order to collect data on minorities, **the sample is not representative at a regional level, neither in terms of communes, nor in terms of ethnicity.**

Table 3. Population of the Gao Region and sample

Cercle/Commune	Population				Sample			
	# of communes	Population	Part of the commune in the cercle	Part in the region	# of communes	# de localities	Part of the commune in the cercle	Part in the region
Ansongo Cercle	7	131,953		24%	7	14		30.4%
Ansongo	1	30,091	23%	6%	1	2	14%	4.3%
Bara	1	15,092	11%	3%	1	2	14%	4.3%
Bourra	1	18,726	14%	3%	1	2	14%	4.3%
Ouattagouna	1	30,263	23%	6%	1	2	14%	4.3%
Talataye	1	14,023	11%	3%	1	2	14%	4.3%
Tessit	1	13,766	10%	3%	1	2	14%	4.3%
Tin-Hama	1	9,992	8%	2%	1	2	14%	4.3%
Bourem Cercle	5	116,360		21%	5	10		21.7%
Bamba	1	28,616	25%	5%	1	2	20%	4.3%
Bourem	1	27,488	24%	5%	1	2	20%	4.3%
Taboye	1	20,641	18%	4%	1	2	20%	4.3%
Tarkint	1	19,099	16%	4%	1	2	20%	4.3%
Temera	1	20,516	18%	4%	1	2	20%	4.3%
Gao Cercle	7	239,535		44%	7	14		30.4%
Anchawadj	1	20,559	9%	4%	1	2	14%	4.3%
Gabero	1	25,621	11%	5%	1	2	14%	4.3%
Gao	1	86,353	36%	16%	1	2	14%	4.3%
Gounzoureye	1	27,249	11%	5%	1	2	14%	4.3%
N'Tillit	1	22,285	9%	4%	1	2	14%	4.3%
Sonni Ali Ber	1	47,618	20%	9%	1	2	14%	4.3%
Tilemsi	1	9,850	4%	2%	1	2	14%	4.3%
Menaka Cercle	5	54,456		10%	4	8		17.4%
Alata	1	2,856	5%	1%	0	0	0%	0.0%
Anderamboukane	1	18,090	33%	3%	1	2	25%	4.3%
Inekar	1	5,421	10%	1%	1	2	25%	4.3%
Menaka	1	22,659	42%	4%	1	2	25%	4.3%
Tidermene	1	5,430	10%	1%	1	2	25%	4.3%
Gao Region	24	542,304		100%	23	46		100.0%

In one locality (Amalawlaw), there are no schools. In several localities, the public school has been closed since 2012. These localities have not been excluded from the sample. Indeed, they potentially hold different perceptions of the State and the education system, of higher education needs, but may also hold different perceptions of alternative education strategies.

The security criterion was not included in the sampling since excluding at-risk areas from a rapid risk assessment would not have been logical. However, in the logistic preparation of the collection, the village of Ahel Sidi Cedeg, commune of Bamba, in the Bourem Cercle, was replaced by another locality

(Sobory) because its access was too dangerous due to the presence of landmines on its ingress, which was not marked. The itineraries were submitted to the field partners for their operations, especially in the identification of sites where nomadic groups were located at the time of the survey. The sample of localities surveyed is found in Appendix 3.

5.3. Collection Protocol

In each village, the team carried out the following tasks:

- Administer the individual questionnaire to 10 young people including 5 women,
- Administer the individual questionnaire to 2 teachers of a school,
- Conduct 2 group discussions with young people (one group of men, one group of women),
- Conduct 1 focus group with community leaders (men),
- Conduct 1 group discussion with the women of the village, and
- Complete, before leaving the village, the village summary information, containing the checklist and information about the access to the village as well as its composition and ethnic cohabitation.

In each CAP, the team interviewed 3 academic advisors and completed the list of projects and initiatives in the field of education.

In each commune, the team interviewed the town hall education officers with regard to children not attending school, current projects and initiatives in the field of education as well as training and employment opportunities.



The teams had language elements for courtesy calls on the prefects, mayors and CAP Directors, as well as for the introduction of the activity to the community and trust-building prior to administering the tools. (See collection protocol in volume 2 for a description of the protocol and tools).

5.4. Ethics in the RERA

The drafts of the Terms of Reference, tools and administration protocol were submitted to the person in charge for the protection of human rights of the EDC in order to begin the validation procedures by the *Institutional Review Board (IRB)* or the EDC's Research Ethics Committee. The IRB concluded that the RERA is not affected by the ethical validation because of its very purpose. The purpose for collecting primary data from the RERA is to inform the team in order to provide support and services to the same communities which are included in the survey. The aim is not to test a support, which could introduce discrimination between the treated/untreated groups or negative effects on individuals and communities. This is an analysis of the needs and risks in the design of a program and that, therefore, does not fall within the usual definition of research on human subjects.

Nevertheless, the team was aware of the importance of respect for ethical principles in the formation of collection agents and the collection itself, and included a session on the main principles for ethical research and their implementation in the collection as part of the training of educators and collection

agents. These principles guided the drafting of the trust-building which preceded the administering of the tools. These were mainly:

- i. Limit risks to the respondents (The place where the interviews takes place is secure; No third party hears the interviews; No respondent is threatened by the mere fact of participating),
- ii. Voluntary participation (data collection agents tell each community member interviewed that participation is free and voluntary; Data collection agents neither insist, nor beg people to participate; No member of the community participates under the pressure of other members of the community; Respondents can decide to stop the interviews at their convenience),
- iii. Transparency of the research objectives and explanation of the use made of the data (The teams explain the purpose of their survey and how they will use the data). They specify that the completed interviews will not be shared with anyone,
- iv. No negative consequences to the respondent, his or her family or community as a result of any answer (The answers provided and the simple fact of taking part must have no negative impact on the respondent, his or her family or community),
- v. Free and informed consent (Explicit consent of any respondent must be obtained, in an "informed" way, in other words, after receiving information on the different objectives, anonymity and other matters. Consent cannot be influenced by the interviewer or by another member of the community), and
- vi. Systematic reporting of trust-building and consent problems.

5.5. The Inclusion of Gender in the RERA

The team sought to take gender issues into account within the design of the survey, especially:

- i. **In the tools**, with questions disaggregated by gender when necessary
- ii. **In the targeted publics:**
 - The individual questionnaires intended for young people are administered to 5 young men and 5 young women
 - In each village, the tool for focus group discussion with young people was used with a group of young men and a group of young women
 - In each village, the tool for focus group discussion with the community was used with a group of community leaders (men) and a group of women;
 - In each village, one of the two teachers surveyed had to be a woman (if possible)
 - In each CAP, one of three academic advisors surveyed by the CAP had to be a woman and if possible the advisor responsible for the girls' education ("SCOFI")
- iii. **In the survey teams**, who had to include at least one woman
- iv. **In the training of the collection agents** in which a GREFFA training agent led a session on the subject of gender and respect in the collection procedure



5.6. Collection Report

The teams managed to respect the collection protocol, even under difficult conditions. Thus, 459 young people were individually interviewed (232 young men and 227 young women). In each locality, four focus groups were conducted with young men, young women, community leaders and women of the community. In all, 68 teachers from 37

schools and 36 communities were surveyed. In the 10 other localities, schools were not operational and the teachers were absent. Nineteen tools for the town hall education officers were completed. In one case, the education officer had left the city, in the other 3 cases, they deemed they did not have enough information to answer.

Table 4. Primary data collected in October 2015

	Scheduled	Completed
Young people surveyed individually	460 (230 M/230 W)	459 (232 M/227 W)
Teachers surveyed	92 (46 W/46 M)	68 (49 M/19 W)
Discussions conducted with young men	46	46
Discussions conducted with young women	46	47
Discussions conducted with community leaders	46	46
Discussions conducted with women	46	46
Academic advisors surveyed	15	15 (15 M)
Town hall education officers surveyed	23	19

The teams had to make considerable efforts in order to respect the very demanding collection protocol, since the work continued through the night, because of the great number and length of the tools to administer. The workload sometimes required a single person to conduct the group discussions, rather than conducting them in pairs (e.g. with both a discussion leader and a scribe).

The number of young respondents by gender and locality has been respected, as have been the different age groups. The interviewers were careful to select young people from different ethnicities, different areas and different socio-economic levels. However, the teams reported that in some of the Gao communes, community leaders participated in the selection of the young people surveyed.

The teams, whose members spoke all the languages of the communities, generally had no comprehension problems with the communities. In the Ansongo Cercle however, some concepts and the existence of dialects required help from the villagers.

The vehicles and travel and communication conditions were adequate, reflecting the ability of ERSA and partnering NGOs to organize the field activities.

The teams faced several risks including those due to road conditions, to the presence of landmines on the roads used (Gao-Ansongo and Gao-Menaka Axes), to tensions between communities (Fula and Daoussaks) and to the proximity of armed groups (Anderamboukane).

The other main difficulties were a poor communication network (Menaka) and the absence of the local authorities (Menaka).

The teams were welcomed by the communities. No negative attitude towards the teams or any of their members was reported. Nevertheless, in Tarkint and Ahel Badi (Tarkint), the populations showed some mistrust. Some questions created discomfort, such as the questions regarding the causes of the conflict, the legitimacy of taking up arms, religion, marital status and the return of the children that had enlisted.

Despite the dangerous nature of the activity and the amount of work, the teams are ready to start again, mainly due to the welcome offered by the communities. One team found that this activity had strengthened its ties with the communities. For future such activities, they recommend to take better

charge of the training, equip teams with cameras, reduce the number of questions and especially, those questions related to the conflict.

II.6 Quality and Completion of the Analysis

The table below, from the *Joint Education Needs Assessment* guide, synthetically visualizes those aspects touched on by the analysis. The RERA by ERSA touches on almost every aspect, except orphans and vulnerable children, higher education and non-formal education, aspects which are not directly surveyed but subject to the comments from the communities encountered during the discussion groups.

Table 5. Evaluation of the analysis (Table resulting from the JENA guide)

Question	Yes	No	Parti ally	Comments
<i>Context Analysis</i>				
General context taken into account (social, economic, political)	x			
Risks related to the conflict, to insecurity	x			
<i>Interaction between the conflict and education</i>				
Conflict	x			
Violence, crime, armed groups	x			
Interaction between school and conflict	x			
<i>Analysis of the resilience factors</i>				
Resilience capacity at the local level	x			
Resilience capacity at the school community level	x			
<i>Analysis of the different education cycles</i>				
Primary education (elementary 1)	x			
Secondary education (elementary 2 and secondary)	x			
Higher education			x	There is no higher education offering in the region. Higher education is mentioned by young people in their aspirations.
<i>Analysis of different types of education</i>				
Formal system	x			
Non-formal education			x	Non-formal education institutions are not directly surveyed, but communities sometimes mention them, especially Koranic schools. The existence of CED (or Education Centers for Development) is informed at each visited locality.
Professional training	x			
<i>Analysis of educational alternatives offered by different stakeholders</i>				
Government	x			
Private sector	x			
Religious groups	x			
Communities	x			
Parallel education system (of the separatists)	x			
UN, NGOs and other partners	x			

<i>Analysis of different types of learners</i>				
Boys	x			
Girls	x			
Specific age groups	x			
Out-of-school learners	x			
Specific groups (disabled, language minorities, refugees)	x			Ethnicity, commune, sedentariness, language
Orphans and vulnerable children		x	x	Orphans and vulnerable children are not subjected to diagnostics or specific questions.
Marginalized or difficult-to-reach individuals and communities	x			Nomads, the poor, sparsely-populated areas, all communes
<i>Geographic areas covered</i>				
Region	Gao			
Cercles	4/4			
Communes	23/24		The commune of Alata was not considered by the survey.	

Secondary Data

The use of statistics from the Education Cluster, the general population census of 2009, and the CPS of the National Ministry of Education, ("MEN", by its acronym in French) allow a deep understanding of the situation in the region and the comparison with the national situation. Disaggregation by commune allows for the discovery of nuanced findings, and allows injustices at the regional and in the cercle-level to be brought to light.

There are no updated data on the current population by commune or locality, let alone of the target populations (children and out-of-school young people). The most recent micro-data from the Education Cluster, dated November 29, 2015, do not contain the number of children and teachers. These data are only available in the previous database, from November 16, whose data reflect the majority of schools in the 2014-2015 school year.

Sampling for Primary Data Collection

Sampling has been adapted for a conflict situation, in which populations feel marginalized and minorities are claiming their rights. Indeed, it gives the same weight to each commune of the Gao Region, regardless of its size. A sampling proportional to the population would have led to the exclusion of these minorities from the evaluation. Moreover, due to the commitment of partnering NGOs, the evaluation was able to take all the populations into consideration, including those living in areas with high insecurity. This was necessary to portray a realistic picture of the living conditions of people in the Gao Region.

The Alata commune was not considered by the survey. In the secondary data used as basis for the preparation of the sample, the town of Alata was included in the Inekar commune. In the Inekar commune, the capital and the village of Tabankort were chosen.

Scope of the Primary Data Collection Tools

The tools cover numerous subject matters, including individual perceptions of the causes of the conflict, the risks faced by the populations, the outlook of the situation as well as resilience factors, the individual impact of the conflict on education, employment, migration, and security. Data collected in the project provide a large volume of information on the conflict, employment, youth, and education. This volume allows for a depiction of a broad picture of the situation.

The collection protocol is very detailed. It was developed by the training team after the completion of the tools. It includes the language elements to have on-hand in the village and the trust-building of those surveyed. The individual questionnaires are used to qualify the findings and prioritize the points of view, expectations and opinions expressed by the populations in the group discussions. They also allow us to explore the determinants of different opinions and expectations.

The summary sheet should enable us to get a quick view of the locality and its particular characteristics. The interviewers were unsettled by the completion of a tool without a respondent. Indeed, some information should have been collected from the community (such as the number of children), while other information was to be completed by the team itself at the end of the survey, according to the perceptions accumulated during the work (e.g. cohabitation between ethnic groups, between religious tendencies, acceptance of the project, etc.). Finally, the sheet did not allow the peculiarities of villages to be identified, as a result of a completion that was too uniform. For example, for all the localities, it is indicated that the communities are very enthusiastic, although the debriefing of the teams was an opportunity to talk about distrust in the Ahel Badi community and the data clearly showed the rejection of the State in the Talataye commune. Another example is that of the division of the population in Kadji, between supporters of a moderate Islam, and the Wahhabi population of Dar Salam, present in the primary and secondary data, but that does not appear in the form.

The protocol did not include a collection tool when administered to children, and thus did not cover the psychological and emotional aspects related to their experiences of the conflict. However, teachers were interviewed about the existence of children affected by the conflict in their class and their ability to help the ERSA team to identify strategies for improving the psycho-social care of children.

The Persons Interviewed

There was a good balance between the ages and gender of the persons interviewed in the villages: community leaders, women leaders, young men, and young women. In addition to the populations, the teachers, local authorities and the CAPs (Pedagogic Advise Centers) were surveyed.

The CGS and APE were not surveyed with specific tools. While these entities are key stakeholders in the education system, they were not emphasized. It was preferred to investigate parents through questionnaires directed at women, and young leaders who are also parents. Indeed, in the questionnaires directed at the community and young people, many questions were asked regarding school. The questionnaire administered to teachers is also very detailed, particularly on the school's needs and the actions of the CGS.

The interventions of the different stakeholders in the Gao Region were surveyed at town halls and CAPs and documented by the 4W data from the Education Cluster. The data could have been enriched

by the direct survey of these stakeholders (NGOs, decentralized structures of other departments, vocational training centers, etc.)

Analysis of Risks Faced by the Populations

During the first fiscal year, ERSA must define a security index for the school and a longitudinal evaluation framework for said index. In preparation for this longitudinal risk study, several questions were asked regarding those existing risks while at school, on the way to school and for young people:

In the individual youth questionnaire, the following four points were included in the survey:

- The main risks faced by young women and young men,
- Young people's sense of security,
- The persons causing such risks, and
- The changes in behavior and attitudes adopted by young people in response to such risks.

Because these data were individual and systematically collected, they reveal the variability of risks between villages and the analysis of risks by gender.

The questionnaire administered to teachers, also includes gender-specific questions about children's safety at school and on the way to school: "Are female students safe at school?; Are male students safe at school?; Are female students safe on their way to school?; Are male students safe on their way to school?" Then the teachers specify the risks faced by the children.

Community leaders and women were also invited to comment in an open manner regarding the safety of children while at school and on the way to school. Indeed, these community members are also parents of students and as such are concerned about the safety of students; they also make decisions based on assessed risks (such as accompanying children to school or the withdrawal of girls from school in order to protect them from attacks).

Thus, the risks faced by children and young people have been surveyed in several tools and via open and closed questions. These data will allow us to design a safety factor adapted to the context of the Gao Region and for all centers and beneficiaries (e.g. back-to-school centers and back-to-employment centers).

Non-Schooling and Dropout Factors

Factors relating to non-enrollment in school and dropout were surveyed in the individual youth questionnaire (e.g. non-schooled children in the household and reasons for the dropout of young people) and in discussions with community leaders and women. However, in order to put in place effective registration strategies and child retention in the Accelerated Program for Resilience and School Insertion (PARIS in French) centers and in schools after their reinstatement, it would have been interesting to include more direct questions regarding the social norms affecting children's schooling, especially girls'. One such question could be, "Until what age must boys and girls go to school?" Indeed, social norms are very different from one community to another and between genders.² These

²In 2012, according to data collected by the USAID / PHARE (Programme Harmonisé d'Appui au Renforcement de l'Education [Standardized Support Program for Education Development]) program in Bamako schools, the majority of parents wanted their children to reach a higher level, including up to a university level, or in some cases, even to obtain a doctorate degree. In almost one fourth of the 44 focus groups conducted, a difference of the aspirations for girls and boys was raised. In half of the cases where discrimination is perceivable, it is a

norms may be surveyed more specifically during the ongoing process of social awareness and negotiations to be based on systematic assessment of the importance of the usual barriers to schooling.

How populations value the different educational alternatives was not directly collected. However, communities expressed their views on the classic, bilingual and Koranic schools in response to the questions on schools' appropriateness to their expectations and values. The preference of the communities and young people for professional training was expressed and discussed widely in the tools. Finally, populations have little material to evaluate accelerated learning initiatives, as these are still rare at the time of collection (4 of 46 localities surveyed had been benefited by an SSA-P (Stratégie de Scolarisation Accélérée/Passerelle [Accelerated Learning Initiative/Gateway] center opened in 2014-2015).

notion shared by the group, in the other half, it is only suggested by one or both parents. Among the concepts mentioned on the difference between girls and boys, we can point out:

"Girls can stop when they can read and write"

"Girls can when they know the Koran"

"There are too many barriers to girls' education: marriage, prejudice."

"Girls' long-term education depends on their husbands and their ethnicity."

"But for girls, it depends on the husband."

"Education is an opening and they will be tempted by Western acts."

SECTION III. OUTLINE OF CAUSES OF THE CRISIS IN THE GAO REGION

Previous Tuareg Rebellions

Since its Independence, the northern regions of Mali have experienced 5 Tuareg rebellions. **The first Tuareg rebellion in 1962-1964**, led by the Ifoghas tribe was severely suppressed by Moussa Traoré and the region would be controlled militarily.

In 1990, Iyad Ag Ghaly's "Mouvement Populaire de Libération de l'Azawad" ("Popular Movement for the Liberation of Azawad", or "MPLA" by its acronym in French) leads an attack on a gendarmerie post at Menaka, marking the **beginning of the 2nd Tuareg rebellion**. In January 1991, the MPA signs the Tamanrasset accords. The MPLA becomes the Popular Movement of Azawad, from which emerge, on an ethnic or tribal basis, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Azawad (FPLA), founded by the Chamanamas and the Revolutionary Liberation Army of Azawad (ARLA) founded by the Imghad tribe. These three movements and the Islamic Arab Front of Azawad (FIAA) sign the National Pact in 1992. The following year, the FIAA, the FPLA and the ARLA retake arms against the Malian State and the MPA. The Ganda Koy Patriotic Movement is then created, a self-defense militia of the sedentary black populations. The four rebel groups lay down their arms during the Flame of Peace ceremony in Timbuktu in 1996, and 1,400 combatants would join the Malian army.

In May, 2006, the May 23 Democratic Alliance for Change (ADC), a Tuareg Ifoghas movement founded by Iyad Ag Ghaly Hassan Fagaga, Ag and Ag Bahanga Bibi, launches the **3rd Tuareg rebellion** with many deserters of the Malian army in its ranks joining after the 1996 ceremony. In July, 2006, the Alliance signed the Algiers Agreement for the restoration of peace, security and development. A part of the combatants continue the attacks and ally with the Nigerian rebels in the **4th rebellion of 2007-2009**. They lay down their arms in 2009, with the exception of Ag Bahanga, who goes into exile in Libya where he approaches the veterans of the 1990-1996 rebellion and prepares the 2011 offensive.

The National Liberation Movement of Azawad (MNLA), political and military separatism group, is created October, 2011 by a group of political activists and combatants of Ibrahim Ag Bahanga. Libyan soldiers, veterans of the 1990 rebellion join the ranks. The **5th rebellion** begins with the attack on Menaka on January 17, 2012. The MNLA joins Ançardine, Islamist movement founded by Iyad Ag Ghaly, and AQIM to attack Tessalit and Aguelhok where more than 150 Malian soldiers are slain. In 3 months, separatist and jihadist groups seize the main cities of northern Mali. On April 4, the MNLA declares the independence of Azawad, before being driven from its positions by its Islamist allies. Attempted reconciliations and fighting between the MNLA and Islamist groups ensue, highlighting the porosity and the fluctuations of ideological lines of different groups. The jihadists (Ançardine, MUJWA, AQIM and Boko Haram) lead an offensive towards the south, stopped at Konna in January of 2013 by the French army. The main cities of northern Mali are then gradually taken over by the Malian army and its allies.

The Fall of Gaddafi in October of 2011.

After the fall of Muammar Gaddafi in October, 2011, 2,000 to 4,000 Tuareg soldiers return to Mali and neighboring Niger with a stock of heavy weapons from Libyan arsenals. According to estimates by NGOs and the UN, over 80,000 Kalashnikovs were purportedly sold in the Sahel in the months following Gaddafi's fall. The Malian government increases by 2,000 with the return of Libyan fighters. Some members accept the peace process provided by the ATT government. Others join the National

Liberation Movement of Azawad which was born a few months earlier. This is the case of Mohamed Ag Najem, who, after 30 years of serving the Libyan guide (interrupted by the participation in the rebellion of 1990), obtaining Libyan nationality and colonel rank in the Libyan army, takes the military command of the MNLA.

Criminality and Trafficking 3

In ten years, West Africa has become the primary route for cocaine trafficking between Latin America and Europe. For some observers, the number one reason behind the security crisis in the north and the proliferation of groups is the struggle for control of the trafficking routes, particularly drug routes. According to the UNODC, 18 tons of cocaine pass through the area each year.



This reality was revealed with the case known as "Air Cocaine." In November 2009, a Boeing plane loaded with over 9 tons of cocaine landed in the Tarkint commune, in the Gao Cercle (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime - UNODC). Coming from Venezuela, its cargo was received by AQIM and transported to Morocco. After unloading, the cargo was set on fire (see photo above). The case highlights the links between the terrorist groups and drug trafficking and complicity within the State (involvement of Baba Ould Cheick, Mayor of Tarkint, involvement of State security). The cables released by WikiLeaks evoke complicity at the highest levels of the State and the seizing of the investigation by the DGSE (France's "General Directorate for External Security").

The mapping of clashes between armed groups also reflects the connection between the security crisis and trafficking. Thus, according to several experts, the harshest fighting is aimed to control the trafficking axes: Tabankort in March, 2015, a crossing point in the strategic Tilemsi valley⁴ and potential hiding place of the cargo of the Boeing plane in 2009, or Anefis in August, 2015, where heavy fighting took place between the CMA and the platform.

The Coup d'Etat of March 22, 2012

The defeats of the early 2012 affected the morale of the Malian army and the trust of the population. The wives of soldiers organized demonstrations to demand ammunition for their husbands on the front lines. On March 21, 2012, the Defense Minister, Sada Samake and the Army's Chief of Staff, General Poudiougou went to the garrison town of Kati, to discuss the situation of the Malian army in the north. They were then attacked by soldiers with stones and chased. Anger mounted and the military attacked the presidency and seized the offices of the national television. On the morning of March 22, a statement read on national television by the putschists (armed dissident groups intent on overthrowing the government) ratified the coup by announcing the dissolution of the institutions of

³ Cocaine: Revelations on the Malian Powder Keg

Sahel as a Narcotics Transit Zone. Stakeholders and Political Consequences

⁴Yvan Guichaoua, expert on the Sahel, professor at the University of East Anglia (United Kingdom): "Holding the Tabankort area allows the control of the major trafficking routes, especially that of cocaine."

the republic and the creation of the National Committee for the Recovery of Democracy and the Restoration of the State ("CNRDRE" by its acronym in French).

The coup, carried out one month before the presidential elections in which ATT, the outgoing president, would not run, was justified by the crisis in the north and the need to give the army the means to fight the separatist rebels and their Islamist allies. However, the coup would favor the growth of armed groups, who took Anefis on March 22, 2012, and Kidal on March 30. The army abandoned Bourem and Ansongo in order to regroup in Gao, which would be taken on March 31 without fighting from the Malian army, on instructions from the junta.

Radical Islam 5

The introduction of radical Islam in northern Mali is not new. In the 1970s, Idrissa Seydou and his disciples, returning from Saudi Arabia, found the Ansar Sunna sect in the village of Kadji and its surroundings. In that sect, they advocate a rigorous Islam. According to residents of the Gao Region, the Wahhabi village Kadji will provide many combatants to the MUJWA. To this date, there are strong tensions between Kadji-Dar Salam fundamentalists and the rest of the population in Kadji who practice a moderate Islam.

In the late 1990s, Pakistani and Afghan rigorist preachers of the Dawa sect settled in the region, especially in the Gao and Ansongo Cercles. Finally, in 1998, Hassan Hattab, dissident of the Algerian Armed Islamic Group ("GIA", by its acronym in French), founded the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat ("GSPC", by its acronym in French), which attempted to install a base in the Kidal region. In 2006, the GSPC would become "al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb" (AQIM).

Inequalities and Sense of Injustice of the Populations

The drought of the 1970s accentuated the antagonism between a fertile south and desert north, of difficult access. The geographic divide is accompanied by a sense of abandonment by the northern populations, particularly among nomadic populations, who feel that the central government has forgotten them. Analyses based on the distance to basic social infrastructure reinforce this feeling, when these are invalidated by the analyses based on spending per capita or population per school.

Parallel to the sense of abandonment of the nomadic populations, a sense of injustice has developed among sedentary black populations, who regret the benefits obtained through the use of arms, such as the integration without competition of Tuaregs in the army and civil service, or the derogation to the demographic principle in administrative divisions (such as the edification of the Tin Essako village - a commune of a few thousand people when taken hostage by Malian soldiers led by Ibrahim Ag Bahanga in 2001, and then cercle in 2011; or the creation of the Taoudéni region in 2011).

The sense of injustice is shared by the Tuareg populations who do not feel represented or defended by the armed groups, who obtain personal benefits and annuities from the various types of trafficking, which surpass those benefits acquired by civilians populations. The "Do not negotiate on my behalf" movement reflects this rupture between the so-called liberation movements and the "liberated" populations. All northern populations suffered the consequences of the demilitarization of the northern regions, achieved by the armed groups in previous peace agreements, and that contributed to the intensification of trafficking and abuses on the populations.

⁵ News note No. 5: The terrorist threat in southern Algeria and the Sahel, French Centre for Research on Intelligence, October 2004

Some of those that repented from past rebellions also broke away from their successors. This is the case of El Hadj Gamou, member of ARLA in the 1990s, who joined the Malian army in 1996: "With the rebellion, we got what we were looking for. I didn't go to school and I'm colonel major. Why take up arms?" he adds. "In the North, we all had our commanding posts before the war. What else could you ask for?"

The sense of cultural discrimination is also present in some of the northern populations. The preponderance of the Bambara language in national institutions and media is a source of frustration for the advocates of northern languages and cultures. Sedentism, suffered or at best accepted by nomads, is also a source of frustration. While this sedentism is not imposed, it is experienced as a result of public policies unfavorable to mobility, loss of livestock and changing socio-economic environment. Sedentism makes some social organizations inoperable.

Interethnic Tensions, Racism

At the same time, sources and consequences of past armed conflicts, tensions between ethnic groups, between tribes or other groups are vivid. Among them, a primary racism, in both directions, between the black populations and the Arab and Tuareg populations, pejoratively called "redskins." Thus, for some analysts, the Tuaregs rebel against Bamako because they refuse to be ruled by blacks. Slavery, whether past or still present, according to observers, of the Bella by the Tuareg, and the atrocities committed against the black Tuaregs in Kidal during the occupation reflect this racism, as well as qualifiers such as "looters" and "lazy people", which frequently used by to designate sedentary Tuaregs.

Tribal conflicts within the Tuareg population are added to this racism based on skin color. These conflicts are partly responsible for splits and confrontations between armed Tuareg groups. They are based on a system of vassalage between the Imajaghan noble caste, to which the Ifoghas belong, and the Idnan, Imghad, a vassal caste and the Iklan, which are slaves or former slaves.

Conflicts between Arabs and Tuaregs are also particularly violent, like those in the locality of Inkhalil on the Algerian border. Arab populations, traditionally dedicated to trade, are often suspected of collusion with terrorists and traffickers.

SECTION IV. THE CAUSES OF THE CRISIS ACCORDING TO THE COMMUNITIES

IV.1 PRIORITIZATION AND DIFFERENCES OF PERCEPTION REGARDING THE FACTORS AND STAKEHOLDERS OF THE CRISIS

Individual interviews and group discussions with young people allowed us to know their perceptions on a range of issues. They also allowed us to prioritize the factors and stakeholders according to the responsibility that young people attribute to them in the crisis, and to compare the perceptions of young people from different groups (e.g. by ethnic group, gender, cercle, etc.).

Perceptions of the sources of the crisis differ across ethnic groups and gender (see Annex 4, the percentage of youth judging that one factor has significantly contributed to the crisis by gender and ethnicity).

Differences in Perception by Ethnicity

Thus, among young Tuaregs, the main problems are the “lack of employment opportunities” (90% believed that it contributed much to the crisis), “lack of access to education” (89%) and “government corruption” (87%). Just like the young Tuaregs, young Daoussaks thought that “lack of access to education and employment” greatly contributed to the crisis, immediately following the “lack of access to water and electricity” (100% of them believed that this problem has significantly contributed to the crisis).

Among young Fulas and young Songhais, the “Tuareg separatist movement” is the phenomenon that has most contributed to the crisis, followed by “violence and insecurity”. The third major problem is the “lack of access to education” for young Fulas and the “lack of employment opportunities” for young Songhai.

Arab youth also mention “violence and insecurity”, followed by the “absence of the State” and the “lack of employment opportunities”.

Table 6. The three main problems contributing to the crisis, according to the ethnic group of young people

Ethnic Group	#1 Problem	#2 Problem	#3 Problem
ARAB	Violence and insecurity (95%)	Absence of the State (89%)	Lack of employment opportunities (84%)
DAOUSSAK	No access to water and electricity (100%)	Lack of access to education (97%)	Lack of employment opportunities (95%)
FULA	Tuareg separatism (100%)	Violence and insecurity (90%)	Lack of access to education (80%)
SONGHAI	Tuareg separatism (89%)	Violence and insecurity (85%)	Lack of employment opportunities (75%)
TUAREG	Lack of employment opportunities (90%)	Lack of access to education (89%)	Government corruption (87%)

Source: Primary data from the RERA, ERSA, Oct. 2015, Individual Youth Questionnaire

Although young people differed in their prioritization of the problems that contributed to the crisis, the “lack of employment opportunities” is one of the main problems for young people from all ethnic groups. The items with the most divergent responses by ethnic group are:

- Tuareg separatism, a major factor in the crisis according to the Fula, Songhai and Arab, but not less for young Daoussaks and Tuaregs.
- The lack of access to water and electricity, considered a major factor in the crisis by all young Daoussaks but by only less than half of young Fula and Songhais.
- Drug use is considered a major factor in the crisis by two thirds of young Daoussaks and young Fula, but only by 11% of Arab young people and less than half for young Songhai.
- Tribal tensions have contributed significantly to the crisis according to 68% of young Daoussaks but only according to 11% of Arab young, 22% of young Fula, 29% of young Songhai and 34% of young Tuaregs.

These differences are strong when other factors such as employment, education, age are controlled⁶.

Differences in Perception by Gender

Among the young women interviewed, the main problems are “violence and insecurity” (90%), followed by “lack of access to education” (77%) and “government corruption” (76%). Among young men, the main problems are the “lack of employment opportunities” (92%), “violence and insecurity” (89%) and “lack of professional training opportunities” (84%).

While young women attributed the same importance as men to “violence and insecurity”, they were more likely to believe that the “destruction of cultural heritage” has significantly contributed to the crisis. This is the item for which the difference between men and women was most pronounced. “Religious fundamentalism”, of which women are often the first victims, is a more important factor for women than for men. More young women than young men considered the presence of MINUSMA (“Mission multidimensionnelle intégrée des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation au Mali” [United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali]) to be a contributor to the crisis; this may be an echo of the accusations of sexual abuse made against the soldiers of the MINUSMA. Conversely, women attributed less importance than men to the “lack of professional training and employment opportunities”, because they are more concerned with domestic work rather than employment issues, and also gave less importance than men to “State corruption and local elites” or to the “absence of the State”.⁷

While controlling the effect of other variables, the effect of gender remains very significant due to the presence of the MINUSMA, whom women considered twice as often as men as having greatly contributed to the crisis, and the “absence of State”, which women also considered twice as often as men as having greatly contributed to the crisis.

⁶Gender and ethnic group appear to be variables which explain the variation in the young people's perceptions. In order to explore the role of other variables, we estimate, for each item, a logistic regression model to measure the impact of a set of variables on the probability to judge that a problem has significantly contributed to the crisis (gender, age, education, employment, marital status, number of children, administrative cercle, commune administrative center, village birthplace, economic wealth index). Annexed Table 5 shows the detailed results of the regressions conducted.

⁷Lack of employment opportunities (M: 92%; W: 75%), lack of PT opportunities (M: 84%; W: 63%), corruption of local elites (M: 70%; W: 58%), absence of the State (M: 84%; W: 72%), government corruption (M: 83%; W: 76%).

The young men and young women interviewed gave the same prioritization of the different stakeholders as a function of their responsibility within the crisis. (See, in Appendix 6, the percentage of young people that consider that a group of people has a very high responsibility for the crisis, by gender and ethnic group, and in Annex 7, the results of the logit models estimated to measure the role of the characteristics of young people on the responsibility attributed to each stakeholder⁸). Women were significantly more likely than many to consider that “France” and the “strength of Serval, Algeria and Burkina Faso”, as well as the “government of Dioncounda Traoré”, are greatly responsible for the crisis. They were also more likely than men to believe that “conservative religious leaders” have a great responsibility in the crisis. Conversely, women were less likely than men to consider that the “Tuareg separatists” have a great responsibility in the crisis.

Other Variables that may Affect the Perceptions of the Causes of the Conflict

Education level has a fairly minor effect on the perceptions of the problems that contributed to the crisis. The importance attributed to violence and insecurity decreased with the level of education of the interviewees. Those young people who have reached secondary or higher level of education were less likely to ascribe importance to the “lack of access to education” (having already received their education) and “lack of access to water and electricity”. On the other hand, these respondents often ascribed importance to the “destruction of cultural heritage”.

Education level has a fairly minor effect on the perceptions of the responsibilities of the different stakeholders in the crisis. The degree of responsibility attributed to the “ATT government” and to the “putschists” increased with education level of the respondents.

Young people’s cercle of residence influences their perceptions, even when the effect of the ethnic group is controlled. The young people of the Bourem and Menaka cercles gave more importance to the “lack of access to water and electricity” in the crisis than their counterparts in Gao (respectively 2 times and 8 times more), but were less likely to give importance to “violence”. Young people of Menaka were more likely than those from other cercles to mention the “corruption of local elites”. The young people of Ansongo and Menaka were more likely than their counterparts in Gao to believe that “tribal tensions” have greatly contributed to the crisis (respectively 2 and 3 times more likely). It is in the cercles where the confrontations between the Daoussaks and the Idoufane Tuaregs take place.

The fact of being employed has no influence at all on the perceptions of the problems that contributed to the crisis. The fact of being employed had a fairly minor effect on the perceptions as to the responsibilities of the different stakeholders in the crisis. The degree of responsibility attributed to the “government of IBK” (Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta) and the “putschists” increased along with respondents’ level of employment.

The economic index (e.g. the number of assets owned by the household) does not play a role either. Household wealth (measured by the number of goods and equipment) significantly reduced the level

⁸Gender and ethnic group appear to be variables explaining the variation in perceptions of young people. In order to explore the role of other variables, we estimate, for each item, a logistic regression model to measure the impact of a set of variables on the probability to judge that a problem has significantly contributed to the crisis (gender, age, education, employment, marital status, number of children, administrative cercle, commune administrative center, village birthplace, economic wealth index). Annexed Table 7 shows the detailed results of the regressions conducted.

of responsibility attributed to “militias”, to the “ATT and IBK governments”, “France”, “Algeria and Burkina Faso”, to “MINUSMA and FAMA” and finally, to “conservative religious leaders”.

IV.2 THE MAIN CAUSES OF THE CONFLICT

2.1. Insecurity and Violence

The communities, through the voices of leaders and women, evoked “**insecurity and violence**” as the major problem contributing to the crisis. They mentioned looting, banditry, robberies, thefts, including those of livestock, landmines, and jihadists, etc. In over two thirds of discussions with the communities’ young people, “insecurity and violence” are cited as the principal problem. Young people explain that insecurity is ubiquitous night and day, at school, in the cities, that they have lost trust. Groups of women (4) and young women (3), as well as a group of young men, evoked “insecurity for girls and women”, especially rape, as a particular problem.

Communities do not speak of “insecurity in the past” as having contributed to the crisis. On the contrary, insecurity, and depending on the population, its resurgence, continues to be the major problem of the crisis. When they speak of insecurity, the young people of Sobory specified that the conflict is not over. Other groups spoke of insecurity as being residual, permanent, growing, and persistent.

In Bentia and Seyna-Sonrhaï, women explained that the proliferation of weapons is one of the main reasons for insecurity. The leaders of Tango and Ouatagouna evoke the defection of the State as the main cause of insecurity.

In Bourem Foghas, in the Bourem Cercle, leaders explained that “insecurity is the region’s number one problem”, the source of other problems. *“It has caused a lack of social cohesion, the refusal of State officials to resume their positions, carelessness where everyone does what they want and where injustice prevails. [...] Even our only ambulance was taken away from us, pinnaces [thin wooden boats] are hardly reassuring for the transport our sick people from here to Gao.”* In Hausa Foulane, commune of Gabero (Gao), insecurity is the reason why young people who have left the village cannot return. Among other consequences of this insecurity is fear. The **sense of fear** is raised by three groups of women and 3 groups of leaders.

This fear has an **impact on economic activities** such as fishing in Djidara and the collecting of wood in Wabaria. Insecurity and the fear of landmines prevent the free flow of goods and people. This fear also has an **impact on social relations**. In Forgho Songhai, women explain that “people cannot see each other because they are afraid.”

According to young people, those mainly responsible for the crisis are the armed groups and the putschists.

Table 7. Those mainly responsible for the crisis, by young peoples' ethnic group

Ethnic Group	#1 Responsible	#2 Responsible	#3 Responsible	#4 Responsible
ARAB	Jihadist groups (88%)	Separatist rebel groups (86%)	Putschists (86%)	
DAOUSSAK	Bandits (85%)	Putschists (85%)	Traffickers (83%)	
FULA	Jihadist groups (100%)	Bandits (100%)	Separatist rebel groups (100%)	Putschists (100%)
SONGHAI	Jihadist groups (93%)	Bandits (78%)	Separatist rebel groups (78%)	
TUAREG	Jihadist groups (89%)	Putschists (74%)	Bandits (71%)	

Source: Primary data from the RERA, ERSA, Oct. 2015, Individual Youth Questionnaire

The different armed groups. “Jihadist groups” was the number one responsible contributor according to young people of all ethnic groups, except for the Daoussaks, who thought “bandits” are more to blame. The responsibility of “separatist groups” was denounced more often by young Arabs, Fula and Songhai than by the Tuareg youth and Daoussaks, even though half of young Tuaregs believed that these groups have a great responsibility in the current crisis. The self-defense militias such as GATIA (Groupe Autodéfense Tuareg Imghad et Alliés [Self-Defense Tuareg Imghad and Allies Group]) or the Ganda Iso/Koy were mentioned less often as having a responsibility in the crisis. They were cited particularly by young Daoussaks and Tuaregs. The percentage of young Tuaregs attributing responsibility to “self-defense militias” was lower than that of young Tuaregs attributing responsibility to “Tuareg separatists”. Indeed, half of young people believed that the “separatist Tuareg rebel groups” have a great responsibility in the current crisis.

During the discussions, the young people especially pointed out the MNLA as responsible for the crisis, followed by the MUJWA. The majority of young female Tuaregs cited the MNLA as responsible for the crisis. The Ançardine and AQIM groups were cited somewhat less often than the MUJWA, which was the main tormentor of the populations of the Gao Region. The Malian State is often picked out as equally responsible.

With regard to the “jihadist groups”, communities often explain that they acted in this way in order to impose Sharia law, and in some cases they have done so in order to create enough chaos so as to be able to conduct their drug trafficking or to kidnap Westerners and negotiate their ransoms. One young person thought that MUJWA’s motivation is for young people to give up tobacco.

2.2. The Lack of Access to a Quality Education

The “**lack of access to education or quality education**” was mentioned by half of the women's groups and a third of the groups of experienced leaders, who decried the lack of schools, the lack of teachers and the lack of qualification of teachers. Young people also evoked the lack of education, but less frequently than their elders.

2.3. Unemployment

However, young people evoked “**unemployment and poverty**” more often than their elders, in one of every two discussions. These topics were mentioned in one third of the discussions with communities, who were concerned in particular about “youth unemployment”, such as the women of

Ansongo, who explained that, "If young people do not work, they become bandits, socially embittered." For the women of Djidara, the "lack of factories and industry" is the key factor behind the unemployment.

2.4. The Lack of Infrastructure

Difficulty in the access to electricity, but above all, to drinking water is a problem that contributed significantly to the crisis according to the communities. When speaking of access to drinking water, communities often cited the health consequences of this absence, such as human and animal diseases. These consequences are all the more dramatic as people often **lack access to health centers** that are distant and under-equipped. Lack of access to treatment was often cited by young people also as a major problem.

2.5. Food Insecurity

Food insecurity is a major problem, as cited in all four of the cercles within the region, mainly by leaders and women. The young people interviewed also evoked it, in approximately twenty discussions. Beyond the political and security crisis, poor rainfalls, desertification and birds have often led to **poor harvests** and to the **death of livestock**. Young people only rarely mentioned "crops and livestock", reflecting the fact that these activities are carried out primarily by the elders, with the help of young people.

2.6. The Abandonment by the State

Generally speaking, **populations feel abandoned** by the State but also by development partners, NGOs and donors. They often evoke a **sense of injustice**.

All young people interviewed attributed a great responsibility to the "putschists" for the crisis. Regarding civilian regimes, more respondents were more likely to blame the "ATT government" than the governments that followed, regardless of respondents' ethnic group, since it the former was blamed for "*selling out the north of Mali*." Young Daoussaks and Fula were those most frequently blamed the ATT government. The IBK and Dioncounda governments were pointed out as those mainly responsible for the crisis, particularly by young Daoussaks and Tamasheqs, but hardly ever by young people from other ethnic groups. Finally, the Malian armed forces (FAMA) were blamed often by young Daoussaks (62%), moderately by young Songhais and Tuaregs (17% and 29%), and never by young Arab and Fula respondents.

Communities often explained that the Malian State is responsible because it has "abandoned the northern regions and favored the southern regions", but also because it has been "lax, letting disarray set in". Others believed that the Malian State has done so for the personal interests of its representatives including interests in trafficking. The grievances against the State are not specific to an ethnic group. For example, women in the urban commune of Gao believed that, "*The State bears the greatest responsibility in the birth and persistence of the crisis, because of its corruption, its laxity and injustice to the northern regions.*"

2.7. The Oppression of the North by the South and Tuareg Separatism

The sense of **oppression of the north by the south** was also often mentioned, mainly by the Tuareg, Arab and Daoussak communities, while **Tuareg separatism** is mentioned as having greatly contributed to the crisis by the leaders of the Songhai communities. According to the majority, the MNLA took up arms to defend the disadvantaged populations of the north, affected by Mali's poor governability, in favor of the independence of the North. According to other young people, it took up arms "for power, for money or to destroy people, and to ruin and divide the country". The young women of Tabango believed that the MNLA is wrong, "it does not know what it wants, and it wants to just take up arms against brothers and sisters." The notion that the MNLA does not know why it took up arms, is manipulated by France and/or the US, was often mentioned.

2.8. Ethnic and Tribal Tensions, Racism

Ethnic and tribal tensions were mentioned in 11 discussions, in terms of mistrust between communities, racism and disintegration of the social fabric.

In group discussions, whether with young people, women or community leaders, responsibility was sometimes attributed to the Tuaregs as a whole and not just the separatists, although Tuareg communities also decried the role of the armed Tuareg groups. The other ethnic groups were also named uniformly as having responsibility in the crisis. Daoussak women from Inchinanane pointed to the Fula and Songhais as being responsible for the persistence of the crisis, the Songhai leaders of Kounsoum pointed to the Fula as those responsible for the theft of cattle.

Generally speaking, in group discussions, young people spoke mostly of insecurity, unemployment, lack of education, poverty and food insecurity. Leaders and women spoke of a wider range of problems, but equally more political.

"It is not a question of knowing who is right or who is wrong. What we need is to outlaw anything that can push people to take up arms." Inchinanane Leaders, Menaka

2.9. Community Leaders and Religious Leaders

In Menaka and Ansongo, young men explained that community leaders bore a responsibility for the crisis. Community and local elected leaders "take advantage of the crisis to strengthen their power" and "benefit from emergency food donations," according to young people from Ansongo, to maintain power and "have projects on the backs of the people", as mentioned by young people from Menaka.

Young Arabs and Daoussaks were more likely than other groups to attribute a great responsibility to "conservative religious leaders" (63% and 69%).

2.10. The Involvement of the International Community

The responsibility of France in the crisis is considered more often than that of Algeria and Burkina Faso, the two countries most involved in the negotiations. In the focus groups, young Songhais often referred to France as having a responsibility in the crisis. In the individual data, it is the young Tuaregs who most often attributed a great responsibility to France in the conflict, even though France is commonly accused of supporting separatist Tuaregs. They are followed by young Songhais and Fula

(42% and 40%, respectively). Algeria, often accused of supporting Tuareg rebels, was also blamed more often by the young Tuaregs than by other young people (47%, versus 19% by Songhais or 0% by Arab respondents). In the discussions, communities explained that the international community, mainly France and the US often “took part in the conflict by supporting rebel groups to monopolize the mining and oil resources in northern Mali” and through “favoritism towards the Tuaregs”.

Burkina Faso, whose former President Blaise Compaore has been responsible for negotiations between the State and the secular and Islamist rebel groups, and where many leaders of armed groups lived, or still live, was blamed less often than France or Algeria. It was again the young Tuaregs that most often believed that Burkina Faso holds great responsibility in the crisis. MINUSMA was denounced by one out of five of the Songhai, Tuaregs, Fula, Daoussaks communities and never by the Arab communities.

The Perceptions of Populations on the Causes of the Conflict - In Summary

✚ The perceptions as to the sources of the crisis differ among ethnic groups, even when controlling other factors such as employment, education and age. “Tuareg separatism” is a major factor in the crisis for the Fula, Songhais and Arabs, but less so for the young Daoussaks and Tuaregs. The “lack of access to water and electricity”, is a major factor in the crisis for 100% of young Daoussaks but for only less than half of young Fula and Songhais.

✚ The communities, through their leaders, women and young people, evoked “insecurity and violence” as the main problem (e.g. looting, banditry, robberies, cattle theft, landmines, jihadists, etc.)

✚ The “lack of employment opportunities” is one of the main problems for young people of all ethnic groups and of all communities that are particularly concerned about youth unemployment.

✚ The perceptions of the causes of the crisis differed according to gender: “Religious fundamentalism” and the “presence of the MINUSMA” were more important factors for women than for men.

✚ The cercle of residence influences the perceptions of young people, even when the effect of the ethnic group is controlled, reflecting a heterogeneity of the populations within the region.⁹

✚ Young people explained that insecurity is ubiquitous night and day, at school, in the cities that have lost trust.

✚ “Insecurity for girls and women” was specifically mentioned in several discussion groups, referring especially to rape.

✚ Communities did not speak of “insecurity in the past”, they spoke of insecurity that is residual, permanent, growing and persistent. For them, the conflict is not finished.


✚ Insecurity has an impact on economic activities such as fishing, gathering and collection of wood. Insecurity and the fear of landmines prevent the free flow of goods and people.

⁹The young people of the Bourem and Menaka Cercles gave more importance to the “lack of access to water and electricity” in the crisis than their counterparts in Gao (2 times and 8 times more, respectively) but mentioned the importance to “violence” less often. Young people from Menaka more frequently cited the “corruption of local elites”. The young people of Ansongo and Menaka mentioned more often than their counterparts in Gao that “tribal tensions” have greatly contributed to the crisis, respectively 2 and 3 times more often.

- ✚ Insecurity and fear have an equal impact on social relations at the heart of communities.
- ✚ Generally speaking, “jihadist groups” are picked out as responsible for the crisis by the whole community.
- ✚ According to the ethnic groups, the terms used and the responsibilities of the different armed groups differ.
- ✚ Food insecurity is a major problem, commonly mentioned everywhere and by all. Leaders explained the role of poor harvests and death of livestock.
- ✚ All populations interviewed felt abandoned by the State, but also by the development partners, NGOs and donors.
- ✚ Communities often spoke of a north/south divide. The feeling of oppression of the North from the South is also often felt mainly in Tuareg, Arab and Daoussak communities. However, separatist Tuaregs movements are not always supported.
- ✚ “Ethnic tensions” were explicitly mentioned as factors of conflict in some discussions only. However, implicitly, the language shift from an armed group based on ethnic grounds to an ethnic group as a whole is common.
- ✚ In Menaka and Ansongo, young men explained that “community and local elected leaders” bore a great responsibility for the conflict, taking advantage of the crisis to “strengthen their power and benefit from donations and projects”.
- ✚ France and the rest of the international community were often accused of contributing to the conflict in order to seize the natural resources of northern Mali and through favoritism towards the Tuaregs.
- ✚ The MINUSMA and the SERVAL force were often seen as disruptive elements or risk sources.

Recommendations

- ✚ Develop content on ethnic diversity, on prejudice in the curricula intended for children and youth
- ✚ Differentiate the communities from the political movements and armed groups
- ✚ Do not speak of a post-conflict situation when the population says that the conflict is not over.
- ✚ Concentrate on common problems such as unemployment, food insecurity, insecurity rather than on political or ideological considerations.
- ✚ *"It is not a question of knowing who is right or who is wrong. What we need is to outlaw anything that can push people to take up arms."*
- ✚ Do not create content using the names of the different armed groups
- ✚ Expand social negotiations to the entire community, not just community leaders
- ✚ Extend the dialogues for the final selection of the host schools to all local stakeholders (town halls, CAP, representatives, civil society organizations, and NGO).
- ✚ Create links between the northern and southern communities
- ✚ Prioritize employment solutions requiring no travel in the region

 Consider relevant professional training from a food insecurity standpoint (for example: protection of fields against birds and predators, care of animals)

IV.3 THE NEED TO TAKE UP ARMS

In the majority of group discussions, views differed on the need to take up arms and the legitimacy that the different stakeholders of the crisis have for doing so. In such discussions, youth were asked whether any of the following reasons justified the taking up of arms: “to defend one’s religion”, “to defend one’s culture and traditions”, “to judge criminals when the State does not” and “to influence government policies”. In every community, some young people justified the taking up of arms by armed groups, either to defend the rights of the northern regions or to protect themselves when the State fails to protect civilian populations. The sense of injustice was constantly raised. Others argued instead that taking up arms solves nothing, makes the situation worse and causes the death of innocent people. This second trend is more pronounced among elders. In Tassiga, local women believed that the self-defense groups, Ganda Izo and Ganda Koy, were right to take up arms but foresaw that if they are not reintegrated, it will create problems.

A young man from Tadjalalt explained that after the Tuareg had taken up arms to defend their rights, the Songhais and the Fula were forced to do the same to avoid being “left out when interests were distributed.” Conversely, a young Tessit noted that everyone is finally losing since “war is not good. The proof is that today we’re all in the same boat. War doesn’t end quickly. It’s a tragedy.”

“The Tuaregs were right to take up arms because they are the ones whose rights are most trampled. The Songhais and the Fula were forced to go on so they would not be left out when interests were distributed.”

Young men of Tadjalalt, Ansongo

“War is not good. The proof is that today we’re all in the same boat. War doesn’t end quickly. It’s a tragedy.”

Young men from Tessit, Ansongo

The communities sometimes explicitly differentiated themselves from the armed groups that claim to defend them. Thus, the Tuareg women from Doro believed that armed groups were wrong to take up arms because it is because of them that they have lost everything. Forgho Songhai leaders indicated that the desire for independence only engages the MNLA. Women from the same village explained that the MNLA, the MUJWA and even their young people came to “plunder, rape, steal, and do anything without asking them.”

In none of the discussions did the youth justify the taking up of arms by Islamist groups. In the village of Kounsoum, however, young women believed that the MUJWA and the GATIA were right to take up arms to punish thieves (by cutting off their hands).

In group discussions with young people, leaders and women, the Tuareg communities further legitimized the taking up of arms in response to marginalization. From the individual data collected, it stands out that young Arabs are less inclined to take up arms, when controlling for other variables. On average, 71% of them think that “it is never necessary to take up arms”. In all, 8% think that “it is always necessary to take up arms”. The reason why most think that taking up arms is necessary is “for judging criminals when the State fails to do so”.

On the opposite end, the young Fula are the most likely to take up arms, controlling for other variables. On average, only 18% of them think that “it is never necessary to take up arms”. On the other hand, 35% think “it is always necessary to take up arms to defend their religion” and “to defend their culture or judge criminals” (40% of young Fula think it is always necessary to take up arms for these 3 reasons). The necessity of taking up of arms in order to influence government policy is less often mentioned, but still, 20% of young Fula think “it is always necessary to take up arms” for that reason. The reason why most think that taking up arms is necessary is “for judging criminals when the State fails to do so”.

Songhais and Touregs were among the least likely to take up arms, with 48% of the former and 51% of the latter believing “it is never necessary to take up arms”. While 76% of young Daoussaks believed “it is never necessary to take up arms in order to judge criminals” and 62% believe that “it is never necessary to take up arms in order to influence the government's policies”, this percentage drops to 49%, and to 41% for “the defense of their religion or their culture”.

Overall, women are less likely to take up arms than men. But there are exceptions. In the case of young Daoussak women, 46% and 31%, respectively, believed that “it is always necessary to take up arms in defense of their religion and their culture”, versus 8% and 17%, respectively, in the case of young Daoussak men. However, no Daoussak woman believed that “it is necessary to take up arms in order to judge criminals” or “to influence the government's policies”.

Only 50% of Arab women considered that “it is never necessary to take up arms to defend their culture and their traditions”, versus 73% of young Arab men. Conversely, 86% think that “it is never necessary to take up arms to judge criminals”, versus 64% of men.


For these four reasons, more Fula women than men believed “it is always necessary to take up arms”.

Songhai and Tamasheq women are slightly less likely to take up arms than their male counterparts, regardless of the reason.

The four graphs below represent the percentage of young people still finding it necessary to take up arms, for each of the four proposed reasons: “to defend one’s religion”, “to defend one’s culture and traditions”, “to judge criminals when the State does not” and “to influence government policies”. The detailed results are in Annex 8.

A total of 14 academic advisors, of the 15 surveyed, believe that the use of force or violence may not always be the right means defend certain causes. However, 10 justified the taking up of arms by one of the parties of the conflict.

Figure 1. Need to take up arms according to ethnicity and gender - By reason



Source: Primary data from the RERA, ERSA, Oct. 2015, Individual Youth Questionnaire

The Need to Take Up Arms - In Summary

- In all communities, there were young people who justified the fact that groups had taken up arms, for one of the four reasons mentioned.
- A sense of “injustice” was the most commonly evoked when discussing the need to take up arms.
- Although communities often view the taking of up arms as legitimate in order to demand justice or to protect themselves, they often dissociate themselves from armed groups.

Recommendations

- Include in the programs:
 - content specific to the fight against the proliferation of arms, the security consequences of the creation of armed groups;
 - content created by community members who defend non-violent struggle and peaceful conflict resolution. Include content from those who have experiences to share of the consequences of the proliferation of arms. Their words can reach more children and young people than content developed elsewhere; and
 - content describing concrete cases of non-violent struggle for social justice.

IV.4 DIVISION FACTORS

The first thing that divides populations, according to young people, is politics, that is to say, men and political parties, who, in order to stay in power, or gain power, foster divisions. Local elected officials themselves, because of their “bad governing”, a euphemism for corruption, also favor division, especially by monopolizing the gifts and benefits of aid programs. Village chiefs, their advisors and the other community leaders sometimes monopolize the benefits of support for the villages and also create divisions during chieftaincy conflicts.

NGOs are also sources of division in the community. In 19 villages (almost half), aid from NGOs and the distributions of food donations have been identified as sources of conflict and tension, by at least one of the groups encountered (leaders, women, young men, young women). Thus, NGOs, due to the lack of sufficient resources or as a result of favoritism, sometimes support a portion of the population at the expense of the other, creating tensions. Food distributions are not equitable, because of the chiefs, advisors, elected officials, and donation management committees, etc.

“Land conflicts” were mentioned frequently as a source of division. “Conflicts over ownership of land and fields” were mentioned in 25 discussions with groups of villagers.

“Social injustice”, “poverty” and “unemployment” were also cited by people, but less often than the previous factors.

In four Tuareg communities, differences of opinions on the conflict (e.g. pro-government versus separatists) are also a source of tension.

“Racism” was rarely mentioned regarding this question. Talataye women spoke of “lack of understanding between ethnic groups”. The young women of Djidara and the young men of Sossokoira and Tessit spoke of racism as a “source of division”.

Yet, to the question of whether the diversity of ethnicities, religions and ideas is an asset or a source of conflict, communities often responded that it is a source of conflict. In approximately one third of the discussions with leaders and women, diversity of culture and ethnicity was seen as a source of conflict. Communities spoke of mistrust, misunderstanding and hatred.

"Diversity is a cause of conflict because we do not like each other." Women of Indelimane

In some cases, ethnic diversity is not a source of conflict but religious diversity is. Sometimes the respondents believed it is an asset, but the conflict that is ending requires them to say otherwise.

"Years ago, the diversity of ethnicities, religion or ideas, it was an asset, but today they are factors of division. We think that those people over there, the white-skins, don't take us into account. So, we do the same. They came back but we don't trust them." Women of Ansongo

More common individual behaviors were also mentioned: gossip, backbiting, hypocrisy are also sources of dispute in the village.

"Yes, it is an asset, but we won't be able to live together seeing their behavior," Women from Tabango

The conflicts between livestock breeders and farmers were rarely pointed out as sources of tension. In the village of Kadji, religion is a source of tension because one part of the village, Dar Salam, is of Wahhabi tendency, while the other is more moderate. This created conflicts and the inhabitants of Dar Salam were accused of having allied with the jihadists.

"Ethnic and religious differences are causes of conflict, either because one always tries to defend the bad behavior of one's people, or because one believes one's religion is better than the others." Inekar Leaders

The Factors for Division - In Summary

- ✚ The primary factors for division are "politics", "men" and "political parties".
- ✚ "Local elected officials" and "village leaders" are those primarily responsible for division.
- ✚ "NGOs create divisions" in the community because "food distributions and supports only affect part of the population".
- ✚ The notion that differences in religions and ethnicities are sources of conflict is widespread.

Recommendations

- ✚ Explain to the populations the selection criteria/targeting, the total amount of inputs delivered to the village and other villages in the commune.
- ✚ Supervise the activities of the project steering committees.
- ✚ Ensure the representativeness of the steering committee and its accountability to the community.
- ✚ Create an ethnic and religious diversity in the activities undertaken with children and youth.

IV.5 THE ROLE OF THE EDUCATION SYSTEM IN THE CRISIS

Inequalities in access or quality of education, or the content of teaching material are likely to play a role in the emergence or continuation of conflicts.

5.1. Schooling Coverage and Access to School

Analysis in Terms of the Number of Schools Per Capita

"Poor infrastructure" was often cited as a sign of abandonment of the northern regions by the central government. An analysis in terms of the per capita number per public primary school led to different conclusions, since for the school year before the start of the crisis, the three northern regions had the lowest ratios of inhabitants per public school: 1,454 in the Gao Region; 1,575 inhabitants per school in the Kidal Region, and 2,096 inhabitants per school in the Timbuktu Region.

However, good school coverage measured by this ratio is not a sufficient measure of school access and can mask problems with access. For example, while the Gao region has good school coverage according to this ratio and a good gross enrollment ratio compared to the rest of the country, Kidal has the lowest gross enrollment rate although the best school coverage ratio. Even within the Gao Region, in the Bourem Cercle, the school per capita ratio is 1,686 versus 2,444 in the Ansongo Cercle. However, the gross enrollment rate is 65% in the Bourem Cercle, versus 76% in the Ansongo Cercle.

Furthermore, while the Gao region has the best school per capita ratio, an analysis at the level of cercles and communes shows large disparities. Thus, the Menaka Cercle seems better equipped, with 545 inhabitants per school than the Ansongo Cercle, with 2,444 inhabitants per school. Even within the cercles, school coverage measured by the ratio of inhabitants per school is very disparate. Within the Gao Cercle, the commune of Gao has 3,598 inhabitants per public school versus 616 for the commune of Tilemsi (a difference of 584%). Within the Ansongo Cercle, the variation between the communes is 260% (4,674 inhabitants per school in the town of Talataye versus 1,170 in the commune of Ansongo). These disparities are a potential source of frustration, even when at the regional level the number of schools per capita is better than nationally.

Distance to School

Schooling coverage cannot be measured using only a per capita ratio. Indeed, the Menaka Cercle has the lowest population per school number, but the lowest percentage of young people having attended school. In all, 58% of those surveyed said they have never attended school “because of the lack of nearby schools”, despite the small number of inhabitants per school. This highlights the special features of those areas with low population density for which the analyses in terms of per capita ratio are not relevant.

During the discussions, half of the communities interviewed (22 women's groups and 20 groups of community leaders out of 46) reported that all children in the community do not have access to school as a result of distance. Sometimes, there is no school in the village (even before the crisis started), sometimes school is not accessible by the children from certain encampments, from nomadic communities, from the other side of the village or the river's islands. The distance from school brings about transportation problems mainly in a situation of insecurity, the need for families or day care facilities for children of nomadic communities and children's nutritional problem are consistently mentioned by the communities as a result of dropping out from schooling. Leaders and women notice that their children are hungry and cannot eat lunch, except where a nutritional service is set up, as in the case of the village of Tadjalalt, whose women explained that they look after those children who come from afar.

In addition to access to school, the difficulty in accessing secondary education was raised by women and leaders of eight communities visited, who explained that the elementary 2 level school and/or high school are far away and bring about other costs such as lodging, catering, and the trips to and from the village.

Access to School and Household Living Conditions

Beyond the existence of a nearby school, access to school is conditioned by the living conditions of households. Thus, one third of those youth surveyed who had never been to school cited “poverty” as the main reason. This ratio rises to 100% in the Tilemsi commune. In this commune of the Gao Cercle, three quarters of young people have never attended school and they all evoke “lack of financial means”. “Lack of financial means” was mentioned by the vast majority of the communities, whether by leaders or women. While some noted that “the school is public and registration is free”, the majority explained that all children in the community do not have access to school due to the “lack of financial means”, preventing them at times from, for example, paying school supplies, birth certificates, student fees or school outfits. Linked to the families' economic situation, women

explained that some parents and children prefer working, especially animal grazing, or farm work. A multivariate analysis of the determinants of schooling (see Appendix 9) conducted by the project indicates that all things being equal, socio-economic status -- as measured by the number of household goods and household equipment -- is correlated with a higher chance of attending school.

Other Barriers to School Access

Some groups of community leaders (in Bara, Indelimane and Tin-Hama, in the Ansongo Cercle) believe that the school meets their expectations since children of all colors, ethnicities and religions can register. Still, access to school is not the same for all children, starting with girls (see Annex 9). For example, in Tessit, where 45% of young people have never attended school, almost half of youth that never attended school report that their lack of schooling is related to marriage, pregnancy or housework. The specific barriers to the enrollment of girls were mentioned by women from six villages and community leaders of a single village, evoking the early marriage of girls, domestic work, and in one case, rape. Moreover, all things being equal, young women who had access to school are half as likely as boys to have had access to the elementary 2 level.¹⁰

The multivariate analysis of the schooling determinants shows that ethnicity has a strong impact on enrollment in school (see Appendix 9). Thus, a young Daoussak is 10 times less likely than a young Songhai to have attended school. A young Tuareg or a young Arab is approximately 4 times less likely than a young Songhai to have attended school. Young Tuaregs who have had access to primary school are half as likely as young Songhais to have access to the elementary 2 level.

The nomadic nature of some communities may be an explanation for this effect of ethnicity on the education of young people. Access to the school is different for nomad and sedentary populations. Indeed, children of nomadic communities have more difficulties in accessing school, even when there is a school in one of the community sites. In six communities, the members interviewed evoked nomadism as a reason for not having access to school. In Djebock and Talataye, the absence of host families was mentioned. Traditionally, nomadic families have a sedentary environment host family, often a Songhai family, and sometimes a sedentary Tuareg family. Successive conflicts have caused the removal of these hospitality mechanisms.

There are also geographic disparities. Thus, regardless of their ethnicity, young people living in a commune capital are more likely to have attended school. Young people of the Bourem and Menaka cercles who had access to primary school are four times less likely than young people of the Gao Cercle of reaching the fundamental 2 level.

¹⁰ The detailed results of these multivariate analyzes are shown in Annex 11

Table 8. Schooling coverage and access to school

Region/Cercle/Commune	RGPH 2009	CPS 2010-2011		# of inhabitants per school	October, 2015 – ERSA Data							
	Population 2009	# of public primary schools	Gross enrollment rate		% of young people who have attended school	Reasons for not attending school						% of young people who think that the lack of access to education is a major problem
						No means	No nearby school	Work	Marriage/pregnancy/Housework	No interest	Others/Unaid	
GAO Region	542.304	373		1.454	64%	35%	20%	13%	12%	11%	10%	
ANSONGO Cercle	131,953	54	75.5	2,444	66%	15%	15%	17%	30%	15%	7%	64%
ANSONGO	30,091	17		1,770	84%	0%	0%	0%	100%	0%	0%	42%
BARA	15,092	7		2,156	79%	0%	0%	0%	33%	67%	0%	55%
BOURRA	18,726	10		1,873	90%	0%	0%	50%	50%	0%	0%	47%
OUATAGOUNA	30,263	9		3,363	90%	0%	0%	50%	0%	50%	0%	40%
TALATAYE	14,023	3		4,674	30%	14%	21%	14%	14%	29%	7%	85%
TESSIT	13,766	3		4,589	55%	11%	11%	22%	44%	0%	11%	75%
TIN-HAMMA	9,992	5		1,998	35%	31%	23%	15%	23%	0%	8%	100%
Bourem Cercle	116,360	69	64.9	1,686	71%	30%	4%	15%	11%	11%	30%	64%
BAMBA	28,616	16		1,789	60%	63%	0%	13%	0%	13%	13%	45%
BOUREM	27,488	18		1,527	90%	50%	0%	0%	50%	0%	0%	50%
TABOYE	20,641	14		1,474	60%	0%	13%	38%	13%	13%	25%	85%
TARKINT	19,099	12		1,592	45%	22%	0%	0%	11%	11%	56%	79%
TEMERA	20,516	9		2,280	100%				0%	0%	0%	60%
GAO Cercle	239,535	150	122.5	1,597	65%	31%	58%	3%	0%	6%	3%	82%
ANCHAWADJI	20,559	27		761	61%	71%	0%	14%	0%	14%	0%	100%
GABERO	25,621	16		1,601	60%	38%	0%	13%	0%	13%	38%	72%
GAO	86,353	24		3,598	80%	50%	0%	0%	0%	50%	0%	70%
GOUNZOUREYE	27,249	19		1,434	85%	33%	0%	67%	0%	0%	0%	75%
N'TILLIT	22,285	22		1,013	55%	33%	11%	33%	22%	0%	0%	85%
SONY ALI BER	47,618	26		1,831	90%	0%	50%	0%	0%	50%	0%	75%
TILEMSI	9,850	16		616	25%	100%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	100%
MENAKA Cercle	54,456	100	112.1	545	51%	31%	58%	3%	0%	6%	3%	90%
ALATA	2,856	5		571					0%	0%	0%	
ANDERAMBOUKANE	18,090	21		861	40%	8%	92%	0%	0%	0%	0%	85%
Inekar	5,421	12		452	25%	15%	62%	8%	0%	8%	8%	90%
MENAKA	22,659	52		436	85%	67%	0%	0%	0%	33%	0%	90%
Tidermene	5,430	10		543	55%	75%	25%	0%	0%	0%	0%	95%

Source: General Census of the Population and Habitat, 2009; CPS Database 2010-2011; RERA Primary Data, ERSA, Oct. 2015, Individual Youth Questionnaire

5.2. Quality of the Education System

The communities, through their community leaders and women, judged the quality of education in public schools as very poor, especially citing the lack of competence of their teachers, neglect on the part of educational authorities, and the lack of infrastructure.

School Infrastructure

Women and community leaders almost unanimously evoked the inadequacy of school infrastructure and equipment such as bench desks. In Seyna-Sonrhaï, the Gourma school was built with mud bricks by the populations themselves. Classrooms are insufficient, leading the students to share classrooms.

As for toilets, infrastructure is also inadequate (see details in Annex 10). Thus, before the conflict, less than half of the public primary schools had toilets (48%) versus 67% on a national scale. In contrast, the percentage of schools with separate toilets for girls is the same as nationally, indicating that toilets are rarer in Gao, but when a school has them, they are separated for girls and boys. The percentage of schools with toilets varies greatly, from only 32% in the Menaka Cercle to 74% in the Bourem Cercle. The same applies for separate toilets for girls, available in 12% of schools in Gao and 38% of schools in Bourem.

In terms of access to electricity and water, the Gao Region is not significantly different from the schools in the rest of the country, but again, there are large differences between the cercles and between the communes, since in 2010-2011, no schools in the Menaka Cercle had electricity, and only one third had access to a water source, versus two thirds of the schools in the Gao Cercle.

School Health Services

As mentioned above, communities often regret the absence of school canteens, believing that this is a reason why some children do not attend school. In the Tuareg communities, the “lack of access to health services for children” is one reason given as to why children do not attend school. Indeed, on average, schools of the Menaka Cercle are 20.5 km away from a health center versus 12 km in the Bourem Cercle. This average distance increases to 69 km in the Alata commune (CPS 2010-2011). In general, “health at school” indicators are worse for the Gao Region and nationally (see table in Appendix 11) and show large disparities between the cercles and communes, with the Menaka Cercle often being the worst-equipped.

Quality of Teaching and Learning

All communities surveyed lamented the fact that schools do not meet their expectations in terms of quality of education and learning. They denounce the low level of the teachers in many cases, the pedagogical choices (program, method, national language), and the poor level of the students. They speak of a school debacle. Although teachers are not less trained than the national average, it remains evident that in 2010-2011, only 34% of teachers in the region had a degree in teaching (excluding SARPE). This percentage varied, from 28% in the Menaka Cercle to 41% in the Ansongo Cercle. The women of Kounsoum, Tarkint and Tassiga as well as Ouattagouna leaders explained that, although some children do not attend school, it is partly due to the fact that the school does not prepare children for job opportunities and instead seems to foster unemployment. Therefore, families such as those from Djidara, prefer their children to learn a profession, such as fishing or market gardening.

The communities also complained about the lack of monitoring and neglect on the part of educational and communal authorities who seem not to be involved in the quality of education. Teachers are not monitored, much less punished, for absenteeism. Furthermore, the school is politicized and the School Management Committees do not always fulfill their role. Finally, complaints and claims of the communities go unanswered.

The Alignment of School to the Lifestyles and Values of the Communities

As mentioned above, the traditional public school is not adapted to the nomadic lifestyle, excluding certain children from the system or making their schooling more difficult. From a values perspective, communities seldom expressed an opposition between school and their values. In five cases, including four in the Menaka Cercle, communities explained how they resort to Koranic schools, as an alternative or complement to public school, in order to overcome the gap between school values and their own values.

The overwhelming majority (93%) of teachers believed that schools “respect the culture and values of the communities”. The remaining 7% who did not believe so did not provide a reason for this belief.

Education in the National Language

The teaching of the national language in primary schools is often used as an indicator of the education system's alignment to the values of the population. Although bilingual education is officially in force in Mali, it is not widespread. Nationally, 34% of public primary schools have at least one elementary 1 class that uses the bilingual program (regardless of how it is implemented including teacher training, and available equipment). In the Gao Region, the percentage is even lower, as 20% of schools are bilingual for one class at least.

Despite being an indicator of the schools' alignment to communities, education in the national language is often rejected by communities themselves. Thus, community leaders of Seyna-Sonrhaï (Ansongo Cercle) and of Konkorum (Bourem Cercle) deplored teaching in Songhai, as did the women of Ouattagouna. In Seyna-Sonrhaï, Ansongo Cercle, the leaders explained why the students and parents are discouraged "because of the use of Songhai in school and the abandoning of French" and that the teachers in the curriculum are not trained and have too poor a level in the particular national language to be able to use the bilingual curriculum. In Ouattagouna, the women mentioned the use of national languages as a reason for parents not sending their children to school. They wished that French would be taught and English introduced in the 6th grade.

In Ansongo, a teacher explained that “2nd grade students are not motivated because Songhai is used as the teaching language”.

Attitudes of the Teachers

Teachers' practices have sometimes been a source of conflict, as reflected by the women of Tarkin: "No, the teachers

"The teachers mistreat us, they sell our canteen. They make our children know that they are dirty." Women from Tarkint, Bourem

mistreat us, they sell our canteen. They make our children know that they are dirty."

The Role of the Education System in the Crisis - In Summary
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- ✚ The number of schools per capita allows for a comparison of the level of investment per capita. The level of investment per capita is better in the northern regions than in the rest of the country.
- ✚ The level of investment by the State, is very variable between the cercles of the Gao Region and between the communes of the same cercle.
- ✚ The number of schools per capita does not allow a comparison of school accessibility by the populations, it is more appropriate to examine the number of schools accessible to the populations, especially for low-density population areas and nomadic areas with the highest schools-per-capita ratios, but with great difficulties in accessing school.
- ✚ The proximity to the school is not enough to determine access to school. Of the young people that have never attended school, 80% of them invoke reasons other than the absence of a nearby school.
- ✚ The percentage of young people who have never attended school is very uneven between the cercles in the Gao Region, and between the communes of a same cercle. The reasons invoked also differ depending on the communes and cercles.
- ✚ All other things being equal, a young person from Daoussak is 10 times less likely than a young person from Songhai to have attended school. Young Tuaregs or young Arabs four times less likely than a young Songhais to have attended school. Young Tuaregs who have attended school are two times less likely than young Songhais to achieve the elementary 2 level of schooling.
- ✚ All other things being equal, young women who have attended school are two times less likely than young men to achieve the elementary 2 level. 22% of women interviewed did not attend school or dropped out because they married, had a child, or had to perform domestic activities.
- ✚ The low quality of education causes communities to no longer believe in school
- ✚ Populations prefer education to be taught in French
- ✚ Infrastructure and equipment allocations are insufficient
- ✚ There are great inequalities between the cercles and among the communes in terms of infrastructure
- ✚ There are great inequalities between the cercles and among the communes in terms of access to health care services

Recommendations

- ✚ Offer educational opportunities to the most disadvantaged populations:
 - Implement strategies that can reach populations in areas of low population density and in nomadic communities
 - Implement strategies to facilitate course attendance by girls and young women, particularly mothers
 - Implement community nutrition programs for children of the ERSA centers.
 - Select the communes and sites so as not to reproduce or widen existing inequalities
 - Bear the costs of school supplies and birth certificates

- Engage in collaborations with the CAPs, town halls and cercle councils to implement procedures that facilitate the obtainment of birth certificates and registration in formal schooling.¹¹

✚ Manage a participatory diagnosis of the profile of children and young people, as well as the reasons for non-enrollment in school during the establishment of the centers (i.e. for those who dropped out of school or those that have not attended).

✚ Promote the return of the tradition of foster families to allow children of nomadic communities or those far from school to pursue an education and in order to restore the social fabric.

✚ Adopt a coherent implementation model, where each stakeholder is supported to fulfill his/her role.

✚ Obtain the adhesion of the communities to limit attrition:

- Adopt teaching practices allowing the fast acquisition of skills in French
- Explain the pedagogical architecture of the program to the community
- Achieve visible gains quickly
- Frequently bring the community together to speak of the learnings, methods, listen to fears and remarks
- Implement a regular mechanism for the collection of opinions and critiques
- Training of teachers on the respectful attitudes of children and communities

¹¹ Given the scale of school dropouts following the crisis, enable the CAPs to accept the registration of children without birth certificates in the formal system.

SECTION V. THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE CONFLICT

V.1 THE OVERALL SITUATION ACCORDING TO THE POPULATIONS

Those interviewed depicted very grim situations. They described a situation of constant insecurity, poverty, no access to health services, food insecurity, unemployment, fear. Leaders and women spoke mainly about insecurity in order to describe the overall situation in their area and their community, then about absence of health services and education, food insecurity and unemployment. Young people spoke more about unemployment.

Reports of improvement were rare and

"The crisis has passed, we live here in peace. Compared to 2012, all goes well, life is starting all over again. There are new construction sites, people are returning. [...] The crisis has never made us give up school. Throughout the crisis, we had courage to go to school." Young men of Tadjalalt, Tessit

young men said that, "all is well".

Women expressed more suffering. In Ansongo, they confessed: "We, women, have lost our routines, we don't do anything. Many of us are forced to prostitute ourselves to provide for our needs." In Bentia, they explained why women are violated in all aspects and that fear is everywhere in the village. In Seyna-Sonrhaï, they consider it regrettable that because of the growing insecurity, they close all the doors; they are in danger even on the road to the market.

"The population is left to itself. The area is as if it were dead". Young men, Inekar, Menaka

How would you describe the situation in the Gao region? In your village/neighborhood?

"There is war. There are dead people, looting. Schools are closed, roads cause fear." Community leaders, Ahel Badi, Bourem

"Everyone is scared. Young people became bandits and drug users. There is no more economic activity because of growing crime. Apart from large cities, all schools are closed. These children must be reclaimed, otherwise they will become bandits." Women from Ansongo

often nuanced by other assertions, apart from the Tadjalalt commune of Tessit, where leaders, women and young people described an improving situation. Women explained that the situation is calm, that a medersa [a traditional, secular Islamic school building] is open, that insecurity is a thing which they are starting to forget, where a healthcare center has started to function. Leaders and young women felt that safety has improved since the signature of peace agreements and

"Even here in our village, there is no peace: killings, thefts. The separation of parents from their children causes great pain". Young women, Bara, Ansongo

V.2 THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE CONFLICT IN THE EDUCATION SYSTEM AND ITS NEEDS

The first consequence of the conflict was closing of schools. This was mentioned by all communities, where respondents explained that students, their parents and teachers fled, that schools deteriorated,

I used to be a student but today there is nothing left. I even forgot how to read and write. 15-year old young woman, Inchinanane

were plundered, and were occupied. Women from Tabankort and leaders of Amalawlaw noticed that the conflict did not have impact on school since their communities did not have any schools before the crisis. Now, approximately 71% of primary schools have reopened their doors. However, according to teachers, there is much effort to be made, including in the opened schools.

2.1. Needs expressed by the teachers

In October 2015, the ERSA team interviewed 68 teachers from 37 public schools. They were invited to describe priority needs for their schools. The most-mentioned need was “didactic materials and supplies”. One teacher spoke about geometry materials, another about maps of the world. The second most-mentioned need was “food support”, or “canteens”, followed by “equipment”. “Construction of a fence for schools” was mentioned more frequently than “construction or renovation of classrooms”, which is a consequence of the precariousness of the security situation. One teacher also spoke about the need for a guard at his school. “Construction of new classes” was mentioned by more than one third of teachers, as was “access to water via drillings or wells”.

Table 9. The priority needs for schools, according to teachers (ERSA 2015)

	Ansongo	Bourem	Gao	Menaka	Total
# of teachers	22	19	20	7	68
Didactic material, supplies	7	15	11	7	40
Canteen, living allowances	14	9	6	5	34
Costs of equipment (tables-benches, chairs, offices, cupboards)	13	9	6	5	33
Construction of fence, playground	9	10	10	1	30
Construction	5	10	7	2	24
Water (drilling, well)	6	7	7	3	23
Renovation (mainly of classrooms)	5	5	5	1	16
Teachers	4	4	4	2	14
Training of teachers and the CGS	1	2	4	1	8
Toilets	0	2	6	0	8
Health (medical kit, hygiene kits)	4	3	0	0	7
Sports ground	3	0	0	0	3
Electricity	0	1	1	0	2
Computer science	0	2	0	0	2
Inscription of students	1	0	0	0	1

Source: Primary data from the RERA, ERSA, Oct. 2015, Individual Youth Questionnaire

2.2. Closings and re-openings

88% of schools in the Gao region are open, according to the Cluster Education data base release of November 29, 2015. The data is from the 2015 school re-entry. In a provisional report of the Education Cluster on the 2015 school re-entry, an evolution of the number of functional schools is noted. Indeed, in August 2015, the percentage of open primary schools at the end of the 2014-2015 school year was 72%. The percentage of open schools is 66% for the Menaka Cercle, in comparison with 96% in the Gao cercle. Within the cercles, re-openings are achieved at irregular intervals. In particular, in the Ansongo cercle, commune of Talataye, no schools are open. In the Bourem Cercle, commune of Tarkint, only 47% of schools have re-opened.

Insecurity and deterioration of infrastructure, as well as lack of personnel, hinder the re-opening of schools.

Medersas re-open more quickly than public schools. 100% of medersas are open, in comparison with 85% of public schools.

Table 10. Re-opening of primary schools in the Gao region.

	Medersas		Other private schools		Public schools		Total	
	# of schools	% of open schools	# of schools	% of open schools	# of schools	% of open schools	# of schools	% of open schools
Ansongo	10	100%	2	100%	16	100%	28	100%
Bara	4	100%	0	0%	9	100%	13	100%
Bourra	6	100%	0	0%	16	100%	22	100%
Ouattagouna	1	100%	0	0%	10	100%	11	100%
Talataye	1	0%	0	0%	3	0%	4	0%
Tessit	1	100%	1	100%	8	100%	10	100%
Tin Hama	1	100%	0	0%	9	89%	10	90%
Ansongo	24	96%	3	100%	81	94%	98	95%
Bamba	1	100%	0	--	17	100%	18	100%
Bourem	2	100%	0	--	22	95%	24	96%
Taboye	4	100%	0	--	15	100%	19	100%
Tarkint	0	--	0	--	17	47%	17	47%
Temera	3	100%	0	--	10	100%	13	100%
Bourem	10	100%	0	--	76	88%	91	89%
Anchawadi	0	--	0	--	29	97%	29	97%
Gabero	2	100%	0	--	23	100%	25	100%
Gao	22	100%	12	100%	24	100%	58	100%
Gounzoureye	14	100%	0	--	22	100%	36	100%
N'Tillit	0	0%	0	--	34	85%	34	85%
Sony Ali Ber	37	100%	0	--	28	100%	65	100%
Tilemsi	0	0%	0	--	17	71%	17	71%

Gao	75	100%	12	100%	177	94%	264	96%
Alata	0	0%	0	--	5	40%	5	40%
Anderamboukane	0	0%	0	--	23	25%	23	48%
Inekar	0	0%	0	--	12	25%	12	25%
Menaka	3	100%	0	--	65	85%	68	85%
Tidermene	0	0%	0	--	11	36%	11	36%
Menaka	3	100%	0	--	116	65%	119	66%
Gao region	112	100%	15	100%	445	85%	572	88%

Source: Cluster Education database, released on November 29, 2015

Data from the primary data acquisition provide percentages lower than those from the Cluster base. 46 communities were visited during the assessment. These communities have 182 public schools and 73 private schools. Two thirds of public schools in the visited communities are open. This percentage varies according to cercles. Indeed, in the Menaka Cercle, only 37% of public schools are open. Several factors explain the difference between the figures from the cluster and the figures from the primary data acquisition:

- The sample from the acquisition pays more attention to the Ansongo and Menaka cercles, which respectively account for 28% and 41% of the sample of surveyed schools, whereas they respectively account for 18% and 26% of all schools in the region.
- The acquisition took place in October, while the cluster database was updated in November. It is possible that the re-opening of some schools took place in the meantime.
- The cluster database contains some duplicates and omits some schools, as a result of which the results can vary.

Table 11. Re-opening of primary schools in the surveyed communities.


Cercle	Ansongo	Bourem	Gao	Menaka	Total
# of surveyed communities	14	10	14	8	46
# of public schools	51	24	32	75	182
% of open public schools	88%	96%	78%	37%	66%
# of private schools (medersas and others)	19	8	31	15	73
% of open private schools	95%	100%	90%	53%	85%
# of schools	70	32	63	90	255
% of open primary schools	90%	97%	84%	40%	72%

Source: Primary data from the RERA, ERSA, Oct. 2015, Summary sheet

2.3. Teaching personnel

Data on teaching personnel present in the most recent schools are those from the education cluster database, released online on November 16, 2015. According to these data, the average number of teachers per primary school is 4.4. In public primary schools, the number of teachers per primary school is 4.4. The ratio of students for one teacher is 45.7 for the whole of primary schools and 48.1 for public schools only. These statistics vary according to cercles and communes. In the Menaka Cercle, there is one teacher for almost 71 children in primary schools, in comparison with 1 for 35 in the Ansongo cercle. In public primary schools in Menaka, this ratio goes up to 74 children for one teacher.


Figure 2. Evolution of the ratio of students per one teacher in public primary schools



Source: CPS 2010-2011; Cluster Education database, released on November 16, 2015

In the Gao cercle, more than 1 in 3 teachers in public primary schools is a woman (38%). In the Menaka Cercle, only 15% of teachers in public primary schools are women.

Figure 3. Evolution of percentage of students per one teacher in public primary schools



Source: CPS 2010-2011; Cluster Education database, released on November 16, 2015

In October 2015, the ERSA team interviewed 68 teachers from 37 public schools, out of which 19 were women. On average, each school has 5.2 teachers, of whom 29% are women. On average, each teacher

is responsible for teaching 66.2 children, which is higher than the average in the region. This is explained by the fact that the smallest communes of the region have the highest ratio of children for one teacher. However, in our sample, small communes (in terms of a number of schools) are overrepresented.

In the preliminary report of the 2015 school year, one reads that “in the beginning of the school year, a deficit of approximately 500 teachers was announced only in the Gao region”. It is estimated that there are approximately 2,150 full-time teachers in primary schools in the region (with all types of schools taken together). Of 68 teachers interviewed 14 (21%) estimated that an increase in the number of teachers is a priority need for their public school.

A third of teachers interviewed are native to the community where they teach while 46% are native to the commune (the same or another community). Two thirds come from the cercle where they teach. 1 teacher comes from Ghana. Out of 50 teachers who have taught in their schools since 2012, 29 left the school when the crisis was most violent, mainly between March and June 2012, some in 2013. The percentage of teachers who left their school when the crisis was most violent is the highest (71%) among the teachers who come from a cercle other than where this school is.

Table 12. Birthplace of teachers

Where were you born?	Ansongo	Bourem	Gao	Menaka	Total
In this village	23%	42%	30%	57%	34%
In another village in this commune	18%	0%	20%	0%	12%
In another commune in this cercle	18%	32%	20%	14%	22%
In another cercle in Mali	36%	26%	30%	29%	31%
Abroad	5%	0%	0%	0%	1%

Source: Primary data from the RERA, ERSA, Oct. 2015, Teacher questionnaire

40% of teachers in the schools visited have a teaching diploma issued by the IFM. This percentage varies from 14% in Menaka to 47% in Bourem. 44% followed the SARPE program and 4% followed the ECOM course. 6% do not have any teaching background and 5% declare that they completed another course (including the SSAP course for a Menaka teacher).

Table 13. Needs for training of teachers

	Ansongo	Bourem	Gao	Menaka	Altogethe
# of teachers	22	19	20	7	68
Psychosocial support	8	11	12	6	37
Pedagogy, psycho-pedagogy, didactics		7	6	2	15
Culture of peace	5	2	5	1	13
Curriculum	2	8	2		12
Large workforce and multi-grade classes	1	7	3		11
Remediation, catching-up, accelerated program		4	3		7
Health, hygiene, first aid	2			1	3
Reading		2			2

Source: Primary data from the RERA, ERSA, Oct. 2015, Teacher questionnaire

14 CAPs out of 15 questioned were instructed in psychosocial support. Among them, 8 have subsequently instructed other teachers. Only one of the trained AAs (Academic Advisors) does not feel competent enough to instruct teachers.

2.4. Material needs (infrastructure, equipment, materials)

In most recent updates of the Education cluster database, the information on the deterioration of infrastructures is available for very few schools, mainly in Menaka.

The infrastructure was damaged at 19 schools out of the 37 schools surveyed in October 2015. Teachers spoke about destroyed or damaged classrooms, equipment, windows, doors, locks, plundered school materials and documents.

Among 19 schools which were damaged by the conflict, 6 benefited from redecoration. However, in all 6 of these schools, renovation was necessary. In addition, 36 schools which were not damaged directly by the conflict also are in need of renovation. Only the Tadjalalt school does not need renovation since it opened in 2014. Nevertheless, teachers expressed the need for construction of additional rooms.

Table 14. Damage and renovation of infrastructure

	# of schools	# of damaged schools	# of damaged schools which were renovated	# of schools in need of renovation
Ansongo	12	5	3	11
Bourem	10	4	1	10
Gao	11	6	1	11
Menaka	4	4	1	4
Total	37	19	6	36

Source: Primary data from the RERA, ERSA, Oct. 2015, Teacher questionnaire

16 teachers out of the 68 surveyed estimated that the need for renovation is a priority. 24 teachers expressed the need for construction of new classrooms and/or annexes (management, storage). Half of teachers expressed the need for equipment (table-benches, offices, cupboards, etc.).

The schools surveyed in the Ansongo cercle on average have 7.1 toilets, those in the Bourem Cercle have 4.6 toilets, those in the Gao circle have 4.4 toilets and those of in the Menaka Cercle have 2.4 toilets. The statistics related to the toilets are better than those from 2010-2011, but here, we are speaking about schools which re-opened, therefore, undoubtedly more of these schools are urban and, thus, better equipped. Schools in the Menaka Cercle have fewer toilets than other schools. 2 out of 4 surveyed schools have separate toilets for girls.

Table 15. Number of toilets in schools

	# of schools	# of schools with toilets	# average of toilets	# of schools with separate toilets for girls
Ansongo	12	12	7.1	10
Bourem	10	9	4.6	6
Gao	11	9	4.4	7
Menaka	4	4	2.4	2
Total	37	34	5.1	25


Source: Primary data from the RERA, ERSA, Oct. 2015, Teacher questionnaire

The need for didactic materials and supplies is the number one need evoked by the surveyed teachers (40 out of 68). Among the schools visited, the percentage of children having access to reading handbooks adapted to his or her class varies greatly: from 0% in schools in Djebok, Menaka, Tadjalalt, Tidermene and Tin-Hama, to more than 80% in Konkorum, Kadji and Bentia. The same schools are underprivileged in terms of calculation handbooks. In Djebok, Tadjalalt, Tidermene, Tin-Hama and Tillit, no students had a calculation handbook whereas more than 85% of students in Bentia, Gargouna, Kadji, Bossalia and Konkorum, had access to them.

2.5. Children with and without access to school

The 2010-2011 school year is used as a reference year, being the last school year completed before the conflict. The graph below presents the evolution of the number of children who were provided with education in the primary education cycle in the following years, expressed as a percentage of the 2010-2011 reference level.

Figure 4. Evolution of the number of children who were provided with education in the primary education cycle, compared to 2010-2011




Source: Annual statistics of the CPS 2010-2011, 2011-2012, 2012-2013; Cluster Education database, released on November 16, 2015

In the Ansongo and Bourem Cercles, the number of children who were provided with education, is higher than in 2010-2011, by 20 and 12 percentage points respectively. This means a return to normality. In Gao, the number of students who are provided with education struggles to reach the level before the crisis, the number of children who are provided with education is lower than in 2010-2011, by one percent. The Menaka Cercle is that in which the children have the most difficulties in returning to school, which is

logical since only 43% of schools have re-opened. The number of children who were provided with education in 2015 reached 78% of the level of 2010-2011. In the four cercles, the percentage of girls who are provided with education is the same as in 2010-2011.

Figure 5. Evolution of the percentage of girls as students in the primary education cycle



Source: Annual statistics of the CPS 2010-2011; Cluster Education database, released on November 16, 2015

Out of 23 surveyed communes, data on the number of school-age children is available only in 11 mayor's offices. Data on the number of school-age children who are provided with education is only available in 8 communes. However, these numbers are not always provided for the same age groups, making it impossible to deduct the number of out-of-school children. Only 4 mayor's offices claimed to have data disaggregated for the villages within the communes.

During the primary data acquisition conducted by ERSa in October 2015, youth surveyed individually provided information on the schooling of children in their households. The questions related more precisely to children in their plots, or tents for nomads. Among children aged 6 to 14, the number attending school was recorded as well as, among those who did not attend school, the number that had never attended school. These data make it possible to estimate the percentage of children who are not provided with education, and the percentage of out-of-school children among children who do not attend school, and to compare cercles, communes and gender according to these two ratios. In communities where the sample was taken, half of children aged 6 to 14 are out of school. This percentage is similar for girls and boys. There are great disparities between cercles as well as communes within a cercle with respect to the proportion of children who are not in school, ranging from 80% of children in Menaka Cercle to 43% in Ansongo, followed by 40% in Gao and 31% in Bourem. In the Ansongo and Menaka cercles, the percentage of girls not provided with education is significantly higher than that of boys. Within cercles, variations are significant.

- In the Ansongo Cercle, rates of out-of-school children ranged from 16% in Ansongo commune to 86% in the Talataye commune.
- In the Bourem Cercle, from 18% in the Bourem commune to 59% in the Tarkint commune
- In the Gao cercle: from 14% in the Gao commune to 71% in the Anchawadi commune and 100% in the Tilemsi commune.
- In the Menaka Cercle: from 67% in the Menaka commune to 93% in the Inekar commune and 95% in the Tidermene commune.

The commune of Menaka, “the best off” in the Menaka Cercle, has the same percentage of children not provided with education as the Tarkint commune, the “poorest” in the Bourem Cercle.

Almost half of children not currently in school are drop-outs Here again, the proportion of out-of-school children among those not provided with education varies from one circle to another: from 36% in the Menaka Cercle to 65% in the Gao cercle. This is explained by the fact that education was first disturbed in the Menaka Cercle and by the fact that the education rate was lower in the Menaka Cercle before the crisis.

From the point of view of training animators for accelerated learning programs, the diversity of education backgrounds among youth in interviewed communities will not pose a problem as animators will be specifically trained to manage and teach in classrooms with varying levels of education.

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Table 16. Children at the age 6 to 14 out of school

Cercle/Commune	A number of children in the plot			% of children not provided with education			% of out-of-school children among those not provided with education		
	G	B	T	G	B	T	G	B	T
Ansongo	1.6	2.3	3.9	10%	21%	16%	33%	44%	42%
Bara	2.8	2.3	5.1	29%	44%	36%	38%	55%	47%
Bourra	1.5	1.9	3.4	34%	18%	25%	30%	57%	41%
Ouatagouna	1.6	1.4	3.0	29%	50%	39%	33%	50%	43%
Talataye	1.6	1.7	3.2	84%	88%	86%	38%	45%	42%
Tessit	1.5	1.5	3.0	40%	21%	31%	58%	83%	67%
Tin Hama	1.7	2.4	4.1	71%	73%	72%	33%	46%	41%
Ansongo	1.7	1.9	3.6	41%	45%	43%	38%	50%	45%
Bamba	1.2	1.6	2.8	17%	22%	20%	79%	86%	86%
Bourem	2.1	1.9	3.9	17%	19%	18%	71%	43%	57%
Taboye	2.5	2.1	4.6	40%	36%	38%	35%	84%	57%
Tarkint	1.0	1.3	2.3	85%	38%	59%	24%	40%	30%
Temera	1.9	1.9	3.8	30%	24%	27%	55%	44%	50%
Bourem	1.7	1.8	3.5	35%	27%	31%	43%	61%	51%
Achawadj	1.1	1.9	3.0	68%	71%	70%	46%	52%	50%
Gabero	1.4	1.7	3.1	14%	33%	25%	50%	45%	47%
Gao	2.7	2.5	5.2	23%	14%	18%	58%	71%	63%
Gounzoureye	2.5	2.3	4.7	20%	24%	22%	80%	27%	52%
N'Tillit	2.2	3.0	5.1	42%	47%	45%	56%	36%	43%
Sonni Ali Ber	1.9	2.3	4.1	27%	24%	26%	80%	73%	76%
Tilemsi	1.3	1.9	3.2	100%	100%	100%	96%	95%	95%
Gao	1.8	2.2	4.1	36%	43%	40%	70%	61%	65%
Anderamboukane	2.0	2.7	4.7	82%	56%	67%	56%	40%	48%
Inekar	2.7	2.7	5.4	92%	93%	93%	16%	10%	13%
Menaka	2.1	3.3	5.3	66%	68%	67%	70%	70%	70%
Tidermene	4.3	5.1	9.4	92%	95%	94%	18%	43%	31%
Menaka	2.7	3.4	6.2	85%	80%	83%	32%	40%	36%
Total	1.9	2.2	4.2	49%	51%	50%	43%	50%	47%

Source: Primary data from the RERA, ERSA, Oct. 2015, Individual Youth Questionnaire

2.6. Languages of children and teachers

Several ethnic groups could be found cohabiting each of the communities visited during the survey, as show in the data collected on these children's languages. On average, children in school speak 2.4 different languages. In one third of schools, three languages or more are spoken by students. In only 3 schools do students speak a single language. Children adopt one common language to communicate between themselves. In two thirds of these schools, it is Songhai, in one third of the schools visited, it is Tamasheq. Lastly, in Agamhor (Ahel Badi fraction), the common language is Arabic and in Inekar, the common language of students is Daoussak. In 79% of these schools, teachers state that some students speak French. In 7 schools (18%), teachers say that students use French to communicate between themselves (apart from one common national language).

On average, teachers speak 1.7 languages (31 teachers speak only one language, 28 speak 2 languages and 9 speak 3 languages). Seven teachers do not speak the common language of their students and report conversing with them in French or in another national language.

2.7. Traumas of children, teachers and parents

Eight teachers declared that some of their students had joined armed groups. Three said it can be explained by unemployment and poverty and one explained that some children followed their parents in such groups. One teacher was even enrolled by one of his former students. Lastly, another

“It is necessary to make them forget what evil they saw, it is also necessary to protect them constantly, be nice to them, be interested in them”, Teacher from Inekar

teacher explained that after their government was actually gone, children had to choose a group to which they would belong. In Tillit, children did not return. In Djebock, Tin-Hama and Djidara, some returned and re-integrated with their communities and schools after they were opened.

40 teachers (60% of the teachers questioned) say that their students or the students' families had been affected by the conflict, especially in terms of the migrations of refugees and loss of goods, but also deaths of parents, armed attacks, traumas, fear, and the closing of schools. In two cases, physical wounds are mentioned and in two other cases, enrollment of parents by armed groups.

Teachers from Bossalia and Konkorum indicate that their classroom activities changed because they live in fear and on constant alert.

27 teachers (39%) noticed children in their classes who were traumatized by the conflict. 23 out of the 68 teachers were trained to support children psychosocially. Those who were trained to support children psycho-socially did not tend to notice anything more than the fact that students were traumatized by the conflict. More than half of the surveyed teachers expressed the need to be trained in order to support students' psychosocial well-being.

Table 17. Traumas experienced by students according to their teachers

	Ansongo	Bourem	Gao	Menaka	Altogether
# of teachers	22	19	20	7	68
Displaced parents	5	2	7	2	16
Loss of goods	4	3	4	2	13
Killed parents	3		4	1	8
Robberies, thefts	2	1	1	3	7
Closing of school	2	2	1	1	6
Traumas, mental shocks, fear		3	1	2	6
Parents enrolled by armed groups		1		1	2
Physically wounded children			2		2

Source: Primary data from the RERA, ERSA, Oct. 2015, Teacher questionnaire

2.8. Monitoring of schools at the deconcentrated/decentralized level

V.2.8.1 Monitoring-support of school authorities

Monitoring of schools by academic advisors is usually a challenge, in particular in the Gao region because of distances and access difficulties. After the conflict started, these difficulties increased. Among 15 interviewed advisers (3 AAs of each of the 5 CAPs), 7 left their CAP when the crisis was most violent. Apart from that, academic advisers cannot go to all communities of their district, due to safety concerns and rejection of government symbols and officials. In the Menaka CAP, two academic advisers estimated that there are no zones to which they cannot go, whereas another, and agents surveyed at the time of the update of data on schools in August 2015, mention 4 of 5 Menaka communes

Table 18. Zones to which agents of the CAP cannot go because of safety

Cercle/CAP	Zone
Bourem	Tarkint (Tabankort, Kinchiwal, Tankint, Tourja, Doinnoune, Ersine)
Ansongo	Talatate
	Tessit
	Chock Hama (in particular Amalawlaw, Tinaman, Tindiguimat)
Gao - Gao	Tilemsi
	Anchawadi
Gao - Wabaria	Commune of Tillit (Marsi, Ebelbel, Tindjarane, Tinkareyzena, Tintihidjrene, Tanala)
Menaka	Alata
	Tidermene
	Inekar
	West of Menaka (Injedalane, Inarabene, Infoukaritane, Tabankort, Askabar, Eghrane Akh)

Source: Primary data from the RERA, ERSA, Oct. 2015, AA questionnaire; data of the mission of the secondary data update, August 2015

V.2.8.2 Monitoring by communes

Out of 23 communes surveyed, data on the number of school-age children is available only in 11 town halls. The age groups of these children vary, limiting the comparisons. Out of 11 communes with school-age children, only 3 have figures disaggregated according to finer sections and 3 have figures disaggregated by the villages of a given commune.

Out of 23 communes surveyed, data on the number of school-age children is available only in 9 town halls. The age groups of these children vary, limiting the comparisons. In these 9 communes however, figures are available by cycle (pre-school, elementary 1 and elementary 2) and in 6 town halls, figures disaggregated according to finer sections' are available. Only four town halls claim to have data disaggregated by the villages of a given commune.

The same commune does not use the same age bracket for school-age children and children provided with education. Thus, it is difficult to deduce number of out-of-school children for 8 communes which provided these two statistics.

This situation shows the weakness of statistical data at the decentralized level. This weakness can lead to poor orientation in the concept and the establishment of support programs in the region as well as moral risk in the identification of sites by town halls.

Those responsible for education in the Taboye and Tin Hama communes left their communities. Thirteen town halls stated to have lost data during the conflict, quoting among other documents, marital status registries, reports/ratios of the CGS, school and medical charts such as lost documents. The communes of Gao and Wabaria declare to be in the process of their reconstruction. Only one town hall estimates that the return-to-school programs do not sufficiently use the data from town halls, that of Gao, which considers it regrettable that NGOs consult the AE and the CAP and inform the town hall afterward. In most cases, collaboration with NGOs/project for the identification of sites goes on well, such as for example with the IRC, the ACTED, the OXFAM, and the Tassaght.

In addition to the absence of statistical data, the tasks of town halls relating to decentralized schools are hindered by the insecurity. Thus, agents from the town halls of Ansongo, Bamba, Bourem, Bourra and Menaka mentioned areas of their communes to which they cannot go.

Table 19. Areas to which community agents cannot go because of insecurity.

Ansongo	Oulak Moulouk and Oulah Bahli fractions
Bamba	Ahellahwal, Ahelsidisadek, Ahelsidi Abedine, Kilinsaye
Bourem	Nobody responsible for education mentions the Temera, Bamba and Tarkint communes
Bourra	Areas with difficult access, areas of nomads
Menaka	Tidinbawene

Source: Primary data from the RERA, ERSA, Oct. 2015, questionnaire responsible for education in town halls

Table 20. Statistics of town halls on school-age children and those provided with education

Commune	School-age children						Children provided with education						
	Available data	# G	# B	# T	Disaggregated data		Available data	# G	# B	# T	Disaggregated data		
					by finer age brackets	by village					by cycle	by finer age brackets	by village
Ansongo													
Ansongo	No				No	No	No				No	No	No
Bara	from 7 to	150	120	270	Yes	Yes	from 7 to	300	250	550	Yes	Yes	Yes
Bourra	from 7 to	1597	1799	3396	No	Yes	from 7 to	1253	1290	2543	Yes	Yes	Yes
Ouattagouna	No				No	No	No				No	No	No
Talataye	No				No	No	No				No	No	No
Tessit	No				No	No	from 6 to	1041	892	1933	Yes	No	Yes
Tin-Hama	No				No	No	No				No	No	No
Bourem													
Bamba	from 6 to	756	594	1350	No	No	No				No	No	No
Bourem	from 7 to	4381	3811	8192	Yes	No	from 5 to	1766	2058	3824	Yes	Yes	No
Taboye	from 6 to	3002	2884	5886	No	No	from 3 to	1781	1989	3770	Yes	No	No
Tarkint	No				No	No	No				No	No	No
Temera	No				No	No	No				No	No	No
Gao													
Anchawadi	from 6 to	1200	800	2000	No	No	No				No	No	No
Gabero	No				No	No	No				No	No	No
Gao	from 6 to	9600	8825	18425	No	No	from 6 to	8716	8520	17236	Yes	Yes	No
Gounzoureye	No				No	No	No				No	No	No
N'Tillit	from 7 to	800	1000	1800	No	No	from 7 to	400	700	1100	Yes	No	No
Soni Ali Ber	No				No	No	No				No	No	No
Tilemsi	from 6 to	225	315	540	No	No	No				No	No	No
Menaka													
Anderamboukane	from 6 to	2340	1565	3905	No	No	from 6 to	2511	1674	4185	Yes	Yes	No
Inekar	from 7 to	1123	1713	2836	Yes	Yes	from 7 to	230	1009	1239	Yes	Yes	Yes
Menaka	No				No	No	No				No	No	No
Tidermene	No				No	No	No				No	No	No

Source: Primary data from the RERA, ERSA, Oct. 2015, questionnaire responsible for education in town halls

2.9. Community implication and CGS

Three teachers interviewed believed that the conflict had an impact on confidence of parents at school because the parents feel an inadequacy between their religious values and traditional schools. Two teachers believed that the conflict had an impact on the confidence of parents at school because they do not feel to be Malians anymore. Teachers also mentioned the mistrust of parents for school, which according to them, is a dangerous place as a target for Islamists. The CGSs are functional in most cases and are often considered active by teachers. However, they mentioned only sensitizing activities.

Table 21. Functionality of the CGSs

	# of schools	# of functional CGS	# of active CGSs
Ansongo	12	12	9
Bourem	10	9	6
Gao	11	10	7
Menaka	4	3	1
Total	37	34	23

Source: Primary data from the RERA, ERSA, Oct. 2015, Teacher questionnaire

2.10. Atmosphere of violence at school

Five of the teachers interviewed said that the conflict had impact on relations between students: between students of different ethnos groups (Agamhor and Tarkint), between pro-governmental and pro-independence fighters (Inekar) and between students “affiliated” with various armed groups (Ansongo, Tillit). In Kadji, a teacher reported that students often take knives to fight. A teacher from Anderamboukane observed racism expressed by Tuareg children towards Black children. On the contrary, a teacher from Tessit explained that Tuareg, Fula and Bella children cohabit well at the school. In many discussions, communities expressed their concern with respect to new attacks by armed jihadists groups on schools.

“Children with red skin think that they are better than black children”
Teacher from Anderamboukane, Menaka Cercle

Consequences of the conflict on education system - summary

- ✚ People depicted very grim situations. Reports of improvement were rare and were often qualified by other assertions.
- ✚ Women were more likely to speak about suffering and limitation of activities.
- ✚ The conflict had a strong impact on schools, which were closed and from which teachers and students fled.
- ✚ The impact of the conflict is still being felt, since 15% of public schools are still closed and since opened schools are facing great challenges.
- ✚ In the Menaka Cercle, 65% of public schools were re-opened, in comparison with 94% in the Gao cercle.
- ✚ Insecurity and deterioration of infrastructure as well as lack of personnel hinder re-opening of schools.
- ✚ In the Talataye commune, no public primary schools are open.
- ✚ Medersas have re-opened more quickly: 100% of medersas were re-opened, in comparison with 85% of public schools.
- ✚ The average number of teachers per school is 4.4, of whom 27% are women. In the Gao cercle, more than 1 in 3 teachers in public primary schools is a woman (38%). In the Menaka Cercle, only 15% of teachers are women.
- ✚ The ratio of students per one teacher is 48.1 for public primary schools. In the Menaka Cercle, there is one teacher for nearly 74 children in primary schools, in comparison with 1 for 35 in the Ansongo cercle.
- ✚ An insufficient supply of teachers is evident, and is evoked by everyone and has not improved since the crisis began. Teachers have not returned because of insecurity and because NGOs sometimes offer them other employment opportunities.
- ✚ The percentage of teachers who left school when the crisis was at its most violent is the highest among teachers who come from a cercle other than the one in which the school is located.
- ✚ 40% of teachers in the schools visited have a teaching diploma issued by the IFM. This percentage varies from 14% in Menaka to 47% in Bourem.
- ✚ While the majority of academic advisors have been trained on psycho-social support, more than half of teachers met expressed the need to have training on such support. but.
- ✚ Teachers requested training in teaching, in peacebuilding, bilingual curriculum and in teaching practices for large groups and heterogeneous groups.
- ✚ Infrastructure was damaged at 19 schools out of the 37 schools surveyed in October 2015. In six of these schools, some rehabilitation was possible but all six are still in need of reconstruction. However, renovation was necessary in all 6 of these schools.

- ✚ All schools require renovation, whether related to the conflict or not.
- ✚ Teachers' number one expressed need is "equipment", followed by the need for "construction of new classrooms and/or annexes" (management, store) and "rehabilitation" needs.
- ✚ Schools in the Menaka Cercle have fewer toilets than other schools. Only half of the schools surveyed have separate toilets for girls.
- ✚ In the Ansongo and Bourem Cercles, the number of children who were provided with education is higher than in 2010-2011. In Gao, the number of students provided with education struggles to reach pre-crisis levels. In the Menaka Cercle, the number of children provided with education in 2015 has not reached 4/5 of the 2010-2011 level.
- ✚ In four cercles, the percentage of girls among students has returned to the 2010-2011 level.
- ✚ The data from communes do not make it possible to analyze educational needs: in many cases, the data were destroyed; age brackets of children vary between communes and vary between number of school-age children and those that are provided with education; data disaggregated at village level are not available.
- ✚ In sampled communities, half of children from 6 to 14 are out of school. This percentage is similar for girls and boys.
- ✚ There are great disparities between cercles as well as between communes within cercles. In the Menaka Cercle, more than 80% of children do not attend school compared to 31% in the Bourem Cercle.
- ✚ Almost half of children who do not attend school are early leavers. The proportion of out-of-school children among those not provided with education varies from 36% in the Menaka Cercle to 65% in the Gao cercle.
- ✚ There are several languages spoken in all the communities visited. On average, children speak 2.4 languages. In one third of schools, three languages or more are spoken. In only 3 schools do students speak a single language.
- ✚ In two thirds of schools, the common language adopted by the students is Songhai, and Tamasheq in the others. In Agamhor, the common language is Arabic and Inekar, the common language of students is Daoussak.
- ✚ In 79% of these schools, teachers state that some students speak French. In 7 schools (18%), teachers stated that students use French to communicate between themselves (apart from a common national language).
- ✚ 60% of the surveyed teachers explain that their students or the students' families were affected by the conflict, especially in terms of migrations of refugees and loss of goods, but also deaths of parents, armed attacks, traumas, fear, and closing of schools. Eight teachers declared that some of their students had joined armed groups.

✚ 39% of the teachers noticed children in their classes who were traumatized by the conflict. Those who were trained to support children psychosocially did not tend to notice anything more than the fact that students were shocked by the conflict.

✚ The need for didactic materials and supplies is the number one need evoked by the teachers questioned. In the schools visited, the percentage of children having access to a reading handbook adapted to his or her class varied greatly: from 0% in schools in Djebock, Tadjalalt, Tidermene and Tin-Hama, to more than 80% in Konkorom, Kadji and Bentia.

✚ The conflict reduced the ability to monitor schools by educational and local authorities (due to the departure of half of academic advisors and communal agents and the impossibility of entering certain dangerous zones and/or the rejection of the State).

✚ The conflict sometimes had a negative impact on the relations between students (racism, violence). Schools are perceived as a main target for jihadist attacks.

Recommendations

Language

✚ Avoid speaking about a “post-conflict” or “post-crisis” situation because the crisis has not ended.

Selection of locations

✚ Selection of sites should be conducted in workshops on the level of cercles, with officials from the mayor’s office, the CAP personnel, representatives of civil society; school principals, local NGOs. During such workshops, data from clusters, town halls, CAP and partners should be analyzed.

✚ The sites where the accelerated learning programs will be implemented for the 2016 school year should be selected according to the following principles:

- At least one location in each commune
- Priority to the most underprivileged communes in terms of **percentage** of children not provided with education (and not in terms of a **number** of children not provided with education).
- Priority to the most underprivileged locations in terms of infrastructure.
- Only sites where public schools exist and are operational.

✚ Priority sites for which no public school exists are also identified, in preparation for the 2nd cohort of the accelerated learning centers.

Construction and renovation

✚ Explore the possibility of building fences for host schools, renovating teachers’ accommodations or dormitories.

✚ Build a classroom in all the intervention locations which do not already have any center (CED, CAF...) but which have open schools.

✚ Wait 2 or 3 years to build/renovate sites where schools will re-open by such time.

✚ Carry out dialogues with the MEN to project a formal school for cohort 2, build a center where there is no school, in which case this center will become a school.

Social negotiations

✚ In social negotiations, communities must engage themselves in accommodating the project participants, including CAP and town hall agents.

Curricula

✚ Preserve national language in speaking, in order to allow children to speak about their experiences on topics related to the conflict and gender, and allow organizers to identify needs for psychosocial support.

Sustainability and Impact on formal schooling

- ✚ Identify strategies which make it possible to improve quality of formal schools:
- Accelerated learning program classrooms should be constructed within schools' closed spaces.
 - Didactic material from accelerated learning programs must be capable of being used in host schools.
 - Mechanisms of exchange between accelerated learning teachers and teachers of host schools (like the Master Training Communities, the CAM) should be introduced in particular so that teachers are able to use the accelerated learning program materials.
 - "Bridging strategies" should be established for accelerated learning teachers to gain teaching certificates.
 - Remediation courses for students of formal schools should be provided during annual leaves.

Other needs of communities

✚ Carrying out discussions and expressing reflections on the way in which activities related to youth and promotion of peace can satisfy other school needs (e.g. canteens, hygiene, water, safety, etc.)

V.3 CONSEQUENCES OF THE CONFLICT ON SECURITY

3.1. Feeling of insecurity

As previously mentioned, insecurity is the primary concern of populations, in particular, mines, abductions, assassinations, looting, robberies and sexual assaults.

During interviews conducted during the assessment, young people individually answered yes/no to various questions about their sense of security. These data make it possible to compare the sense of security in different places and between sexes, cercles and other variables. Logit models were estimated in order to identify those characteristics of youth which influence their sense of security. The detailed results of the models are gathered in annex 12. Table 22 below summarizes these results.

Table 22. Sense of security of young people

	Women	Men	Total
Do you feel you safe at home?	88%	82%	85%
Do you feel safe when you walk in your village during daytime?	70%	85%	77%
Do you feel safe when you walk in your village at night?	25%	49%	37%
Do you feel safe at your workplace?	54%	68%	64%
Do you feel safe when you travel?	28%	31%	30%

Source: Primary data from the RERA, ERSA, Oct. 2015, Individual Youth Questionnaire

85% of the young people questioned feel safe on their premises. The difference between men and women (out of whom 88% and 82% respectively, feel safe on their premises) is not statistically significant. On the other hand, sense of security varies between cercles, since 62% of young people from the Menaka Cercle feel safe only on their premises, in comparison with 92% of young people from the Bourem Cercle. All other things being equal, a young person from Menaka is four times less likely than a young person from Gao to “feel safe”. Household economic level is also significantly correlated with the sense of security at home.


77% of the young people surveyed feel safe on streets of their villages during the daytime. The difference between men and women (out of whom 85% and 70% respectively, feel safe when they walk in their villages) is very significant statistically. Moreover, the percentage of women walking through their villages during daytime is lower than that of men (93% in comparison with 97%). This difference is partly caused by the fact that women traditionally have fewer activities outside their households. It can also be caused by the sense of insecurity, as women’s sense of insecurity would be higher than 30%. Sense of security in villages during daytime varies significantly between cercles, since only 63% of young people in the Menaka Cercle feel safe when they walk in their villages, in comparison with 83% of young people of the Gao and Bourem Cercles. Young people who have an economic activity feel less safe than others while walking in their villages during the daytime.

37% of the young people surveyed feel safe on streets of their villages at night. The difference between men and women (out of whom 49% and 25% respectively, feel safe when they walk in their villages) is very significant statistically. Moreover, the percentage of women walking in their villages at night is lower than that of men (36% in comparison with 68%), which can be partly assumed by the sense of insecurity itself. Sense of security in villages at night varies significantly between cercles, since only 43% of young people in the Menaka Cercle feel safe when they walk in their villages, in comparison with 71% of young people of the Gao Cercle. Young people who completed secondary or higher education feel significantly less safe than others while walking at night in their villages.

Of those youth who are employed, 64% feel safe in their workplaces. The difference between men and women (out of whom 68% and 54% respectively, feel safe in their workplaces) is statistically significant, controlling for other variables. Sense of security in workplace varies between cercles, since only 35% of young people in the Menaka Cercle feel safe when they walk in their villages, in comparison with 73% of young people of the Gao and Ansongo cercles.


30% of the young people surveyed feel safe when they travel. The difference between men and women (out of whom 31% and 28% respectively, feel safe when they travel) is not significant statistically. Sense of security while traveling varies between cercles. Here, young people from Gao feel less safe: only 20% feel safe while traveling, in comparison with 42% of young people from Ansongo. As measured by the questions posed by the survey, youth in Menaka appear to have the weakest sense of security overall (see Figure 6 below).

Figure 6. Sense of security of young people according to their cercle



Source: Primary data from the RERA, ERSA, Oct. 2015, Individual Youth Questionnaire


Figure 7. Sense of security of young people according to their sex



Source: Primary data from the RERA, ERSA, Oct. 2015, Individual Youth Questionnaire

Prospects on improvement of safety indicate the populations' relative optimism since approximately four out of five young people interviewed believed that the situation will improve next year. Women were more pessimistic and less likely to believe that insecurity will decrease next year.

Figure 8. Evolution of security according to young people, by cercle




Source: Primary data from the RERA, ERSA, Oct. 2015, Individual Youth Questionnaire

3.2. What are the risks?

According to community leaders and women, the greatest risk that communities face is robbery, armed thefts/attacks, followed by theft in general. In a quarter of discussion groups, women and leaders explained the health risks to which they are exposed, including diseases and lack of clean water. In a quarter of discussions, but especially in discussions with women, rape was mentioned as the main risk. Risks related to childbirth and insufficient healthcare during and after pregnancy because of impossible access to medical care were also mentioned. Risk of mines and other explosive machines was also present, as it was expressed in a quarter of the discussions.

Figure 9. Risks incurred by populations according to populations themselves.



Source: Primary data from the RERA, ERSA, Oct. 2015, Individual Youth Questionnaire

In contrast to community leaders, youth who were interviewed felt that the main risk they faced – for both men and women -- was that of “unemployment”. However, women who were interviewed saw the risk of sexual assault as a slightly higher risk for women than unemployment at 69% versus 65% for unemployment.

Only 48% of young men reported rape as the main risk for young women. In the same way, whereas 37% of young women reported that the “risk of abduction” is one of main risks for young women from villages, only 19% of young men considered it an important risk. As for risks incurred by young men, the same variation is visible for the “risk of abduction”. This risk was mentioned by 36% of women, in comparison with 17% of men.

Table 23. Risks incurred by young men and young women, according to young people themselves

	Principal risks for young men from villages.			Principal risks for young women from villages.		
	According to women	According to men	Altogether	According to women	According to men	Altogether
Unemployment	75%	80%	78%	65%	66%	65%
Disease	56%	56%	56%	61%	59%	60%
Physical aggression/Rapes	36%	27%	31%	69%	48%	58%
Theft	37%	31%	34%	29%	22%	25%
Motor bike/bicycle/car accident	39%	37%	38%	21%	16%	18%
Abduction	36%	17%	26%	37%	19%	28%
Looting	24%	27%	25%	16%	14%	15%
Enrollment in armed groups	30%	29%	30%	10%	9%	9%
Accidents at work	13%	15%	14%	11%	12%	12%
Marriage or early pregnancy	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	3.1%	2.6%	2.8%
Murder/Attempted murder	0.9%	0.0%	0.4%	0.4%	0.0%	0.2%
Starvation	0.0%	0.4%	0.2%	0.4%	0.4%	0.4%
Drugs	0.4%	0.0%	0.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%

Source: Primary data from the RERA, ERSA, Oct. 2015, Individual Youth Questionnaire

The importance attached to risks varies by cercle. Generally, young people from the Bourem Cercle mention more principal risks than their counterparts in other circles: 95% of young people from the Bourem Cercle mention “unemployment” as the main risk for young men from villages, whereas only 66% of young people from the Menaka Cercle mentioned it. The variation is even greater for risks incurred by young women: 49% of young people of Menaka mention the risk of “unemployment” in comparison with 91% of young people from the Bourem Cercle.

Table 24. Risks incurred by young men and young women, according to young people themselves, by cercle.

	Principal risks for young men from villages.				Principal risks for young women from villages.			
	Ansongo	Bourem	Gao	Menaka	Ansongo	Bourem	Gao	Menaka
Unemployment	68%	95%	81%	66%	58%	91%	64%	49%
Disease	43%	69%	66%	48%	46%	75%	67%	54%
Physical aggression/Rapes	18%	65%	25%	24%	46%	82%	52%	61%
Theft	22%	48%	32%	39%	19%	28%	27%	29%
Road accidents	42%	39%	41%	23%	18%	29%	16%	9%
Abduction	34%	42%	11%	19%	41%	44%	10%	15%
Looting	25%	32%	22%	24%	17%	19%	9%	19%
Enrollment by armed groups	27%	54%	16%	29%	9%	22%	1%	8%
Accidents at work	15%	15%	14%	10%	13%	20%	7%	8%
Marriage/early pregnancy	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	9%	1%	1%
Murder/Attempted murder	1%	0%	0%	0%	1%	0%	0%	0%
Starvation	0%	0%	1%	0%	1%	0%	1%	0%

Drugs	0%	0%	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
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Source: Primary data from the RERA, ERSA, Oct. 2015, Individual Youth Questionnaire

According to the young people interviewed, the main groups creating this insecurity are bandits, followed by Islamists and jihadists¹², then the MNLA. Men and women indicated the same groups in the same order. However, young women accused Islamists and jihadists more frequently than young men did (see section about causes of the conflict). Details on groups creating insecurity according to young people are gathered in appendix 13.

3.3. How do populations face these risks?

To face insecurity, populations modify their behaviors and initiate certain mechanisms to protect themselves. However, in the majority of their answers, the populations expressed their helplessness when it comes to protection, relying on the return of the army, and protection by separatist groups or God.

Half of the young people interviewed changed their habits because of security risks, from 31% in the Ansongo cercle to 75% in the Menaka Cercle. Women changed their habits more frequently than men, except for the Menaka Cercle, where 68% of young women and 84% of young men respectively changed their behavior.

"I was obliged to marry a man because of fear of a jihadist who wanted to marry me at all costs."
Young woman, Ouani

Table 25. Percentage of young people who changed their behavior or habits because of insecurity

	Ansongo	Bourem	Gao	Menaka	Altogether
Women	34%	75%	66%	68%	59%
Men	29%	60%	28%	84%	46%
Altogether	31%	67%	48%	75%	52%

Source: Primary data from the RERA, ERSA, Oct. 2015, Individual Youth Questionnaire

The first adaptation made is the limitation of their mobility, in and outside villages. This limitation has had an impact on the economic activities of 11% of the young people surveyed (e.g. ceasing their trade, limiting their pasture areas). Young women changed their dress habits, as did young men, to a lesser extent. Some young people said they do not dare to shave their beards. One in 10 young people surveyed says that he or she ceased to participate in sporting activities, having fun, leisure activities, going out to dance, and getting married.

Some young people explained that from now on, they are "wary of Tuaregs", or "wary of their neighbors"; a young woman stated that she "does not trust her friends anymore".

Table 26. Changes of behaviors of young people because of insecurity

	Women	Men	Total
Limited mobility	30%	52%	39%
Changes in dress habits (hijab, short trousers)	16%	7%	12%
Ceased or limited economic activities	6%	18%	11%
Ceased leisure activities	14%	5%	10%
Limited mobility at night	7%	12%	9%

¹² AQIM, MUJWA, ANCARDINE, JIHADISTS, TERRORISTS, radical Islamists

	Women	Men	Total
Increased vigilance	11%	6%	9%
Ceased smoking	4%	3%	4%
Mistrust towards ethnic group, neighbors	6%	1%	4%
Ceased or limited domestic activities (water, heating wood)	6%	3%	4%
Kept their long beards	1%	3%	2%

Source: Primary data from the RERA, ERSA, Oct. 2015, Individual Youth Questionnaire

Individual changes of behavior were more easily implemented than mechanisms for communal or school protection, which were put in place in only a few cases. Women and community leaders interviewed spoke

“Yes, we created car defense brigades which today are beyond our control”. Community leaders, Ouattagouna

about patrols, armament of young people and creation of self-defense groups as mechanisms of community protection. These mechanisms are, however, likely to increase insecurity, as noted by leaders from Ouattagouna, who noted that such civilian defense groups are hard to control. Certain communities rely on God

through prayers and readings of the Koran.

3.4. Risks at school and on the way to school

Teachers’ sense of security at school varies according to cercles: from 43% of teachers from the Menaka Cercle to 91% of teachers of the Ansongo cercle who feel safe at school (68% in Bourem and 60% in Gao). Two thirds of the teachers changed their behavior because of the conflict. Above all, they stated that they have modified timetables, to have continuous schedules and to finish earlier. One teacher sleeps in the main town of a commune and more in a village.

Some teachers adapted their dress habits, as was mentioned above by young women. One teacher related that, before the conflict, he used to patronize businesses from all ethnic groups but that now he is more careful. Lastly, regarding classroom activities, one teacher explained that he is less rigorous, orders fewer punishments (without it being known if it is to spare students or because of fear of reprisals). Another teacher explained that he “avoids stigmatizing some students because of their social and cultural affiliation”.

The same percentage of teachers estimated that female and male students are safe at school. In fact, all the teachers interviewed gave almost the same answers with respect to girls’, boys’ and their own safety. Among the risks that children face at school, the main risk is the “health risk related to lack of hygiene”, followed by risk related to “poor infrastructure” (including absence of fences), “thefts”, “rackets” and “attacks on school”. Risk of sexual abuse is the least frequently mentioned risk at present, which is explained by the fact that teachers (wrongly or rightly) believed that female and male students are equally safe.

Teachers from Ansongo are the most confident in this sense of safety, with 91% of them thinking students are safe at school. By contrast, those from Menaka are the least confident, with only 43% of them thinking

that students are safe at school. This tracks with youths' own sense of safety in Menaka, as youth from this cercle felt the least safe.

In more than half of discussions held with communities, respondents estimated that children are safe at school. When it came to security measures, they spoke about the "presence of the army", "vigilance of community and teachers" or the "fencing of schools".

For other groups, those who estimated that children are not safe at school, one of the main risks were attacks by armed groups, in particular by jihadists who reject traditional teaching. In Inchinanane and Bara, communities mention the case of high-school girls from Chibock being abducted by Boko Haram. Other risks were related to the absence of fences, absence of police forces, ceilings which might collapse or food insecurity. Communities of the Menaka Cercle are the least confident ones, as is the case with teachers.

Table 27. Risks incurred by children at school, according to the teachers interviewed

	Ansongo	Bourem	Gao	Menaka
Are your girl students safe at school?	91%	63%	60%	43%
Are your boy students safe at school?	91%	63%	60%	43%
Risks incurred by students				
Health risks related to lack of hygiene	77%	79%	75%	71%
Poor infrastructure	50%	79%	85%	71%
Racketing/theft	18%	37%	20%	57%
Attacks on school	18%	37%	20%	67%
Recruitment of students by armed groups	23%	21%	20%	67%
Sexual abuse	9%	17%	20%	14%

Source: Primary data from the RERA, ERSA, Oct. 2015, Teacher questionnaire

According to teachers and communities, students are more vulnerable on their way to school than at school itself. In the Bourem and Gao cercles, teachers sometimes gave different answers for girls and boys. In the Gao cercle, 35% of the teachers interviewed believed that girls are safe at school, compared with 40% for boys. On the other hand, in the Bourem Cercle, 63% of teachers believed that girls are safe on the way to school compared with 53% for boys. The main risk is that of road accidents, which may occur when children must walk along a road or cross one. Mines and other explosive objects are next the greatest danger, followed by forced recruitments and sexual abuse.

Table 28. Risks incurred by children on their way to school, according to the teachers interviewed

	Ansongo	Bourem	Gao	Menaka
Are your girl students safe on their way to school?	73%	63%	35%	29%
Are your boy students safe on their way to school?	73%	53%	40%	29%
Risks incurred by students				
Road accidents	41%	53%	80%	71%
Mines and remnants of explosive objects	36%	47%	50%	57%
Combat engagements near school	18%	26%	45%	57%
Racketing/theft	18%	32%	25%	86%
Forced recruitment	18%	32%	25%	71%
Sexual abuse	18%	21%	35%	57%

Source: Primary data from the RERA, ERSA, Oct. 2015, Teacher questionnaire

The communities estimating that their children are safe on their way to school spoke about the presence of the army and accompanying parents as protective measures.

In view of these risks, 14 schools undertook actions to improve security at school, according to teachers from six schools who mentioned such measures. In addition, two schools undertook sensitizing activities, without details,

another issued preventive posters warning against remnants of explosive devices. In one school, access of all foreigners is prohibited during teaching hours. Another school chose not to hoist the flag of Mali and another school organized simulations to train children in the event of an attack on the school.

"It is the fear. Each time a motor bike or a vehicle moves towards the village, we leave to make sure that they are not jihadists." Teacher of Tarkint, Bourem

The consequences of the conflict on safety - summary

- ✚ 85% of the young people surveyed feel safe at home; 77% feel safe in their villages during daytime and 37% of the young people surveyed feel safe in their villages at night.
- ✚ Sense of security while traveling varies between cercles. All other things being equal, a young person from Menaka is four times less likely than a young person from Gao to feel safe at home. Controlling for other variables, young people from Menaka are those who feel the least safe.
- ✚ Only 29% of women feel safe walking in their villages at night, compared to 49% of men. Prospects for the improvement of safety indicate the populations' relative optimism since approximately four out of five young people believed that the situation will improve next year.
- ✚ Overall, the principal risk incurred by young men and young women is unemployment, according to the young people interviewed.
- ✚ 69% of young women reported that the main risk for young women is physical aggression and/or rape. Only 48% of young men reported rape as the main risk for young women.
- ✚ The importance allocated to different risks varied according to cercle.
- ✚ On average, half of the young people interviewed changed their habits because of security risks, ranging from 31% in the Ansongo cercle to 75% in the Menaka Cercle. Women have changed their habits more often than men.
- ✚ Changes of behavior included limiting mobility, both in and outside villages, cessation or reduction of economic activities, wearing hijabs and refraining from leisure activities.
- ✚ Communities claim to have set up patrols, and self-defense groups (including arming of youth) as mechanisms of protection of villages.
- ✚ The main risk faced by children at school is the health risk related to lack of hygiene, followed by the risk related to poor infrastructure (including absence of fences), thefts, rackets and attacks on school. The risk of sexual abuse is the risk the least often considered as present.

✚ In more than half of discussions held with community leaders, respondents estimated that children are safe at school due to the presence of the army, vigilance of communities and teachers as well as fencing around schools.

✚ , By contrast, women, youth groups and teachers interviewed felt that children were not safe at school, with the main risk being that of attacks by armed groups, in particular by jihadists (two groups referred to the abduction of high-school girls from Chibok by Boko Haram). They also spoke about the absence of fences, absence of police forces, as well as ceilings which might collapse or food insecurity.

✚ According to teachers and communities, students are more vulnerable to insecurity on their way to school than at school itself.

✚ The principal risks to students on their way to school are road accidents (when children walk along a road or cross one); followed by mines and other explosive objects; and forced recruitments and sexual assault of girls.

✚ The communities that estimated that their children are safe on their way to school spoke about the presence of the army and accompanying parents as protective measures.

✚ Only some schools initiated actions to improve safety, sensitizing actions and safety procedures (e.g. limitation of access to school and simulation of attacks).

Recommendations

Analyze risks on the level of school, education and training centers

✚ Conduct a participative analysis of the risks incurred at schools by students and teaching staff, together with the CGS, students and their parents.

- Who is at what risk?
- For which risks can the school community do something? How?
- Which solutions also involve risks or limitations?
- What to do with risks which cannot be reduced? (support for victims afterward)

This analysis might lead to a security “action plan” at the school level.

✚ Find notable cases of self-defense militias or armed community members aimed at protecting it that led to the harm of community itself.

Other

✚ Explore the possibility of building fences surrounding schools and rooms for accelerated learning programs.

✚ Share with young people the sense of insecurity of other youths (other ethnic groups, other cercles).

✚ For each accelerated learning center, institute a school safety index to evaluate and monitor school safety. This should include a disaster management plan managed by a disaster management committee comprised of members of the School Management Committee and community leaders.

SECTION VI. THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND DEMOGRAPHIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE CONFLICT

VI.1 Effects on employment

The conflict had a strong economic impact, as noted by the communities interviewed, whose members spoke about food insecurity, poverty, and unemployment, both as causes but also as consequences of the conflict. In particular, the departure of NGOs, closure of public administration offices as well as that of the Manganese factory of Tassiga were mentioned. As mentioned, the main problem facing young people, according to the youth themselves, is unemployment.

Before the conflict, 41% of young people on average were involved in some type of economic activity, with the highest rates of involvement in such activities among those in Menaka and Ansongo. This fell to 27% at the time of the survey in October 2015, with half of those who lost their activities attributing it directly to the conflict. A larger proportion of women lost their activity due to the conflict itself, at 54% of all women who ceased activity, compared to 48% for men.

Some young people who lost their employment because of the conflict undertook economic activity again after. Furthermore, about 8% of young people who were not employed before the conflict began to work with the start of the conflict. But in most of these cases, it is because the conflict forced them to give up their studies that they started to work.

Table 29. Impact of the conflict on employment of young people

	Ansongo	Bourem	Gao	Menaka	Total
Percentage of young people involved in economic activity before the conflict					
Men	64%	38%	48%	69%	54%
Women	42%	15%	23%	27%	28%
Altogether	53%	27%	36%	48%	41%
Percentage of young people who are involved in economic activity now					
Men	46%	31%	32%	38%	37%
Women	29%	10%	10%	10%	16%
Altogether	37%	21%	21%	24%	27%
Percentage of young people who had an activity before the conflict but lost it because of the conflict					
Men	27%	65%	44%	78%	48%
Women	48%	57%	69%	45%	54%
Altogether	35%	63%	52%	68%	50%

Source: Primary data from the RERA, ERSA, Oct. 2015, Individual Youth Questionnaire

As mentioned, only 6 out of 23 communes could provide a number of young people in their commune. Age brackets of young people are very variable, from 15 to 24 years in Anderamboukane, Inekar and Taboye; from 15 to 45 years in Anchawadi and Gao. Among these 6 communes, 5 provided a number of young unemployed people and 2 provided a number of unemployed for the same age bracket as for the total number of young people. Data about unemployed people from mayor's offices are not easily usable.

Data collected in October 2015 make it possible to compare communes in terms of youth unemployment. Unemployment is the highest in the Gao cercle, as it more urbanized. In rural areas, few young people are unemployed since they work in agriculture or help their families with livestock breeding.

Table 30. Estimate of unemployment rate among the young people surveyed

Cercle/Commune	Men	Wome	Total
Ansongo	33%	100%	69%
Bara	33%	45%	40%
Bourra	67%	57%	63%
Ouattagouna	80%	75%	78%
Talataye	20%	70%	45%
Tessit	50%	67%	60%
Tin Hama	45%	67%	55%
Ansongo	48%	67%	57%
Bamba	46%	83%	58%
Bourem	70%	100%	83%
Taboye	75%	100%	89%
Tarkint	89%	80%	84%
Temera	50%	82%	71%
Bourem	65%	89%	77%

Cercle/Commune	Men	Wom	Total
Achawadj	73%	100%	85%
Gabero	40%	70%	55%
Gao	80%	75%	78%
Gounzoureye	70%	86%	76%
N'tillit	90%	89%	89%
Sonni Ali Ber	20%	100%	60%
Tilemsi	100%	100%	100%
Gao	68%	89%	78%
Anderamboukane	60%	100%	80%
Inekar	30%	90%	60%
Menaka	89%	82%	85%
Tidermene	70%	90%	80%
Menaka	62%	90%	76%

Source: Primary data from the RERA, ERSA, Oct. 2015, Individual Youth Questionnaire

Large factories, companies or farms, as well as NGOs offering employment opportunities or training courses for young people were rare before the conflict and even rarer now. In fact, only 5 surveyed local communities could mention employment opportunities. In Ansongo, officials from the mayor's office announced the presence of NGOs IEDA Relief, ENDA, Mercy Corps and PAT Mali (which ended in 2015), as well as a branch of the APEJ and an educational center in agriculture, market gardening and wood carpentry, which is not operational. In Bourem, the presence of Sini Sanouma, a local NGO, was indicated, which is active in the field of sewing in Bourem Foghas. In Menaka, commune agents indicated the presence of the Doctors of the World (MdM) and the IRC, as well as employment opportunities and training courses in automotive garages, sewing workshops, as well as in the fields of masonry and handicraft. In Tessit, 7 NGOs were mentioned: AAG, FAABA, MSF, NRC, WFP, Première urgence, Tassaght. Other communes could not speak about employment opportunities for young people.

Opportunities for vocational training are also reduced and a few vocational training centers which existed before the conflict are now rarely operational (only in the town of Gao). In Ansongo, the mayor's office indicated 5 vocational training centers (in Bazi Haoussa, Monzonga, Seïna Bellah, Fraction Oulad Bahli and Fraction Oulad Moulouk), but none are operational. The Tessit mayor's office m spoke of 7 vocational training centers in various fields, but none are operational. In Gao, 9 vocational training centers are operational:

- the Training Center for Women (CAF) in Bourem Foghas, which provides training in cloth-dyeing, soap-making and agro-alimentary transformation for women.
- the CFPAS which provides training in agriculture, livestock breeding and agro-forestry (Château).
- the CFTP which trains in woodwork (Château)
- the training centers in sewing in Château, Sanèye and Sosso - koirra
- the training center in Automotive Mechanics Oumar Koné (Château)

- the training center in Automotive Mechanics of Ibrahim M. Touré (Saneye).

In Bamba, 5 CEDs are operational, providing only literacy courses. In Temera, 3 CEDs are operational.

"The conflict had consequences on our economic activities. It was not possible for fishermen to fish, for market-gardeners to work, for tradesmen to open their shops anymore."

Women from Djidara

Communities unanimously spoke about a slowdown in economic activities, even "economic death". As mentioned, personal mobility is limited because of insecurity. Many small trade activities, in particular those of women, were closed because their shops were broken into and looted. Buyers from neighboring countries and communes do not come anymore. In Seyna-Sonrhäi, onion and potato crops rot because customers from Ghana, Niger and Algeria are no longer coming. Just like farmers, livestock breeders are affected by cattle theft and death of livestock. Lastly, communities consider it regrettable that the NGOs left, just like part of their workforce.

VI.2 Demographic consequences

In view of the insecurity and economic situation, populations had no other choice but to leave their villages and cities. Populations of all locations, at the time of the crisis, took refuge in Gao, Sévaré or Bamako, or in Niger, Algeria, Mauritania and Ghana. Also, nearly one third of the young people surveyed left their villages. The percentage of those who left varies from one cercle to another and from one commune to another. Women and leaders from Seyna-Sonrhäi (commune of Ansongo) indicated, however, that no member of their village left because of the crisis. In Tabango (commune of Bara), women indicated that except for teachers, nobody left their village. On the contrary, the villages Chock Aouker, Anderamboukane, Inchinanane and Tinfadimata, were emptied because of the crisis. The proportion of young people surveyed who left their villages (and returned as they were present at the time of the survey), also varies but on average represented about 30% of the population surveyed. (see table below).

"During the crisis, our village was completely emptied of its inhabitants." Leaders of Tin Aouker.

Table 31. Percentage of young people surveyed who left their villages because of the crisis

	Men	Women	Total
Ansongo	20%	33%	26%
Bara	22%	18%	20%
Bourra	30%	40%	35%
Ouattagouna	40%	20%	30%
Talataye	30%	70%	50%
Tessit	10%	30%	20%
Tin Hama	55%	67%	60%
Ansongo	30%	39%	35%
Bamba	15%	29%	20%
Bourem	45%	33%	40%
Taboye	20%	30%	25%
Tarkint	11%	36%	25%

	Men	Women	Total
Achawadj	36%	44%	40%
Gabero	20%	20%	20%
Gao	70%	50%	60%
Gounzoureye	40%	50%	45%
N'tillit	20%	60%	40%
Sonni Ali Ber	30%	20%	25%
Tilemsi	10%	40%	25%
Gao	32%	41%	36%
Anderamboukane	50%	40%	45%
INEKAR	0%	10%	5%
Menaka	44%	18%	30%
Tidermene	10%	10%	10%

Temera	33%	27%	30%
Bourem	25%	31%	28%

Menaka	26%	20%	23%
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Source: Primary data from the RERA, ERSA, Oct. 2015, Individual Youth Questionnaire

Most young people took refuge abroad as well as in in Bamako and in the Mopti region. Destinations varied according to circle where youth surveyed live. Thus, young people from Bourem went abroad relatively less often (29%) than young people from Ansongo (54%), but relatively more often to Bamako (21%) than young people from Ansongo (6%). Displacements within regions occurred not only towards the largest villages or main towns within the cercles but towards villages more towards the interior as well as to other villages in the commune towards bushland or other villages within their commune.


Table 32. Destinations of young people in their migration

Cercle	Urban	Gao	Mopti/Sév	Bamako	Other	Abroad
Ansongo	12.5	2.08	2.08	6.25	6.25	54.17
Bourem	3.57	7.14	17.86	21.43	14.29	28.57
Gao	0	7.84	17.65	19.61	5.88	41.18
Menaka	11.11	16.67	0	0	5.56	61.11
Total	6.21	6.9	10.34	13.1	7.59	45.52

Source: Primary data from the RERA, ERSA, Oct. 2015, Individual Youth Questionnaire

Migrations were massive during the first half of 2012 especially in the first quarter of the year. Returns began a few months later, with intensification during the 1st quarter of 2013, i.e. along with the liberation of cities in the north of Mali from occupation by Islamist groups. Returns have been continuing until today, with a rather constant intensity.

Figure 10. Evolution of migrations and returns of young people to their villages



Source: Primary data from the RERA, ERSA, Oct. 2015, Individual Youth Questionnaire

new or better employment. (See the detailed reasons that could make young people leave their village, appendix 14).

Among young people who left and returned, 55% say they would leave again if attacks intensified. Among young people who did not leave their village at the time of the crisis, the percentage is lower at 34%. In effect, if youth did not leave in 2012, it was because they had less desire to leave their communities or fewer opportunities outside their villages. In fact, 26% of young people who did not leave their villages say that nothing could make them leave, "apart from death", as many of them added. One quarter of young people who did not leave their villages are ready to leave in search of

As mentioned earlier, nearly one third of youth surveyed had left their villages, having returned by the time of the survey. If those who had not returned by the time of the survey are factored in, the proportion of youth who left would surely rise above 30%. To determine the proportion of the population from surveyed communities who have still not returned, youth were asked to count members of their families

“ They did not leave the village because of the crisis but because of the lack of water. They left to look for places where they could find water. None of them returned because the same problem is always there.” Women from Tabankort, Menaka

who had left and those who had returned. Thus, the number of family members who left per young person interviewed varies from 1.9 in the Ansongo cercle to 5.4 in the Menaka Cercle. Despite having the highest number of family members who have left, Menaka also had the lowest percentage of youth who migrated during the crisis, a seeming contradiction explained by the fact the Menaka has one of the smallest percentages of family members who have not returned (at 72%). Since more

family members and youth were unavailable at the time of the survey, Menaka has registered a smaller proportion of those who left.

Table 33. Estimated percentage of refugees who have returned

	# average number of family members who left	% of members who returned		# average number of family members who left	% of members who returned
Ansongo	2.1	51%	Achawadj	4.2	89%
Bara	2.0	81%	Gabero	1.6	68%
Bourra	1.7	77%	Gao	5.0	78%
Ouattagouna	1.6	45%	Gounzoureye	3.2	69%
Talataye	2.2	75%	N'tillit	3.5	78%
Tessit	0.8	85%	Sonni Ali Ber	1.6	79%
Tin Hama	3.1	89%	Tilemsi	1.2	100%
Ansongo	1.9	71%	Gao	2.9	77%
Bamba	2.2	35%	Anderamboukane	8.2	78%
Bourem	2.4	87%	INEKAR	2.3	23%
Taboye	3.9	96%	Menaka	8.2	83%
Tarkint	2.2	88%	Tidermene	3.2	63%
Temera	2.6	82%	Menaka	5.4	72%
Bourem	2.6	79%			

Source: Primary data from the RERA, ERSA, Oct. 2015, Individual Youth Questionnaire

Regardless of the cercle, a reduction in attacks and violence, reinforcement of the presence of the Malian army, employment and peace were all cited as factors that could effect a return of refugee populations from abroad, especially to Menaka and Ansongo. In these two circles, independence of the northern regions was also mentioned as a possible contributing factor for returns. (See details reasons for return, appendix 15)

In Tarkint, women said that “the majority returned to the village to start their lives all over again,” while in Talataye, women stated that those who had left returned to take up arms along with brothers who had

stayed.

In Tassiga, women worry that villagers who left will not return. “Some of them returned. The majority will not return. We want them to return.” It is the same in Ahel Badi, where the community leaders said that some returned, but that others will never return.

In Tabankort and Ikadewane, communities stated that the populations had left their villages, but due to lack of water and not because of the conflict. In Tabankort, women explained that they did not return because of a permanent lack of water. Also in Tinfadimata, the question of water was crucial for the return of populations.

“The village is uninhabited. Because of thirst, few villagers returned.” Women of Tinfadimata, Menaka

Some 250,000 Malians fled the country during the two first quarters of 2012, mainly for Niger, Burkina Faso and Mauritania. The majority of refugees in Mauritania come from the Timbuktu region. The populations of Gao migrated mainly to Niger and Burkina Faso.

The return of the population of Timbuktu from Mauritania was more sizable than that of the population of Gao. Thus, in November 2015, there were still 34,322 Malian refugees in Burkina Faso, 50,000 in Niger and 50,000 in Mauritania. The latest information on repatriation trends published by the HCR is not encouraging. In effect, the number of Malian refugees in Burkina has actually increased slightly since the beginning of 2015, as has the number in Niger (see the text box to the right for more details). These populations come mainly from Ansongo and Menaka and comprise primarily Tuaregs but also Songhai, Fula, Hausa, and Arabs. Tuareg refugees, in particular, tend to have fewer economic resources – including cattle -- to be able to face the crisis.

Increase in the number of Malian refugees in Niger

At the beginning of the year 2015, there were 47,449 recorded Malian refugees in Niger, out of whom approximately 5,000 were refugees living in the urban environment in Ayorou and Niamey, the capital. The rest of refugee population lives in five camps in the Tillabéri and Tahoua regions. However, the number of arrivals started to increase during recent months, with a peak in October and at the beginning of November, when approximately 4,000 Malian refugees crossed the border with Niger, coming from scarcely-populated areas in the east of Mali. After these migrations at the beginning of November, the total number of recorded refugees rose to a record level of 54,000. In addition, 3,000 people still wait to be recorded.

This increase in migration is an alarming and unexpected development, which puts our operation in Niger to a hard test.

The people who made it to Niger give, as a reason for their flight into exile: anarchy, extortion, food shortages, inter-tribal rivalry, fights between livestock breeders and farmers, power vacuums, absence of a strong government and military presence in the east of Mali.

The majority of newcomers come from rural zones in the Menaka and Ansongo regions. In Inates, where more than 2000 Malians have recently arrived, refugee women said to have fled to escape from combat engagements between the Idourfane and Dawsahak tribes. Their animals had been stolen, their children could not attend public school anymore and infrastructures had been damaged in the absence of national authorities.

Report of the HCR of November 2015

The socio-economic consequences of the conflict - summary

- ✚ The economic situation in the region, already precarious before the crisis, has only deteriorated in the wake of the conflict. Food insecurity, poverty and unemployment are, according to the populations, both the main causes and the major consequences of the conflict.
- ✚ Before the conflict, 41% of young people worked. This rate is higher in Ansongo and Menaka, but this also implies that young people there had less access to education and therefore pursued an economic activity in its place.
- ✚ 50% of young people who were engaged economically before the conflict lost their activities due to the conflict. Women's jobs were hit harder, with 54% of women unemployed who were working before the conflict to 48% of men who had been employed pre-conflict.
- ✚ About 8% of young people who did not work before the conflict started to work with the onset of difficulties, often because the conflict put their studies to an end.
- ✚ Mayors' offices have very little data on youth employment.
- ✚ Unemployment is higher in the Gao Cercle than in other circles, which are more rural, and where young people work in subsistence agriculture or on family farms.
- ✚ Opportunities for employment and vocational training are almost nonexistent, except for NGOs and a few vocational training centers in the city of Gao.
- ✚ One third of the young people surveyed left their villages because of the conflict (the majority during the 1st semester of 2012). 40% of the young people surveyed said they would leave if attacks intensify.
- ✚ The departure and return of young people and their families are linked mainly to the security situation and to job opportunities.
- ✚ In November 2015, UNHCR estimated that there are 139,502 Malian refugees outside the country, including 50,000 in Niger, 50,000 in Mauritania and 34,322 refugees in Burkina Faso.
- ✚ The number of refugees in Niger and Burkina Faso is on the rise, notably because of the exodus of the populations of Menaka and Ansongo, who are fleeing ongoing fighting between the Idoufane and Daoussak tribes.

Recommendations

- ✚ Develop mechanisms for vocational training that are adapted to the quasi-total absence of opportunities at the local level, for example while engaging young people in training courses with local entrepreneurs (such as through internships). In addition, such training should be reinforced with both capacity building in pedagogy and with appropriate training materials in order to meet well-defined training objectives.
- ✚ Seek public-private partnerships to provide micro-enterprise startup kits to youth after the completion of these courses.
- ✚ Diversify employment and training areas that (I) are favorable to youth entrepreneurship or (II) meet communities' primary education needs (e.g. masonry, health, first aid, guards, teaching, support

for teachers, etc.) or (III) allow for the support of youth employment within family agricultural companies facing negative shocks on crops and cattle.

SECTION VII. NEEDS AND EXPECTATIONS OF YOUNG PEOPLE

VII.1 Education and training of young people

On average, more than a third of the youth surveyed have never been to school, reaching a maximum of 49% of youth in Menaka. Very few young people – only 1% – had ever received vocational training. By contrast, 8% of the youth surveyed on average had attained a secondary school or higher education. In almost half the villages or locations visited (22 out of 46), there was at least one young person who had reached secondary school or higher. Such youth with higher education can be important resources for the project. Of the 38 youth who have attained such education, 27 live in main towns within the communes and 11 in other villages.

	Ansongo	Bourem	Gao	Menaka	Total
None	35%	29%	34%	49%	36%
Koranic school	3%	0%	1%	3%	2%
Elementary 1 - 1st to 3rd year	6%	8%	4%	16%	8%
Elementary 1 - 4th to 6th year	20%	32%	16%	21%	22%
Elementary 2	27%	21%	33%	9%	24%
General secondary	6%	7%	6%	3%	6%
Technical secondary	1%	1%	3%	0%	1%
Higher	1%	2%	1%	0%	1%
Not specified	1%	0%	1%	0%	1%

Source: Primary data from the RERA, ERSA, Oct. 2015, Individual Youth Questionnaire

VII.2 Young people's activities and their professional expectations.

The young men and women interviewed often spontaneously said that they “do not do anything”, before speaking about their daily activities. Women mainly spoke of their domestic tasks, but also about being engaged in small trade, doing pastoral work, handicraft activities (e.g. textiles, mat weaving) or livestock rearing. However, in some villages such as


We do nothing else in life but look for water, grind food and prepare meals. We do not even have a school or a place to go.” Young women of Tabankort

Absolutely nothing is done because of the crisis. People leave school and even stop their small trade activities, young women from Bagnadji

Bagnadji and Tabankort, women regretted that they do nothing at all apart from domestic tasks. Regarding their activities, young men spoke mainly about agriculture, trade and livestock rearing, which is consistent with individual data (see details about branches of industry for youth surveyed, by gender

and cercle, appendix 16). More than one quarter of the young people surveyed work in agriculture (including cultivation of cereals and/or market gardening). This proportion varies from 5% in Menaka to 40% in Gao.

Figure 11. Sectors of industry of young workers



Source: Primary data from the RERA, ERSA, Oct. 2015, Individual Youth Questionnaire

In one quarter of the villages, the majority or all young men say that they “do nothing”. For example, a young man from Tassiga is a footballer whereas another from Kounsoum says that he fights in a self-defense group. In Sosso Koïra, some young people work with NGOs. In Inekar, a young woman is a first-aid worker; another is a community relay.

Regarding the question of whether young people like their daily activities, the answers were mainly positive, but the comments that followed seemed to suggest that respondents did not enjoy these activities or see them as a fulfilling means of personal development. In effect, youth surveyed like their work because it enables them to provide (partially) for their needs, because they do not have “anything

else” to do, or because they do not have any choice. Some young people do not like their daily activities at all, such as groups of women from Kousoum and Menaka, who mentioned they did not enjoy domestic work. Some young people did not like their economic activities either, such as the young men from Bossalia who did not like their family agriculture work because they would prefer to be learning at school. In Tessit, a young baker did not like his work because he had completed school and had hoped to find better employment while in Ahel Badi young women say they do not like livestock breeding work at all (“going after animals”), but they have no other choice.

On the contrary, some young people like their work and would like to achieve success doing it. Thus, in Inekar, a young female first-aid worker, likes “her first aid”, another young woman likes her trade activity and would like to become a businesswoman on a large scale; another one likes her catering activity and would like to have a canteen. In Tessit, young men working in market gardening, sewing as well as another young baker like what they do.

A group of women from Tidermene like their manual weaving and cooking activities because it is their culture. In Konkorom, men like their agricultural and fishing work because they can find their ancestry in these activities. Similarly, in Wabaria, young men like their agriculture activity because it is traditional work.

Do you like your work activities? “No, staying at home to do housework is not profitable and does not offer freedom.” Young women from Menaka

VII.3 Expectations and perspectives for young people

In three years' time, young people want to work and study. From the point of view of work, they want to diversify their activities or achieve success in their current activities. In many cases, they want to evolve and move forward in the same sectors as those in which they currently work, such as petty trade, agriculture, handicrafts (mainly sewing, mat weaving), and livestock breeding. While women mostly spoke of the need to learn sewing, knitting, and dyeing, young men want to be trained in agriculture, in particular to modernize their techniques. Aside from developing traditional economic activities, exposure to new areas of study were also mentioned, such as sales and commercial management techniques, automotive mechanics, soap-making, hairdressing, data processing, training in pedagogy for teaching, or learning to drive for transportation jobs.

Leaders and women of the communities wished the same thing for young people, that they would become trained in a trade, stating that vocational training was a priority for youth. According to them, the trades to be chosen are mainly mechanics and welding, agriculture, sewing, woodwork, trading and livestock breeding, but also masonry or dyeing. Interest in the healthcare and teaching sectors was also mentioned often by both young people and communities. Young people must be trained in nursing, in animal health

(to support livestock breeders) and in teaching in order to educate children from the villages. Jobs that were mentioned less frequently, in 3 or 4 villages, included electricity, solar energy, poultry farming, and transport (driving).

Aside from learning a trade, young people also want to study and complete their formal education in order to obtain their ninth-grade diploma (DEF), to learn to read and write, but also to count, or sometimes to handle management tools and to calculate profits. In the majority of cases, young people want to learn French. Many youth interviewed stated that in order to achieve their goals, it was necessary to study and not give up on the school to which they have access. Leaders and women also evoked the need for basic education for youth however, less often than young people themselves. While young people spoke about learning, having diplomas, going to college or traveling, elders spoke more about the basic need to overcome illiteracy.

Some 13 communities mentioned the need for training in handling arms or in military strategy as preparation for joining the army or to protect villages. Other members of communities wanted young people to be trained to live in peace and unity.

“They have to be taught professions instead of each time giving them materials which they will later resell”,
Women from Ansongo

To achieve their professional and education goals, young people would prefer to stay in their villages, near their parents. It is only the lack of employment that could make them emigrate. Often, young people explained that they want to work in their village to support local economic development or to serve their community. One young person wanted to develop his sewing activity in order to be able to open workshops which would give work to other young people.

Those young people who did want to migrate for the purposes of pursuing their studies mentioned Gao, Bamako, Kayes or abroad. Others looked even farther away, such as a group of youth from Inekar who would like to work in Kidal, Bamako, Paris, Saudi Arabia or Brazil! Some young people dreamed of traveling and discovering – even temporarily – other places in Mali or abroad.

In order to reach their professional goals, young people said that they first need financial support to launch or develop their activities, without specifying the source of such funding. In rare cases, they stated that this financing could come from their savings, whether individual or collective.

After financing, the top requirements mentioned for starting an economic activity were education – including vocational training centers – followed by materials such as sewing materials or agricultural equipment.

“We, young unemployed graduates, want to learn teaching techniques to distribute them between classes and schools.” Young men from Tessit

Young people also frequently evoked the return of peace and safety as a condition necessary for the development of their professional projects, as the conflict has had a great impact on the economy and daily life. The unity of young people is also a factor which will make them succeed.

Lastly, young people often spoke about the role of individual qualities for success such as will, courage or reliability. To achieve success in their trade, teaching, agriculture or midwife projects, young women from Menaka, who regretted not gaining either profit or freedom from their domestic activities, need to be “psychologically strong”.

Support from their communities was another factor for success frequently mentioned. For example, young people stated they need a place to carry out vegetable gardening, which would be a contribution of the community. In addition, one group of young women explained that communities sensitized to girls’ education and activity would better allow them to achieve their professional goals. Encouragement and moral support also seemed to play an important role for young people.

The main difficulties which young people said they face in the professional field are lack of funds to start an activity, lack of start-up materials, education, and water as well as insecurity. Women also spoke about early marriages, inequalities between men and women, and lack of support from their parents.

“We want to learn professions like men do, and take part in vocational trainings.”

Young women from Tin Aouker

VII.4 Projects to help young people

Very few communities have profited from projects aimed at helping young people. The main support received by villages are living allowances and school kits for reopened schools. Young people want education and especially employment, as young men from Sossokoira pointed out:

“Yes, there are projects like the PAT-Mali, the Enda Mali, the MINUSMA, the DRC, the NRC, which intervened in the region, in the fields of education and training. The projects are still being carried out and they are going well. Only, our expectations are not satisfied. We need employment.” Young men from Sossokoira

Some projects received a mixed response, e.g. in Kounsoum where some community members did not join a project implemented by the IRC:

“The IRC had programs and activities which were not very appropriate for us, because adults criticized them: playing music, speaking about awkward subjects.” Young women from Kounsoum

However, leaders from Kounsoum explained that the IRC helped children who were out of school, to rejoin the school which was renovated by the NRC and that the IRC financed income-generating activities.

Young people also criticized the way in which recipients are targeted.

“Youth support projects take place here but nothing is seen. There were support projects for the implementation of income-generating activities. We were marginalized.” Young men from Tessit

“Supporting the youth in terms of education has no impact because the targeting of recipients is conducted poorly.” Young men from Ansongo.

“A partner who wants to help young people must first identify representatives of the youth, including the president who holds a receipt, because there are people who respond immediately when one calls the youth whereas in fact, they do not work for the interest of Tessit.” Young men of Tessit

Lastly, young people insisted on the necessity of monitoring and of measures towards creating employment. Young people from Seyna-Sonrhaï spoke about a disappointing experience during which recipients spent all the money provided for launching their income-generating activity.

“This experience was not good as there is no good monitoring here. The impact was insignificant. For example, the money provided for launching an income-generating activity was simply eaten by young people.” Young men from Seyna-Sonrhaï.

This lack of monitoring was also often evoked by women and leaders, such as the women from Inekar who regretted that training is provided without ongoing support and that there are no monitoring activities.

As for starting a youth project, young people in Doro suggested that projects start by asking youth what they want. Similarly, the youth of Ouattagouna suggested that project teams starting by providing training in what youth themselves say they want.

According to those interviewed, communes are not equitably served by development or emergency projects. In Bamba, villagers received support from GREFFA, Save The Children, the Tassaght and the OXFAM. In other places, young people did not receive any support: such as in Menaka, Tarkint (Bourem) and Talataye (Ansongo). One reason cited is the lack of security in certain zones. For example, women from Indelimane considered it regrettable that there no was support in the village, because “people” (from armed groups) do not let aid groups enter the village although the community is truly in need.

VII.5 Community Expectations of Youth

Communities are convinced that young people have a lot to offer as far as community development goes, including teaching, construction of schools, dams, wells, sanitation objects and protecting villages. They often spoke about the present situation, pointing out what young people already do for their communities. In Tassiga, women claimed that “young people here are brave, they do all our pastoral work. When you want a table-bench, a young person brings it for you. They do a lot of other things.” Some communities are more reserved, estimating that as long as young people do not have a job, they cannot help their communities. Young people themselves have confidence in their potential, judging that they have the physical strength, intelligence, courage, engagement in work, and hope to be contributing community members. Lastly, they pointed out their solidarity and mutual assistance in the service of other youth and their community.

“As long as young people do not have employment opportunities, nothing can be done for communities.” Leaders of Emnaguil

Women and leaders say that they can also support young people, by advising them, sensitizing them to various dangers, in particular enrollment in armed groups, and by giving them blessings. Financial support was mentioned by some communities, as well as employment support. To support young people, the leaders of Seyna-Sonrhaï said that they can grant them space to make use of.

Needs and expectations of young people - summary

Expectations of young people and communities concerning young people

- ✚ Young people want to work. Employment is their main concern
- ✚ Employment of youth is the main concern of community leaders as well.
- ✚ The inability to raise funds prevents young people from launching their activities.
- ✚ Young people want to learn to read, write, count, and manage. They prefer to learn French.
- ✚ Enjoying work, making it flourish or develop are long-term concepts and goals of young people. Currently, they do their work because they have no choice and since it enables them to provide for all or part of their needs.
- ✚ The fields of activities in which young people want to work and be trained are:
 - Agriculture, livestock breeding (flock management)
 - Trade
 - Sewing, knitting
 - Mechanics/welding
 - Woodwork
 - Masonry
 - Hairstyling
 - Handicraft (weaving, making mats)
 - Electricity, plumbing
 - Processing and marketing of agricultural products
 - Control, transport
 - Human health
 - Veterinary care
 - Teaching
 - Solar energy

Youth support programs.

- ✚ Programs are concentrated on school and nutrition; there is little support for youth.
- ✚ Programs intended for youth must be focused on employment.
- ✚ Projects do not reach their goals because of absence of monitoring after training. This lack of support is the reason for recipients' misuse of materials (i.e. the resale of kits).
- ✚ The way in which the projects target recipients is criticized by young people.
- ✚ If a project wants to help youth, it must help them find employment.
- ✚ If a project wants to help youth, it should start by asking youth what they want.

Expectations from young people

- ✚ Young people have confidence in their own physical, intellectual, mental (courage, hope, reliability) and moral abilities (solidarity, mutual aid).

✚ Communities also trust that their young people will protect them, serve them and develop their village.

✚ Young people have a role to play in the education of children: they can build schools and teach children.

✚ In many communities, one of the youths' first roles is protecting villages, defending them and in order to fulfill this role, they must learn how to fight, learn how to handle weapons, and enter the army, etc.

Recommendations

✚ Focus must be put on employment.

✚ In social negotiations, the project must be very clear on what it can bring in terms of education and employment, making our "limits" clear and managing expectations from the outset.

✚ The project must also elicit and register the professional aspirations of youth participants and attempt to offer training selections that meet these aspirations.

✚ The teaching and healthcare sectors are to be explored since these are areas of interest and value to young people with respect to training and community utility.

✚ Presence of volunteers in villages and regular visits of NGO agents must make it possible to monitor young people after completing the education cycle, on their way to employment.

✚ At the end of the 1st cohort, ongoing monitoring and support must be provided to program graduates, even if it is in a less frequent.

✚ Project impacts must be measured in terms of employment, support for community needs and expenses, the number of community activities carried out, as well as more subjective aspects of professional development.

✚ Within selected intervention villages, all young people must be registered for the project. The way in which villages were selected must be also explained.

✚ Consultations with communities and young people about their needs, their satisfaction and their concerns must be carried out continuously.

✚ Young people must be trained in saving strategies and community credit in order to be able to launch micro-enterprises.


SECTION VIII. PROSPECTS AND FACTORS OF RESILIENCE

VIII.1 Perspective on evolution of the situation

Populations, in their great majority, think that the situation will improve soon. Optimism is most common among young Arabs (100% of whom believe the situation will improve), followed by young Songhai (88%), Dassouak Tamasheq (65%) and finally Fula (60%). (see graph below).

Figure 12. Prospects on evolution of the situation according to young people

Source: Primary data from the RERA, ERSA, Oct. 2015, Individual Youth Questionnaire



Even if communities think that the situation will improve, in particular because of the signing of peace agreements, some respondents remained pessimistic. Women from Tidermene and some of those from Seina Songhai did not believe the situation will improve. Leaders of Bentia did not have confidence in the return of peace and safety anymore, since arms freely circulate. Leaders of Haoussa Foulane did not see any positive signs of peace on the horizon.

"We have not seen any positive signs of getting closer to peace. Even the free hotline of military authorities is not operational." Community leaders of Haoussa Foulane


VIII.2 Measures that are likely to improve the situation

Positive prospects are related to implementation of peace agreements and the continuation of dialogue. A list of measures was proposed by the young people surveyed. For each of them, it was indicated whether they thought the measure could improve or not. Among youth interviewed, the number one measure for improving the situation was the continuation of the process of reconciliation and dialogue. The 2nd measure was the reinforcement of the government administrative presence, which is the first measure mentioned by young Daoussaks, followed by greater involvement from the international community. Other measures were less frequently considered capable of contributing to peace, and in a less uniform way between the different ethnic groups. Thus, young Daoussaks and Tamasheqs were more inclined mention amnesty for members of various armed groups as an ameliorative measure than were young Arabs, Songhais and especially young Fulas. On the contrary, young Fulas and Songhais were more in favor of arresting and judging members of various armed groups. With respect to the contributory effect of independence of the northern regions we see clear ethnic disparities, with 59% of young Daoussaks believing independence could contribute to peace followed by 51% of young Tamasheqs, in stark contrast to only 16% of young Arabs, 12% of young Songhais and 0 Fulas.

Prospects for young men and young women were not significantly different except that 77% of young women believed that the reinforcement of the FAMA would contribute to improvement of the situation, compared with 87% of young men.

Figure 13. Measures that could contribute to improvement of the situation according to young people

Source: Primary data from the RERA, ERSA, Oct. 2015, Individual Youth Questionnaire



VIII.3 Resilience factors at the local level

At the local level, young people, women and leaders interviewed believed that intercommunity meetings and sensitizing activities can contribute to the return of peace and safety. Thus, women from Forgho Sonrai built a house of peace to share with their Tuareg sisters. Women from Ansongo, coming from all ethnic groups, undertook activities together (meetings) aimed at the return of peace.

According to the young people interviewed, employment can also contribute toward the return of peace, as could the return of the government.

Respondents also mentioned education and schools as factors that could contribute to the return of peace. According to the community leaders interviewed, schools discourage children from taking up arms and wandering and allow for ethnic diversity and interrelation. Women from Sobory pointed out that schools can contribute to peace and safety if they “are up to standards”. Understanding between children can be reflected in the attitudes of adults, as the women of Menaka explained. Some schools that have re-opened have organized sensitizing activities which

“Once schools are opened, we will live in courtesy and peaceful cohabitation as often these are our children who influence us. They show us good manners without words, they are all together”. Women from Menaka

favor children's return to school as well as the promotion of peace. In Ouattagouna, a school theater group was created whose performances tackle taboo subjects from the stage. They also prepared lessons about peace, as conceived by the MEN.

Communities often mentioned the disarmament of both paramilitary and civilian groups as a necessary condition for a return to peace. However, the same communities also expressed the need to be protected by patrols comprised of young people from their villages, even trained in the use of arms for that purpose.

In addition to disarmament, cultural activities and sports were mentioned as promotive of peace. According to community leaders from Tessit, culture and the arts can contribute to peace because they emphasize "ancestral bonds and historical factors of union." They make it possible to forget traumas, according to leaders of Forgho Sonrai and to exchange and mix between various ethnic groups, according to all communities.

Sermons, prayers and blessings are also sources of hope for peace. Thus, religion fosters cohesion and communion. However, religion is usually a factor of cohesion only in the absence of religious diversity for communities often see such diversity of beliefs as a source of conflict. In the case of Kadji, for example, religion has always caused conflict as the village is divided between Wahhabi Islam and followers of a more moderate strain of Islam. Lastly, in many villages, the return of peace means respecting the agreements signed in 2015.

VIII.4 Resilience actors at the local level

Women, young people and community leaders see themselves as the primary actors of local impact. However, in answers to open questions about agents of resilience, women were evoked slightly less frequently than young people and leaders.

Women are aware of the role they have played to support the return of peace. They see themselves as the first to advise men and young people, their mothers and sisters, and for this reason, can work toward pacification. They also believe they can initiate, and have already initiated, activities which bring together women from different ethnic groups. In some villages, women are reserved in their capacity to effect change, such as in Indelimane, where they didn't say anything but only listened to what the men present had to say.

"Yes, we can contribute to return of peace by propagating non-violence, and educating future generations in the culture of peace." Women from Sobory

Young people are also conscious of the role that they can play, through sensitization campaigns, cultural activities and sports. They know that they are "the people of tomorrow" or "the leaders of tomorrow". Young men from Ahel Badi affirmed that if young people accept themselves, their parents will inevitably accept them. By contrast, some young women from Ikadewane think that since young people cause tensions, they cannot make peace return.

"We, young people, when we get together, we mix with each other, have fun together, we can spread peace." Young men from Hâ

NGOs are also mentioned as actors in the return to peace, although they are sometimes criticized elsewhere because of lack of monitoring, their targeting of recipients, and conflicts related to distribution of food. In particular, actions of the PAT-Mali are often mentioned as supporting the return of peace.

Prospects and resilience - summary

- ✚ Populations, in the great majority, think that the situation will improve soon. Optimism is the greatest among young Arabs and young Songhai.
- ✚ The signing of peace accords was seen as a significant step toward stabilization.
- ✚ Aside from continuation of the reconciliation and dialogue process, reinforcement of the government administrative presence and greater involvement of the international community could, according to young people, contribute greatly toward improving the situation.
- ✚ Young Daoussaks and Tamasheqs are inclined to grant amnesty for members of various armed groups, more so than young Arabs, Songhai and Fula, who would like to arrest and judge these members of various armed groups.
- ✚ Independence of the northern regions could improve the situation, according to 51% of young Tamasheq and 59% of Daoussak youths, (compared to 16% of young Arabs, 12% of young Songhais and no Fulas).
- ✚ At the local level, communities are counting on inter-community meetings, sensitization activities, employment and the return of the government to bring back peace and safety.
- ✚ Women, young people and community leaders see themselves as the primary actors of local resilience, even if women are mentioned slightly less frequently.
- ✚ NGOs are regarded as actors for the return of peace, although they are sometimes criticized in discussions. In particular, actions of the PAT-Mali are often mentioned as working in support of peace.

Recommendations

- ✚ Work with the PAT-Mali team to better understand their actions for the promotion of normality and peace and their principles of implementation.
- ✚ Help young people in conceiving and organizing community activities for the promotion of peace.
- ✚ Use artistic activities such as theater to enable children and youth to express themselves on difficult or taboo topics.

SECTION IX. ANSWERS FOR EDUCATION, TRAINING AND EMPLOYMENT

The education projects in progress in the Gao region are mainly:

- trainings on the psychosocial care of students.
- return-to-school initiatives
- construction and rehabilitation of schools (e.g. ACTED)
- distribution of school kits. They are frequent, meeting the need for materials and supplies expressed by the teachers and allow for interaction with ERSA.

The psycho-social trainings and return-to-school initiatives are related to ERSA, which can learn from the experiment.

IX.1 Trainings on psychosocial support for students

14 advisers out of 15 were trained on psycho-social care and participated in classes on healing thanks to the support of UNICEF. The training deals in particular with:

- psychosocial support to students and detection of cases of trauma requiring special care,
- management of healing classes,
- children's rights,
- explosive remnants of war (ERW), and
- violence based on gender.

8 trained advisers out of 14 have also trained teachers. A third of the teachers were trained. More than half of the teachers (37 out of 68) expressed the need to be trained on this topic. It was the number one need for training expressed.

IX.2 Return-to-School projects in the Gao Region

There are several return-to-school projects in the Gao Region since the last school year. During the 2014-2015 school year, UNICEF (Education Section) implemented a support program for the integration of out-of-school children in the formal system in the areas of Gao, Timbuktu and Kidal. Between 35 and 37 education centers accelerated the procedure for matters of urgency in the Gao Region. The teaching program is the Accelerated Learning Programme in Matters of Urgency.

In the current 2015-2016 school year, two programs have been carried out in the area. The first, financed by UNICEF (Child Protection Section) and implemented by World Education, SEAD and AEDS, opened 100 centers of Accelerated Learning SSA-P.

UNICEF (Child Protection Section) also financed a return-to-school program implemented by NRC in 43 schools of the area, also based on the SSA-P approach by the Stromme Foundation.

Lastly, UNICEF (Education Section) obtained a financing of 5 million dollars on behalf of USAID for a vast return-to-school program with support to formal schools in the areas of Gao, Mopti, Timbuktu, Kidal and Ségou, which target areas with significant insecurity. In the Gao Region, it is being implemented by Save the Children and IRC for the Menaka Cercle. Save the Children will be responsible for 60 education centers

with Accelerated Learning Programme in Matters of Urgency; IRC will be responsible for approximately 20 centers.

Half of the academic advisors (8 out of 15) already took part in the implementation of centers of Accelerated Learning Programme in Matters of Urgency. In the CAP of Wabaria, no academic advisors have experience in this domain, as the 3 academic advisors of the CAP of Menaka do. All academic advisors stated that they were already involved in the implementation of Accelerated Learning Programmes in Matters of Urgency, being able to control each stage/task related, namely:

- To clearly define the roles of the several players
- To train organizers
- To support organizers
- To work out the transfer test
- To train teachers and CGS to administer this test
- To make decisions based on the test
- To report the operation of Accelerated Learning Programmes in Matters of Urgency

The organizers level is a source of concern for academic advisors. They don't always have the required level and are not sufficiently trained (i.e. they lack continuous training). This results in not having mastered the subjects taught. In addition, the ownership of these organizers is insufficient.

The respect for the learning time is a strong point of the centers with Accelerated Learning Programmes in Matters of Urgency, according to one Ansongo academic advisor. Others regretted the insufficient learning time and proposed refresher courses during the holidays and weekends.

The follow-up by the academic advisors is difficult, with regard to responsibility, workload and sedentary conditions.



In August, the academic advisors were also questioned briefly on the strong points of the Accelerated Learning Programmes in Matters of Urgency. They cited:

- the procurement of birth certificates of children who did not have any
- the level of those children coming from Social Welfare Centers (they acquired more experience than others)
- the favorable reception of the population

They had also made certain recommendations, such as:

- To act in all the communes
- To raise awareness among the populations via convincing methods
- To obtain community adhesion
- To provide food support (canteens)
- To involve the communities and technical services

- To reinforce CGS qualifications

All the advisers who spoke of Accelerated Learning believe that there is a synergy between the several speakers in the field (except for one which did not comment on its answer). The table below summarizes the main return-to-school program implemented in the area since 2014-2015. UNICEF is the most active partner in the area promoting return-to-school, with 3 Accelerated Learning projects; that is to say more than 215 Accelerated Learning centers in 3 years.

Table 34. Main return-to-school programs

Program	Support for integration in the formal out-of-school system for children	Peace building	Fair access to a quality education in the areas of insecurity
Financing	CERF	Peace-building Fund Program	USAID
	\$ 9,665.293	\$ 2,000.000	\$ 5,000.000
Areas	Gao, Timbuktu, Kidal	Gao and Timbuktu	Gao, Timbuktu, Kidal, Ségou, Mopti
NGO lead	UNICEF (Education)	UNICEF (Child prot.) World Education	UNICEF (Education)
NGO as an implementation modality	NRC	SEAD, AEDS	Save the Children IRC (Menaka) CRADE, Tassaght, GARDL
School year	14-15	15-16	16-17
# of centers	35-37	100	80
Curriculum	PAASU	Stromme	PAASU
Other activities	Teacher training on the culture of peace and activities to promote peace	Promotion of social cohesion and culture of peace	Support to formal schools (like EIR by EDC)

Source: Académie d'Enseignement de Gao

The local communities were not able to provide a list of the centers of Accelerated Learning which they harbor. They generally cited less than half of the academies' data. In the municipality of Bourra, the director of education says that the commune does not harbor Accelerated Learning centers, whereas, according to the CAP data, the commune harbors 10 of them.

Table 35. Social Welfare Accelerated Learning Centers and host schools in the Gao Region

	Total of state primary schools	# of PAASU centers UNICEF 2014-2015	# of SSA-P centers UNICEF 2015-2016
ANSONGO	71	7	22
TIN HAMA	9	0	0
Bara	9	2	0
TESSIT	8	0	0
TALATAYE	3	0	0
ANSONGO	16	5	7
BOURRA	16	0	10
OUATTAGOUNA	10	0	5
Menaka	116	23	10
ALATA	5	1	2
ANDERAMBOUKANE	23	2	5
INEKAR	13	2	1
MENAKA	64	16	2
TIDERMENE	11	2	0
Bourem	75	4	19
TABOYE	14	4	0
BOUREM	20	0	17
Bamba	16	0	0
Tarkint	16	0	2
Temera	9	0	0
Gao	177	5	49
Gounzoureye	22	1	9
Gao	23	4	7
Gabero	21	0	0
N'Tillit	34	0	7
Anchawadi	29	0	7
Sony Ali Ber	28	0	15
Tilemsi	20	0	4
Total	439	39	100

Source: Académie d'Enseignement de Gao

IX.3 Vocational training and economic inclusion initiatives

The CAPs did not mention any vocational training project or initiative. However, certain projects exist, even if they are minorities compared to the projects targeting education. Thus, NGO ACTED supports farming activities. It has notably led an evaluation on livestock losses in collaboration with the FAO. It also supports a group of dyer women in the Menaka Cercle (Swiss Cooperation).

In the commune of Temera, Bourem Cercle, the NGO ADIZOSS, is active in the domain of food safety, training recipients on good farming techniques, and on the consolidation of high-risk dams, providing small farming tools and enhanced paddy rice seeds.

Answers - In short

- ✚ Ongoing education in the Gao Region projects are mainly training on psychosocial support of students; back-to-school projects; construction and rehabilitation of school and the distribution of school kits.
- ✚ Despite the CAP training, the teachers have a great need for training concerning psycho-social care for students.
- ✚ Mali and its partners made the return of the children to school, in the Gao region, a clear priority.
- ✚ During the 2015-2016 school year, 100 SSA-P centers operated in the area within the framework of the peace consolidation project implemented by UNICEF, World Education, SEAD and AEDS.
- ✚ During the most recent school year, between 35 and 37 Accelerated Learning centers operated in the area, within the framework of the reintegration school project implemented by UNICEF.
- ✚ In the next school year, approximately 80 Accelerated Learning centers will open in the area, within the framework of the project to access a quality education in the areas of insecurity, financed by USAID and implemented by UNICEF.
- ✚ The presence of several return-to-school programs requires a synergy in the sites' selection and teaching approaches.
- ✚ Half of the academic advisors have experience in Accelerated Learning strategies.
- ✚ The level of the organizers and the follow-up methods of these organizers are the main challenges of the Accelerated Learning strategies.
- ✚ The local communities are not always able to provide a list of the centers of Accelerated Learning which they harbor. Initiatives and projects for vocational training and economic inclusion.
- ✚ The CAPs do not mention any vocational training project or initiative. However, certain projects exist, while they are minorities compared to the projects targeting education (i.e. the activities of ACTED or ADIZOSS).

Recommendations

- ✚ Include contents on the students' psychosocial responsibility in the training of the organizers and volunteers.
- ✚ Reinforce the capacities of the AEs and CAPs to coordinate and follow Accelerated Learning Programmes (including: integrated data base, exchange context between all involved, targeting principles, teaching differences, etc.).
- ✚ Reinforce the local capacities of NGOs to implement Accelerated Learning Programmes.
- ✚ Reinforce the capacities of local communities to follow Accelerated Learning Programmes (integrated data base, participation on the exchange context between all AEs/CAPs and others involved, targeting principles, teaching differences).
- ✚ Benefit from the experience of academic advisors for a more precise analysis of the challenges, strengths and risks of the Accelerated Learning strategies

SECTION X. MAPPING AND TARGETING

X.1 Project acceptance

The teams welcome was always friendly and this highly-anticipated project was understood by the populations which reject the State and its schools (Indelimane and Talataye, commune of Talataye, Ansongo cercle). The populations of Talataye should again be approached during 2016, to prepare a favorable reception of all the ERSA players, such as the State, in 2017.

X.2 Languages of the children and teaching language in host schools.

French taught in host schools.

The children must be reintegrated in the 4th year. However, in 2010-2011, 20% of state schools officially announced a bilingual curriculum or at least a class of the 1st basic education applies the bilingual curriculum. (Source Base CPS 2010-2011). (In the 4th grade, 5% of elementary schools use a bilingual curriculum). This rate goes from 0%, in 13 communes, to 30% in the commune of Bourra. It is known that the real use of the curriculum is well below what is required. Accelerated learning students will thus be reinstated in French classes.

Table 36. Percentage of state schools whose 4th grade follows the bilingual curriculum

Cercle/Commune	%	Cercle/Commune	%
Ansongo	6%	Anchawadi	0%
Bara	14%	Gabero	6%
Bourra	30%	Gao	8%
Ouattagouna	0%	Gounzoureye	16%
Talataye	0%	N'tillit	0%
Tessit	0%	Sonni Ali Ber	8%
Tin Hama	20%	Tilemsi	0%
Ansongo	11%	Gao	5%
Bamba	13%	Alata	0%
Bourem	0%	Anderamboukane	0%
Taboye	14%	Inekar	0%
Tarkint	0%	Menaka	2%
Temera	0%	Tidermene	0%
Bourem	6%	Menaka	1%

Source: Data base of CPS at MEN, 2010-2011

The rejection, by the communities, of learning in the national language

The communities deplored all schools that do not answer their expectations from the point of view of learning quality and training, and particularly, they reject learning in the national language. Thus, community leaders of Seyna-Sonrhäi (Ansongo Cercle) and of Konkorum (Bourem Cercle) deplored teaching in the Songhai language, as did the women of Ouattagouna. In Seyna-Sonrhäi, Ansongo Cercle, the leaders explained why students and parents are discouraged, "because of the use of Songhai in school

and the abandoning of French," and that the teachers in the curriculum are not trained and have a poor level in order to use the bilingual curriculum. In Ouattagouna, the women mentioned the use of national languages as a reason for parents not sending their children to school. They wished that French would be taught and English introduced in the 6th grade. In Ansongo, a teacher explained that 2nd grade students are not motivated because Songhai is used as a teaching language. The communities reject learning in the national language.

To ensure the adhesion of the community in PARIS and the retention of children, as well as the children's success after their (re)integration in formal school in 4th grade, It is necessary that they quickly develop skills in French, within 9 months.

Fast acquisition of skills in French

The results of the experiment carried out in 10 schools from 2013 to 2014 show that the acquisition of French skills is faster in the traditional schools than in bilingual schools, with an appropriate pedagogy and a regular use of interactive teaching by radio. For example, at the end of the 2nd grade, students in traditional schools read 19 words of a French text against the 13 words of those in bilingual schools.

Table 37. Results of the Balanced Approach experiment carried out in the 10 schools

School Curriculum	Traditional	Curriculum	
Language	L1 = French	L1 = LN	L2 = French
Recognition of graphemes			
1st grade, DEC	9.2	5.5	2,4
1st grade, June	32.6	36.8	25,8
2nd grade, June	43.6	36.8	34.9
Reading of informal words			
1st grade, DEC	0	0.4	0,2
1st grade, June	3.9	9.7	2,7
2nd grade, June	12.7	15.6	10
Reading of invented words			
1st grade, DEC	0	0.4	0,0
1st grade, June	2.7	7.2	2,3
2nd grade, June	9.6	10.6	7.2

School Curriculum	Traditional	Curriculum	
Language	L1 = French	L1 = LN	L2 = French
Reading of a text			
1st grade, DEC 2013	0,0	0,5	0,0
1st grade, June 2014	5,0	11,9	3,7
2nd grade, June	18.7	19.2	13.1
Reading comprehension			
1st grade, DEC 2013	0,0	0,0	0,0
1st grade, June 2014	0,2	1,0	0,1
2nd grade, June	1.4	1.6	0.3

Source: *Experiment on 10 schools Balanced Approach*, EDC, 2014.

The time-frame for the acquisition of skills in French is also a speculation in the grid of the standards adopted by MEN in November 2011, since it is only in the 6th grade that bilingual school students are supposed to reach the same level of French as their counterparts in traditional schools.

Table 38. National standards for reading/writing in Mali

	Traditional	Schools curriculum	
	L1 = French	L1 = LN	L2 = French
1st grade	20	20	N/A
2nd grade	31	31	N/A
3rd grade	45	45	20
4th grade	61	61	41
5th grade	76	76	66
6th grade	91	91	91

Source: Decision no. 4336 of MEN, supporting reading standards in basic teaching classes, November 4th, 2011.

- ⇒ An adapted teaching approach and a regular use of EIR makes it possible to acquire French skills quickly, more quickly than learning with the national language; that envisaged by the national standards established in 2011 by MEN.

Beyond the teaching aspects, in all the localities visited (46 covered 23 communes), several ethnic groups cohabited. On average, children in one school speak 2.4 different languages. In one third of schools, three languages or more are spoken by students. In only 3 schools do students speak a single language. Children adopt one common language to communicate between themselves. In two thirds of these schools, it is Songhai, in one third of the schools visited, it is Tamasheq. Lastly, in Agamhor (Ahel Badi fraction), the common language is Arabic and in Inekar, the common language of students is Daoussak. In 79% of these schools, teachers stated that some students speak French. In 7 schools (18%), teachers said that students use French to communicate between themselves (apart from one common national language). On average, teachers speak 1.7 languages (31 teachers speak only one language, 28 speak 2 languages and 9 speak 3 languages). Seven teachers do not speak the common language of their students and reported conversing with them in French or in another national language.

- ⇒ In the great majority of schools, at least two official languages coexist. In 1 third of schools, at least 3 official languages coexist.

Ethnic tensions are strong, resulting in feelings of mistrust, incomprehension and hate. The sense of injustice (between the north and the south of Mali, between ethnic groups) is very common. The teaching of reading and writing in the national language will require the use of the common language, recruiting, in multi-ethnic communities, several organizers, one for each language. The use of a common language suggests that all cultures will not be developed equally and as such it is not appropriate within a context of strong ethnic tensions.

- ⇒ The common language could create a sense of injustice and reinforce ethnic tensions.

The recruitment of an organizer per language, and the constitution of an Accelerated Learning classroom by language would require the recruitment of Songhai, Tamasheq, Daoussak, Arabic and Fula organizers and to develop all materials in as many languages as possible. It is not possible to develop all materials in 5 languages. By choosing some of them it would be implied that all cultures are not developed equally. In addition, it is not easy to recruit speakers and readers able to transcribe in these languages. Lastly, it

would not be possible to build up inputs and recruit qualified organizers for the Daoussak language, not transcribed officially.

- ⇒ It's not possible to create separate centers for each language from a financial point of view (development of the material) and practical point of view (recruitment of organizers for all languages)

To create centers for all existent languages in the village would end up separating children from several ethnic groups, the opposite of what the ERSA project is trying to accomplish.

- ⇒ To create separate centers is a source of division and prevents co-education and intermixing.

Nevertheless, the national language is necessary so that children can express themselves concerning the conflict and their personal lives.

X.3 Overview of children's educational needs

Children's needs vary greatly both by cercle and within the cercles. The Accelerated Learning Programmes, acting under sedentary constraints and the constraints of practicality of the host schools, do not make it possible to reduce disparities. The following table summarizes key statistics by cercle and area.

The communes in which the percentage of out-of-school children is highest are the communes that are the least-covered by Accelerated Learning Programmes. It is not a question of a poor targeting by the Accelerated Learning Programmes. The pressures of formal learning represent so many obstacles to an Accelerated Learning Programme. Mainly, the communes with many out-of-school children are also the communes with greater insecurity, insecurity which limits the establishment of centers. The communes with fewer centers are also those with the lowest population density: Talataye, Tessit and Tin-Hamma in the Ansongo cercle, Tarkint and Temera in the Bourem Cercle, Anchawadi, N'Tillit and Tilemsi in Gao cercle; Menaka and Tidermene in the Menaka Cercle. From an effectiveness point of view (cost per child), it is preferable to establish centers in places with high population density.

Table 39. Summary of primary education needs for each commune

Cercle/Commune	Total of state primary schools ¹	Population 2009 ²	Density of the population ²	# of inhabitants per school ^{2,3}	Infrastructures ³				Reopening of state schools ¹		PAASU 2014-2015 ⁴	SSA-P centers 2015-2016 ⁴	Ratio of SSA-P centers per open school ^{1,4}	% of out-of-school children ⁵
					% of state schools with toilets	% of schools with access to water	% of schools with a fence	% of schools with a health	# of schools	% of open schools				
ANSONGO Cercle	71	131,953	4.3	2,444	67%	63%	30%	35%	67	94%	7	22	0.43	43%
ANSONGO	16	30,091	56.9	1,770	76%	65%	41%	41%	16	100%	5	7	0.75	16%
BARA	9	15,092	10.8	2,156	57%	57%	14%	29%	9	100%	2	0	0.22	36%
BOURRA	16	18,726	6.8	1,873	90%	60%	0%	30%	16	100%		10	0.63	25%
OUATAGOUNA	10	30,263	8.5	3,363	78%	78%	56%	33%	10	100%		5	0.50	39%
TALATAYE	3	14,023	1.3	4,674	0%	67%	33%	67%	0	0%		0	--	86%
TESSIT	8	13,766	1.5	4,589	67%	67%	33%	33%	8	100%		0	0.00	31%
TIN-HAMMA	9	9,992	1.2	1,998	20%	40%	20%	20%	8	89%		0	0.00	72%
Bourem Cercle	75	116,360	2.3	1,686	74%	49%	16%	38%	64	85%	4	19	0.36	31%
BAMBA	16	28,616	5.5	1,789	94%	81%	31%	44%	16	100%		0	0.00	20%
BOUREM	20	27,488	4.1	1,527	61%	50%	17%	33%	19	95%		17	0.89	18%
TABOYE	14	20,641	13.7	1,474	57%	50%	21%	57%	14	100%	4	0	0.29	38%
TARKINT	16	19,099	0.5	1,592	75%	8%	0%	33%	6	38%		2	0.33	59%
TEMERA	9	20,516	1.3	2,280	89%	44%	0%	11%	9	100%		0	0.00	27%
Gao Cercle	177	239,535	5.7	1,597	39%	68%	19%	58%	166	94%	5	49	0.33	40%
ANCHAWADJI	29	20,559	1.0	761	15%	67%	11%	48%	28	97%		7	0.25	70%
GABERO	21	25,621	11.4	1,601	31%	63%	6%	75%	21	100%		0	0.00	25%
GAO	23	86,353	2025.4	3,598	83%	88%	58%	67%	23	100%	4	7	0.48	18%
GOUNZOUREYE	22	27,249	39.5	1,434	53%	58%	26%	53%	22	100%	1	9	0.45	22%
N'TILLIT	34	22,285	1.0	1,013	23%	68%	14%	64%	29	85%		7	0.24	45%
SONY ALI BER	28	47,618	37.0	1,831	50%	50%	4%	54%	28	100%		15	0.54	26%
TILEMSI	20	9,850	1.8	616	13%	88%	6%	50%	15	75%		4	0.27	100%
MENAKA Cercle	116	54,456	0.9	545	32%	34%	14%	15%	76	66%	23	10	0.43	83%
ALATA	5	2,856	ND	571	40%	60%	0%	0%	3	60%	1	3	1.33	ND
ANDERAMBOUKANE	23	18,090	2.0	861	29%	24%	14%	29%	11	48%	2	7	0.82	67%
INEKAR	13	5,421	10.0	452	8%	17%	17%	8%	3	23%	2	0	0.67	93%
MENAKA	64	22,659	0.2	436	38%	44%	12%	12%	52	81%	16	0	0.31	67%
TIDERMENE	11	5,430	1.2	543	30%	10%	30%	20%	7	64%	2	0	0.00	94%

Source: 1) Data base of Cluster Education, updated on November 28, 2015 2) General Census of the Population and Habitat 2009; 3) Data base of CPS, 2010-2011; 4) Teaching Academy of Gao; 5) Primary education data of ERSA, Oct. 2015, Individual Youth Questionnaire

X.4 Selection of host schools for cohort 1

The pre-selection of host schools for cohort 1 is based on the following criteria:

- A state school exists and is open at the time the center is opened
- The community accepts the presence of the State
- There is at least one open center in each commune
- Priority is given to the most underprivileged communes
- The selection takes into account other return-to-school programs recently completed or ongoing.

By carrying out a simulation based on these criteria, we obtain the following distribution of centers:

Table 40. Simulation of host school options for cohort 1

	# of state primary schools ¹	# of open state primary schools ¹	% of state primary schools opened ¹	# of SSA-P UNICEF centers ²	# of schools accommodating a PARIS center	% of state primary schools opened that include a PARIS center
ANSONGO	71	67	94%	22	26	39%
ANSONGO	16	16	100%	7	5	31%
BARA	9	9	100%	0	4	44%
BOURRA	16	16	100%	10	4	25%
OUATTAGOUNA	10	10	100%	5	2	20%
TALATAYE	3	0	0%	0	0	--
TESSIT	8	8	100%	0	6	75%
TIN HAMA	9	8	89%	0	5	63%
Menaka	116	76	66%	10	32	42%
ALATA	5	3	60%	2	2	67%
ANDERAMBOUKANE	23	11	48%	5	6	55%
INEKAR	13	3	23%	1	4	133%
MENAKA	64	52	81%	2	13	25%
TIDERMENE	11	7	64%	0	7	100%
Bourem	75	64	85%	19	38	59%
BAMBA	16	16	100%	0	15	94%
BOUREM	20	19	95%	17	4	21%
TABOYE	14	14	100%	0	9	64%
TARKINT	16	6	38%	2	4	67%
TEMERA	9	9	100%	0	6	67%
Gao	177	166	94%	49	51	31%
ANCHAWADI	29	28	97%	7	15	54%
GABERO	21	21	100%	0	11	52%
GASO	23	23	100%	7	2	9%
GOUNZOUNREYE	22	22	100%	9	5	23%
N'TILLIT	34	29	85%	7	9	31%
SONY ALI BER	28	28	100%	15	2	7%
TILEMSI	20	15	75%	4	7	47%
Total	439	373	85%	100	147	39%

Source: 1) Data base of Cluster Education, updated on November 28, 2015 2) Teaching Academy of Gao.

Around 39% of opened schools in the Gao Region will accommodate a PARIS center at the beginning of 2016. None of the 66 closed schools will accommodate it during the 2015-2016 school year. To offer – at a later time – this group of re-opened schools the same support that was offered to the group of schools already opened, it would be necessary that at least 26 of the schools opened in 2016-2017 accommodated a center in 2017-2018. These schools will remain close for 3 and a half years, when all others remain closed for only 1 and a half years or 2 and a half years. Therefore they have a larger percentage of children to accommodate who did not complete their basic education and are not enrolled. And they are potentially in need of renovation. This is why, it is recommended to build/rehabilitate 2 centers per school, that is to say 50 buildings/renovations for the schools' 2nd cohort.

X.5 Telecom coverage

The variable coverage of the area in terms of mobile networking and 3G is also an operational constraint for education programs which must adapt their communication and follow-up-evaluation to this situation. In 2013, in a newsletter, MINUSMA informed that mobile and 3G networking could never cover the entire area, even if it were to be restored, after having been sabotaged by Jihadist groups.

During a collection of primary data, the teams tested the coverage at the visited sites. The coverage varies between the communes, but also between the urban centers and other villages. Orange network is non-existent or of very bad quality in at least 10 urban centers out of the 23 visited and in all the other 14 villages. Malitel network is non-existent or of very bad quality in at least 13 urban centers out of the 23 visited and in all of other 13 villages. 3G coverage is non-existent or of very bad quality in 10 urban centers out of the 16 visited and in all the other 9 villages out of the 12 reported on the list. This casts doubts on electronic data collection for a regular follow-up, because it will not be possible to send any data. None of the two main operators has a clear advantage in terms of coverage.

Table 41. Coverage on the communes by telecommunication networks

Commune	Urban center	Orange	Malitel	3G	2nd town	Orange	Malitel	3G
Ansongo Cercle								
Ansongo	Ansongo	Reasonable	Reasonable	Non-existent	Seïna Sonraï	Very poor	Very poor	
Bara	Bara	Non-existent	Non-existent		Tabango	Very poor	Very poor	
Bourra	Tassiga	Excellent	Reasonable		Kounsoum	Very poor	Very poor	
Ouattagouna	Ouattagouna	Reasonable	Reasonable		Bentia	Reasonable	Reasonable	Non-existent
Talataye	Talataye	Non-existent	Non-existent		Indelimane	Non-existent	Non-existent	
Tessit	Tessit	Non-existent	Very poor	Very poor	Tadjalalt	Non-existent	Very poor	Very poor
Tin-Hama	Tin-Hama	Non-existent	Non-existent		Amalawlaw	Non-existent	Non-existent	
Bourem Cercle								
Bamba	Bamba	Reasonable	Non-existent	Reasonable	Sobory fraction	Very poor	Non-existent	Non-existent
Bourem	Bourem - Foghas	Excellent	Excellent	Reasonable	Konkorom	Reasonable	Reasonable	Very poor
Taboye	Ouani	Excellent	Excellent	Excellent	Ha	Reasonable		Excellent
Tarkint	Tarkint		Very poor		Agamhar (Ahel Badi)		Reasonable	
Temera	Temera	Very poor	Non-existent	Very poor	Bossalia	Reasonable	Very poor	Very poor
Gao Cercle								
Anchawadi	Djebock	Non-existent	Non-existent	Non-existent	Emnaguil (Kel Bardagh II)	Non-existent	Non-existent	
Gabero	Haoussa Foulane	Very poor	Very poor	Very poor	Gargouna	Excellent	Excellent	Excellent
Gao	Sosso Koira	Excellent	Excellent	Excellent	Djidara	Excellent	Excellent	Excellent
Gounzoureye	Wabaria	Excellent	Excellent	Excellent	Kadji	Excellent	Excellent	
N'Tillit	Intillit Village	Non-existent	Very poor	Very poor	Doro (Tinalgar)	Non-existent		
Sonni Ali Ber	Forgho Sonrhail	Excellent	Excellent	Excellent	Bagnadji			
Tilemsi	Tin Aouker	Non-existent	Non-existent	Non-existent	Ellawagen	Non-existent	Non-existent	Non-existent
Menaka Cercle								
Anderamboukane	Anderamboukane		Reasonable		Inchinanane	Non-existent	Non-existent	Non-existent
Inekar	Inekar	Non-existent	Non-existent	Non-existent	Tabankort	Non-existent	Non-existent	Non-existent
Menaka	Menaka	Excellent	Reasonable	Very poor	Tinfadimata	Very poor		
Tidermene	Tidermene	Non-existent	Non-existent	Non-existent	Ikadewane	Non-existent	Non-existent	Non-existent

Source: Primary data from the RERA, ERSA, Oct. 2015, summary information

X.6 Education opportunities for young people

The following table summarizes all information on young people, by commune. It makes it possible to check in which communes young people have had fewer education opportunities. Those are also the ones in which young people believe that the lack of education is a source of the problem and believe that the independence of the North would contribute to the improvement of the situation. Table 39 presents the statistics on the languages spoken by young people.

Table 42. Statistics summary on young people, by area

Cercle/Commune	% of young people who have attended school	The lack of access to education is the #1 major problem	Estimated unemployment rate among young people			% of young people surveyed who left the village because of the crisis			# average number of family members who left	% of members who returned	The independence of 3 areas of the North would improve the situation	The reinforcement of the Malian administration would improve the situation	State hostility
			Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total					
ANSONGO Cercle	66%	64%	48%	67%	57%	30%	39%	35%	1.9	71%	37%	92%	
Ansongo	84%	42%	33%	100%	69%	20%	33%	26%	2.1	51%	16%	100%	
Bara	79%	55%	33%	45%	40%	22%	18%	20%	2	81%	40%	100%	
BOURRA	90%	47%	67%	57%	63%	30%	40%	35%	1.7	77%	16%	95%	
OUATAGOUNA	90%	40%	80%	75%	78%	40%	20%	30%	1.6	45%	15%	85%	
TALATAYE	30%	85%	20%	70%	45%	30%	70%	50%	2.2	75%	65%	80%	(1)
TESSIT	55%	75%	50%	67%	60%	10%	30%	20%	0.8	85%	60%	85%	
TIN-HAMMA	35%	100%	45%	67%	55%	55%	67%	60%	3.1	89%	45%	100%	
Bourem Cercle	71%	64%	65%	89%	77%	25%	31%	28%	2.6	79%	6%	98%	
BAMBA	60%	45%	46%	83%	58%	15%	29%	20%	2.2	35%	0%	100%	
Bourem	90%	50%	70%	100%	83%	45%	33%	40%	2.4	87%	5%	95%	
TABOYE	60%	85%	75%	100%	89%	20%	30%	25%	3.9	96%	5%	100%	
TARKINT	45%	79%	89%	80%	84%	11%	36%	25%	2.2	88%	20%	95%	(2)
TEMERA	100%	60%	50%	82%	71%	33%	27%	30%	2.6	82%	0%	100%	
Gao Cercle	65%	82%	68%	89%	78%	32%	41%	36%	2.9	77%	21%	99%	
ANCHAWADJI	61%	100%	73%	100%	85%	36%	44%	40%	4.2	89%	72%	94%	(2)
Gabero	60%	72%	40%	70%	55%	20%	20%	20%	1.6	68%	0%	100%	
Gao	80%	70%	80%	75%	78%	70%	50%	60%	5	78%	11%	100%	
Gounzoureye	85%	75%	70%	86%	76%	40%	50%	45%	3.2	69%	5%	100%	
N'TILLIT	55%	85%	90%	89%	89%	20%	60%	40%	3.5	78%	5%	100%	
SONY ALI BER	90%	75%	20%	100%	60%	30%	20%	25%	1.6	79%	5%	100%	
TILEMSI	25%	100%	100%	100%	100%	10%	40%	25%	1.2	100%	58%	100%	(2)
MENAKA Cercle	51%	90%	62%	90%	76%	26%	20%	23%	5.4	72%	60%	91%	
Alata													
ANDERAMBOUKANE	40%	85%	60%	100%	80%	50%	40%	45%	8.2	78%	50%	85%	
INEKAR	25%	90%	30%	90%	60%	0%	10%	5%	2.3	23%	47%	95%	
Menaka	85%	90%	89%	82%	85%	44%	18%	30%	8.2	83%	85%	90%	
TIDERMENE	55%	95%	70%	90%	80%	10%	10%	10%	3.2	63%	56%	95%	

Source: Primary data from the RERA, ERSA, Oct. 2015, Individual Youth Questionnaire, and on the last column, group discussions with the communities (leaders and women)

X.7 Languages spoken by young people

The basic education program intended for young people is bilingual, allowing young people to acquire reading/writing skills in the national language and in French. Thus, for each youth center, it is necessary to determine the national language to be taught.

Concerning the area, the majority language is Songhai. In our sample, 59% of young people speak Songhai. As explained in the methodological section, our sample overrepresented less-populated areas. If we weigh the results obtained on our sample with the actual weight of each commune resulting from RGPH 2009, three quarters of young people on the Gao Region speak Songhai and a quarter speaks Tamasheq. These two languages – Songhai and Tamasheq – reach 95% of young people.

In the majority of communes, (16 out of the 23 surveyed), these two languages reach all young people (i.e. 100% of the youths surveyed speak either Songhai OR Tamasheq). In other communes, there are young people who do not speak either of these 2 languages, such is the case of the communes of Talataye, Anderamboukane, Inekar and Menaka where some young people speak only Daoussak and the case of the commune of Tarkint where some young people speak only Arabic. These reports depend on the villages surveyed in the communes.

In 13 communes, the same language is spoken by all young people surveyed, which makes it possible to thereby provide the courses in one language, reaching out the young people of potentially different ethnic groups and without dividing the young people between several centers according to language criteria. For instance, in the localities of Bourem that were visited, all the young people speak Songhai, even the young Tamasheqs. It is in the Menaka Cercle that it is most difficult to identify a common language. 25% of young people speak Songhai but not Tamasheq, 35% of the young people speak Tamasheq but not Songhai, 10% speak the 2 languages and 30% speak neither Songhai, Tamasheq nor Daoussak.

Table 43. Languages spoken by young people, per commune

Cercle/Commune	% of young people that speak Songhai or Tamasheq			Language of other young people	% of young people that speak Songhai	% of young people that speak Tamasheq	% of young people that speak Songhai but not Tamasheq	% of young people speak Tamasheq but not Songhai	% of young people speak Songhai and Tamasheq
	Men	Women	Total						
Ansongo Cercle	96%	100%	98%		63%	40%	57%	34%	6%
Ansongo	100%	100%	100%		95%	0%	95%	0%	0%
Bara	100%	100%	100%		100%	0%	100%	0%	0%
Bourra	100%	100%	100%		100%	0%	100%	0%	0%
Ouattagouna	100%	100%	100%		100%	5%	95%	0%	5%
Talataye	70%	100%	85%	Daoussak	10%	75%	10%	75%	0%
Tessit	100%	100%	100%		35%	100%	0%	65%	35%
Tin-Hama	100%	100%	100%		5%	100%	0%	95%	5%
Bourem Cercle	100%	92%	96%		81%	26%	70%	15%	11%
Bamba	100%	100%	100%		90%	35%	65%	10%	25%
Bourem	100%	100%	100%		100%	10%	90%	0%	10%
Taboye	100%	100%	100%		100%	5%	95%	0%	5%
Tarkint	100%	64%	80%	Arab	15%	75%	5%	65%	10%
Temera	100%	100%	100%		100%	5%	95%	0%	5%
Gao Cercle	99%	99%	99%		62%	39%	59%	36%	3%
Anchawadi	100%	100%	100%		0%	100%	0%	100%	0%
Gabero	100%	100%	100%		100%	0%	100%	0%	0%
Gao	100%	90%	95%		95%	0%	95%	0%	0%
Gounzoureye	100%	100%	100%		100%	0%	100%	0%	0%
N'Tillit	90%	100%	95%		40%	75%	20%	55%	20%
Sonni Ali Ber	100%	100%	100%		100%	0%	100%	0%	0%
Tilemsi	100%	100%	100%		0%	100%	0%	100%	0%
Menaka Cercle	79%	80%	80%		21%	69%	11%	59%	10%
Anderamboukane	70%	70%	70%	Daoussak	35%	45%	25%	35%	10%
Inekar	80%	50%	65%	Daoussak	5%	65%	0%	60%	5%
Menaka	67%	100%	85%	Daoussak	25%	70%	15%	60%	10%
Tidermene	100%	100%	100%		20%	95%	5%	80%	15%
Gao Region	95%	94%	95%		59%	42%	53%	35%	7%

Source: Primary data from the RERA, ERSA, Oct. 2015, Individual Youth Questionnaire

Mapping and targeting - In short

Welcome

- ✚ The team's welcome was always friendly and the highly-anticipated project was understood by the populations which reject the State and its schools (commune of Talataye, Ansongo cercle).

PARIS language of teaching

- ✚ The students of PARIS centers will thus be reinstated in French classes.
- ✚ Communities reject learning in the national language
- ✚ To ensure the adhesion of the community to PARIS and the retention of children, as well as the children's success after their (re)integration into formal school, in 4th grade, It is necessary that they quickly develop skills in French, within 9 months.
- ✚ An adapted teaching approach and a regular use of EIR make it possible to acquire French skills quickly, more quickly than learning with the national language.
- ✚ According to the reading standards adopted by MEN in November 2011, only in the 6th grade are students in bilingual schools supposed to reach the same level of French as their counterparts in traditional schools.
- ✚ In the great majority of schools, at least two official languages coexist. In one third of schools, at least three official languages coexist.
- ✚ The common language could create a sense of injustice and reinforce ethnic tensions.
- ✚ It is not possible to create separate centers for each language from a financial point of view (development of the material) and practical point of view (recruitment of organizers for all languages)
- ✚ To create centers for all existent languages in the village would end up separating children from several ethnic groups, the opposite of what project ERSA is trying to accomplish. This would be a source of division and would prevent co-education and intermixing.
- ✚ The national language is necessary so that children can express themselves concerning the conflict and their personal lives.

Persistence of access to education inequalities

- ✚ The return-to-school programs face the same constraints as formal education, especially security constraints and the difficulty of reaching populations in areas with low population density (cost/efficiency).
- ✚ Inequalities persist. The communes where the percentage of out-of-school children is highest are the communes that are the least covered by Accelerated Learning Programmes.

Telecom coverage

- ✚ The regional coverage by Orange and Malitel is poor, including in the urban center commune.

- ✚ None of the two main operators has a clear advantage in terms of coverage.

Selection of "En Route vers l'Emploi" (On Track to Employment) centers and inclusion of linguistic realities

- ✚ The communes in which young people had less education opportunities are also the ones in which they believe that the lack of education was a source of the problem and believe that the independence of the North would contribute to the improvement of the situation.
- ✚ On a regional level, the predominant language is Songhai (59% of our sample, 75% in the population).
- ✚ Songhai and Tamasheq languages make it possible to reach out to 95% of the young people of the area.
- ✚ In certain communes, there are young people who do not speak either of these two languages. They speak Daoussak in the communes of Talataye, Anderamboukane, Inekar and Menaka and Arabic in the commune of Tarkint. These reports depend on the villages surveyed in the communes.
- ✚ In 13 communes, the same language is spoken by all young people surveyed which makes it possible to thereby providing the courses in one language, reaching out the young people of potentially different ethnic groups and without dividing the young people between several centers according to language criteria. For instance, in the localities of Bourem that were visited, all the young people speak Songhai, even the young Tamasheqs.
- ✚ It is in the Menaka Cercle that it is most difficult to identify a common language.

Recommendations

- ✚ Begin the social negotiations in Talataye this year for cohort 2.
- ✚ Privilege French teaching in PARIS centers.
- ✚ Preserve the national language, to allow children to speak about their experiences, about topics related to the conflict and gender problems.
- ✚ Target disadvantaged communities, regardless of the security situation and effectiveness (cost per child).
- ✚ Do not adopt a data feedback system based on telephone network or 3G.
- ✚ For the selection of the "En Route vers l'Emploi" (On Track to Employment) sites, target communities where young people have fewer education opportunities and feel underprivileged in terms of these opportunities, in the context of peace-building.
- ✚ For the selection of "En Route vers l'Emploi" (On Track to Employment) sites, target communities in which only one language allows reaching young people, even if they belong to different ethnic groups.
- ✚ In the Menaka Cercle, better analyze, by village, the languages spoken by the young people, in order to identify villages in which only one language allows reaching all the young people, even if they belong to different ethnic groups.

SECTION XI. MAIN RESULTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

XI.1 Main results of the evaluation

Factors of the crisis according to populations

The perceptions of the causes of the crisis differ according to ethnic groups. For example, Tuareg separatism was more frequently evoked as a major factor of the conflict by the young Fula, Songhai and Arabs than by the young Tuaregs and Daoussaks. The lack of access to water and electricity was cited by 100% of the young Daoussaks but by less than half of the young Fula and Songhai. All other things being equal, perceptions differed according to the administrative cercle, even once ethnicity is controlled.

Insecurity and the lack of employment opportunities are unanimous. The main problem in this crisis is insecurity and violence. The populations described it as permanent, growing, persistent. For the communities, the conflict is not finished. The lack of employment is the main problem or one of the main problems of young people of all ethnicities and all communities. Food insecurity is also a major problem, commonly mentioned everywhere and by all. This is due to crop failures and to the death of livestock.

Perceptions of the sources of the crisis differed according to the type. Religious fundamentalism, of which women are often the first victims, was a more important factor for women than for men. The presence of MINUSMA contributed to the crisis more so according to the young women than according to the young men; it may be an echo of accusations of sexual abuse made against the soldiers of the MINUSMA.

The divide between North and South and the injustices against Northern Mali was mentioned frequently. People expressed a feeling of abandonment by the State. This feeling is shared by all the communities. The feeling of oppression of the North from the South is also often felt mainly in Tuareg, Arab and Daoussak communities. However, if this resentment is largely divided, it is not systematically synonymous with legitimization of the actions of the armed groups. In all the communities, some young people justify the use of the weapons by certain groups, whatever the reason. The primary reason given was injustice.

Ethnic tensions are very palpable, sometimes very explicit. Communities spoke of mistrust, misunderstanding and hatred. The ethnic diversity of ethnic groups, religions and ideas was often seen as a source of conflict.

According to communities, politicians, locally elected representatives and traditional leaders are the greatest stakeholders of the division at the local level, taking advantage of the crisis and emergency projects to enrich themselves or consolidate their power. According to many communities, NGOs also create divisions in the community because the food distribution and support affect only some populations either by the NGOs' favoritism, or misuse by the community leaders or the program steering committees at the community level.

The role of the education system in the crisis

Schooling coverage. The number of schools per capita is relatively good within the Gao Region, compared to the whole of the country. This number, which is an indicator of the level of investment of the State,

varies greatly between the cercles of the Gao Region and between the communes of the same cercle. The number of schools per capita does not make it possible to compare access to school by the populations. It is also necessary to take distance into account, particularly in the zones with low density of the nomadic population and zones having the best ratios of school per capita but with great difficulties of access to the school. Distance to school was mentioned by half of the communities surveyed as being a barrier to children's schooling. Sometimes, there is no school in the village (even before the crisis started), sometimes the school is not accessible by the children from certain encampments, from nomadic communities, from the other side of the village or from the river's islands. Distance from school is all the more problematic when there is no canteen for students at the school level.

Access to school. 80% of the young people that are not enrolled in school evoked reasons other than the distance to school, reflecting the fact that access to education is conditioned by factors other than that of distance. The first reason is poverty (35%), followed by the distance to the school (20%), then the preference for employment (12%) and then marriage or pregnancy (10%). There are major inequities in access to school:

- Economic Inequalities: The living conditions of young peoples' households, measured by the number of household goods and equipment, significantly influence his or her likelihood of having gone to the school. The communities expressed that also. One third of the surveyed youths who have not gone to school evoked poverty as the main reason (100% in the commune of Tilemsi).
- Geographical inequalities: the percentage of out-of-school youth and the reasons vary considerably according to the cercles and communes.
- Ethnic Inequalities: All things being equal, a young Daoussak youth is ten times less likely than a young Songhai to have gone to school. A young Tuareg is four times less likely than a young Songhai to have gone to school.
- Gender inequalities: 22% of the young women did not go to school or left school before completing the cycle, either got married, had a child or carried out domestic tasks.

Inadequate infrastructure. Communities and secondary data describe the failure and inequality in infrastructure endowments. Thus, before the conflict, less than half of the public primary schools had toilets (48%) versus 67% on a national scale. The percentage of schools with toilets varies greatly, from only 32% in the Menaka Cercle to 74% in the Bourem Cercle. In terms of access to electricity and water, the Gao Region is not significantly different from the schools in the rest of the country, but again, there are large differences between the cercles and between the communes, since in 2010-2011, no schools in the Menaka Cercle had electricity, and only a third had access to a water source, versus two thirds of the schools in the Gao Cercle.

Quality of teaching and learning. If the school is in line with the values of the communities, the latter regret that schools do not meet their expectations of quality learning and no longer believe in school, which according to them, produce unemployed people. Communities regret the teaching in the national language, sometimes explaining that it was a reason to remove the children from school. (In 2010-2011, 5% of the public elementary schools use the bilingual curriculum in the 4th year). In 13 municipalities, this rate is 0%. They also believe that "teachers have a low level", "the program and the methods used are bad", "the educational and communal authorities are not involved in the quality of education", "the school is politicized" and that "SMCs do not always fulfil their role".

Consequences of the conflict and its implications on education

General situation depicted by the populations. It is very dark, evoking fear, violence, food insecurity, economic difficulties. The reports of improvement are rare and are often nuanced by negative reports. There is more pain in women's descriptions.

Schools. The conflict has had a strong impact on the schools that closed, and on the teachers and students that have fled. Nevertheless, 12% of schools are closed today and the schools that re-opened have acute needs. The re-opening of schools varies according to the cercles, from 66% in Menaka to 96% at Gao, and it varies within the cercles themselves. Thus, in the Talataye commune, no schools have re-opened. The religious schools re-open more quickly than do public schools; almost 100% of them re-opened. Insecurity and deterioration of infrastructure, as well as lack of personnel, hinder the re-opening of schools.

Among the 37 schools visited, 19 have seen their infrastructure damaged by the conflict. 6 of them benefited from renovations but always needed other work. All the schools are in need of renovation, whether they already benefited from renovations or not, and whether degradations are related to the conflict or not. Teachers' most frequently-expressed need is the need for equipment, followed by the need for the construction of new classrooms and/or annexes (e.g. administration, school store) and rehabilitation needs.

The teachers. In the preliminary report of the 2015 school year, it is stated that a "deficit of approximately 500 teachers was announced only in the Gao Region". According to data from the Education cluster, the ratio of students per teacher is 48 for public schools. This ratio varies from 35 children per teacher in the Ansongo Cercle to 74 children per teacher in the Menaka Cercle. In the area, 27% of the public school teachers are women: 38% in Gao, 15% in Menaka. Teachers said they need training in psychosocial support, in teaching, in peace culture, the bilingual curriculum and in teaching practices for large groups and heterogeneous groups.

School Enrollment

A return to pre-crisis schooling levels, in terms of numbers of children in school, and certainly the exceedance of this earlier level, is difficult. Thus, if at Bourem, the number of children in school in 2015 is higher than in 2010-2011, in Menaka it does not reach 4/5 of the 2010-2011 levels. In all the cercles, the percentage of girls among the students has returned to the 2010-2011 level.

In the localities surveyed, half of the children aged 6 to 14 are not provided education (% similar for girls and boys)¹³. There are great disparities between cercles and communes within the cercles. In the Menaka Cercle, more than 80% of children are not enrolled in school. In the Bourem Cercle, this ratio is 31%. Almost half of the children who are not in school are dropouts. The proportion of children that are out of school amongst those who have not been provided with education varies from 36% in the Menaka Cercle to 65% in Gao (A high rate of children not attending school is associated with a low percentage of children not provided with education.)

¹³ To measure this rate, every young person that is interviewed provides the total number of children in his household, including the number of children in school, those who have never been in school as well as those that are out of school.

Traumas and psychosocial support. 60% of teachers interviewed explained that their students or the students' families have been affected by the conflict (including migration of refugees, loss of property, armed attacks, fear, recruitment into an armed group, death of parents, etc.) 39% of the teachers observed children in their classes who were shocked by the conflict. 8 teachers testified that one or more of their students have joined armed groups. Teachers who have been trained in psychosocial support of children were not more likely to notice that students were shocked by the conflict.

Monitoring of schools by educational and local authorities. The monitoring of schools by the academic advisors and by local communities, usually a challenge, is even more difficult in this conflict. Half of the academic advisors as well as some of the communal agents had left their position at the peak of the crisis and so the follow-up in certain localities was made impossible due to the security situation. Moreover, the statistics from local authorities on school-age children are often unavailable and rarely usable. Out of 23 communes surveyed, the number of school-age children is available only in 9 town halls. The age groups of these children vary, limiting the comparisons. Only 4 town halls have statistics by village. Town Hall documents (e.g. registries of marital status, reports of the CGS, school and medical cards, etc.) were looted or lost at the time of the crisis.

Materials. The need for didactic materials and supplies is the number one need evoked by the teachers interviewed. In the schools visited, the percentage of children having access to a reading handbook adapted to his or her class varied greatly: from 0% in schools in Djebock, Menaka, Tadjalalt, Tidermene and Tin-Hama, to more than 80% in Konkorom, Kadji and Bentia.

School violence. The conflict sometimes had a negative impact on the relations between the students (including racism and violence). Schools are perceived as a prime target for jihadist attacks.

The consequences of the conflict on the risks incurred by the populations and their mitigation

Sense of security. 85% of the youths questioned feel safe on their premises; 77% feel safe in their village during the day and 37% feel safe in their village at night. The sense of security varied between the cercles: Menaka youths are four times less likely than Gao youths to feel safe at home. The women feel less safe in their village, day and night, than young men. The prospects on the evolution for safety are relatively optimistic since 4 out of 5 young people believed that the situation will improve the next year.

Incurred risks. The main risk incurred by the young men and young women is unemployment, according to youths. The importance allocated to various risks differs according to the cercles and by gender. For example, 69% of the young women reported that the main risk that they incur is physical aggression and/or rape. Only 48% of young men reported rape as the main risk for young women. The importance allocated to different risks varied according to the cercles. 95% of the young people of the Bourem Cercle cited unemployment as a main risk for the young men of the village but for only 66% of the young people of the Menaka Cercle.

Attenuation/mitigation. Half of the young people interviewed have changed their habits because of the security risks, from 31% in Ansongo to 75% in Menaka. Women have modified their habits more often than men. The main changes in behavior are limitations on personal mobility, a decrease or even a cessation of economic activities, the wearing of the hijab or even the discontinuation of leisure activities.

For their part, communities say they adapt by implementing patrols, and young people's self-defense groups, which are sometimes armed.

Safety at the school and on the way to school. According to teachers and communities, students are more vulnerable to insecurity on their way to school than at school itself. The main risks on the way to school are road accidents as well as mines and other explosive objects, followed by forced recruitments and rape of girls. The communities estimating that their children are safe on the way to school evoked the proximity to school, the presence of the army and accompanying parents as protective factors.

The judgments on safety at the school are shared. According to more than half of the discussions with the communities, children are safe at the school, due to the presence of the army, the vigilance of the community and the teachers, and the school fences. For the others, the children are in great danger because of the risk of attacks by jihadist groups (the populations referred to the abduction of the Chibok high-school girls by Boko Haram), of the absence of a fence, the absence of police forces, ceilings which are in danger collapsing, or food insecurity. According to the teachers, the main risks at the school are the health risks related to the lack of hygiene, poor infrastructure (including the absence of fences), followed by thefts, rackets and attacks on the school.

The schools and CGS initiated few actions in favor of safety at the school level, except for sensitization (ERW) and the installation of safety procedures such as the prohibition to access to the school during class hours, and exercises simulating attacks on the schools.

Socioeconomic consequences of the crisis

Economic situation. The economic situation, which was already precarious before the crisis, has worsened. Food insecurity, poverty and unemployment are, according to the populations, the main causes and major consequences of the conflict. Opportunities for employment and vocational training are almost nonexistent, except for NGOs and a few vocational training centers in the city of Gao.

Youth employment. Town halls have very little data on youths and youth employment. The primary data of RERA teaches us that before the conflict, 41% of the young people worked. This rate is higher in Ansongo and Menaka by virtue of the young people's lower rate of school enrollment. Half of young people who had an economic activity before the conflict have lost said activity because of the conflict. Women's jobs were hit harder. 54% of women who worked before the conflict are no longer working, compared to 48% of men. Conversely, some 8% of young people who were not employed before the conflict began to work with the conflict. Unfortunately, this is often because the conflict put an end to their studies. Unemployment is higher in the Gao Cercle than in the other cercles, which are more rural, and where the young people take part in the agricultural work or on family farms.

Migration. A third of the young people interviewed left their village because of the conflict (the majority during the 1st semester of 2012). The young people took refuge mainly abroad, then in Bamako and in the area of Mopti. 40% of the young people surveyed said they would leave if attacks intensify. The departures and return of young people and their families are linked mainly to the security situation and to job opportunities. In November 2015, UNHCR estimated that there are 139,502 Malian refugees outside the country, including 50,000 in Niger, 50,000 in Mauritania and 34,322 refugees in Burkina Faso.

The number of refugees in Niger and Burkina Faso is on the rise, notably because of the exodus of the populations of Menaka and Ansongo fleeing the fighting between the Idourfane and Daoussak tribes.

Needs and expectations of the youth

Aspirations. The young people want to work. Employment is the main concern of young people and the rest of the community. They also want to learn, to read, to write, to count, learn management, and accounting. They prefer to learn French. Young people need training as well as financial and material support to start their businesses. They cannot mobilize funds to launch their activities. For these youth, loving work, flourishing or developing are concepts and distant goals. They do their work because they have no choice. They like it since it enables them to provide for all or part of their needs. The employment and training sectors of interest to the young people are:

- | | |
|-----------------------------------|---|
| - Agriculture, livestock breeding | - Electricity, plumbing |
| - Trade | - Processing/marketing of agricultural products |
| - Sewing | - Control, transport |
| - Mechanics/welding | - Human health |
| - Carpentry | - Veterinary care |
| - Masonry | - Teaching |
| - Hairdressing | - Solar energy |
| - Handicrafts | |

Youth support programs. These are rare. Emergency programs are focused on school and food donations. The programs intended for youth should focus on employment and ensure a true post-training follow-up of the young people in order to ensure results and to avoid the misuse of the materials by the recipients (i.e. the resale of the school kits). The way in which the projects target the recipients is criticized by the young people. To help the youth, the projects should initially inquire about what the youths need and explain to them what they can contribute. The CAPs did not mention any project or initiative of vocational training. However certain projects exist, they are minor compared to the projects targeting education (i.e. the activities of ACTED or ADIZOSS).

Expectations placed on the young people. The young people have confidence in their own physical, intellectual, mental abilities (courage, hope, serious) and moral capacities (solidarity, mutual aid). The communities are also confident that their youth will protect them, serve them and develop the village. They have a role to play in the education of the children: they can build schools, they can teach the children. In many communities, one of the first roles of youth is to protect the village, to defend it and in order to assume this role, “they must learn how to fight, learn how to handle the weapons, enter the army”.

Answers provided

Key projects in education. Ongoing education in the Gao region projects are mainly training on psychosocial support of students; return to school projects; construction and rehabilitation of school and the distribution of school kits. In spite of CAP training, the teachers have a great need for training in psychosocial care for students

Priority to school reintegration. Mali and its partners made the return of the children to school, in the Gao region, a clear priority. During the 2015-2016 school year, 100 SSA-P centers operated in the area within the framework of the peace consolidation project implemented by UNICEF. During the most recent school year, between 35 and 37 accelerated enrollment centers operated in the area within the framework of the reintegration school project implemented by UNICEF and the NRC. Next school year, approximately 80 schooling accelerated emergency centers will open in the region, within the framework of the project to access a quality education in insecure areas, financed by USAID and implemented by UNICEF, Save the Children, IRC and local NGOs.

Persistence of the inequalities. Furthermore, with the return to school programs facing the same constraints as formal education, especially security constraints and the difficulty of reaching people in areas with low population density (efficiency), inequalities persist. So the inequalities persist since the communes where the percentage of out-of-school children is highest are the communes that are the least covered by the accelerated schooling programs.

Linguistic Mapping

On the regional level, the predominant language is Songhai (59% of our sample, 75% in the population). The Songhai and Tamasheq languages make it possible to reach out to 95% of the young people of the area. In certain communes, there are young people who do not speak either of these 2 languages. They speak Daoussak in the communes of Talataye, Anderamboukane, Inekar and Menaka and Arabic in the commune of Tarkint. These reports depend on the villages surveyed in the communes. In 13 communes, the same language is spoken by all young people surveyed, which makes it possible to thereby provide courses in one language, reaching out the young people of potentially different ethnic groups and without dividing the young people between several centers according to language criteria. For instance, in the localities of Bourem that were visited, all the young people speak Songhai, even the young Tamasheqs. It is in the Menaka Cercle that it is most difficult to identify a common language.

Telecommunications

The regional coverage by the Orange and Malitel networks is poor, including in the commune capital. Neither of the two main operators has a clear advantage in terms of coverage.

XI.2 Recommendations

The process of social negotiations

- ✚ Lead an inclusive social negotiations process, involving the whole of the community.
- ✚ Collect the commitment of the communities to accommodate the project stakeholders, including the agents of the CAP and the town halls.
- ✚ Conduct a participative diagnosis of the profile of the children and young people and reasons for non-enrollment in school during the establishment of the centers.
- ✚ Explain the criteria for selection of the communities and targeting of the recipients.
- ✚ Continue the process of consultation with the communities on their needs, satisfaction and concerns towards the ERSA using a formalized and consistent approach; and with a feedback system (every 2 months).
- ✚ Organize an inclusive steering of the project at the community level (youth, women, teachers, leaders and members of the CGS) and regularly reassess the legitimacy and accountability of the steering committee and the relevance of its decisions.
- ✚ Adopt a very clear approach in social negotiations on ERSA's offering in terms of training and support to employment, on what is expected, what is possible and what is impossible.
- ✚ Engage ERSA on key points (such as the number of children returning to school, the quantity of inputs provided to the village...)
- ✚ Ensure coherence between the messages conveyed on the ground and in the media (for example in the event of launching).
- ✚ Begin the social negotiations in Talataye this year for cohort 2.

Beneficiary enrollment and retention

- ✚ Register all young people of a same village.
- ✚ Implement strategies to facilitate the attendance of courses by girls and young mothers.
- ✚ Obtain the commitment of the communities to support the students of the PARIS centers.
- ✚ At the time of the social negotiations, obtain the formal commitment of the community to encourage the attendance of girls and young women and implement the internal awareness mechanisms.
- ✚ Along with the steering committee, secure the attendance targets and follow the achievement of these goals.
- ✚ Bear the costs of school supplies and birth certificates.
- ✚ Obtain the membership of the communities in the PARIS:
 - Adopt teaching practices allowing the fast acquisition of skills in French.
 - Explain to the communities the pedagogical architecture of the program.
 - Obtain visible learning gains from the parents, as of the 1st month.

- Frequently meet with the steering committee and the community to listen to the fears and gather comments, opinions and criticism about the PARIS.
- Train the teachers on the appropriate practices in terms of gender and conflict.

Vocational training of the young people

- + Diversify the training areas:
 - favorable to youth-entrepreneurship.
 - or meeting the primary education needs for the community (masonry, health, first aid, babysitting, teaching, support to the teacher, school support).
 - or responding to the needs of family farms and dealing with negative impacts on crops and livestock.
- + Provide training and support in the education and health sectors that interest young people, which is rewarding and useful to the community.
- + Base the approach of young female role models on fundamental professional skills for the community (health, first aid, teaching, school education, veterinary care, reconstitution of the livestock, protection of crops)
- + Develop vocational training mechanisms adapted to the almost total absence of opportunities at the local level:
 - Place the youths in internships with local entrepreneurs.
 - Preliminarily reinforced in pedagogy and related material in order to be able to conduct training courses.
 - in which the duration, the contents and the training goals will be well-defined.
- + Adopt a local vocational training model, preventing youth movements in a precarious security situation.
- + Train the young people on saving strategies and Community credit intended to launch or develop their professional activities.
- + Seek public-private partnerships to provide startup kits to youth after the completion of these courses.
- + Explore funding opportunities through the internet for the youths' projects (i.e. crowdfunding)
- + Support the young people in the launching of collective microenterprises (i.e. construction with bricklayers, electricians, painters, plumbers, managers).
- + Continue to follow the young people of the 1st cohort after the completion of the level.

Curricula

For the children in the PARIS centers:

- + Focus on education in French in the PARIS centers because the children will be transferred in French classes.
- + Use the national language when speaking on peace, conflict activities and common life skills.

For the young people:

- ✚ Offer a bilingual program in order to meet the needs of all young people (balance between the national language and French).
- ✚ In multi-ethnic communities, use the common language of the young people.

Sensitivity to the conflict:

- ✚ Do not speak about post-conflict situations.
- ✚ Focus on common problems (unemployment, food insecurity, insecurity, etc.) more than on the political claims.
- ✚ Prioritize the contents on ethnic diversity, the prejudices, the fight against the proliferation of arms, on the peaceful fight for social justice (rather than on defamation, jealousy, etc.).
- ✚ Develop contents by the communities themselves.
- ✚ Use artistic activities such as theater to enable children and youth to express themselves on difficult or taboo topics.

Conflict and promotion of peace

- ✚ Create bonds between the communities of the north and the communities of the south (“twinning” with the PAJE villages or the young PAJE).
- ✚ Impose an ethnic and religious mix in the activities.
- ✚ Promote the return of the foster family tradition in order to allow children of nomadic communities or those far from school to pursue an education and in order to renew the social web.
- ✚ Work with the PAT-Mali team to better understand their return-to-normality actions and peace promotion, as well as their principles of implementation
- ✚ Help young people to design and organize community-based peace-building activities, including activities that meet other needs of the schools (e.g. canteen, hygiene, water, security, etc.).

Sustainability and institutional anchoring

- ✚ Adopt a coherent implementation model, where each stakeholder is supported to fulfill his/her role.
- ✚ Reinforce the capabilities of the AEs and CAPs in order to coordinate and follow the Accelerated Learning Programs (integrated database, exchange framework between all parties involved, targeting principles, and teaching differences).
- ✚ Reinforce the local capacities of NGOs to implement Accelerated Learning Programs.
- ✚ Reinforce the capacities of local communities to follow Accelerated Learning Programs (integrated data base, participation on the exchange context between all AE/CAP and others involved, targeting principles, teaching differences).

- ✚ Benefit from the experience of the academic advisors for a more precise analysis of the challenges, strengths and risks of the Accelerated Learning strategies.

Impact on the formal system

- ✚ Improve the quality of the school at the same time that the PARIS center operates:
 - Build the PARIS classroom within the school space.
 - Establish mechanisms of exchange between PARIS organizers and teachers of the host school (such as teacher learning communities) to ensure that teachers are able to use the PARIS teaching material.
 - Develop materials and continuing education material usable by the organizers and the teachers together (audio support, support adapted to the CAM).
 - Establish links to formal education for the PARIS organizers.
 - Benefit from the presence of the organizers during the vacation within the 2 years of PARIS to offer courses of remediation to the students
 - Conduct consultations with the CAPs, town halls and cercle councils to implement procedures that facilitate the obtainment of birth certificates and enrollment in formal schooling.

Risks and prevention

- ✚ Conduct a participative evaluation of the risks incurred in the schools by the students and staff teachers, with the CGS, students and their parents to define a safe “action plan” at the school level:
 - Who is at what risk?
 - What preventative or mitigation measures, can the school communities take?
 - What are the limits of certain prevention/mitigation measures?
 - How to foster resilience to incidents that cannot be avoided?
- ✚ Identify a set of security procedures for schools and a code of conduct to ensure that the ERSA centers are safe and secure environments compliant to the security index.
- ✚ Share with young people the sense of insecurity of other youths (other ethnic groups, other cercles).
- ✚ Explore the possibility of building fences surrounding schools during the construction/rehabilitation of PARIS premises.
- ✚ Include contents pertaining to psychosocial support in the training of the organizers.

Selection of the communities of intervention

- ✚ Cover the maximum amount of communes.
- ✚ Select the communities so as not to reproduce or widen existing inequalities, target the most disadvantaged communes.
- ✚ Target disadvantaged communities, regardless of the security situation and effectiveness (cost per child).

- ✚ Widen the dialogues for the final selection with all the stakeholders: town halls, CAP, MPs, organizations of the civil society, school principals and NGOs.
- ✚ During the time of these consultations, analyze the data of the Education Cluster, town halls, CAP and other partners in order to create a synergy between the various return to school programs.
- ✚ Use the data base of the CPS and its codes to identify the open schools and the schools that are supported by the various programs.
- ✚ During the 2nd cohort of the PARIS centers, implement strategies capable of reaching populations in areas of low population density and in nomadic communities.
- ✚ Initiate discussions with MEN for the creation of local schools adapted to communities with special educational needs.
- ✚ For the selection of the "En Route vers l'Emploi" (On Track to Employment) sites, target communities where young people have fewer education opportunities and feel underprivileged in terms of these opportunities, in the context of peace-building.
- ✚ For the selection of "En Route vers l'Emploi" (On Track to Employment) sites, target communities in which only one language allows reaching young people, even if they belong to different ethnic groups.
- ✚ In the Menaka Cercle, better analyze, by village, the languages spoken by the young people, in order to identify villages in which only one language allows reaching all the young people, even if they belong to different ethnic groups.

Construction and rehabilitation

- ✚ Do not count on the contributions of the communities, except in labor.
- ✚ Build/rehabilitate 100 centers in the first year and 50 in the second.
- ✚ Reserve the 50 centers of the second year for:
 - the communities whose schools will reopen at the beginning of October 2016,
 - communities not having the infrastructures to accommodate the projects' young recipients.
- ✚ Carry out dialogues with MEN to project a formal school for cohort 2, build a center where there is no school, in which case this center will become a school.
- ✚ Explore the possibility of building the fences around the schools and the PARIS classrooms.

Follow-up evaluation

- ✚ The project's impacts must be measured in terms of employment, of subsidies to its needs, contributions to expenditure, community actions carried out, rather than on subjective aspects of professional flourishing.
- ✚ Indicators and targets relating to employment and the FP must be in line with what ERSA can offer to the youths.

- ✚ The regular exchanges with the communities must be a central element during the project follow-up.
- ✚ Do not to adopt a data feedback system based on telephone network or 3G

SECTION XII. ANNEXES

Annex 1. Main secondary data collected

Needs analysis - Mali

Analyse des données secondaires – Région de Gao, Kidal et Timbuktu, UNICEF, Décembre 2012 (Analysis of secondary data - Region of Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu, UNICEF, December 2012)

Evaluation rapide à distance - Situation et besoins éducatifs au Nord du Mali (Gao – Kidal – Mopti – Timbuktu), août 2012, UNICEF (Remote rapid assessment - educational Situation and needs in Northern Mali (Gao - Kidal - Mopti - Timbuktu), August 2012, UNICEF)

Appel global Mali 2012, ONU (Global appeal Mali 2012, UN)

Rapport d'évaluation Des Besoins Educatifs Dans Les régions Du Nord Du Mali (Gao et Timbuktu), Juillet 2013, Cluster Education (Evaluation report for the Educational Needs in the northern areas of Mali (Gao and Timbuktu), July 2013, Education Cluster)

Priority actions and humanitarian need analysis: A re-evaluation prompted by intensified conflict in central and northern Mali in January 2013, ONU 2013

Food safety plans for the 24 communes of the area,

Overview of the humanitarian needs, Education Cluster, October 2015

Analysis of the conflict and its impact - Mali

Impact socio-économique de la crise au nord du Mali sur les personnes déplacées, Etang-Ndip A., Hoogeveen J., Lendorfer J., Banque Mondiale, 2012 (Socio-economic impact of the crisis in northern Mali on displaced people, Etang-Ndip A., Hoogeveen J., Lendorfer J., World Bank, 2012)

Etude sur les stratégies de développement économique et social des régions nord du Mali, Programme Spécial pour la Paix, la Sécurité et le Développement dans le Nord du Mali, Mars 2012 (Study on the strategies of economic and social development of the northern regions of Mali, Special Program for peace, security and development in northern Mali, March 2012)

Mali Education Cluster, Overview, May 2015

Exploring The Nexus Between Ethnicity And Terrorism In Africa, Hussein Solomon, Conflict Trends, Issue 3 (2013)

Mali: Impact of the Crisis on Social Sectors Education Impact strength RES-360° Report, June 2014

Domination ethnique ou linguistique, GREAT 2012, données de 2008 (Ethnic or linguistic domination, GREAT 2012, 2008 data)

AFROBAROMETRE 2012, GREAT

Mali And Its Sahelian Neighbors, World Development Carryforward 2011, Background case study, Scott Straus, July 2011

Perceptions populaires des causes et conséquences du conflit au Mali, Afrobaromètre 2013 (Popular perceptions of the causes and consequences of the conflict in Mali, Afrobaromètre 2013)

Fending for Ourselves: The Civilian Impact off Mali's Three-Year Conflict, Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC), 2015

Les besoins des Maliens en matière de justice: vers plus d'équité, HiIL, 2014 (Needs for the Malians in terms of justice: towards more equity, HiIL, 2014)

The impact of conflict and political instability on agricultural investments in Mali and Nigeria, Africa Growth Initiative, Working Paper 17, July 2014

Critical Case Insights from Mali: Strengths and Opportunities for Education Reform in the Midst of Crisis, Education Resilience Approaches program, 2014

Impact des Crises sur le Système Éducatif Malien, Magali Chelpi-den Hamer et Fété Impact Développement, commissionné par USAID/Mali, 2015, version provisoire (Crisis impact on the Malian educational system, Magali Chelpi-den Hamer and party Impact Development, 2015 commissioned by USAID/Mali, provisional version)

Reconstruire la mosaïque: (Rebuild the mosaic:) Perspectives pour de meilleures relations sociales après le conflit armé au Nord du Mali, OXFAM, 2013 (Prospects for better social relations after the war in Northern Mali, OXFAM, 2013)

Etudes de cas, conflits armés et le défi de la faim, Mali et Soudan du Sud, Concern Worldwide, Welthungerhilfe et ACTED, 2015 (Case studies, armed conflicts and the challenge of hunger, Mali and Southern, Concern Worldwide, Welthungerhilfe, and ACTED, 2015)

Echoués dans le désert, Médecins sans Frontières, Avril 2013 (Stranded in the desert, Doctors without Borders, April 2013)

Partners

2014 Annual report of the Resident Coordinator / Humanitarian on the use of the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) grants

NRC Mali/Burkina Faso - Fact Sheet, January 2015

Funds for the Consolidation of Peace (Pbf), Annual report on the progress report of the project, 2015

Other studies and research

News bulletin, Civil Military Interaction Command, December 2013, Netherlands

Pratiques de sédentarité et nomadisme au Mali, Réalité sociologique ou slogan politique ?, B. Cissé, Politique Africaine, Paris, Karthala 34, juin 1989 (Sedentary practices and nomadism in Mali, sociological reality or political slogan?, B. Cissé, Politique Africaine, Paris, Karthala 34, June 1989)

Le Coup d'État au Mali, les Touaregs et la Sécession de l'Azawad: (The Coup d'etat in Mali, Tuareg and the Secession of the Azawad): Irredentism and Terrorism with the length of the 16th Northern Parallel, CEMISS (Center Military of Strategic Studies, Marco Massoni, 2012)

Maps

Map of WASH intervention schools in the region of Gao, UNICEF, April 2014

Percentage of Schools closed March 2015, Cluster

MALI - Gao Region - Reference Chart - September 2013 - OCHA

MALI - ANSONGO Cercle - Reference Chart - September 2013 - OCHA

MALI - Bourem Cercle - Reference Chart - Oct. 2013 - OCHA

MALI - GAO Cercle- Reference Chart - September 2013 - OCHA

MALI - MENAKA Cercle - Reference Chart - Oct. 2013 - OCHA

Region of Gao - Reference chart UNICEF - July 2013

Data

Database of schools of the Education Cluster dated 16 November 2015 with their opening/functionality and the number of children and teachers (for most schools, the last update was in March, except for the cercle of Menaka whose data is dated October 2015)

Database of schools of the Education Cluster dated November 29, 2015, with their opening/functionality dated November 2015, but without the numbers of children and teachers

Database of CPS 2010-2011

Directory of the RGPH villages 2009

Projection of the population of Mali by region and age, OCHA

Geographical co-ordinates of all the “populated areas” of the region of Gao (source OCHA)

Database of security incidents in the Gao region, from January 1 to August 20, 2015, INSO 2015

ERSA database (crossing between the bases of the HPC, the cluster, RGPH and OCHA)

Methodology

Research Ethics Training Curriculum vitae, FHI 360, 2009

Rapid Education and risk analysis, USAID/ECCN, 2015

Integrating Conflict and Fragility Analysis into Education Sector Analysis, USAID, Seven 13

Integrating Conflict And Fragility Analysis Into The Education System Analysis Guidelines: A Proposed Companion Guides, USAID, 2013

Methodological guide for the sectoral analysis of education, UNESCO, the World Bank, UNICEF, 2014

Emergency Risk Informed Analysis Situation, UNICEF 2012

A Rapid Needs Assessment Guides: For Education, Usaid 2014

Conflict Assessment Framework, Usaid 2012

Education and Fragility Barometer, Save The Children, 2007

The Joint Education Needs Assessment Toolkit, Total Cluster Education, 2010

Conflict Analysis Framework Field Guidelines & Procedures, HALF-VALUE LAYER, 2012

Literacy Education In Conflict And Crisis-Affected Contexts, USAID, Mars 2014

Annex 2. Agents having taken part in the primary data acquisition of the RERA in October 2015

team no.	First and last name	NGO	M/F	Age	Songha	Tamasheq	Arab	Bambara	Daoussak	Zarma	Hausa	Fula
	Ansongo											
1	MAHMOUD AG MOHAMED	CRADE	M	34	x	x						
1	ABDOURAHAMANE B GAZERE	CRADE	M	35	x			x				
1	LALA BAIED MAIGA	GREFFA	F	30	x		P	x				
1	MAHAMADOU DIALLO FOAMED	CRADE	M	30	x			x		x	x	
2	DJIBRILLA YEHIA	CRADE	M	33	x							
2	ABDOULHAKIM AG ABDRAHAMANE	CRADE	M	24	x	x	x					
2	MRS. HAIDARA HALIMATOU KAMPO	CRADE	F	28	x			x				x
	Bourem											
1	MAHAMADOU TINDER MAIGA	SEAD	M	33	x	P		x		x		
1	ALKAYA SIDIBE	SEAD	M	28	x			x				
1	FATOUMATA DIAIE	SEAD	F	43	x			x				
1	SARAWI DIARRA	GREFFA	M	30	x			x				
2	ABDOURHAMANE OULD YOUSSEUF	SEAD	M	57	x	x	x	x				
2	ADAMA SULTANA MAIGA	SEAD	M	34	x			x				
2	BALKISSA FOAMED MAIGA	SEAD	F	25	x			x				
	GAO											
1	ALMAHADI MIYARATA MAIGA	TASSAGHT	M	36	x			x				
1	HABIBOULAYE AGHISSA	TASSAGHT	M	25	x	x		x				
1	KABANGOU YEHIYA TOURE	GREFFA	M	33	x							
1	MOMINA WT IBRAHIM	TASSAGHT	F	25	x	x						
2	DJIBRILLA BILAL	TASSAGHT	M	50	x	x	P					
2	ALHER AG HAMDI	TASSAGHT	M	27	x	x	x	P				
2	FATOUMATA A YATTARA	TASSAGHT	F	30	x	P		x				

team no.	First and last name	NGO	M/F	Age	Songha i	Tamas heq	Arab	Bamba ra	Daouss ak	Zarma	Hausa	Fula
	Menaka											
1	WARISILA AG ISTAM	GARI	M	60	x	x			x	x	x	
1	AMINATA ASKOU	GARI	F	32	x	x		x				
1	ASSYITOU WT SIDI MOHAMED	GREFFA	F	30	P	x						
1	SALAH AG ALHAMIS	GARI	M	43	P	x			x			
2	OUSMANE AG AFRAYBA	GARI	M	34	x	x			x	x		
2	BILAL AG AGORKI	GARI	M	55	P	x	P		x			
2	FATMA WT IBRAHIM	GARI	F	25	x	x		x				


Source: Formation des enquêteurs de la collecte de données primaires de l'ERRE, ERSA, (Training for investigators collecting primary data from the RERA, ERSA,) Oct. 2015

Annex 3. Sample of localities surveyed for the collection of primary data


Cercle/Commune	Capital	Other village	Mapping	Nomad/Sed
Ansongo				
Ansongo	Ansongo	SEYNA SONRHAI	Songhai	Sedentary
BOURRA	TASSIGA	KOUNSOUM	Songhai	Sedentary
OUATTAGOUNA	OUATTAGOUNA	Bentia	Songhai	Sedentary
TESSIT	TESSIT	TADJALALT	Tamasheq (90%), Songhai	Semi-nomadic
BARA	BARA	TABANGO	Songhai, Tamasheq	Sedentary
TALATAYE	TALATAYE	INDELIMANE	Daoussak (80%), Tamasheq	Semi-nomadic
TIN-HAMMA	TIN-HAMMA	AMALAWLAW*	Tamasheq (100%)	Semi-nomadic
Bourem				
BAMBA	BAMBA	SOBORI	Tamasheq (70%), Songhai	Semi-nomadic
BOUREM	BOUREM FOGHAS	KONKOROM	Songhai	Sedentary
TEMERA	TEMERA	BOSSALIA	Songhai	Sedentary
TABOYE	OUANI	HA	Songhai	Sedentary
TARKINT	TARKINT	AGAMHOR (AHEL BADI)	Arab (70%), Tamasheq	Semi-nomadic
Gao				
GOUNZOUREYE	WABARIA	KADJI	Songhai	Sedentary
N'TILLIT	N'TILLIT	DORO	Tamasheq	Semi-nomadic
SONY ALI BER	FORGO SONRAI	BAGNADJI	Songhai	Sedentary
GABERO	HAOUSSA FOULANE	GARGOUNA	Songhai	Sedentary
GAO	7th DISTRICT OR SOSSOKOIRA	DJIDARA	Songhai	Sedentary
ANCHAWADI	DJEBOCK	EMNAGUIL	Tamasheq	Semi-nomadic
TILEMSI	TIN AOUKER	ELLAWAGEN	Tamasheq	Semi-nomadic
Menaka				
INEKAR	INEKAR	TABANKORT	Daoussak (70%), Tamasheq	Semi-nomadic
ANDERAMBOUKANE	ANDERAMBOUKANE	INCHINANANE	Daoussak, Tamasheq	Semi-nomadic
TIDERMENE	TIDERMENE	IKADEWANE	Tamasheq	Semi-nomadic
MENAKA	MENAKA	TINFADIMATA	Tamasheq	Semi-nomadic

Source: ERSA, Oct. 2015


Annex 4. Percentage of young people finding that a problem has greatly contributed to the crisis by problem, gender and ethnic group.




Item 7 - No access to water and electricity




Item 8 - Absence of the State




Item 9 - Drug-taking




Item 10 - Religious fundamentalism




Item 11 - Tuareg separatism




Item 12 - Interethnic tensions




Item 13 - Tribal tensions



Item 14 - Presence of the MINUSMA






Source: Primary data from the RERA, ERSA, Oct. inhg2015, Individual Youth Questionnaire



Annex 5. Determinants of perceptions about the factors of the crisis (logit model)

	Item1 Violence	Item2 Government corruption	Item3 Corruption of local elite	Item4 Education access	Item5 Unemploy ment	Item7 Access to water/elec.	Item8 Absence of State	Item9 Drug-taking	Item10 Religious fundamentals	Item11 Tuareg separatism	Item12 Interethni c tensions	Item13 Tribal tensions	Item14 MINUSMA Presence	Item 15 Destrct. heritage
Women	1.005 (0.350)	1.548 (0.478)	0.839 (0.207)	0.795 (0.230)	0.639 (0.210)	0.946 (0.244)	0.541** (0.141)	0.870 (0.218)	1.460 (0.341)	0.799 (0.224)	1.056 (0.250)	0.933 (0.238)	2.126** (0.647)	1.272 (0.342)
Age	0.654 (0.318)	0.767 (0.381)	1.213 (0.480)	0.431* (0.205)	3.014** (1.513)	1.428 (0.603)	1.604 (0.676)	0.805 (0.316)	1.072 (0.430)	1.247 (0.617)	0.990 (0.406)	0.918 (0.399)	2.744* (1.656)	1.469 (0.690)
Age ²	1.009 (0.012)	1.010 (0.013)	0.996 (0.010)	1.022* (0.012)	0.973** (0.012)	0.993 (0.011)	0.987 (0.010)	1.006 (0.010)	0.998 (0.010)	0.995 (0.013)	1.001 (0.010)	1.003 (0.011)	0.976 (0.015)	0.991 (0.012)
Administrative cercle (ref.: Gao)														
Ansongo	0.226*** (0.096)	0.311*** (0.106)	0.534** (0.145)	0.318*** (0.101)	0.596 (0.216)	1.245 (0.331)	0.344*** (0.101)	0.125*** (0.037)	0.516** (0.138)	0.696 (0.230)	0.773 (0.202)	1.942** (0.548)	0.826 (0.285)	0.212*** (0.070)
Bourem	0.276*** (0.136)	0.448* (0.191)	0.627 (0.197)	0.579 (0.216)	0.678 (0.265)	1.771* (0.553)	0.460** (0.162)	0.226*** (0.075)	0.988 (0.315)	1.475 (0.645)	0.373*** (0.127)	0.682 (0.262)	1.027 (0.397)	0.123*** (0.054)
Menaka	0.313** (0.174)	3.778 (2.940)	2.562** (1.184)	0.822 (0.394)	1.484 (0.808)	8.382*** (4.461)	0.683 (0.271)	0.456** (0.167)	0.339*** (0.126)	0.763 (0.301)	0.616 (0.232)	3.185*** (1.282)	0.327** (0.175)	0.642 (0.236)
Level of education (ref.: Not schooled)														
Elementary 1	0.829 (0.324)	1.099 (0.425)	1.125 (0.329)	0.665 (0.229)	0.635 (0.236)	0.768 (0.233)	0.775 (0.248)	0.847 (0.252)	0.838 (0.228)	0.991 (0.315)	0.729 (0.218)	0.619 (0.204)	1.734 (0.618)	0.652 (0.211)
Elementary 2	0.480* (0.192)	0.707 (0.283)	1.139 (0.351)	0.812 (0.301)	1.589 (0.705)	0.746 (0.239)	0.645 (0.220)	1.368 (0.442)	0.971 (0.297)	1.627 (0.667)	1.377 (0.428)	1.454 (0.484)	1.046 (0.426)	1.074 (0.386)
Secondary/	0.396* (0.208)	0.450 (0.242)	0.888 (0.376)	0.247*** (0.127)	0.994 (0.592)	0.370** (0.168)	0.504 (0.247)	2.005 (0.974)	0.835 (0.370)	0.831 (0.470)	1.897 (0.819)	1.905 (0.857)	2.346 (1.251)	3.312** (1.550)
Employed	1.256 (0.413)	1.687 (0.553)	0.694 (0.180)	0.929 (0.275)	1.045 (0.312)	0.842 (0.226)	1.404 (0.392)	1.080 (0.286)	1.036 (0.259)	1.184 (0.361)	0.915 (0.236)	0.937 (0.241)	1.450 (0.457)	0.697 (0.224)
Capital of commune	1.125 (0.329)	0.846 (0.230)	1.368 (0.304)	0.933 (0.235)	0.864 (0.239)	1.423 (0.327)	1.430 (0.328)	1.126 (0.263)	1.121 (0.237)	1.258 (0.339)	0.995 (0.218)	1.075 (0.247)	0.860 (0.250)	1.985** (0.530)
Ethnic group (Ref.: Songhai)														
Arab	3.072 (3.480)	0.552 (0.333)	0.494 (0.256)	1.111 (0.647)	1.428 (0.981)	0.995 (0.591)	3.801 (3.278)	0.212** (0.163)	1.718 (1.019)	0.532 (0.412)	0.799 (0.506)	0.477 (0.367)	0.266 (0.308)	0.764 (0.660)
Daoussak	1.086 (0.797)	1.167 (0.927)	2.922 (1.904)	17.995*** (19.278)	2.663 (2.255)	1.000	1.652 (0.920)	3.771*** (1.912)	3.265** (1.691)	0.097*** (0.051)	5.418*** (2.883)	2.862** (1.419)	4.479** (2.994)	4.507*** (2.220)
Fula	1.000 (--)	0.922 (0.856)	0.923 (0.645)	1.418 (1.124)	0.819 (0.771)	0.452 (0.381)	0.661 (0.541)	1.031 (0.811)	0.535 (0.413)	1.000 (--)	0.819 (0.595)	0.663 (0.567)	1.631 (1.436)	0.668 (0.626)
Tuareg	0.531* (0.186)	1.449 (0.506)	1.937** (0.552)	4.372*** (1.519)	2.207** (0.857)	1.606* (0.449)	0.600* (0.174)	1.044 (0.318)	0.870 (0.244)	0.165*** (0.054)	1.904** (0.540)	1.197 (0.360)	1.410 (0.478)	1.466 (0.474)
In a relationship	0.605 (0.233)	1.249 (0.450)	1.018 (0.289)	1.455 (0.481)	0.872 (0.307)	0.964 (0.277)	1.517 (0.454)	1.858** (0.513)	0.979 (0.257)	2.183** (0.753)	0.496*** (0.130)	0.883 (0.253)	0.579 (0.201)	0.990 (0.302)
Number of children	0.977 (0.130)	0.706*** (0.080)	0.949 (0.088)	0.777** (0.085)	0.981 (0.122)	0.906 (0.110)	0.981 (0.110)	0.937 (0.097)	1.056 (0.099)	0.913 (0.108)	1.166* (0.104)	1.060 (0.100)	1.060 (0.135)	1.088 (0.105)
Economic index	0.962 (0.069)	0.971 (0.078)	1.006 (0.063)	0.968 (0.068)	0.887 (0.076)	1.022 (0.063)	1.080 (0.072)	1.071 (0.074)	0.960 (0.060)	0.998 (0.073)	1.008 (0.064)	1.022 (0.068)	0.977 (0.081)	0.933 (0.071)
Born in the village	1.276 (0.422)	1.842* (0.620)	1.357 (0.391)	0.820 (0.266)	0.707 (0.258)	0.661 (0.194)	0.584* (0.184)	1.110 (0.332)	0.982 (0.273)	0.554 (0.199)	0.518** (0.148)	0.587* (0.166)	1.089 (0.400)	1.365 (0.468)

Source: Primary data from the RERA, ERSA, Oct. 2015, Individual Youth Questionnaire

Annex 6. Percentage of young people judging that a group of people has a very high responsibility in the crisis, by type and ethnic group.





Source: Primary data from the RERA, ERSA, Oct. 2015, Individual Youth Questionnaire

Annex 7. Determinants of perceptions about the factors of the crisis (logit model)

	Item 1 - Jihadists.	Item 2 - Bandits	Item 3 - Separatists	Item 4 - Militia	Item 5 - Traffic	Item 6 - ATT Gvt	Item 7 - IBK Gvt	Item 8 - DT Gvt	Item 9 - Putsch	Item 10 - France	Item 11 - Algeria	Item 12 - BF	Item 13 - MINUSMA	Item 14 - FAMA	Item 15 - Serval	Item 16 - Relig
Women	1.540 (0.570)	0.886 (0.253)	0.543** (0.143)	0.760 (0.210)	0.834 (0.201)	1.417 (0.340)	1.309 (0.387)	1.972** (0.569)	1.402 (0.384)	1.616* (0.397)	1.795** (0.510)	2.046** (0.642)	1.378 (0.417)	1.121 (0.330)	1.849** (0.524)	1.563* (0.397)
Age	2.142 (1.317)	2.147 (1.007)	0.959 (0.424)	2.889** (1.367)	1.155 (0.454)	0.558 (0.222)	1.241 (0.659)	1.397 (0.685)	1.495 (0.661)	1.519 (0.620)	1.680 (0.793)	0.709 (0.368)	2.409* (1.247)	1.166 (0.582)	1.645 (0.786)	2.537** (1.120)
Age ²	0.981 (0.015)	0.981 (0.012)	1.001 (0.011)	0.973** (0.012)	0.998 (0.010)	1.015 (0.010)	0.995 (0.013)	0.994 (0.012)	0.990 (0.011)	0.989 (0.010)	0.988 (0.012)	1.011 (0.013)	0.979 (0.013)	0.996 (0.013)	0.989 (0.012)	0.980* (0.011)
Administrative cercle (ref.: Gao)																
Ansongo	0.195*** (0.093)	0.080*** (0.034)	0.472** (0.146)	0.699 (0.216)	0.595* (0.159)	1.471 (0.403)	1.359 (0.462)	0.755 (0.244)	0.241*** (0.080)	0.243*** (0.069)	0.481** (0.154)	0.967 (0.330)	1.160 (0.387)	0.654 (0.211)	0.447** (0.135)	0.885 (0.259)
Bourem	1.165 (0.762)	0.221*** (0.105)	1.203 (0.485)	0.175*** (0.086)	0.511** (0.159)	0.487** (0.161)	1.197 (0.506)	0.560 (0.231)	0.324*** (0.118)	0.358*** (0.113)	0.495* (0.192)	0.787 (0.332)	1.721 (0.645)	0.322** (0.145)	0.581 (0.201)	1.054 (0.344)
Menaka	0.341* (0.222)	0.152*** (0.080)	1.086 (0.428)	0.944 (0.374)	1.035 (0.389)	0.365*** (0.137)	0.243*** (0.124)	0.219*** (0.100)	0.266*** (0.117)	0.175*** (0.069)	0.286*** (0.120)	0.708 (0.331)	0.371* (0.195)	0.152*** (0.077)	0.189** (0.090)	1.322 (0.532)
Level of education (ref.: Not schooled){2}																
Elementary 1	1.888 (0.846)	1.345 (0.461)	0.918 (0.281)	1.675 (0.536)	0.807 (0.227)	0.850 (0.240)	0.908 (0.309)	0.946 (0.309)	0.845 (0.261)	1.450 (0.412)	1.224 (0.390)	1.916* (0.697)	2.106** (0.737)	1.432 (0.507)	1.519 (0.495)	0.824 (0.245)
Elementary 2	1.550 (0.743)	0.853 (0.320)	1.496 (0.548)	0.732 (0.274)	1.063 (0.326)	2.147** (0.672)	0.524 (0.221)	0.544 (0.208)	1.967* (0.727)	1.138 (0.361)	0.759 (0.281)	1.811 (0.730)	2.060* (0.783)	1.495 (0.593)	1.351 (0.482)	1.039 (0.337)
Secondary/	4.398* (3.838)	0.653 (0.345)	0.851 (0.435)	1.345 (0.728)	0.876 (0.381)	0.564 (0.270)	1.565 (0.828)	0.253** (0.174)	1.016 (0.496)	1.890 (0.886)	2.038 (1.035)	1.390 (0.838)	1.755 (0.937)	2.748* (1.486)	2.235* (1.063)	0.667 (0.313)
Employed	0.921 (0.336)	1.179 (0.346)	1.162 (0.334)	1.106 (0.322)	0.639* (0.158)	1.221 (0.308)	2.031** (0.621)	0.770 (0.244)	1.598* (0.451)	1.271 (0.322)	1.178 (0.351)	1.021 (0.335)	1.234 (0.376)	1.229 (0.391)	0.984 (0.289)	0.892 (0.238)
Capital of commune	0.808 (0.272)	1.112 (0.291)	1.186 (0.290)	0.843 (0.217)	1.272 (0.275)	1.131 (0.249)	0.930 (0.260)	1.332 (0.354)	0.688 (0.170)	1.065 (0.236)	0.903 (0.232)	1.066 (0.299)	1.436 (0.385)	1.976** (0.557)	1.112 (0.278)	2.290** (0.545)
Ethnic group (Ref.: Songhai)																
Arab	0.104*** (0.074)	0.490 (0.286)	0.844 (0.616)	2.408 (1.832)	0.335* (0.213)	0.800 (0.481)	0.723 (0.609)	0.578 (0.492)	2.879 (2.026)	0.472 (0.284)	0.193 (0.213)	0.287 (0.318)	0.147* (0.160)	0.559 (0.618)	0.000 (0.000)	0.695 (0.379)
Daoussak	1.388 (1.025)	1.922 (1.149)	0.176*** (0.090)	5.337*** (2.828)	2.501* (1.310)	2.064 (1.024)	5.238*** (3.180)	6.986*** (3.991)	5.198** (3.360)	1.003 (0.514)	1.518 (0.840)	0.541 (0.417)	1.814 (1.175)	38.499*** (24.250)	1.618 (1.010)	0.526 (0.279)
Fula	0.641 (0.756)	0.749 (0.921)	0.000 (0.000)	1.316 (1.161)	1.314 (1.026)	1.563 (1.173)	1.031 (1.170)	0.000 (0.000)	1.871 (2.116)	0.244 (0.216)	0.372 (0.418)	1.936 (1.775)	1.392 (1.255)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.233* (0.201)
Tuareg	1.393 (0.608)	1.046 (0.352)	0.293*** (0.089)	3.688*** (1.142)	1.663* (0.456)	1.838** (0.516)	3.443*** (1.183)	2.928*** (0.953)	1.534 (0.480)	1.346 (0.386)	2.291*** (0.718)	1.348 (0.490)	1.173 (0.402)	3.201*** (1.076)	1.623 (0.505)	0.273** (0.087)
In a relationship	1.079 (0.461)	0.915 (0.297)	2.130** (0.662)	0.709 (0.229)	0.950 (0.261)	0.638 (0.176)	0.814 (0.278)	0.406*** (0.138)	0.642 (0.198)	1.064 (0.297)	0.960 (0.308)	1.140 (0.397)	1.063 (0.361)	0.907 (0.311)	0.929 (0.290)	1.401 (0.397)
Number of children	1.172 (0.191)	1.098 (0.134)	0.877 (0.096)	1.079 (0.117)	1.105 (0.113)	1.029 (0.099)	0.997 (0.122)	0.938 (0.125)	1.201 (0.146)	0.915 (0.097)	0.798* (0.103)	0.759* (0.115)	0.802 (0.119)	1.113 (0.134)	0.906 (0.114)	0.987 (0.096)
Economic index	0.865 (0.080)	0.941 (0.069)	1.054 (0.071)	0.839** (0.059)	1.046 (0.062)	0.872** (0.054)	0.871* (0.069)	0.973 (0.071)	0.910 (0.062)	0.835*** (0.054)	0.742*** (0.056)	0.848* (0.072)	0.834** (0.064)	0.839** (0.064)	0.906 (0.063)	0.847** (0.059)
Born in the village	1.567 (0.617)	0.816 (0.263)	1.081 (0.345)	0.749 (0.256)	1.116 (0.311)	1.201 (0.348)	0.944 (0.358)	0.725 (0.249)	0.775 (0.241)	1.471 (0.438)	0.873 (0.298)	2.789** (1.329)	1.232 (0.456)	0.799 (0.295)	1.811 (0.679)	1.324 (0.411)

Source: Primary data from the RERA, ERSA, Oct. 2015, Individual Youth Questionnaire

Annex 8. Need to take up arms - Detailed results

Ethnic Group	To defend one's religion			To defend one's culture, traditions			To judge criminals			To influence government policy			Average		
	M	F	Total	M	F	Total	M	F	Total	M	F	Total	M	F	Total
Arab															
Always	9%	0%	5%	9%	13%	11%	18%	14%	17%	0%	0%	0%	9%	7%	8%
Sometim es	18%	25%	21%	18%	38%	26%	18%	0%	11%	27%	25%	26%	20%	22%	21%
Never	73%	75%	74%	73%	50%	63%	64%	86%	72%	73%	75%	74%	70%	71%	71%
Daoussak															
Always	8%	46%	22%	17%	31%	22%	25%	0%	16%	13%	0%	8%	16%	19%	17%
Sometim es	38%	15%	30%	38%	38%	38%	8%	8%	8%	33%	23%	30%	29%	21%	26%
Never	54%	38%	49%	46%	31%	41%	67%	92%	76%	54%	77%	62%	55%	60%	57%
Fula															
Always	33%	43%	40%	33%	43%	40%	0%	57%	40%	0%	29%	20%	17%	43%	35%
Sometim es	67%	29%	40%	67%	29%	40%	100%	14%	40%	100%	57%	70%	83%	32%	48%
Never	0%	29%	20%	0%	29%	20%	0%	29%	20%	0%	14%	10%	0%	25%	18%
Songhai															
Always	37%	32%	35%	32%	28%	30%	28%	23%	25%	21%	15%	18%	29%	25%	27%
Sometim es	17%	22%	19%	28%	22%	25%	21%	19%	20%	38%	33%	35%	26%	24%	25%
Never	46%	46%	46%	39%	50%	45%	51%	58%	54%	42%	52%	47%	45%	51%	48%
Tuareg															
Always	16%	20%	18%	21%	20%	20%	29%	24%	26%	22%	14%	18%	22%	20%	21%
Sometim es	37%	27%	32%	34%	24%	29%	15%	19%	17%	33%	38%	36%	30%	27%	28%
Never	47%	52%	50%	45%	56%	51%	56%	57%	56%	45%	48%	46%	48%	53%	51%

Source: Primary data from the RERA, ERSA, Oct. 2015, Individual Youth Questionnaire

Annex 9. Schooling factors of the young people aged 14 to 25 years

	Probability of having attended school	Probability, for the young people who attended school, to have reached elementary 2 level
Women	1.099 (0.308)	2.069** (0.731)
Age	0.352** (0.176)	0.488 (0.248)
Age ²	1.023* (0.013)	1.016 (0.013)
Administrative cercle (ref.: Gao)		
Ansongo	0.855 (0.303)	1.625 (0.586)
Bourem	0.645 (0.268)	4.171*** (1.560)
Menaka	1.585 (0.645)	4.173*** (2.181)
Employed	0.825 (0.249)	2.556** (0.949)
Capital of commune	1.863** (0.483)	0.598* (0.165)
Ethnic group (Ref.: Songhai)		
Arab	0.275** (0.161)	1.369 (1.115)
Daoussak	0.089*** (0.048)	5.923 (6.894)
Fula	0.305 (0.257)	1.599 (1.876)
Tuareg	0.225*** (0.075)	2.087** (0.727)
In a relationship	0.343*** (0.105)	1.035 (0.406)
Number of children	0.999 (0.101)	1.092 (0.188)
Economic index	1.419*** (0.106)	0.956 (0.067)
Born in the village	0.94 (0.338)	1.689 (0.545)

Source: Primary data from the RERA, ERSA, Oct. 2015, Individual Youth Questionnaire

Annex 10. Statistics on infrastructure before the crisis, by region and by the commune of the Gao region

Region/Cercle/Commune	% of public primary schools with toilets	Average number of toilet per school	% of primary schools with a separate toilets for girls	% of schools with electricity	% of schools with access to water	% of schools with a fence
GAO Region	48%	2.4	19%	5%	55%	18%
Ansongo Cercle	67%	4.1	26%	4%	63%	30%
ANSONGO	76%	4.4	41%	0%	65%	41%
BARA	57%	4.4	29%	0%	57%	14%
BOURRA	90%	4.4	20%	0%	60%	0%
OUATAGOUNA	78%	6.8	22%	11%	78%	56%
TALATAYE	0%	0.0	0%	0%	67%	33%
TESSIT	67%	2.0	0%	33%	67%	33%
TIN-HAMMA	20%	1.2	20%	0%	40%	20%
Bourem Cercle	74%	3.7	38%	1%	49%	16%
BAMBA	94%	5.1	38%	6%	81%	31%
BOUREM	61%	3.6	33%	0%	50%	17%
TABOYE	57%	2.8	43%	0%	50%	21%
TARKINT	75%	2.9	42%	0%	8%	0%
TEMERA	89%	4.1	33%	0%	44%	0%
Gao Cercle	39%	1.9	12%	9%	68%	19%
ANCHAWADJI	15%	0.7	4%	0%	67%	11%
GABERO	31%	1.6	6%	13%	63%	6%
GAO	83%	5.3	46%	38%	88%	58%
GOUNZOUREYE	53%	2.5	16%	0%	58%	26%
N'TILLIT	23%	0.5	5%	9%	68%	14%
SONY ALI BER	50%	1.8	4%	0%	50%	4%
TILEMSI	13%	0.4	0%	6%	88%	6%
Menaka cercle	32%	1.5	14%	0%	34%	14%
ALATA	40%	1.6	0%	0%	60%	0%
ANDERAMBOUKANE	29%	1.7	33%	0%	24%	14%
INEKAR	8%	0.5	100%	0%	17%	17%
MENAKA	38%	1.7	45%	0%	44%	12%
TIDERMENE	30%	1.3	67%	0%	10%	30%
OTHER REGIONS					100%	
BAMAKO	82%	5.0	20%	46%	83%	83%
KAYES	59%	2.3	12%	7%	52%	27%
KIDAL	88%	4.6	35%	0%	60%	16%
KOULIKORO	69%	3.2	16%	6%	60%	14%
MOPTI	70%	3.3	30%	5%	30%	23%
SEGOU	75%	3.7	26%	8%	59%	25%
SIKASSO	65%	2.5	13%	4%	47%	8%
TIMBUKTU	71%	2.9	25%	9%	56%	33%
NATIONAL	67%	3.0	19%	8%	52%	23%

Source: Database of cell of planning and statistics of MEN, 2010-2011

Annex 11. Health statistics in school, by region and by municipality of the Gao region (Source: CPS Base 2010-2011)

Region/Cercle/Commune	% of schools with a nearby health center	Average distance to health center	% of schools that have medical examinations	% of schools with a first-aid kit	% of schools having benefited from HIV prevention campaign	% of schools having benefited from a supplementation campaign	% of schools having profited from a deworming campaign	% of schools having benefited from prevention against bilharzia campaign	% of schools equipped with a wash basin
GAO Region	39%	15.1	18%	1%	30%	18%	9%	6%	12%
Ansongo cercle	35%	7.5	14%	2%	35%	10%	8%	8%	22%
ANSONGO	41%	9.0	13%	7%	41%	7%	7%	13%	20%
BARA	29%	8.0	0%	0%	43%	14%	0%	0%	29%
BOURRA	30%	5.4	11%	0%	10%	11%	0%	0%	22%
OUATAGOUNA	33%	3.7	25%	0%	22%	0%	0%	0%	25%
TALATAYE	67%	20.0	33%	0%	67%	33%	33%	33%	0%
TESSIT	33%	7.5	33%	0%	100%	33%	67%	33%	33%
TIN-HAMMA	20%	11.5	0%	0%	20%	0%	0%	0%	20%
Bourem Cercle	38%	11.7	36%	3%	41%	18%	16%	10%	34%
BAMBA	44%	7.3	43%	0%	31%	7%	29%	29%	57%
BOUREM	33%	15.7	33%	0%	44%	11%	11%	0%	28%
TABOYE	57%	4.0	36%	0%	50%	21%	7%	7%	7%
TARKINT	33%	23.8	33%	17%	25%	25%	17%	8%	0%
TEMERA	11%	6.0	33%	0%	56%	33%	22%	11%	100%
Gao cercle	58%	14.9	5%	0%	28%	22%	4%	3%	2%
ANCHAWADJI	48%	23.6	0%	0%	22%	0%	0%	4%	0%
GABERO	75%	6.8	0%	0%	50%	13%	0%	0%	0%
GAO	67%	1.5	0%	0%	50%	13%	4%	4%	0%
GOUNZOUREYE	53%	4.4	5%	0%	32%	11%	6%	5%	11%
N'TILLIT	64%	15.8	5%	0%	9%	5%	0%	0%	0%
SONY ALI BER	54%	5.3	19%	0%	19%	88%	15%	8%	4%
TILEMSI	50%	42.4	0%	0%	19%	13%	0%	0%	0%
MENAKA cercle	15%	20.5	27%	0%	24%	14%	10%	6%	7%
ALATA	0%	69.0	33%	0%	0%	33%	0%	0%	0%
ANDERAMBOUKANE	29%	8.5	19%	0%	29%	5%	10%	10%	5%
INEKAR	8%	27.0	11%	0%	25%	0%	0%	0%	0%
MENAKA	12%	17.8	28%	0%	27%	17%	9%	4%	9%
TIDERMENE	20%	22.3	56%	0%	10%	22%	33%	11%	11%

Region/Cercle/Commune	% of schools with a nearby health center	Average distance to health center	% of schools that have medical examinations	% of schools with a first-aid kit	% of schools having benefited from HIV prevention campaign	% of schools having benefited from a supplementation campaign	% of schools having profited from a deworming campaign	% of schools having benefited from prevention against bilharzia campaign	% of schools equipped with a wash basin
OTHER REGIONS									
BAMAKO	97%	2.5	47%	34%	73%	21%	45%	40%	46%
KAYES	47%	7.7	23%	9%	58%	16%	30%	27%	30%
KIDAL	49%	45.9	24%	10%	44%	20%	25%	10%	37%
KOULIKORO	59%	5.6	16%	9%	55%	8%	12%	12%	30%
MOPTI	29%	8.8	22%	16%	56%	18%	44%	24%	40%
SEGOU	48%	8.7	20%	12%	73%	25%	22%	18%	44%
SIKASSO	43%	7.0	7%	8%	48%	23%	31%	4%	12%
TIMBUKTU	38%	11.8	31%	2%	45%	28%	44%	30%	31%
NATIONAL	47%	8.3	20%	11%	55%	19%	29%	18%	30%

Source: Database of cell of planning and statistics of MEN, 2010-2011

Annex 12. Determinants of the sense of security of the young people (Logit model)

	The young person feels safe				
	at home	in the village during the day	in the village at night	at workplace	while travelling
Women	1.048 (0.341)	0.295*** (0.089)	0.510* (0.181)	0.149*** (0.093)	0.526* (0.178)
Age	1.569 (0.855)	2.257* (1.067)	1.064 (0.586)	52.722*** (57.651)	0.482 (0.267)
Age ²	0.987 (0.014)	0.980* (0.012)	1.000 (0.014)	0.904*** (0.025)	1.018 (0.014)
Administrative cercle (ref.: Gao)					
Ansongo	0.882 (0.375)	0.625 (0.218)	0.807 (0.311)	1.245 (0.920)	3.202*** (1.152)
Bourem	1.406 (0.782)	0.871 (0.361)	0.607 (0.282)	0.360 (0.283)	1.608 (0.663)
Menaka	0.235*** (0.110)	0.349** (0.153)	0.264** (0.154)	0.344 (0.326)	2.619* (1.409)
Level of education (ref.: Not schooled)					
Elementary 1	1.609 (0.641)	0.876 (0.299)	1.084 (0.457)	2.643 (1.757)	0.675 (0.253)
Elementary 2	1.195 (0.539)	0.724 (0.283)	0.790 (0.359)	2.598 (2.131)	1.468 (0.588)
Secondary/	2.470 (2.004)	0.816 (0.481)	0.283** (0.171)	2.652 (2.925)	0.572 (0.307)
Employed	0.564* (0.192)	0.524** (0.160)	1.026 (0.358)	NA	1.043 (0.316)
Capital of commune	0.736 (0.230)	1.129 (0.299)	0.951 (0.299)	0.617 (0.331)	0.952 (0.274)
Ethnic group (Ref.: Songhai)					
Arab	0.403 (0.291)	0.720 (0.479)	1.000	1.000	0.306 (0.264)
Daoussak	1.087 (0.655)	0.858 (0.495)	0.984 (0.717)	0.521 (0.561)	0.383 (0.261)
Fula	0.976 (1.126)	0.480 (0.449)	0.210 (0.278)	0.373 (0.732)	1.486 (1.271)
Tuareg	1.209 (0.517)	1.167 (0.415)	1.221 (0.491)	2.163 (1.558)	0.312*** (0.121)
In a relationship	1.127 (0.439)	0.860 (0.275)	0.806 (0.341)	2.221 (1.489)	1.550 (0.566)
Number of	1.063 (0.129)	1.127 (0.139)	0.883 (0.131)	1.071 (0.238)	1.009 (0.125)
Economic index	1.210* (0.118)	1.088 (0.082)	0.971 (0.088)	1.105 (0.186)	0.984 (0.080)
Born in the village	0.895 (0.384)	0.660 (0.234)	1.382 (0.507)	1.205 (1.006)	0.492** (0.165)
n	441	418	227	113	316

Source: Primary data from the RERA, ERSA, Oct. 2015, Individual Youth Questionnaire

Annex 13. Groups that create this insecurity according to young people

Who causes the insecurity?	Women	Men	Total
Bandits	44%	44%	44%
Jihadists and Islamists ¹⁴	27%	12%	19%
MNLA	15%	12%	14%
Ethnic group	8%	4%	6%
Thieves	4%	7%	5%
GATIA	9%	0%	5%
Unspecified armed groups	4%	5%	4%
FAMA	3%	3%	3%
Government of Mali	2.2%	2.6%	2.4%
Leaders and local elected officials	0.4%	4.3%	2.4%
Young People	3.5%	0.9%	2.2%
Unemployed	2.2%	1.3%	1.7%
France, Serval Force	3.1%	0.4%	1.7%
Ganda Koy	1.8%	0.9%	1.3%
Politicians	0.9%	1.3%	1.1%
Traffickers	1.8%	0.0%	0.9%
Insane	1.3%	0.4%	0.9%
MINUSMA	0.9%	0.4%	0.7%
NGO	0.4%	0.0%	0.2%

Source: Primary data from the RERA, ERSA, Oct. 2015, Individual Youth Questionnaire

¹⁴ AQIM, MUJWA, ANCARDINE, JIHADISTS, TERRORISTS, radical Islamists

Annex 14. Reasons that may lead the young people to leave their village

	Young people who did not leave the village	Young people who left the village because of crisis	Total
None of the above	26.05	2.46	19.4
Attacks	33.76	54.92	39.72
Administrative/school absence	4.5	6.56	5.08
Funds	3.22	4.1	3.46
Employment	23.15	22.13	22.86
Unemployment	0.32	1.64	0.69
Studies	3.54	2.46	3.23
Disease	0.64	0.82	0.69
Travel/Holiday/Visit	1.61	1.64	1.62
Emergency	2.25		1.62
Marriage	0.96	3.28	1.62

Source: Primary data from the RERA, ERSA, Oct. 2015, Individual Youth Questionnaire

Annex 15. Reasons for refugees' return

	Ansongo	Bourem	Gao	Menaka	Total
Never	0	5.88	6.45	0	2.78
Decrease in attacks	55.56	35.29	41.94	66.67	50.93
Increased presence of the Malian army	11.11	17.65	3.23	12.5	10.19
Increased presence of the foreign armies	0	0	3.23	0	0.93
Independence of the areas of the north	5.56	0	0	16.67	5.56
Lack of refuge solution	0	0	12.9	0	3.7
Return of peace	8.33	11.76	12.9	0	8.33
Employment	5.56	11.76	16.13	4.17	9.26
Money	0	5.88	0	0	0.93
Studies	2.78	5.88	3.23	0	2.78
Temporary travel	5.56	0	0	0	1.85
Marriage	5.56	0	0	0	1.85
Departure in France	0	5.88	0	0	0.93

Source: Primary data from the RERA, ERSA, Oct. 2015, Individual Youth Questionnaire

Annex 16. Sectors of industry of the young people, by cercle and gender

	Ansongo			Bourem			Gao			Menaka			Total		
	M	F	Total	M	F	Total	M	F	Total	M	F	Total	M	F	Total
Agriculture	44%	0%	27%	38%	20%	33%	48%	14%	40%	7%	0%	5%	37%	6%	28%
Trade	16%	25%	19%	0%	80%	19%	9%	57%	20%	33%	100%	47%	14%	47%	24%
Livestock breeding	19%	0%	12%	6%	0%	5%	4%	0%	3%	47%	0%	37%	17%	0%	12%
Sewing	3%	25%	12%	6%	0%	5%	0%	14%	3%	0%	0%	0%	2%	17%	7%
Handicraft	0%	30%	12%	6%	0%	5%	0%	14%	3%	0%	0%	0%	1%	19%	7%
Transport	9%	0%	6%	6%	0%	5%	4%	0%	3%	0%	0%	0%	6%	0%	4%
Teaching	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	17%	0%	13%	0%	0%	0%	5%	0%	3%
Fishing	0%	0%	0%	6%	0%	5%	9%	0%	7%	0%	0%	0%	3%	0%	2%
Masonry	0%	0%	0%	13%	0%	10%	0%	0%	0%	7%	0%	5%	3%	0%	2%
Mechanics	0%	0%	0%	6%	0%	5%	4%	0%	3%	0%	0%	0%	2%	0%	2%
Hairstyling	0%	10%	4%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	6%	2%
Processing of agricultural products	3%	5%	4%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	3%	2%
Bakery	6%	0%	4%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	2%	0%	2%
Butchery	0%	0%	0%	6%	0%	5%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	0%	1%
Forge	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	7%	0%	5%	1%	0%	1%
Wood collecting	0%	0%	0%	6%	0%	5%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	0%	1%
ND	0%	5%	2%	0%	0%	0%	4%	0%	3%	0%	0%	0%	1%	3%	2%

Source: Primary data from the RERA, ERSA, Oct. 2015, Individual Youth Questionnaire