



Helpdesk Research Report

Capacity development at the national level in fragile and conflict-affected states

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Question

What is the current thinking on best practice in capacity development for national-level government institutions in fragile and conflict-affected states? Identify common forms of support for capacity development provided by donors as well as innovative approaches being trialled, and evaluations of programmes where available. What are the key lessons learned? Afghanistan is of particular interest.

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1. Overview

There is a clear international consensus on desirable principles for capacity development in fragile states, which include country ownership, use of country systems, improvements to technical assistance and training, adapting initiatives to local contexts, a focus on adaptive and flexible approaches, a focus on results, improved coordination, and a focus on a clear set of priority sectors. Capacity development has been recognised as central to peacebuilding and statebuilding in important international policy statements including the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States.

In practice, capacity development is a difficult problem even in stable situations, and is even more difficult in fragile situations. Power and politics in fragile states are less orderly, the shadow or informal state can take on a more pervasive and powerful role, capacity deficits can be large due to damage to physical infrastructure and the social fabric, and chronic instability and crises can distract from the long-term perspective of capacity development (Baser, 2011, p. 8).

Technical assistance and training remain very common approaches to capacity development in fragile states, despite significant doubts that have been raised in recent years about their effectiveness. Notable innovative approaches that have been successfully deployed in Afghanistan and other fragile contexts include an increased emphasis on adaptive, flexible, and incremental approaches, and on South-South and triangular cooperation.

2. International consensus on best practices

Country ownership and leadership

There is strong global consensus that capacity development must be nationally owned and led, and driven by nationally-identified needs and priorities, rather than being driven by donors (UN, 2013, pp. 2-16). Country ownership includes not only identifying priorities, but also developing policies and programmes, undertaking outreach and coalition-building, implementing measures to reduce resistance, involving different societal groups, and defining and monitoring progress indicators (UN, 2013, p. 16). Where national ownership is not genuine and strong, there is a risk that aid recipients can become dependent on donors, rather than developing sustainable capacities (UNDP, 2012, p. 36).

Successful examples of capacity development initiatives show strong motivation and commitment by political or government leadership at high levels (Baser, 2011a, pp. 7, 24). In a capacity development project in the education sector in Afghanistan, for example, the Minister of Education was directly involved in driving policy development. In Sierra Leone, capacity building of the police was enabled by direct support and a mandate from the President. In Liberia, the President, senior national professionals, and professionals from the Liberian diaspora were important in developing capacities across government (Petersen & Engberg-Pedersen, 2013).

Undertaking capacity development programmes under national ownership in collaboration with international agencies implies a highly political process in which donor agencies identify and support reformers, support coalitions for reform, and adapt to national actors' readiness (UN, 2013, pp. 15-16). Donor agencies need to understand the conditions, factors and incentives that could induce elite groups to focus on developmental goals, and the sources of authority that leaders bring to the process of change (Baser, 2011a, p. 24). Capacity development affects power relations, and identifying and analysing these relations in a conflict-sensitive manner is important to minimise political resistance (UN, 2013, pp. 17-18).

Use of country systems

There is consensus that long-term capacity development and legitimacy of national institutions are better served by working with country systems instead of working around them (UN, 2013, p. 4). Experts recommend disbursing aid through national partners and systems, building on national or regional solutions rather than importing solutions, and privileging local procurement while monitoring and managing risk (Baser, 2011a, p. 21; Petersen & Engberg-Pedersen, 2013, p. 9; UN, 2013, pp. 35-36). Formal institutions should be complemented with traditional and customary institutions and practices that may have worked to some degree in the past (UNDP, 2012, p. 26).

In fragile or conflict-affected states, key capacities for public administration (public financial management, monitoring and evaluation, statistics and information management, and procurement) may be weak. International agencies are often reluctant to use country systems, and instead have been inclined to overlook or bypass them and set up alternative mechanisms (such as Project Implementation Units) to deliver results more quickly and reduce risk (Land, 2011; Keijzer, 2013, p. 2; UNDP, 2012, p. 34). There are “strong disincentives to using country systems” for both donors and recipients that relate to trust, risk, benefits, visibility and control (Keijzer, 2013, p. 2). Procedures for recruitment and procurement are often copied from those used in stable environments, and not adapted to conditions in fragile states (Keijzer, personal communication).

Technical assistance

A common approach to capacity development is to engage experienced international (and sometimes national) staff to provide technical assistance (TA). This mode of support has made up about one-quarter of overall Official Development Assistance over the last 50 years (Baser, et al., 2011, p. 10). It can fill capacity gaps and strengthen systems considerably, and can contribute to changing policies, practices, and organisational culture (Petersen & Engberg-Pedersen, 2013, pp. 10-11; UNDP, 2012, p. 34). It can be particularly useful “in the early post-recovery period to restart services” to accelerate progress or remove bottlenecks (Baser, 2011a, pp. 10-11).

However, despite the prevalence of TA, current international guidance warns that there are many instances where it can produce undesirable consequences. There is a high risk that TA staff may simply fill gaps – “capacity substitution” (UNDP, 2012, p. 34) – without contributing to sustainably developing the capacities of national staff around them (Petersen & Engberg-Pedersen, 2013, pp. 10-11). TA projects are not always designed with knowledge transfer and mentoring in mind, but even when they are, “the anticipated capacity development is usually not achieved” (UNDP, 2012, p. 34). TA personnel often have little guidance on capacity development goals, are typically recruited for their technical knowledge rather than for training and coaching skills, are evaluated on the basis of technical outputs rather than capacity development achievements (Baser, 2011a, p. 17), and have little time allocated to knowledge-sharing activities (UNDP, 2012, p. 34). Technical assistance has been further criticised for encouraging dependency, contributing to brain drain, disempowering national staff, and producing resentment due to salary differentials (Baser, 2011a, p. 10; Petersen & Engberg-Pedersen, 2013, p. 35; UNDP, 2012, pp. 34-35). In one case in Afghanistan, TA staff in the Ministry of Education received seven times the salary of other civil servants (Petersen & Engberg-Pedersen, 2013, p. 35). TA personnel are often short-term, leading to inefficiencies, a lack of

continuity and institutional memory, and the risk that systems may collapse when they leave (Petersen & Engberg-Pedersen, 2013, pp. 10-11; Baser, 2011a, p. 10).

There are now calls for TA to focus on “delivering advice and support with knowledge management, coaching through feedback and performance management and on-the-job skills development... instead of providing technical backstopping” (UNDP, 2012, p. 35).

South-South technical assistance

There is emerging evidence that South-South and triangular cooperation for technical assistance (TA) offers significant potential for supporting capacity development in fragile contexts (UN, 2013, p. 3; Baser, 2011a, p. 23). Such programmes typically involve using technical assistance from neighbouring countries.

South-South cooperation is cheaper than Northern-sourced technical assistance, Southern counterparts are often more aware of potential governance challenges and have experience with similar internal politics, and there is often a sense of cultural affinity that improves prospects for trust, acceptance, and cooperation (Petersen & Engberg-Pedersen, 2013, pp. 10-12). On the other hand, there is an extreme shortage of trained people in many fragile and post-conflict states and the use of regional TA poses some risk of draining capacity from supplying countries (Baser, 2011a, p. 23).

In South Sudan, for example, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Regional Capacity Enhancement Initiative provided about 200 civil servant support officers from Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda, who were twinned with counterparts across a range of ministries for two-year terms. The programme experienced a slow start in organising placements and ensuring that the support officers were transferring skills rather than filling capacity gaps, and preparations were weak in some cases. Staff from neighbouring countries appear to have been better accepted than Northern experts and the programme has successfully demonstrated capacity development, shown evidence of impact on core practice, and achieved strong ownership by all participating countries (Felix da Costa, Haldrup, Karlsrud, Rosén, & Tarp, 2013). In Afghanistan, a highly successful capacity development programme in Afghanistan relied on coaching from Indian civil servants – see “Capacity for Afghan Public Service” below.

Some programmes have also attempted to tap in to diaspora networks. In Liberia, for example, a strategy to recruit professionals with extensive international experience from the Liberian diaspora into key TA positions proved successful, in part because the individuals were able to understand and question vested interests and internal politics (Petersen & Engberg-Pedersen, 2013, pp. 10-11). Similarly, in Sierra Leone reforms were introduced that would have been “unlikely to have been initiated without the influence of someone intertwined in the local cultural and political systems” (Petersen & Engberg-Pedersen, 2013, pp. 10-11). However, “resentment towards diaspora members has been an issue in every programme utilising this type of capacity” (Felix da Costa, Haldrup, Karlsrud, Rosén, & Tarp, 2013, p. 3).

Training

Although training has long been a central element of capacity development initiatives, there is now recognition that training has not been as effective as desired, and that capacity development is “more than the transfer of knowledge and skills to individuals” (Pearson 2011, p. 8). While training can provide technical skills, it does not transform people or organisations and is insufficient for deeper capacity development (UNDP, 2012, p. 34; Pearson, 2011, pp. 8-9).

Training remains an important part of capacity development, but current trends are towards including an increasing variety of training activities such as coaching and mentoring, action research, e-learning, knowledge management and organisational strengthening (Pearson, 2011, p. 10). There are also calls for training to be designed with greater focus on results to achieve identified needs and facilitate monitoring and evaluation, and to better adapt concepts to local contexts as well as language, through more effective use of local providers (Pearson, 2011, p. 9).

Understanding and adapting to context

It is widely argued that “understanding the context is paramount for deciding on an approach, and the value of informed analysis and judgment cannot be underscored enough” (UNDP, 2012, p. 37). Capacity development works best when it is adapted to local institutional and political realities including formal and informal power relations, involves local knowledge sources, integrates with informal institutions, develops and maintains legitimacy in the eyes of citizens, and understands local needs, systems, and capacities (Baser, et al., 2011, pp. 6, 24-25; Petersen & Engberg-Pedersen, 2013, p. 10). A study of successful capacity development projects in Afghanistan, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Liberia and South Sudan, concluded that “there are rarely uniform best practices” but that successful interventions showed a good fit with their context (Petersen & Engberg-Pedersen, 2013, pp. 10-13).

However, while the importance of local context is increasingly accepted, “much programming is not well rooted in an understanding of the country context” (Baser, 2011a, p. 9). Fully understanding the local context and its practical implications requires substantial time and effort, and deep knowledge of history, formal and informal power relations, and elites’ incentives, and is “maybe the most difficult challenge of capacity development” (Baser, et al., 2011, pp. 6-9). Context assessment is usually best done by people with inside knowledge of the country – either local staff, or people with many years of experience in the country who can not only assess needs and deficiencies, but also identify motivation, committed people and opportunities for supporting institutional change (Petersen & Engberg-Pedersen, 2013, p. 10).

Recommended tools for context assessment include dilemma analysis, which directs attention to the frequent dilemmas and trade-offs which occur in fragile situations (Baser, 2011a, p. 22), stakeholder mapping, political economy analysis, and conflict analysis (UNDP, 2012, pp. 10-13, 25). International guidance recommends that development agencies let go of predefined projects, and recognise that “successful capacity development processes are organic and thrive when multiple experiences and options are brought to the table and validated and tested by those owning the process” (UN, 2013, pp. 19-20).

Adaptive, flexible approaches and windows of opportunity

There is increasing recognition that capacity development in complex systems such as fragile and post-conflict states can be better guided by adaptation and communication, rather than by comprehensive planning. There is emerging evidence that big, complex strategies are achieving limited results (UNDP, 2012, p. 32) and experts suggest starting small and building on functioning pockets of expertise where they exist, rather than setting up entirely new structures (Baser, 2011a, p. 21; Petersen & Engberg-Pedersen, 2013, p. 9). For example, reviews of national case studies in Afghanistan, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and South Sudan showed that “the most remarkable changes have occurred without following a grand plan... capacity is developed through numerous incremental, small and meticulous actions and rarely as a large, designed process” (Petersen & Engberg-Pedersen, 2013, p. 9).

Agencies such as UNDP are now recognising that comprehensive national capacity development strategies “tend to be too far reaching for national actors to implement, especially in light of the exceptional capacity challenges in fragile contexts and difficulty in facilitating agreement on priorities and realistic sequencing of efforts” (UNDP, 2012, p. 33). Instead, there is now movement towards adopting approaches to working in fragile contexts that involve “flexibility over formula”, adapting approaches to suit social and political dynamics, and being flexible on timeframes, sequencing, priority-setting, and alliance-building (UNDP, 2012, p. 37).

There is also evidence that quick, highly visible and symbolic changes that “break with past ways of doing things have created remarkable results” and can develop momentum if nurtured and sustained (Petersen & Engberg-Pedersen, 2013, pp. 8-9). New international guidance recommends that “less is more” and that donors should prioritise working in areas where results are readily achievable and where national commitment to reform already exists (UN, 2013, p. 9).

Much of this current thinking is consistent with emerging ideas about “problem-driven iterative approaches” in wider governance reform (see for example Rao, (2014)).

Focus on results

There is increasing interest among donor agencies in measuring and managing both short-term and long-term results in capacity development (UN, 2013, p. 3). This requires the development of better methods for monitoring and evaluation (M&E), as current approaches “are not adapted to capturing emergent change in complex systems and especially the more strategic and intangible aspects of capacity such as legitimacy, sustainability, coherence, and management of change.” (Baser, 2011a, pp. 23-24)

Challenges in monitoring and evaluating capacity development include that evaluation processes have been designed for accountability rather than for improvement, capacity development processes are inherently complex, capacity development interventions and evaluations have been poorly designed, and knowledge sharing and professional development and expertise are limited (Horton, 2011, pp. 6-8). A wide variety of approaches have been suggested for addressing capacity development, including: action research, complexity-based approaches, developmental evaluation, locally-driven process approaches, plausible linkages, quick and dirty evaluation, storytelling

approaches, appreciative inquiry, unpacking the elements of capacity, outcome mapping, among others (Baser, 2011b).

Coordination and collaboration

It is widely recognised that “fragmented, disjointed support to capacity development is not only inefficient, but risks undermining national capacities instead of strengthening them” (UN, 2013, p. 4). Current best practice is to improve coordination and collaboration within and among agencies (UNDP, 2012, pp. 11-13) and to use multi-donor approaches, preferably channelling support through sector working groups or thematic groups on capacity development (Baser, 2011a, p. 23). However, “alignment and harmonisation are difficult when the country does not offer a clear vision of where it wants to go, as is often the case in fragile and post-conflict countries” (Baser, 2011a, p. 23).

Coordination can often be difficult because (Baser, 2011a, pp. 7-21):

- Different agencies have different definitions of and policies for capacity development.
- It requires time and energy which can distract country partners from their regular functions.
- For donors, time spent in coordination with other donors may distract from the importance of collaborating with national partners.
- It is not always in the interests groups which may stand to lose power.
- There can be a lack of understanding among actors.
- Rapid turnover of staff hampers relationship-building.
- It can expose sensitive issues such as corruption.
- Incentives and capabilities for coordination across organisational boundaries is often limited unless there is strong leadership from the top.

Priority sectors

Although one of the highest principles for capacity development is the importance of countries setting their own priorities, there is also international consensus around a set of common priorities for fragile states. The highest priority capacity gaps identified by the global consensus are: basic safety and security, justice, inclusive political processes, core government functionality, and economic revitalisation. Capacities for delivering basic services in health, education, food security and nutrition, and water, and for promoting environmental sustainability, are also acknowledged for consideration in the prioritisation process (UN, 2013, pp. 8-9). There is agreement between the UN “critical capacity gap areas” and the g7+ “peacebuilding and statebuilding goals”.

UN Secretary General’s Civilian Capacity Progress Report, 2011: Critical capacity gap areas	g7+ New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States, 2012: Peacebuilding and statebuilding goals
Basic safety and security – disarmament and demobilisation, police and security sector reform and governance	Security – Establish and strengthen people’s security
Justice – corrections, criminal justice and judicial and legal reform	Justice – Address injustices and increase people’s access to justice

Inclusive political processes – political party development and public information	Legitimate politics – foster inclusive political settlements and conflict resolution
Core government functionality – aid policy and coordination, legislative branch and public financial management	Revenues & Services – manage revenue and build capacity for accountable and fair service delivery
Economic revitalisation – employment generation, natural resource management and private sector development	Economic Foundations – generate employment and improve livelihoods

Source: UN, 2013, p. 21.

3. Examples of capacity development projects in Afghanistan

Education sector capacity building (Danida, IIEP)

Source: Petersen, B., & Engberg-Pedersen, L. (2013). *Capacity Development of Central State Institutions in Fragile Situations*. Danish Institute for International Studies.

http://en.diiis.dk/files/publications/Reports2013/RP2013-27_Capacity-development_blp-lep_web.pdf

Pedersen and Engberg-Pedersen (2013) reviewed a series of case studies in the education sector involving support from Danida, the International Institute for Educational Planning, and other donors. Danida provided management support and training delivered through general budget support. IIEP activities included mentoring and coaching; training in planning, management, IT skills, and English language; guidance and review of documents; technical assistance; advocacy within the Ministry of Education; and dialogue with donors to support coordination.

The programmes were generally judged successful. According to an internal Danida evaluation, Danish aid improved “management capacity at the level of policy, strategy, and systems” and was credited with contributing to improved education outcomes including more schools and teachers, increased student enrolment, and printing of textbooks. IIEP aid was credited in an independent review with developing the Ministry of Education’s capacity for situational analysis, planning, policy making, and policy implementation.

Success factors included:

- National commitment and dedicated leadership, including commitment by the Education Minister.
- Partnerships developed through decade-long engagements in Afghanistan which allowed the donor agencies to gain credibility and develop trust.
- Flexibility, pragmatism and long-term commitment, including taking ‘responsible risks’ by adapting to changes, accepting participatory design, and starting with country-specified needs initially, including basic infrastructure.
- Provision of a large number of technical assistance posts in key positions.

There are still many challenges remaining for the programme, however. There is heavy dependence on technical assistance (TA) staff, salary disparities between TA staff and civil servants are a point of conflict, and civil servants tend to be marginalised. TA staff take a long time to get familiar with the local situation, but are often short-term and liable to leave for alternative jobs. When unfamiliar with local languages, they need interpreters and other support. TA staff have filled capacity gaps but have not been as successful at transferring knowledge and building capacity of national staff. There is a lack of monitoring and evaluation, subcontracting procedures have bypassed government systems and coordination, individual projects have not been fully aligned with national strategies, and it is not clear that internal politics and power relations have been taken into account adequately. The sustainability of local capacity development has not yet been demonstrated and capacity development so far remains at the individual level rather than the institutional.

Capacity for Afghan Public Service (2007-2009)

Source: Gibbons, G. (2009). Capacity for Afghan Public Service (CAP) Final Evaluation Report. UNDP. <http://erc.undp.org/evaluationadmin/manageevaluation/viewevaluationdetail.html?evalid=2807>

The Capacity for Afghan Public Service project provided one-to-one on-the-job coaching for Afghan civil servants, some basic management and administrative support services at provincial and lower levels, and developed a roster of Afghan coaches and advisers from within the public service and private sector. The project operated in 22 government ministries and involved 661 government personnel between 2007 and 2009. (Gibbons, 2009, p. 5)

An independent evaluation (Gibbons, 2009) described the project as unique, innovative, low cost, and high impact (p. 5), and found that it had a “significant and sustained impact on capacity development at the individual level” (p. 7). The project focused on building capacity of individual staff members in response to needs driven by the ministry staff, and resisted requests from ministries for the international staff to substitute for low capacity in line management functions. The international coaches were senior Indian civil servants who provided individual support in response to specific problems. The Indian coaches had “close cultural and regional affinity” with their Afghan counterparts and were experienced in working in conditions with similar levels of development (p. 6). The concept of coaching as an approach to capacity development was novel for the Afghan government but “is now well established in the ministries and producing good results” (p. 5). National coaches were also recruited, but with mixed results as some of the national coaches lacked the necessary skills, experience and confidence. The project was succeeded by the National Institution Building Project (NIBP) in 2010 (Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and UNDP, 2009).

Civil Service Leadership Development Project (2006-2009)

Source: Kinder, R. (2008). Civil Service Leadership Development Project: Report - CSLD Final Evaluation. UNDP. <http://erc.undp.org/evaluationadmin/manageevaluation/viewevaluationdetail.html?evalid=2806>

The Civil Service Leadership Development Project aimed to address training needs and develop a new civil service culture of professionalism and impartiality through training and coaching programmes, networking, and developing and maintaining links with programme alumni. Training courses are tailored to target groups. By 2007, 435 civil servants had taken part in the programme.

An UNDP evaluation (Kinder, 2008) concluded that the programme was generally successful, and found evidence of positive attitude changes, particularly improved communication, on the part of senior civil servants who had been trained by the programme. It also found evidence of improvements in management and administration including filing, delegation, supervision, management, planning, and organisation resulting from the training programmes. The programme was, however, heavily dependent on international trainers and long-term sustainability was doubtful. There was an initiative to train of local staff to deliver training but this was not working well as they needed “much more practice and coaching to achieve the levels of flexibility, analysis, problem solving, and explanation of abstractions required of master trainers” and the incentives offered appeared inadequate to motivate potential national trainers (p. 13).

Afghanistan Capacity Building for Results Facility (2012-2017)

Source: World Bank. (2014). Implementation Status & Results: Afghanistan Capacity Building for Results Facility. World Bank.

<http://erc.undp.org/evaluationadmin/manageevaluation/viewevaluationdetail.html?evalid=2806>

The Capacity Building for Results Facility aims to develop capacity in line ministries by enabling them to recruit skilled civil servants into critical posts at near-market rates to implement ministries’ reform programs. The programme also supports training for selected civil servants and limited technical assistance to support ministry reforms.

According to a World Bank (2014) status report, there is clear demand for the programme and progress has been made in establishing a framework for the approval of reform plans, the development of a pay scale for high capacity staff, the development of a batch recruitment process, and the approval of the first ministry. Progress has been slow, “due to aspects of the project design, capacity issues, and political-economic factors” (p. 2). A mid-term review in 2014 recommended that the programme should simplify the process for accessing support, increase the focus on results, and quickly deliver technical assistance where needed to support ministry reforms.

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5. About this report

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Annex: International statements on capacity development in fragile and conflict-affected states

United Nations principles for effective use and development of national capacity in post-conflict contexts, 2013

1. Make national ownership the starting point for capacity development.
2. Analyse and manage the political aspects of capacity development.
3. Adapt capacity development support to fit the national context.
4. Prioritise the feasible within the context of national priorities, including critical capacity gap areas.
5. Take a strategic approach to capacity development, balancing support for quick wins and long-term results.
6. Draw on countries with experience of transition, especially from the global South.
7. Minimise the risk of undermining national capacity through the use of national and international capacity.
8. Build back better: develop new capacities that don't just replicate the past.
9. Make more use of national systems and capacities.
10. Lead and collaborate more effectively as the United Nations in support of national capacity development.

Source: UN. (2013). United Nations Guidance Note for Effective Use and Development of National Capacity in Post-Conflict Contexts. United Nations Inter-Agency Team on National Capacity Development. United Nations. http://www.undg.org/docs/13236/CivCap%20Capacity%20Development%20Guidance%20Note_130816.pdf

New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States, 2011

Engagement to support country-owned and -led pathways out of fragility

- Fragility assessment: periodic country-led assessment on the causes and features of fragility and sources of resilience.
- One vision, one plan: one national vision and plan, country-owned and -led, developed in consultation with civil society.
- Compact for implementation, drawing upon a broad range of views from multiple stakeholders and the public.
- Use of the Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (legitimate politics, security, justice, economic foundations, revenues and services) to monitor progress.

- Support political dialogue and leadership.

Commitments for results

- Transparency: monitor overall resource flows, track international assistance against individual goals, and strengthen national reporting and planning systems.
- Risk-sharing: identify context-specific, joint risk-mitigation strategies.
- Use and strengthen country systems: strengthen public financial management systems and deliver aid through country systems.
- Strengthen capacities: build critical capacities of state and civil society institutions through jointly administered and funded pooled facilities.
- Timely and predictable aid: improve the speed and flexibility of aid delivery and increase predictability of aid in multi-year timeframes.

Source: *International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (2011) A New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States*. <http://www.pbsdialogue.org/documentupload/49151944.pdf>

Cairo Consensus on Capacity Development, 2011

- Capacity development is not an afterthought.
- Capacity development is strategic for the achievement of development results and accountable institutions.
- Domestic leadership of capacity development is essential.
- Existing capacities should be the backbone of any capacity development initiative and must not be undermined.
- Systematic learning on what works and what doesn't is key to improved capacity.
- Supply-driven technical co-operation rarely builds sustainable capacity.
- Capacity development is a top priority for all partner countries and especially countries affected by fragility.

Source: *Cairo Workshop on Capacity Development (2011). Cairo Consensus on Capacity Development: Call to Action*. <http://www.lencd.org/event/2011/cairo-workshop-capacity-development-concepts-implementation>